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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to detail and advance path-based explanations for the changing character 
and conduct of Chinese state sector governance at both evolving national and current leading 
firm level. The ruling Chinese party-state has expressed concern about how governance 
failings lower operational efficiency in the state sector over three decades while continuing to 
devise and implement different reforms in the process. However, empirical research often 
suggests that its gradualist or incremental approach to reform can also result in a mosaic of 
different transplanted governance institutions which are not necessarily fully or immediately 
compatible with China’s own unique context.  
This thesis specifically examines the transformative dynamics of China’s state sector 
governance system through the prism of path based theory in order to provide a more holistic 
and in-depth understanding of how that context and leading Chinese actors’ own conduct 
both exert salient influences over governance practices. It uses a mixed-method strategy at 
both national and firm levels to derive a deeper and more holistic understanding than any one 
single method alone might do. Overall it finds governance reform to be characterized by a 
relatively unsynchronised and challengeable process of policy making and implementation 
which allows for some degree of flexibility and openness. Its more detailed findings also 
question path dependency type explanations' emphasis upon continued institutional stability 
and reproduction. These findings further suggest that the actual reform is not necessarily the 
collective and consensual quest for ever high levels of efficiency which certain financial 
economists typically assume.  It can also depend upon the outcome of other competing 
pressures between increased marketization and competition on one hand, and different 
demands for maintaining extant governance structures and vested interests on the other. The 
former are no less legitimate and, in principle, urgent concerns for both policy makers and 
other leading stakeholders than the latter. Embedded characteristics cannot just be reduced to 
efficiency-technocratic considerations for inducing different competitive performance when 
these neglect how redistributive an economic governance system can be, and also the 
essentially mediated efficacy of certain transplanted mechanisms. Much of the convergence-
divergence debate regarding national economic governance systems has nevertheless been 
conceived in efficiency and competition terms alone. However, this thesis suggests that the 
promulgation and transplantation of SSG reform policies needs to take the specific country 
context into greater consideration if it is to be both more meaningful and effective.    
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Research Motivation and Questions 
China is changing the global economy (Schuman, 2012) for, despite financial turmoil, the 
economy continues to grow, albeit at a slower rate, so that its international importance 
becomes ever more apparent (Tricker, 2012). With this rising economic influence, its state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) have lately rapidly and consistently upgraded their presence 
outside China itself. With a record number in the latest Fortune 500 List (73 by late 2012), 
SOEs (and their directly-controlled entities) accounted for over 40 per cent of China’s non-
agricultural GDP, according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 
By the end of 2011, the total assets of China’s 121 central SOEs managed by the State Asset 
Supervisory and Administration Commission (SASAC) reportedly amounted to US$ 2.9 
trillion, up from US$ 360 billion in 2002 (Galvez, 2012).
1
 China officially intends to reduce 
their total number and focus upon fewer, globally competitive large conglomerates which 
might act as key players within the selected strategic sectors such as aviation, military, 
power generation, petroleum, finance, mineral resources, shipping and telecommunications. 
Their growing overseas investment and business expansion contrast even more significantly 
with their peers from other developed economies. Although SOEs’ outside expansion – 
either by international listing or cross-border investments – can benefit the host countries, 
the side effects of their business conduct and, in particular, the quality of the state sector 
governance (SSG) as a whole are still in question. The exposure of accounting-related frauds 
and scandals among the overseas listed companies has resulted in significant financial losses 
and reputational damage that still afflict the party-state.  
As regards SSG various different reforms have been attempted. Apparent performance 
deterioration over the late 1980s suggested that initial reforms had disappointed (Qian, 1999). 
Since the early 1990s, establishing “modern enterprise system” has been officially regarded 
as the core element in China’s state sector reform (Tam, 1999). Continuous efforts imply 
progress in building market institutions, including industrial restructuring, corporatisation, 
introducing corporate governance (CG) mechanisms and stock market listing. However, up 
to now, SOEs fall short of being modern industrial corporations (Nolan and Wang, 1999; Pei, 
                                                 
1
 This excludes the major state owned financial institutions outside SASAC’s jurisdiction.  
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2009; McGregor, 2012). Empirical research (e.g. Tenev et al., 2002; Ewing, 2005) 
underlines how different reforms have resulted in a complex mosaic of transplanted 
governance institutions. Assessments can nevertheless show nuanced understandings about 
the mediating or even constraining impact of political institutions upon ultimate policy 
outcomes (see Tam, 1999; Ewing, 2005; Wu, 2005; O’Connor et al., 2006). Leading 
commentators here associate governance malpractices such as bureaucratic intervention, 
asset tunnelling and insider trading with certain particular forms of ownership control by 
shareholding agencies. While the efficacy of SSG mechanisms may ultimately rest upon 
more credible market competition and stronger regulatory capacities, complementary socio-
economic institutions are still underdeveloped in China (Tenev et al., 2002; Cheng and 
Lawton, 2005; Pei, 2009; Ahrens et al., 2011). Chinese SOEs not only face similar problems 
to others elsewhere, but also political problems inherited from past central planning (Cheng 
and Lawton, 2005). For financial economists, sustainable improvements in SSG are highly 
unlikely without fundamental changes in ownership patterns and political institutions (Pei, 
2009).  
On the other hand, the overall success of China’s economic reform questions whether 
socialist political institutions are always or even necessarily rigid and hostile to policy 
innovations. Reforms have here been conducted through the same political institutions and 
bureaucratic authorities which have often existed since the 1950s. Nevertheless, even 
without structurally changed political institutions, policymakers have moved towards a 
competitive “socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics”.2 For Shirk (1993, pp. 
14-15), contests for leadership succession –  as occurred during 1978 and 1980 between 
Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng and also during 1996 and 1998 between Li Peng and Zhu 
Rongji – led contending factions to propose more innovative solutions for persistent 
economic problems (Jung, 2011; Oi, 2011). These included particular programs to procure 
above-quota agricultural output at market prices, to expand enterprise autonomy, to allow 
enterprise management to share the profits, and to spin-off the non-performing asset for 
stock market listing, have changed the economic and career incentives of bureaucracies and 
managers by giving them greater interest in promoting different reform initiatives. Despite 
the lack of political reform, marketization gained momentum, and mass living standards 
                                                 
2
 Studies of Chinese centrally planned economy often propose many commonalities with the former Soviet 
Union experience of socialist planning (Jefferson and Rawski, 1996). Such an oversimplified perspective 
neglects the fact that governance apparatus in China’s state sector has been far more comprehensive and 
complex than in other socialism economies.  
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improved. Over successive decades, bureaucracies, managers and employees have more 
vested interest in reform, while for Shirk (1993, p. 5), “no one suggested turning back to the 
command economy”. For Dickson (2003, p. 37), the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP)  
adoption of new recruitment and evaluation criteria reflected a switch of focus from class 
struggle to economic modernization, especially when compared with other former socialist 
regimes. As regards SSG reform, it is therefore reasonable to ask: 
 Given the constraints faced, is the Chinese SSG system significantly deviated from past 
central planning? 
 Who first initiated and then continued its reform? Which other actors were involved? 
 What are the influences of specified socio-political constraints? What different policy 
outcomes are claimed and/or observed to result? 
 What are the process and dynamics of reform in action? What strategies have been 
employed by the leading actors to overcome the constraints encountered? 
1.2 Research Background 
In seeking to answer these questions this thesis details and explains the particular dynamics 
behind the sector’s governance system. Drawing upon the path-generation literature, it 
rejects as over-static that point of view which stresses the constraining effects of current 
institutional arrangements, and instead pays more attention to how transformation occurs, 
and which actors help make SSG reform actually happen. The thesis starts from the view 
that it is possible to study related policy-making and implementation in a socialist regime as 
one would also do in advanced capitalist countries by similarly examining the pattern of 
interaction among different stakeholders and wider socio-economic environments. The 
Variety of Capitalism (VoC) approach to institutional transformations in these democracies 
has often examined the way in which different sets of institutional arrangements generate 
distinctive political and economic incentives which then lead towards particular policy 
outcomes. It underlines the importance of institutional embeddedness and leading social 
actors’ interactions for understanding cross-national variations in policy and practice. For 
example, Vogel (2006) analysed the reform initiatives and processes which the Japanese 
government and leading industrial sectors have undertaken since the 1990s, ranging from 
labour relations to the financial system and corporate governance. This study found that, 
while existing institutions have left heavy imprints upon particular reform measures, and 
P a g e  | 4 
 
also limited Japan's convergence with liberal market orthodoxy, both prolonged economic 
problems and globalization eventually propelled its leading actors to go beyond continued 
routine adjustment. Its concept of “patterned innovation” illuminated how industries and 
government can actively devise innovative solutions without being entirely constrained by 
other considerations (Chen, 2008).  
As regards China economic reform questions the actual and potential adaptability of the CCP 
(Dickson, 2000). Here Dickson’s argument was supported by Nathan’s (2003, pp. 6-17) 
description of the combination of Party and state as “authoritarian resilience”, implying that 
the CCP has developed self-improving solutions which enhance its own political survival. 
Fan’s (2012) review likewise suggests that, although the state has steered SOE reform, the 
necessity for its continuation has also turned the state itself into another object for reform. 
While Fan does not discount the political feasibility of governmental reform, other political 
scholars have identified further potential political transformation. Thus Nolan (2005) 
recognized that China was in search of its own “third way” while still being in the midst of 
economic development and industrialization, this “third way” being a creative symbiotic 
interrelationship between state and market. In this regard, the interplay of politics and 
economics emphasized above constitutes a more dynamic approach to understanding how 
both governance practices change and different developmental paths evolve.
3
 While such 
arguments may exclude the possibility of institutional lock-in, this thesis will employ a 
distinct path-generation perspective to fully grasp and assess China’s state sector reform.  
Neoclassical economists and transnational bodies tend to play down or ignore the particular 
socio-political settings where a state sector operates. It has been frequently assume that 
institutional rules of different line authorities are not really relevant and that any governance 
failure will be addressed sooner or later due to competitive pressure from market 
liberalization. Unsurprisingly the prevailing guidelines for SSG reform are drawn heavily 
upon the ‘free market’ principles and the much advocated Anglo-American model of CG 
featured by disperse ownership structure and separation of ownership and control (OECD, 
                                                 
3
 Early scholars, most notably Robert Bates (1983), Susan Shirk (1993) and Barry Naughton (1996), used 
similar institutional analysis to understand policy-making and implementation process in China and other non-
democratic, authoritarian, less developed countries. Similar approach has been applied to analyse the reform 
dynamics of China’s state sector governance. 
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2005a, 2005b, and 2011a).
4
 However, to the extent that the complementary institutions have 
yet developed in transitional economies, the piecemeal and pragmatic imposition of CG 
codes and regulations often achieve limited effect. This in turn questions the value of 
remedial prescriptions drawn from Anglo-American sources alone (Todd, 2010; Bebchuk 
and Weisbach, 2010; Ahrens et al., 2011). Saich (2011) maintains that effective SSG 
involves strengthening or developing institutions, enacting regulations, building 
administrative and monitoring capacity, and political support. Although this thesis does not 
deny the possibility of such competitive pressure arising from market liberalization, it places 
Chinese economic reform in a broader institutional context in order to make actual reform 
dynamics more explicit.  It recognizes how China is particularly distinctive in terms of: 
 In contrast to the transitional economies in Eastern Europe, social and economic 
transition has here been more gradual and deliberately paced, given the lack of 
complementary socio-economic conditions. As one official assessment put it, “markets 
in capital, land technology, and labour” are still underdeveloped; the government has 
only “incomplete capabilities in macroeconomic management” and achieved limited 
success in “forming a system of public finance… and improving fundamentally the 
management or/and governance systems of the state owned enterprises” (O’Brien, 2008; 
see also Pei, 2009). 
 The authority relationship between CCP and government is at the core of reform 
decision making. The CCP considers itself as “the organized expression of the will of 
the society” and “the leader of government work” (see Schurmann, 1968, p. 110). This 
has two implications. First, while the communist party is not directly accountable to 
citizens, its legitimacy concerns are often drivers for reform. Second, while the CCP 
retains absolute authority over the bureaucratic apparatus, it delegates much of the 
actual administration involved. Within this delegated relationship, the CCP can be 
conceived as the “principal” while the government is the “agents” (Shirk, 1993, p. 55).  
 For an authoritarian regime like China, the state sector is of vital importance for the 
party state, for it not only contains the strategic industries of “commanding height” but 
also constitutes “the centrepiece of a vast patronage system” to secure its legitimacy and 
                                                 
4
 As noted in the next chapter, all these rely on various prerequisites for its successful operation including 
perfect market competition, developed financial market, rule of law, and a regulatory regime of high 
accountability and transparency. 
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continuing loyalty from its key constituencies. Accordingly, the party-state is reluctant 
to relinquish its control and, more importantly, the ability to protect and even improve 
the rents obtained under gradualist reform, especially where these help the ruling party 
co-opt emerging social elites and other groups which could potentially threaten its 
authority. 
 Despite certain structural similarities, the key political and economic authorities in 
China have been less monolithic and more fragmented than those of the former Soviet 
Union. The departmentalism and federalism so characteristic of the Chinese political 
system suggests that policy-making over the post-Mao era is less determined by the 
moral-ideological vision of charismatic leaders and more consensus-based. For 
Huntington and Fukuyama (2006), the combination of divided authorities and consensus 
decision-making can result in compromised solutions and slow reform. This questions 
the orthodox finance-economic literature presumption of monolithic and top-down 
policy-making in the socialist state.  
1.3 Research Design and Structure 
The dynamic nature of institutional change also poses difficult methodological issues. 
Indeed, Hurmerinta-Peltomäki and Nummela (2006, p. 440) argued that “if a narrow 
methodological approach were to be applied in this complex context, only a small slice of 
the reality would be revealed”. Moreover, SSG in transitional economies is a relatively new 
field of research for which the necessary theoretical roadmaps may not yet have fully 
emerged. This provides researchers from different disciplines the opportunity to invent and 
apply the more innovative methods required to answer questions of now growing importance. 
Given the special research context and the qualitatively-driven logic sought here, an 
“embedded design” has been chosen as the primary methodological framework, with further 
statistical evidence and analysis subsequently ‘nested’ within individual qualitative case 
research. There is a range of well-rehearsed evaluative studies about the merits of a mixed-
method strategy, often emphasizing its relative merits for validating data and triangulation, 
in gaining a fuller picture of the phenomenon under investigation (Mason, 2006). While the 
overall research design adopted here can be conceived as qualitatively based, the quantitative 
data and analysis nested into this qualitative analysis can further elaborate upon it (Srnka and 
Koeszegi, 2007). Such an elaboration model is considered to be an efficient form of deriving 
deeper insights and gaining greater confidence. 
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With their special focus upon decision-making and leading social actors’ interactions, the 
further empirical inquiries here are primarily based on elite interviews with senior 
government officials, and corporate executives from China Life in particular. Valuable 
research data was obtained through intensive interviewing from July 2009 to September 
2011 mainly in Beijing, Liaoning and Guangdong Provinces. It was so challenging to 
persuade these senior officials and executives to talk frankly about the issues and problems 
surrounding different reform initiatives that relatively unstructured interviews were essential 
for this purpose. To gain in-depth insight into the implementation of reforms at enterprise 
level, the range of interviewees was duly expanded to include other managers and employees 
at China Life's various regional business branches. The verification and analysis of such 
first-hand data were further supplemented by extensive documentary research, especially 
official documents and articles from Chinese economic newspapers and journals. As most 
topics under discussion were politically sensitive it was important to guarantee informants’ 
anonymity and confidentiality. To provide extra protection, the empirical chapters here do 
not identify the informants’ names and affiliated institutions, and instead use designated 
informant codes and dates. Specific Chinese documentary sources are cited in references.  
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 identifies and uses selected theories from 
related economic, political and developmental literature to provide a more 'joined up' 
conceptualization of governance reform in China’s state sector. Chapter 3 surveys selected 
neo-institutionalist literature on reform, with particular attention to institutional 
transformation among different transitional economies’ chosen economic governance 
systems. Before specifying further research propositions, it identifies the different sources 
and modes of institutional transformation which ‘path generation’ may take into account. 
Chapter 4 then discusses the rationale behind the case study, given the particular context in 
which it is situated. It outlines the specific objectives for further research and identifies 
potential methodological problems. The relative merits of a mixed-methods approach are 
discussed in terms of its potential to mobilize multiple theories and data sources when 
examining particular SSG practices, thereby combining both breadth and depth of inquiry, 
while assuring more valid findings (Modell, 2010). It outlines data collection and analysis 
procedures used here for further theory building purposes.  
Chapter 5 illuminates the transformative dynamics of Chinese SSG system at large drawing 
upon path-generation theory. It seeks to answer the questions: to what extent and how has 
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China’s SSG actually changed? Is there either institutional continuation with incremental 
policy adjustments or has a more distinctive system emerged instead? What are the path-
dependent or path-generating mechanisms underpinning this process? What are the leading 
social actors’ roles? Are they simply passive receivers of given institutional constraints or 
else more innovative institutional entrepreneurs? The further statistical analysis then added 
duly elaborates upon these prior narrative accounts using simple statistical regression in 
order to examine how international investors themselves regard and value certain prevailing 
SSG practices. Chapter 6 then uses a firm-level case study of China Life to illuminate the 
actual dynamics of ongoing SSG reform, highlighting the proactive roles of both change 
agents and other specifically enabling conditions (Jing and McDermott, 2012). By taking a 
close look at China Life – the world’s largest life insurer in terms of market capitalization – 
this chapter addresses the question: (1) Who are the reform actors or/and change agents? (2) 
How the reforms were conducted? (3) What are the results so far? The use of this leading 
company case presents a more dynamic, contextual and holistic analysis of actual SSG 
reform in action. 
Chapter 7 then employs path-generation theory to finally explain SSG reform thus far. Its 
response to the initial research propositions incorporates the empirical evidence offered in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 while further reflecting upon the essential methodological issues 
regarding (1) using a path-based approach in the Chinese context, and (2) the nature and 
importance of conducting in situ studies with elite actors therein. Chapter 8 finally concludes 
and identifies important directions for future research.  
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Chapter 2  
Understanding Chinese State Sector Governance 
2.1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis, in particular the meltdown of prominent state-backed financial 
institutions, questioned laissez faire approaches to state sector governance (SSG). It also 
emphasized the continuing importance of linking economic with institutional factors in order 
to produce better explanations (Ahrens et al., 2011). The core concept of SSG is itself still 
emerging with important theoretical and empirical issues still to be resolved (see Hye, 2000; 
Bevir, 2007). This chapter seeks a more ‘joined-up’ approach which will produce better 
understandings of Chinese SSG reform. It will identify the impetus for such reform along 
with the mediating effects of surrounding Chinese socio-political factors. This requires 
integrating different theories and evidence to illuminate both the diversity and the 
uniqueness of national SSG systems while also capturing emerging real world institutional 
practices. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section will define governance by examining 
the different contexts in which the concept has been derived and applied. On this basis, it 
conceptualises SSG and evaluates what constitutes “good SGG” in order to assess the 
implications for this and further research. Section 2.3 describes the cross-national variation 
in SSG systems. Section 2.4 reviews the prevailing theorems that explain the characteristics, 
and reform strategies of SSG. By linking political with economic perspectives, it further 
explains Chinese SSG, and argues that this should embrace and incorporate an explicitly 
political-economic perspective in order to fully illuminate and better explain its institutional 
embeddedness and dynamics. Section 2.5 summarises. 
2.2 Conceptualising SSG 
Governance has moved centre stage in much developmental discourse about developing 
economies (Hye, 2000; OECD, 2005a). Aside from its accepted importance, there are still 
important differences regarding how it should be best theorized and applied. Due 
conceptualization is necessary to define what is meant by governance and identify the 
institutions and loci of power whereby it is conducted among leading, in particular state 
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sector, actors at large. On this basis, the definition will be applied into the specific context of 
state sector.  
2.2.1 Defining Governance 
The concept of governance represents the configuration of the rules and activities of ruling 
(Pierre, 2000). Historically, it referred to narrowly defined phenomenon related to executive 
branches of the state – administrative, legislature, and judiciary – without much synergistic 
relation with other private sector and/or civil society actors (Hye, 2000). Its more recent 
formulation introduces civil society, public investors, private enterprises, and local 
governments as both participants and promoters of good governance, by virtue of their roles 
and involvement in actions hitherto kept exclusively in the public domain (Bevir, 2007). For 
more precise definition it is first necessary to examine the following different contexts in 
which the concept has been derived and applied. 
2.2.1.1 Governance as Corporate Governance 
This specialized use originally referred to “the system by which organizations are directed 
and controlled” (Cadbury Report, 1992). Corporate governance (CG) here arises from the 
separation of ownership and control which is an ongoing feature of Angle-American public 
companies: highly dispersed shareholdings and an active stock market on one hand, and 
professionalizing management on the other (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). While these respective parties might diverge about particular goals and risk 
preferences, CG encompasses mechanisms whereby shareholders might bring the interests of 
managers into line with their own (Eisenhardt, 1989; Walsh and Seward, 1990). Although 
the nature of ownership structures and interests can differ significantly outside purely Anglo-
American domains, CG has become a watchword of those seeking to improve the 
accountability and transparency of corporate management while optimizing shareholder 
returns. 
2.2.1.2 Governance as New Public Management  
The new public management (NPM) denotes broadly those government policies and 
practices intended to modernise and render public sector working more efficient (Hood, 
1991). It raises the issue of governance in two main aspects. The first stems from the growth 
of managerialism which aims to introduce more expressly commercial styles and 
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management practices into the public sector. These include: hands-on professional 
management, explicit performance standards and measures, performance-oriented 
management, value for money, and closeness to ‘customers’. The second refers to 
introducing market-based competition, ownership diversification, and consequent need for 
better regulated (public) service providers (Pierre, 2000; Rhode, 2007, 2010). It stresses: 
disaggregating bureaucracies, greater competition through privatization and/or contracting-
out, and customer choice. For Pierre (2000), while both policy strands stress a ‘steering’ role 
for governments, they have also remade public service in a different way from previous 
public administration orthodoxy (see also Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Bellamy and 
Palumbo, 2010). 
2.2.1.3 Governance as Network Coordination 
In relation to NPM, governance also refers to the coordination of public service delivery 
through networks, partnerships and voluntary organizations. In many respects this makes 
governance involve managing and coordinating networks of such different actors as labour 
unions, trade associations, firms, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local authorities, 
social entrepreneurs, and community groups. Rhodes (1997) argued that these organizations 
can be highly autonomous and self-regulating networks where government is only one of 
many influential actors. For Kickert (1993, p. 275), “deregulation, government withdrawal 
and steering at a distance … are all notions of less direct government regulation and control, 
which lead to more autonomy and self-governance for social institutions”. For advocates of 
NPM, a self-regulating and society-centred system based on dialogical and bottom-up 
dynamics is considered capable of assuring the coordination of economic activities without 
the ‘Hobbesian sword’ of nation-state (Bellamy and Palumbo, 2010). 
2.2.1.4 Governance as ‘Good Governance’ 
Governance gained currency in the field of economic development when national 
governments and transnational bodies advocated normative ideas of ‘good governance’ to be 
indispensable for modernity (Bellamy and Palumbo, 2010). Development economists such 
as Evans (1989, 1995) and Nolan (2007) recognised that, since institutions matter, economic 
growth requires more than liberating markets, promoting investment, and adopting 
appropriate macro-micro economic policies. Sustainable economic development is also 
underpinned by appropriate laws and regulations, socio-political institutions, and values. 
P a g e  | 12 
 
Governance becomes ‘good’ within effective frameworks conducive to market activities – 
stable regimes, the rule of law, efficient state administration adapted to roles that 
governments perform well, and more self-regulating civil society (Bellamy and Palumbo, 
2010; Rhodes, 2010). 
2.2.1.5 Governance as Global Governance 
This usage of governance lies in the field of international institutions and regimes. It has 
been widely argued that certain important problems such as climate change, international 
trading and monetary policies cannot be administrated or contained at the level of nation-
state alone (Bellamy and Palumbo, 2010). To address these expansive problems also requires 
the creation of transnational political institutions such as, but not limited to, the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World Trade Organization (WTO), 
and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). This raises the issue of how such 
supra-state agencies and intra-state agreements are best monitored and controlled by 
different domestic publics. For Pierre (2000, p. 17), “the parcellized government of 
international problems by a technocracy, interacting with the elites of the major wealthy 
states, influences the vital life aspects of domestic publics, and yet remain inherently remote 
from their control”. 
While the meaning of governance may sometimes seem too broad to be useful, the concept 
can be enhanced by encapsulating the common themes deriving from different usages 
(Rohde, 2010). First, governance denotes the exercise of authority – political, economic, 
administrative or otherwise – to manage resources and affairs (OECD, 2005c). This can be 
interpreted at many levels, from the state down to the local communities and/or corporations. 
Governance analysis thus considers the mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions 
through which actors articulate their particular interests and exercise their respective rights 
and obligations (Bellamy and Palumbo, 2010). Second, governance implies interaction and 
coordination among various actors to achieve common objectives. The term thus extends 
beyond the administrative branches of the state to include other actors in society, including 
private sector, civil society and international organizational actors (Pierre, 2000; OECD, 
2005a). Third, good governance implies effective political institutions and responsible use of 
political power and management of public resources by the state. Governance issues pertain 
to the nation-state’s ability of sustaining coordination and coherence among actors with 
divergent interests and goals (Jessop, 1995, 1997). Therefore, it is proposed to define 
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governance as the system of values, policies, institutions and processes through which 
relevant actors attempt to work towards common objectives, make decisions, generate 
authority and legitimacy, and exercise power (Pierre, 2000; OECD, 2005a). While a 
stipulative definition as such can be arbitrary, it arguably incorporates significant elements 
as follows (Rhodes, 2007, 2010). 
 Expanding the boundaries of governance with a greater variety of actors; 
 A more ‘steering’, less monopolistic role for the nation-state; 
 Governance as both a constellation of mechanisms and techniques, and leading dynamic 
among societal actors; 
 Governance polity as the result of interactive socio-political forms of governing. 
In fact, governance can here be viewed as “the complex art of steering multiple agencies, 
institutions and systems which are both operationally autonomous from one another and 
structurally coupled through various forms of reciprocal interdependence” (Jessop, 1995, 
p.66). For Bellamy and Palumbo (2010), this definition involves the transformation of those 
institutions which govern socio-economic activities, as their interactions often imply the 
emergence and rearrangement of different forms of governance (see also Lindgerg et al., 
1991; Pierre, 2000). It is important to research cross-national variation in governance 
policies and practices to understand how particular governance quality expresses itself 
through attributes such as accountability, efficiency, legitimacy and sustainability (Hye, 
2000). 
2.2.2 Governance of State Sector 
A state sector generally covers a broader range of legal entities – in most cases state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and/or state-controlled corporations (SCCs) – created by the owner state 
to undertake commercial activities (Carnevale, 2002; Barlow et al., 2010). For both 
developed and developing economies, the state sector represents a substantial part of gross 
domestic production (GDP), employment and market capitalisation. SOEs and SCCs are 
often prevalent in more strategic industries, such as energy, transport, natural resources and 
banking, whose performance is important to broad segments of the population, as well as 
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other industrial and/or business sectors (OECD, 2005a; Nolan, 2007).
1
 It overlaps with the 
public sector in that most providers of basic government services have been, or might 
become, corporatized (Lapsley, 1999; see also Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007). 
SSG here is concerned with relations between the state and its business entities: how the 
nation-state steers corporations to achieve desired goals, how it makes itself accountable to 
stakeholders, and how it guarantees their rights and interests (OECD, 2009b). Therefore, 
SSG relates to the structure and process of overseeing the direction and management of 
SOEs and/or SCCs so that they carry out their mandate and achieve given objectives (Hye, 
2000; Bevir, 2007). Such governance arrangements provide the structure through which the 
objectives of these enterprises are set, and “the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined” (OECD, 2005c, p. 11). SSG is important because it 
sets the rules for economic and political interactions between state and market and within the 
state; it determines which decision-making structures set public policy priorities; it allocates 
resources to address these priorities. In short, it is at the core of much economic development 
(Rhodes, 2007, 2010; Bellamy and Palumbo, 2010).  
The focus of governance in the private sector is on the board of directors (BODs). In the 
public sector context, boards are sometimes difficult to identify and define, as they operate 
in different statutory and managerial frameworks (OECD, 2005a, 2009). In most cases state 
sector entities are “subject to forms of accountability to various stakeholders … each with a 
legitimate interest, but not necessarily with ‘ownership rights’” (IFAC, 2001, p1). Therefore, 
in its broadest sense, SSG refers to relationships involving organizations and institutions of 
the state at different levels (see Figure 2.1). These could be between different organizations 
such as central ministries and local governments, or between state ownership agencies and 
other stakeholders, or how regulations and orders can be enforced (Rhodes, 2007, 2010). 
Moreover SSG involves a broader range of socio-political factors in comparison other types 
of governance. For state sector entities “have to satisfy a complex range of political, 
economic and social objectives, which subject them to a different set of external constraints” 
(IFAC, 2001, p. 1). The OECD (2005b, 2005c, 2009) lists five key elements likely to be 
present in the context of SSG. 
                                                 
1
 In some countries the public sector includes a large number of entities that have been separately established 
by government agencies to undertake new activities or activities previously performed by core government 
(IFAC, 2001; OECD, 2009). 
P a g e  | 15 
 
Figure 2.1 Aspects and Levels of SSG  
 
Source: Fox and Heller, (2006), Ahrens et al., (2011), and Tricker (2012) 
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 Traditional administrative, rule-based governance (including the centrally planning 
systems in former socialist countries); 
 Increasingly performance-based governance; 
 Network coordination between organizations inside and outside the sector; 
 Political-economic factors: formal and informal power and interests and their mode 
of articulation; 
 Historical factors: context specific and path-dependent trajectories through which 
governance practices have developed.  
There are major issues and debates regarding government and business. Rather than 
being confined to the role as the “gatekeeper” in public administration, the nation-
state encompasses more diverse roles and functions in SSG, including asset 
allocation, corporate management and operation, regulatory enactment and 
implementation, as well as stakeholder coordination (OECD, 2011b). However, it has 
been long contended that businesses, even if state-owned, need to be run according to 
a commercial rather than administrative cycle. This implies that day-to-day 
management of SOEs and/or SCCs should be independent and commercially-based. 
Thus the state, often acting as the main (and often the only) owner, should engage 
management to ensure due performance (Estrin, 1998, 2002). On the other hand, state 
sector owners may have other objectives besides profitability alone. For economic 
historians (e.g. Cameron, 1978; Rose and Miller, 1992; Hannah, 1994), 
nationalisation, which often took place after the Second World War in Western 
Europe, was originally approved by voters as ‘being in the national interest’, even if 
that that involved relaxing other market pressures. Other goals were also stressed at 
the time, including universality of public service, income redistribution and 
employment promotion. The multiplicity of goals emerging from the political process 
raises difficulties in monitoring target fulfilment, especially when objectives are 
defined as “loose long-term goals” (Estrin, 1998, p. 16). Where objectives are 
arbitrarily decided by different government agents, SOEs generally “suffer as much 
from undue hands-on and politically motivated interference as from totally passive or 
distant ownership by the state” (OECD, 2005a, p. 10). The problem becomes more 
salient where the state sector involves complex chains of agents, including national 
and local governments, ministries, public investors, and corporate management, with 
divergent interests (Estrin, 1998). This in turn gives rise to certain repeatedly cited 
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problems, including (1) conflicts among different government apparatuses, (2) 
political intervention by officials acting in the capacity of ‘owners’, (3) excessive 
slack and resource misallocation by corporate managements, (4) soft budget 
constraints arising from power-responsibility asymmetry, (5) and (6) the pursuit of 
non-business objectives at the cost of other stakeholders (Alchain and Demsetz, 1972; 
de Alessi, 1980; Kornai, 1980; Estrin, 2002; La Porta et al., 1997, 2000). The 
consequences of these problems can be not only loss-making and/or inefficiency, but 
also a weakened financial system and economic underdevelopment (Megginson and 
Netter, 2001; Pagano and Volpin, 2005).  
2.2.3 Good Governance in State Sector 
Concern about SSG is not new: the past two decades have witnessed widespread 
attempted reforms in consequence. This is due to various factors, including market 
liberalisation, technological advance, and political reforms calling for readjustment 
and restructuring (Roland, 1994b; Megginsom and Netter, 2001; Nolan, 2001; OECD, 
2005c, 2009b). Since early 1990s, transnational bodies have maintained that effective 
governance of a state sector will “be critical to ensure their positive contribution to a 
country’s overall economic efficiency and competitiveness” (OECD, 2005c, p. 9). 
Quest for good SSG suggests that there are different cause-effect relationships 
between specific repeated practices and desired outcomes (Todd, 2010). First, to the 
extent that multiple functions induce political intervention, separation of business and 
social functions delineates power and responsibility between enterprise managers and 
officials, keeping them accountable for performance (Vagliasindi, 2008). Bertero and 
Rondi (2000) for example demonstrated this occurring in Italy since the late 1980s 
when state controlled firms responded to hardened budget constraints and increased 
competition by increasing their productivity and reducing employment. Second, 
sound SSG practices, in particular effective CG mechanisms, enhance the confidence 
of investors and business partners and thus increase SOEs’ potential access to external 
finance (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Richardson and Welker, 2001; Maher and 
Andersson, 2000). These mainly include strong legal protection and enforcement, 
effective information disclosure, independent boards, and shareholder activism. A 
reduced expropriation risk encourages financiers to offer equity or loans at better 
terms as reflected by a lower cost of capital and higher firm valuation (Megginson 
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and Netter, 2001; La Porta et al, 2002; Claessens, 2006). Moreover, effective SSG can 
accelerate economic growth in a context of the structurally weak markets and certain 
specific ‘catch-up problems’ faced by developing countries (Khan, 2007). It requires 
growth-enhancing strategies and institutions that promote private and public 
accumulation, and ensure further productivity growth across different sectors (Levine 
and Zervos, 1998; Khan, 2007).  The key governance goals may thus include (1) 
“assisting the transfer of assets and resources to more productive sectors using both 
market and non-market mechanisms”, (2) “managing incentives and compulsions for 
achieving rapid technology acquisition”, and (3) “maintaining political stability in a 
context of rapid social transformation” (Khah, 2007, pp. 3-4). Such arguments often 
point to East Asian success where SSG practices typically amounted to more than just 
those necessary for ensuring market efficiency alone (see Leftwich, 1994, 1995; 
Riain, 2000).   
Reform typically espouses good governance practices, not least where scandals have 
brought campaigns for better standards (Howson, 2009). For Scott (2007), SOEs 
should be conceived and managed within a clearer vision of solving existing 
weaknesses or problems in the provision of needed services and goods without these 
solutions also becoming another problem themselves. SSG reform should therefore 
ensure that SOEs “pursue the objectives for which they were established, preventing 
mission creep and an institutional tendency to continue to grow in size and expand in 
scope” (Scott, 2007, p. 4). Transnational bodies (e.g. OECD, 2005a, 2009b, and 
2011a) therefore identify these key levers for promoting sound SSG: 
 Separation of ownership from regulatory and other social functions. The dual role 
of SOEs as both market players and arbitrators can induce conflicts of interest, in 
particular when ownership and social functions are vested with the same sectoral 
ministries (OECD, 2005b).   
 Clear state ownership policies and corporate objectives. Policies should define a 
state’s overall objective as the business owner, outline the possible legal form of 
SOEs and specify the state’s own roles in corporate governance and how they 
should be effected. With clearer guidelines for corporate management this lessens 
undue political intervention (OECD, 2009a; Scott, 2007).   
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 Ensuring Effective Regulatory Framework. This provides a level-playing field in 
the market where SOEs and private enterprises compete on a fair basis. As an 
essential step to avoid market distortions, SOEs should not be exempt from 
application of general laws and regulations. Other stakeholders including 
competitors should have access to proper redress and even-handedness when their 
rights are deemed to have been violated (OECD, 2005a). 
 Introducing Sound CG and Enhancing Board Functions. This helps ensure 
requisite corporate decision-making through holding managers and officials 
accountable for their actions to more professional and independent SOE boards 
(Vagliasindi, 2008; OECD, 2011b). 
 High-level transparency. This means that information about economic conditions, 
budgets, markets and government intentions is reliably attested and made 
accessible to a wider public. Insistence upon transparency requires enhanced 
accountability, limiting corruption, and stimulating cooperation between 
governments and non-state players (OECD, 2011b). 
The prevailing guidelines, nevertheless, are drawn heavily upon the Anglo-American 
model of CG featured by disperse ownership structure and separation of ownership 
and control (OECD, 2005a, 2005b, and 2011a).The model is based on normative ‘free 
market’ principles and relies on various prerequisites for its successful operation 
including perfect market competition, developed financial market, rule of law, and a 
regulatory regime of high accountability and transparency. Although compliance with 
these elements and/or guidelines is voluntary, national policymakers tend to respond 
to code recommendations due to market forces and peer pressures (Gregory and 
Simmelkjaer 2002; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009).
2
 This, however, can be 
problematic. Firstly, translating approaches developed from the level of organisation 
to a broader state or public sector can encounter difficulties due to the complexities of 
the larger system (Halligan, 2001, p. 17). As noted, the reform process for large state 
sector administration that involves multiple-organisational systems presents 
distinctive challenges. Secondly, the apparent ascendancy of Anglo-American CG 
institutions has been profoundly questioned by the scale and contagion of the global 
financial crisis (Clarke, 2010). Critics refer to overemphasis on self-regulating 
                                                 
2
 For example, South Korea, badly hit by the 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis, was forced to revamp its 
traditional governance systems as a condition of ﬁnancial aid from the international ﬁnancial 
community. 
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markets and minimal regulatory interventions (see Siddiqui, 2010). The devastation of 
prominent state-backed ﬁnancial institutions and recurring corporate failures remind 
the world of the extreme dangers of unregulated markets and institutions, and of the 
eternal importance of effective regulation, and robust governance. Moreover, to the 
extent that prerequisites of the model have yet developed in transitional economies, 
the piecemeal and pragmatic imposition of governance codes and regulations often 
achieve limited effect. This in turn questions the value of remedial prescriptions 
drawn from Anglo-American sources alone (Todd, 2010; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 
2010; Ahrens et al., 2011).  
Saich (2011) maintains that effective SSG involves strengthening or developing 
institutions, enacting regulations, building administrative and monitoring capacity, 
and political support. Where reform is mediated by particular institutional 
characteristics and developmental objectives, SSG often exhibits distinctive national 
patterns (Hoskisson et al., 2004; Khan, 2007; Vagliasindi, 2008). For Fox and Heller, 
(2006, p. vii), prevailing interpretation of good SSG lacks the insights to be gained 
from “examining the much greater deviations in corporate behaviour from the 
welfare-maximizing norm” which exist outside the US. A multi-equilibrium 
perspective (e.g. Bratton and McCahery, 2002) further argues that opportunities for 
efficiency cross-referencing are so limited that significant national variations in SSG 
systems are likely to persist. The wholesale embracement of Anglo-American model, 
therefore, fails to explain the striking cross-national variations in state ownership 
involvement, intervention scope, managerial incentives, and regulatory approaches 
(see Vagliasindi, 2007).  
2.3 Cross-National Variation in SSG 
The pursuit of sound SSG reflects changed state-enterprise relationships (Pierre, 
2000; Bellamy and Palumbo, 2010). Despite this repeated theme, comparative studies 
still report striking cross-national variations in strategies to reform governance 
practices and their outcomes (e.g. Hye, 2001; Berghe and De Ridder, 2002; Chew and 
Gillan, 2010; see also OECD, 2011b). For the OECD (2005a) also, the rationale for 
state ownership of commercial enterprises has observably differed between both 
countries and industries. The comparative analysis of SSG requires identification of 
the different characteristics of economic coordination and control, of which the 
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reform strategy is a key variable, direct impacting upon governance systems and 
practices (see Vagliasindi, 2008). The following discussion proceeds along three key 
dimensions: reform strategies, sectoral scope, means of control and coordination (see 
Whitley, 1999; Bevir, 2007; Liao, 2009).  
2.3.1 Privatisation and Marked-Based Governance 
The 1980s accentuated claims that transferring assets from the state sector to private 
enterprises would raise both allocative and technical efficiency (Yarrow et al., 1986) 
which almost assumed that states are inherently inefficient compared markets 
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). This was allegedly due to inferior accountability in the 
absence of real owners, leading to (1) lack of efficiency related incentives, (2) 
bureaucratic rent-seeking, and (3) political intervention favouring selected 
constituencies (Perotti, 2004). For Perotti (2004, p. 4), “the free rider problem applies 
to taxpayers even more so than to dispersed shareholders; moral hazard may be 
enhanced under state ownership since the powers of government are greater than 
private management and thus harder to control”.3 In the face of mobile capital and 
vigorous economic competition, neoliberal-affiliated policymakers and economists 
argued that state ownership or administration was intrinsically predatory and could 
best, if not only, be addressed by privatisation (Nolan and Wang, 1999; Estrin, 2002; 
Bevir, 2007).
4
 This alone would “create(s) a whole new penalty-reward system which 
will alter the incentives in the firm and ultimately its performance” (Veljanoski, 1987, 
p. 570; Budds and McGranahan, 2003), while also addressing the taxation issues and 
cyclical inflation they associated with Keynesian welfare states (Vickers and Yarrow, 
1991). 
The neoliberalism ideology induced extensive state ownership divesture across 
advanced capitalist economies through either wholesale privatisation or functional 
outsourcing followed (see Clarke and Pitelis, 1995). As a result, the borders of state 
ownership were dramatically redrawn – over £40 billion of UK state assets have been 
sold since 1979 and parts of the Civil Service ‘hived–off’ to social agencies effecting 
                                                 
3
 Thus there are striking parallels between the governance problems caused by abstract state ownership 
and diffuse private ownership. 
4
 The long-term fiscal squeeze in many industrialised economies induced governments to revise their 
governance practices purely on efficient ground (Megginson and Netter, 2001; OECD, 2005). 
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more ‘commercial management’ (Clarke and Pitelis, 1995).5 Dramatic though these 
reforms had already been, they were ‘overshadowed’ by the privatization wave 
sweeping the former Soviet Bloc.
6
 Under the Washington Consensus, the term 
privatisation involved both transferring nominal ownership and control while also 
transforming complementary political and social institutions (Boycko et al., 1996; 
Bakker, 2003). German experience further suggested that the radical transformation 
of ownership and means of production was necessary “to ensure a complete break 
with the old (socialist) regime” (see Borenzstein and Kumar, 1991, p. 231). An 
optimistic view that emerging market forces would spontaneously replace state 
redistributive mechanisms without adverse effects therefore prevailed (e.g. Chang, 
2003; Megginson et al., 2004). Privatization thereby became a keystone of state sector 
reform and socio-economic transition (Estrin et al., 2009). 
In the would-be minimal state, government ownership only becomes reasonable 
where market failures occur (Shleifer, 1998). While the scope of state sectors varies 
across countries, it has often been reduced to natural monopoly sectors and/or 
provision of non-excludable goods (Stiglitz and Brown, 1988).
7
 In many cases, the 
term public sector is referred to as synonym of state sector, where the latter is limited 
to providing basic government goods and services (OECD, 2005a). Laws and 
regulations have replaced administrative direction as the preferred form of 
intervention to ensure equity and avoid market distortion (Rhodes, 2010; OECD, 
2011a).
8
 Control is further delegated to special-purposed government agents and/or 
other civil organizations, encouraging delineation of responsibilities and increasing 
                                                 
5
 In 1979 public enterprises in the UK acconted for 8 per cent of employment, 10 per cent of output 
and 5 per cent of gross domestic fixed capital formation. By 1992 the comparable figures have declined 
to 3 per cent, 3 per cent and 5 per cent respectively (see Pollitt, 2000). 
6
 Experiments in privatizing enterprises in transition economies abound, from extensive efforts at sales 
to strategic owners (as in Estonia and Hungary), to programs based primarily on insider buyouts (as in 
Russia and Slovenia), to innovative mass privatization programs involving the creation of large and 
powerful new financial intermediaries (as in the Czech and Slovak republics and Poland) (see Gray, 
1996). 
7
 Some public services, such as health service and education, are difficult to privatize even by the most 
market-oriented government since “people require access to them regardless of their ability to pay” 
(Clarke and Pitelis, 1994, p. 14). In these circumstances, attempts have been made to preserve these 
services in public sector while adopt private sector practices. 
8
 The 1990s witnessed the growth of the regulator states which relies on rule-making, rule-monitoring 
and rule-enforcement (Glaeser and Sleifer, 2003). Privatization also leads to more diversified 
ownership structures whereby governments exert limited influence upon enterprise operation. 
Governance of the privatized enterprises resembles the stylized Anglo-American model that relies 
heavily upon active financial institutions (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Williamson, 
1983; Demsetz, 1983). 
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management professionalism (OECD, 2005a, 2011a). The vagueness and ambiguity 
of state property rights are thus reduced. More detached market exchange and 
decentralised control imply that enterprises can and should be run on a commercial 
basis, i.e. maximising owners’ interests, as principal-agent theorists advocate (e.g. 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Williamson, 1983; Demsetz, 1983). For 
Bevir (2007), this meant more management by results, performance measures, value 
for money, and closeness to customers, all tied into budgetary reforms. 
All this requires more inter-organizational coordination based on standard market 
mechanisms and enforceable formal contracts, where organizations need to exchange 
resources to achieve their objectives, maximize their influence over the outcomes, and 
avoid over dependence on others (Liao, 2009). It is assumed that the coordination of 
networks can be sufficiently autonomous and self-regulating to make (central) 
government only one potential influence (Rhodes, 1997, 2000, and 2007; Bellamy 
and Palumbo, 2010). Proponents of such a market-based model stress the need to 
disaggregate bureaucracies and induced more competition through contracting-out, 
quasi-market and consumer choice.
9
 For them, the state sector can “retain the 
essential properties of a public service while reaping the benefits of market 
mimicking” in several distinct ways (OECD, 2008, p. 5). These include (1) raising the 
quality and “economizing” state expenditure, (2) making public providers more 
responsive to consumers’ preferences, and thus (3) improving resource allocation and 
budget management efficiency.
10
 
2.3.2 Alternatives to Privatisation and State-Centric Governance 
For Stiglitz and Sappington (1987), the fundamental issue underlying state sector 
reform is the assumption that enterprises belong to private sphere and governance to 
centralized planning (see also Megginson and Netter, 2001). Gamble (2000) argued 
that such an oversimplified dichotomy has neglected other ways for governing state 
sectors, as if there are no other alternatives to a purely private, unregulated private 
                                                 
9
 For Kickert (1993, p. 275), deregulations and ownership divesture would lead to “more autonomy 
and self-governance for social institutions”. Advocates of this view often point to the success of public 
sector reform of Britain and Nordic countries (see OECD, 2011a). 
10
 These innovations are said to have produced a more effective and efficient polity: “a polity less 
dependent on command and control logics and hubristic developmental visions, and therefore less 
susceptible to government failures” (Bellamy and Palumbo, 2010, p. xi).  
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sector.
11
 In countries with vestiges of socialist planning, efforts to privatise and 
deregulate the state sector have proved especially difficult, due to its scale and 
resistance to reform (OECD, 2012). Moreover, these countries generally lack the 
essential economic and institutional conditions to support or regulate private activities 
such that “indeed rapid privatisation may lead to an unacceptable loss of control over 
the economic system” (Perotti, 2004, p. 14). In such cases, state ownership and 
intervention prove necessary, if temporary, intermediate supports for social-economic 
transition. This means adopting a more comprehensive, less dogmatic view of SSG, 
whose improvement becomes an end in itself, not another move towards outright 
privatization. This requires policymakers to seek different strategies to improve their 
performance, including but not limited to private engagement (Megginson and Netter, 
2001; Andrés et al., 2011). 
In Poland and Hungary, significant improvement in productivity and profitability 
occurred without large-scale privatisation (see Megginson and Netter, 2001). Pinto et 
al. (1993) attributed this to reform packages which spanned price deregulation, 
introduction of foreign competition, and imposition of harder budget constraints 
reinforced by tighter lending. Competition made enterprise performance more 
responsive to managerial efforts alone (Vagliasindi, 2007). Groves et al. (1995) 
discussed how incentives were brought into the Chinese managerial labour market 
during the late 1980s, including retaining above-quota profit and linking of 
managerial remuneration to profits. Enterprise autonomy and retained profit increased 
workers’ incentives and improved enterprise profitability (see also Shirk, 1993; 
Naughton, 1996). Li (1997) documented marked improvements in the marginal and 
total factor productivity of 272 Chinese SOEs between 1980-89 arising from a series 
of partial reforms, including increased use of performance contracts (see also Shirley 
and Xu, 2001). It was further suggested that much (87 per cent) of productivity 
increase could be attributed to improved incentives and compensation (see also 
Megginson and Netter, 2001). 
For Megginson and Netter, corporatization alone represents the best policy alternative 
for enhancing SOE performance without privatisation. It usually involves 
                                                 
11
 For Bergloff and Claessens (2006), the pursuit of minimal state and/or privatisation simply neglects 
the complex web of social institutions and actors where SSG is embedded. All this suggests that certain 
attributes of good SSG are embedded among broader socio-economic environments where most 
complementary institutions are still being developed in emergent economies (Tricker, 2012).  
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commercialisation of activities so that SOE operations are governed by commercial 
laws like private enterprise (Pannier, 1996). On this basis, governments attempt to 
provide clear and unambiguous objectives by means of performance agreements that 
specify respective obligations. Aivazian et al., (2005) compared the performance of 
308 corporatized SOEs and 121 non-corporatized SOEs in China and found that 
corporatization had a significantly positive impact on enterprise performance in terms 
of profitability and efficiency. For Vagliasindi, (2007), the sources of efficiency 
engendered by corporatization can be traced to reform of internal governance 
structures, including the introduction of board mechanisms, expanded managerial 
autonomy, and administrative streamlining. Corporatisation also altered the incentives 
and objectives of managers by linking enterprise performance with their evaluation 
and remuneration (Nolan and Wang, 1999; Bai and Xu, 2005). Continued 
shareholding control allowed the Chinese party-state to pursue industrial restructuring 
and fiscal reforms intended to nurture a globally competitive state sector (Nolan, 
2007; Yao and Sutherland, 2009).  
As noted, the absence of rapid and massive privatisation allows the state to retain its 
ownership and control over a broader range of business and/or industrial sectors 
(Wade, 1990). Policymakers take into consideration effects beyond the capacity of 
private investment, including social unrest and regulatory capture (see Pannier, 1996; 
Perotti, 2004).
12
 In most cases, the state often retains its firm grip over pillar 
industries or “commanding heights” and makes decisions “on the basis of long-term 
considerations and these are not and cannot be profit-minded” (Toninelli, 2000, p. 
8).
13
 Where commercialization and corporatization imply increasing decision-making 
power at firm level, the pyramid and cross-shareholdings structure encourage sharing 
of financial and intangible resources and thus provide additional advantages for SOEs 
                                                 
12
 As regards on-going financial crisis, nationalization of insolvent financial institutions has proved 
succeeded in preventing the further financial meltdown in both developing and developed economies. 
The significant state shareholdings provide governments with strong incentives and means of curbing 
managerial malpractices and improving business performance (see Tian and Estrin, 2005). Thus, in 
addition to negative externalities and market failures, the opportunistic and fraudulent bank insiders in 
an unregulated market system offer another rationale for state intervention.  
13
 Groups of large SOEs are preferentially developed through a top-down process and viewed as the 
driving forces of economic growth and technological catch-up (Toninelli, 2000; Nolan, 2007). 
Prominent examples include China’s central state-owned corporations since the late-1990s and Korea’s 
chaebols over the 1970s. Their structure typically entails a core, shareholding company converted from 
a government agent, together with the subordinate member firms in related lines of business (Wu, 
2005). Relations among the core company and member firms are often close-knit and expansive, 
including cross-shareholding, interlocking directorship, financing relations, and joint production (Liao, 
2009).  
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facing outside competition (Pannier, 1996; Liao, 2009; OECD, 2011b). They also 
enable state control in excess of cash flow rights, thus increasing the risk of investor 
expropriation (Claessens and Fan, 2003; Wang and Xiao, 2006). Moreover, corporate 
executives under the state-centric model often encounter the conflicting roles as both 
government officials and business managers, making performance evaluation and 
monitoring difficult (Perotti, 2004). Sound SSG here requires complementary 
governance capabilities which ensure due accountability (Khan, 2007). For 
developmental economists, benevolent practices by the state (e.g. state 
developmentalism and state entrepreneurialism) are central to the technological 
progress and economic growth in newly industrialized countries (NICs) (White and 
Wade, 1984; Toninelli, 2000; Chang, 2003; Evans; 2004). For Toninelli (2000, p. 8), 
they can arguably foster “the modernization in the neglected sections of otherwise 
developed economies or stimulate growth in strategic sectors of the economy by 
initiating public activities”. All this contrasts with the predatory image offered by 
neoclassical economists (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1998, 2002). The difference in SSG 
modes and reform strategies raise some fundamental issues regarding the relationship 
between the state and economy. In other words, should SSG be best addressed solely 
in efficiency terms or should it consider other social and political factors? The 
interpretation and policy prescriptions, therefore, vary not only according to the 
national and institutional contexts where SSG is pitched, but also the theoretical 
frameworks employed (Bevir, 2007).
14
 
2.4 Reviewing Relevant Theories 
As shown, the varied meanings of SSG essentially relate to differing interpretations of 
its raison d’être, given the term governance has its own specialist coinage. In this vein 
SSG reform “has arisen not only as more or less pragmatic responses on the ground, 
but also as result of sustained theoretical (and even ideological) advocacy by 
intellectuals and policy makers” (Bevir, 2007, p. 27). Academic interest has latterly 
become increasingly interdisciplinary, drawing upon both economics and finance and 
institutional and political economics. This section will now examine two leading 
conceptions of SSG, namely neoclassical and political economic theories. Any further 
                                                 
14
 The observed cross-national variation suggests that national SSG systems exhibit their specific 
merits within wider institutional settings. A multi-equilibrium perspective (e.g. Bratton and McCahery, 
2002) further argues that opportunities for efficiency cross-referencing are so limited that significant 
national variations in governance systems are likely to persist. 
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recognition that not just one but several different modes and/ or techniques of 
governance are relevant to how the state sector is governed hereafter initially requires 
the “abandonment of the stark opposition between state and markets” (Gamble, 2000, 
p. 111). 
2.4.1 Neoclassical Theories 
Neoclassical economists would ideally conceive the market economy to be a non-state 
site free from relations of force and compulsion (Bevir, 2007). They have long 
advocated patterns of governance that marginalize state intervention and instead 
emphasized the weakness of state ownership compared with private ownership, 
except for market failures (e.g., Hayek, 1944; Jewkes, 1948; Stiglitz, 1989a, 1989b; 
Shleifer, 1998; Heath and Norman, 2004). The neoclassical conception of governance 
as the minimal state expresses a preference for free and spontaneous association of 
individuals and firms. In the context of the state sector, radical privatization 
constitutes a critical and common feature of neoclassical theories (Nasser, 2003). The 
mainstream Washington Consensus views radical and full divestment of state 
ownership as indispensable for improving governance quality and firm performance. 
Market economists and policymakers maintain that large, inefficient state-owned 
plants be closed, and replaced with smaller privatised enterprises. They have thereby 
emphasized “the importance of competition among (numerous) small firms as the 
explanation for the prosperity of the advanced economies” (Nolan, 2001, p. 3) while 
demerging large vertically integrated plants would replace rigid and hierarchical 
administrative practices with free-market led mechanisms. It is also expected that 
democratisation, in parallel with broader social transition, might enhance the efficacy 
and independence of legal and regulatory frameworks. In the neoclassical view, the 
central task is to regulate industrial structure so as to ensure better competition. 
Where market economic functioning is introduced simultaneously and 
comprehensively, mere partial reforms are not enough, and might even become 
dysfunctional (Murphy et al., 1992; King and Levine, 1993a, 1993b; Dewartripont 
and Roland, 1995). Drawing upon Bevir (2007), the following section details 
important theoretical arguments regarding privatisation (see also Vickers and Yarrow, 
1991). 
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2.4.1.1 Market Equilibrium 
This argument rests upon the assumption of atomized marketplaces. As the term 
suggests, atomization assumes that buyers and sellers are relatively unrelated, apart 
from when transactions occur, so that markets can operate without outside 
interruption (Granovetter, 1985; MacLeod, 2004). In this perspective, the absence of 
political and other non-market interference allows individuals and firms to pursue 
their self-interest, and while actors pursue their interests, others benefit accordingly. 
Free transactions among firms naturally coordinate diverse economic activities more 
efficiently than state and other efforts (MacLeod, 2004). Inspired by the classical 
political economy of Adam Smith, neoclassical economists hold that a free market or 
laissez faire tends towards equilibrium, with price and competition harmonising the 
numerous transactions of unrelated individuals and firms into efficient resource 
allocation and optimal production (Friedman, 1982; Hayek, 1994). For Nolan (2001, 
p. 3), the market equilibrium argument is “deeply suspicious of departures from 
perfect competition, under which there are large numbers of anonymous firms, none 
of which can exert any influence on the market”. Privatisation is regarded as the only 
way to introduce effective competition (Pollitt, 2000). Thus, theoretical arguments for 
state ownership and control are confined to market failures bringing costly 
externalities and natural monopolies (Stiglitz, 1989a; Wellink, 1990). Shleifer (1998, 
p.147) summarized the essence of neoclassical economic arguments thus: 
“private ownership should generally be preferred to public ownership when the 
incentives to innovate and to contain cost must be strong…. [M]any of the concerns 
that private firms fail to address the “social goals” can be addressed through 
government contracting and regulation, without resort to government ownership… A 
good government that wants to further the “social goods”, would rarely own 
producers to meet it objectives”. 
For empirical researchers, comparing pre and post-privatization performance is one 
method by which the impact of marketization can be assessed. Policies to encourage 
ownership or control transformation include: denationalization (the sale of state 
owned assets), deregulation (introduction of other competitive forces), and 
contracting out (franchising production of state subsidized goods or services to private 
firms) (Kay and Thompson, 1986; Pollitt, 2000). For example, Bishop and Thompson 
P a g e  | 29 
 
(1992) examined how deregulation impacted across British nationalised industries. 
For industries with greater market openness such as steel, telecom, electricity, and 
gas, improvement in productivity proved to be more significant than in industries with 
less competitive conditions. For example, labour productivity growth in British Steel 
rose from -1.7 per cent per annum to 13.7 per cent per annum, and -2.4 per cent to 8.1 
per cent in British Coal (see Pollitt, 2000). These findings were consistent with the 
extensive literature on deregulation and performance (e.g. Bailey, 1986; Hämäläinen, 
2003). For Megginson and Netter (2001), the success of the British privatization 
program helped persuade other industrialized countries to divest SOEs through public 
share offerings. The Chirac government of 1986 privatized 22 companies (worth $12 
billion) before being ousted in 1988. Although the returning socialist government did 
not pursue further sales, it did not renationalize any divested firms either. It launched 
the two largest French privatizations ever, the $7.1 billion France Telecom initial 
public offering (IPO) of October 1997, and the subsequent $10.5 billion rated France 
Telecom issue of November 1998. Degulation and privatization soon spread across 
other leading European governments through the 1990s, including those of Italy, 
Germany and, most spectacularly, Spain. Recent research by Modell and Wiesel 
(2009) has illuminated how different marketization measures, ranging from 
competitive contracting to conceptions of citizens or users as customers or consumers, 
claimed significant cost reduction and efficiency improvement in Swedish central 
government. Using a more comprehensive panel-data set, Hämäläinen (2003) found 
that deregulation increased the competitiveness/openness of markets across 22 
countries, and thus assumed an important role in directly explaining export growth 
and economic performance. 
Notwithstanding the dominant analytical tool for interpreting national economic 
performance, the core assumptions of the equilibrium argument have been challenged. 
For example, the assumption that individuals and firms act rationally on the basis of 
self-interest is an incomplete social-organizing device at best (Arrow, 2012). As 
Haavelmo (1997) remarked, economic activities are embedded within a web of social 
institutions and thus influenced by many other factors. However, a more prominent 
critique asserts that many claims to allocative efficiency are naively based upon 
perfectly competitive markets (Fisher, 1987; Murrell, 1991). For neoclassical 
economists, the price mechanism determines the optimum allocation of resources 
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among various productive uses and the due distribution of services and goods among 
customers (Shinha, 1995). However, in many developing and/or transitional 
economies, similarly competitive market conditions and other institutions scarcely 
exist, and cannot be instantaneously created. Critics of neoclassical economics have 
therefore contended that it skirts and neglects real-time economic transition and 
reform, apart from regularly returning to the same theme of static equilibrium with 
optimum resource allocation (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; Murrell, 1991; Sinha, 1995; 
see also Nasser, 2003; Arrow, 2012).  
2.4.1.2 Rational Choice  
Rational choice theorists seek to explain governance modes and practices by reference 
to micro-economic analysis of individual actions driven by calculative interests 
(Bevir, 2007). On one hand, the theory attempts to unpack social institutions and rules 
entirely by analyses of individual (rational) action. On this basis, it models individual 
behaviours as if they act in accord with preformed preferences. This requires such 
preferences to be rationally complete and transitive provided that individuals have full 
and complete information about the consequences of their chosen actions. Although 
such unrealistic assumptions can be relaxed by introducing the concept of bounded 
rationality, the theory generally explains individual actions in terms of complete 
rationality, especially profit or utility maximisation. 
Rational choice theorists incorporate cost-benefit analysis into their idea of self-
governing market mechanisms and attempt to explain how market activities become 
self-regulating and enforcing with minimal influence from nation-state (Pierre, 2000). 
Unlike new institutional economists, they view governance systems extending across 
a continuum, of which the two opposing poles are hierarchies and markets 
(Williamson and Winter, 1993). It is then pivotal for any governance system to find 
the right equilibrium between direct government intervention and market 
coordination. For example, Williamson (2012) argues that hierarchical control by the 
state becomes increasingly untenable in the context of marketization and globalisation 
compared with the self-regulating contracting in free market (see also Dowding and 
Dunleavy, 1996). Williamson further identifies two main structures of self-regulating 
contracting: (1) a bilateral structure that creates incentives for actors to resist 
opportunistic urges that otherwise destroy the system; (2) unified structures which 
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integrate transactions vertically under one private owner so as to eliminate any self-
interest leading to wider breakdown. In both cases, self-regulating contracting appears 
to be an efficient alternative to state coercion as a viable way of avoiding “tragedies 
of commons” (see Hardin, 2010). In this view, the role of state should be limited to 
eliminating the negative externalities that “otherwise erode cooperation by fostering 
coalitions and networks from which all the actors benefit” (Bevir, 2007, p.1). 
Moreover, rational choice theorists conceive of firm size as tending towards an 
equilibrium position: “at the margin, the cost of organizing within the firm will be 
equal to the costs of organizing in another firm or to the cost involved in leaving the 
transition to be organized by the price mechanism” (Coase, 1937, p. 55). For the large 
corporation, outsourcing non-core assets and business areas has been more prevalent, 
and received particular attention since the late 1980s when technological advance 
reduced the costs involved in undertaking transactions with other firms. This trend has 
been argued to mark the end of large (state-owned) corporations and herald another 
epoch of production systems based more upon small and medium-sized (private) 
firms (see Nolan, 2001). These analyses open up the possibility of self-governing 
network with minimal influence from nation-state. In the case of public sectors in 
advanced economies, analysts are more interested in exploring specific cases where 
hierarchical administrative coordination has been replaced by self-regulating 
networks among more numerous market participants. For example, Rhodes (2010) 
used the phrase of ‘hollowing out the state’ to summarise key changes in Britain’s 
public sector, including large-scale privatization, diminished central and local 
government discretion, and the emergence of more potentially self-organizing 
networks through outsourcing. As such networks multiply national government’s 
capacities to intervene and control will erode further. Swedish experience in particular 
suggested that agencies would “become increasingly independent with their own 
distinctive culture and marked reluctance to accept central guidelines” (Rhodes, 2010, 
p. 13). 
However, rational choice theory, important as it is, has not yet informed comparative 
studies of governance due to an (over) emphasis upon cost efficiency and a relatively 
static conception of governance institutions, whose respective prerequisites have been 
overlooked (Granovetter, 1985; Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Ghoshal and Moran, 
1996). It takes limited account of the nuances of particular economic and institutional 
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settings, including how different governance systems evolve. Issues of how (self-
regulating) institutions and practice emerge, expand, and persist often remain 
unanswered. Critics also question its optimistic assumptions about market 
atomisation, where both financiers and managers have full freedom of entry and exit 
from certain contractual relationships, and continually search for better alternatives 
(Hill and Jones, 1992). In other words, it neglects the weakly institutionalized 
environment characterized by a limited number of participants and underdeveloped 
legal infrastructures. These might well occur among those transitional and/or 
developing economies which lack due market discipline – disequilibrium raises 
barriers to entry and exit instead (Bevir, 2007). Recurring scandals and crises in 
developed economies also suggest that few governance systems are truly self-
regulating (Clark and Branson, 2012). So, by regarding self-regulating networks as if 
almost frictionless and conflict free, this argument may ultimately underestimate the 
range of relationships through which economic transactions are conducted, and 
conversely overestimate the effect of network coordination per se. 
2.4.1.3 Property and Ownership Rights 
The argument of property rights refers to the theoretical construct in economics for 
determining how assets and/or resources should be owned and used (Demsetz, 1964, 
1966, 1967; Kay and Thompson, 1986). The core bundle of property rights includes 
(1) the right to utilize the asset, (2) the right to possess the benefit (and responsibility 
for the negative outcomes, such as damages and debts) of utilization, and (3) the right 
to transfer the asset through gift or sale (Kay and Thompson, 1986; Putterman, 1995). 
This bundled concept applies not only to discrete assets such as machines and 
buildings, but also to business enterprises, which are simultaneously both the property 
of persons or other entities, and also entities empowered to act as legal agents in their 
own right. In the case of private property, owners have exclusive rights of using and 
benefiting from the resources they own, as well as transferring to others at whatever 
prices are mutually agreeable. For de Alessi (1987, p. 26), the stronger the private 
property rights are, i.e. more carefully defined, allocated, and enforced, “the closer is 
the relationship between the welfare of the owners and the economic or social 
consequences of their decisions and the greater is the owners' incentive to take 
account of the harms and benefits that their decisions visit on others”. However, the 
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separation of ownership and control – common among many large modem 
corporations – raises issues of incentive incompatibility and information asymmetry 
between owners and managers. While agency problems, such as the moral hazard and 
managerial slack and discretion, may surface, principal-agent theorists assert that 
managerial opportunism and the related costs can be resolved via various governance 
mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Williamson, 1983; Oviatt, 
1988). As they cannot capture the full gains from any investment they might 
undertake, they generally have to increase their productivity or else conserve them (de 
Alessi, 1987). For large state-owned plants, where most ownership rights are 
delegated to the bureaucratic apparatus, managers can encounter ambiguous or 
contradictory goals from having multiple principals at the intermediate level. For 
Stiglitz (1989a, p. 32), “managers can always claim that the reason they are losing 
money is not that they are inefficient or incompetent, but they have been pursuing 
other goals”. It is virtually impossible for various supervisory or controlling organs in 
the bureaucratic apparatus to distinguish between policy-induced losses and those 
caused by managerial malpractices. The abstractness of the real owner and ambiguity 
of multiple goals affords managers scope to evade accountability for their own 
professional failings (Heath and Norman, 2004). The asymmetry between power and 
responsibility further implies that resources under state ownership are less likely to be 
allocated to their highest-valued use, provided that private ownership is economically 
feasible (de Alessi, 1987; Heath and Norman, 2004).  
Empirical studies of privatization to date often consist of firm-level econometric 
comparisons of the pre and post-privatization financial or operating performance. For 
example, Megginson et al. (1994) examined the profitability and productivity 
improvement of 61 firms across 18 countries and 32 industries which underwent full 
or partial privatization from 1961 to 1990. In addition to a revealed reduction in 
leverage ratio and government subsidies, there were significant increases in 
profitability, output per employee, capital spending, and employment following both 
full and partial ownership divesture. The findings were consistent with Ehrlich et al. 
(1994), which demonstrated a positive correlation between private ownership and 
productivity growth as well as cost reduction over the long term. Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001) examined whether the profitability, leverage, and labour intensity of 
the privatized firms in the 500 largest international companies, as reported in Fortune 
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Magazine for 1975, 1985, and 1995, outperformed those state-owned firms in the 
heterogeneous group. After controlling for specific firm size, geographical, industry, 
and business-circle effects, their statistical analysis provided robust evidence that 
privatized companies had statistically higher profitability, lower levels of 
indebtedness, and fewer labour-intensive production processes than the state-owned 
counterparts. 
The merits of the ownership argument stems from its analytic simplicity – its 
abstraction of two distinct parties, i.e. principal (owners) and agent (managers), which 
affords insights into important but once-neglected features such as information 
asymmetry, goal conflicts, and differing attitudes towards risk. However, as the 
interests of stakeholder groups are reduced to just two different parties at firm level, 
the argument can overlook subtle but important interactions among each different 
stakeholder. Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) deemed a bilateral contractual 
relationship between principals and agents to be a type of “dyadic reductionism” 
which struggles to recognize multiple “principals”, let alone how any conflicting 
interests are resolved (Wei, 2003, pp. 44-45). For the management of privatised firms, 
incentives for profit maximisation and cost reduction rely upon CG mechanisms to be 
the key means of aligning otherwise divergent interests (Daily and Dalton, 2003; 
Denis and McConnell, 2003). Where essential prerequisites, such as active takeover 
markets and stringent regulatory oversights, remain underdeveloped, the efficacy of 
privatization schemes diminishes, as found in developing and transitional economies 
(Allen and Gale, 1999; Frydman et al., 1999; Megginsom and Netter, 2001). In fact, 
the argument has been criticised for retaining a ‘thin’ view of the actual socio-
economic environment influencing particular reform sequences and institutional 
governance design (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). 
2.4.2 Political-Economic Perspectives  
Variations among governance systems and reform outcomes are here explained by the 
underlying political-economic dynamics (see Roland, 2002). While governance 
practices can reflect laws and regulations, politics determines much about the 
legislative process, and public policy choices (Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Gourevitch 
and Shinn, 2009). The significance of the politics behind SSG is most obvious with 
respect to not only types of investment made, but also how gains become distributed, 
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and what long-term goals get achieved (O’Sullivan, 2001). Structural adjustment 
inevitably gives rise to both winners and losers (Leftwich, 1994, 1995; Naughton, 
1996). For Gourevitch and Shinn (2009, p. 3), governance structure “affects the 
creation of wealth and its distribution into different pockets”. It is no wonder that SSG 
reform provokes conflicts, particularly in regard to outcome uncertainty (Dewatripont 
and Roland, 1995, 2000; Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Campos and Horváth, 2012). As 
Gourevitch and Shinn (2009, p. 3) stated, “anything that shaped wealth, opportunities, 
stability, and corruption is sure to attract the concerns of the powerful and provoke the 
anxiety of the weak”. In short, redistributive reform can be opposed by entrenched 
interests (Roland, 1994b; Shirk, 1993). The practical challenge of reforming a state 
sector includes how to manage politically any major redistributions of capital and 
power involved during structural transformation (Shirk, 1993). What appears clear 
from the experience of developing and/or transitional economies is “the ability to plan 
and implement adjustment was largely a consequence of both political commitment, 
capacity and skills, as well as bureaucratic competence, independence, and probity” 
(Leftwich, 1994, p. 367; see also Healey and Robinson, 1992). In search of more 
profound factors, political economists therefore argue that state sector reform is 
“fundamentally a political matter and that it is illusory to conceive of good 
governance as independent of the forms of politics and type of state which alone can 
generate, sustain and protect it” (Leftwich, 1994, p. 363). For them, sound SSG is 
intimately related to broader economic, social and political factors, in particular the 
role and capacities of the state (Saich and Saich, 1981; Saich, 2004). In this vein, they 
examine and compare different socio-economic causes and conditions which enable 
the state to conduct certain developmental actions but not others (Nordlinger, 1987; 
Leftwich, 1994, 1995). 
2.4.2.1 State Developmentalism 
The notion of state developmentalism or developmental state seeks to explain the 
state’s (positive) role in East Asia’s unexpectedly extraordinary post war economic 
development (Robinson and White, 1998; Johnson, 2010). Economies within this 
region, often referred to as NICs, originally embraced free market-defying selective 
industrial policies through powerful state agencies and/or total state ownership (Fine, 
1999; Johnson, 2010). The locus of this theory is a developmentally-driven nation-
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state, consisting of government bureaucracies and SOEs, “whose politics have 
concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the centre to shape, pursue 
and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by 
establishing and promoting the conditions and direction of economic growth, or by 
organising it directly, or a varying combination of both” (Leftwich, 1995, p. 401; see 
also Öniş, 1991; Evans, 1995). The theory pragmatically regards the best arrangement 
of state sector as that which would more rapidly produce national prosperity amid 
hostile international competition. The free market and centralized planning were each 
regarded as inadequate for this task (Nolan, 2007). Compared with the model of 
regulatory state, a developmental state intervenes more directly in the economy 
through a variety of means to pursue industrial policies and reduce investment 
dislocations (Öniş, 1991). 
The ‘classic’ developmental state was an ideal type derived from the Japanese 
experience between the 1950s and the 1980s. There are of course cross-national 
variations. In the case of Japan, there is less direct government ownership of industry, 
but the private sector was (administratively) guided by the ruling government 
apparatus, most notably the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). 
These government agents consisted of bureaucratic elites who were not necessarily 
elected officials and were accordingly less subject to influence by either the corporate 
groups or labour unions through the political process. This originally allowed 
government ministries greater autonomy to conduct strategic economic planning and 
look towards long-term national interests without being disrupted by other rival short-
term or narrow interests. South Korea went even further than Japan: an extremely 
powerful pilot agency, i.e. the Economic Planning Board (EPB), actively encouraged 
the growth of large business conglomerate, the Chaebols, by means of protected 
domestic markets and low interest credit from the state-owned banking system 
(Chang, 1994; Nolan and Wang, 1999). While the (similarly US influenced) 
Taiwanese government had elsewhere intervened less forcefully, the extent of its 
direct state ownership of large-scale heavy industry was even wider (Wade, 1990). 
Such state control and leadership focused on vital upstream industries ranging from 
synthetic fabric to metal processing, which in turn strongly influenced the private 
sector. It is noteworthy that even in sectors where SOEs did not dominate, such as 
plastic and textiles, the state “aggressively led private producers” using various 
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measure including import controls, tariff, domestic content requirement, and 
concessional credit (Wade, 1990, p. 10; also Noland, 2007). Singapore used yet 
another model incorporating free trade, foreign direct investment, and a significant 
state sector – one of the biggest in the non-oil-producing world, once accounting for 
more than 22 per cent of GDP, when the global average approached 10 per cent (see 
Chang, 2010). A state-owned investment corporation, Temasek, controlled a broad 
spectrum of sectors including financial services, telecommunications, media and 
technology, transportation and industrials, life sciences, consumer, real estate, as well 
as energy. While SSG governance necessarily encompasses bureaucrats, technicians, 
and other functionaries (Hye, 2000), these different national examples highlight the 
central role of nation-states in first “supporting the emergence of modern industrial 
corporations … which could have formed the basis of prosperity in other parts of the 
economy” (Nolan and Wang, 1999, p. 180). 
Although the political and institutional structures of these states were development 
directed, the foremost objectives of SSG were often politically-driven. For Leftwich 
(1994) the important factors normally included nationalism, external threat, 'catch up' 
with the west, and regional competition. Woo-Cumings (1999) traced the historical 
origins of developmental states to broader colonial and postwar leanings towards 
secure national development self-determination. Security issues were pronounced 
where Taiwan faced the mainland communist regime. The Nationalist Party or 
Kuomin Tang had to justify its very existence in this light (Leftwich, 1994). It is 
further argued that this nationalistic vision and unique commitment to long-term 
economic growth enabled ruling elites to bypass income distribution and social 
welfare related issues. The pull of nationalism in calls for ‘catch up’ and ‘getting 
even’ led Johnson (1995) to question how important their domestic economic take-off 
phase alone really was. For Chang (2010) this particularly underscored ownership 
control and regulatory intervention in large business conglomerates. Large state-
owned businesses were disproportionately important among more capital intensive 
and other upstream sectors. For Nolan and Wang (1999) intervention in state 
ownership and/or regulation has been also been consequential. Far from simply 
emerging through free markets many leading corporations also have relied upon 
extensive government support at particular stages in their cycle (see also Nolan, 
2007). 
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2.4.2.2 State Entrepreneurialism  
While neoclassical scholars focus upon profit seeking and exploiting opportunities 
among private enterprises, political economists would argue that these same practices 
are realized through government as well (Yu, 2003), and are best termed 
entrepreneurial rather than rent-seeking, corruption, predation, and related 
interventions (Duckett, 2002). The term state entrepreneurialism therefore presages 
how the proactively entrepreneurial state (Mazzucato, 2011) becomes the catalyst for 
more innovative governance and business practices (Duckett, 2002). In particular it 
refers to state agencies and/or local governments characterised by entrepreneurial 
activities for profit seeking purposes (Blecher and Shue, 2001). The SSG practices 
here entail the following important features. 
 State entrepreneurial involvement in business by state bureaux and local 
governments. Leading officials create new business ventures which require making 
business decisions on agencies’ behalf and investing government funds in the same 
way as private entrepreneurs (Yu, 2003); 
 State led pursuit, and further justification, of due profit-seeking, making and 
distribution; 
 Entrepreneurial bureaux and local governments conduct business in an individual 
capacity for their own ends even where this requires competing with each other; 
 They also take and manage risks in the sense that they stand to lose their 
investment where success and profitability are not guaranteed; 
 An entrepreneurial state is adaptive where officials change codes and conduct in 
line with differing socio-economic contexts. This includes re-deploying state 
officials and staff in the course of state restructuring and market transition; 
 State entrepreneurialism differs from bureaucratic profiteering or rent-seeking 
because it is more potentially productive than anything the predatory state would 
envisage (see Lu, 2000). 
Castells (2010) argues that, in early economic take-offs, NIC governments 
(particularly in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore) assumed more entrepreneurial 
roles via public corporations and state investment agencies (see also Nolan and Wang, 
1999; Yu, 2003). For Lichauco (1988, p. 111) such governments were “not only as 
the source of economic policy, but also as the proprietor, entrepreneur and operator of 
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industrial and commercial enterprises”. Entrepreneurial states have been notably 
attentive to, and taken well-coordinated actions about, their chosen/target industrial 
sectors, and pursued 'governed markets' for further development purposes (Weiss and 
Hobson, 1995; Henderson and Appelbaum, 1992; Wade, 1990). In some cases, they 
invested heavily in new technologies, usually by setting up government research and 
development facilities before transferring the results to both state and private 
companies, and without necessarily transferring the associated development costs in 
the same way. For example, Hyundai and Samsung Heavy Industries, now leading 
global players, drew upon earlier state initiatives including subsidised credit, domestic 
market protection, and internationally sourced specialist technical assistance (see 
again Weiss and Hobson, 1995; Yu, 2003, Mazzucato, 2011). Officials have also 
acted like private entrepreneurs in that, where economic policies first demonstrably 
faltered, they have often been quickly discontinued or reversed (Luedde-Neurath, 
1988). For example, the Singapore government embarked upon wage correction 
policy in the late 1970s, aiming for substantially increased income levels, but when 
this was later found inappropriate, an immediate wage freeze was implemented to 
counter further possible recession (Blecher and Shue, 2001; Yu, 2003). 
State entrepreneurialism challenges orthodox privatization and the minimal state view 
by demonstrating how governments can adapt and even contribute to governed 
marketization by facilitating further state restructuring (Duckett, 2001). For political 
economists, successful SSG may also arise from the entrepreneurial conducts by 
government agents. The proactive role of state thus goes beyond creating the right 
environment for growth and stimulating demand (Mazzucato, 2011). In most cases, 
both arguments, i.e. state developmentalism and entrepreneurialism, are jointly used 
to explain relative success of SSG in NICs. Certain essential institutional elements are 
nevertheless unaddressed (Hochstetler and Montero, 2013). A major role for the state 
is announced, but the necessary institutional and social conditions for its discharge are 
insufficiently identified (Leftwich, 2010). Concern about “bringing the state back in” 
did not always fully engaged the political determinants of its autonomy and capacity, 
and in particular how the leading actors response to the changing socio-economic 
environments in their own ways (Skocpol, 1985; Leftwich, 2010; Chang, 2010; 
Hochstetler and Montero, 2013). Hochstetler and Montero (2013) argued that inability 
to analyse the anatomy of the developmental or entrepreneurial state has been at fault. 
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Flawed institutional explanations sometimes allowed neoliberals and anti-statist 
theorists to deem state failure almost inevitable and then seize theoretical and policy 
initiatives following the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis (Leftwich, 2010; Chang, 2010). 
2.4.2.3 Political Economy of Gradualism 
In addition to developmental goals and conducts, there are unresolved issues 
concerning the most optimal speed and sequencing to effect meaningful improvement 
in the state sector (Martinelli and Tommasi, 1997). In many transitional economies, 
continued state influence and mediated effects of marketization in SSG practices can 
be best explained by the gradualist approach employed. The gradualist argument 
anticipates a sequential and piecemeal implementation of reform programmes as 
opposed to ‘big bang’ or ‘shock therapy’ approaches (Roland, 2002). Such limited or 
partial liberalisation seeks to maintain the state's influence over business sectors (Wei, 
1997; Roland, 2002). Gradualists, who emphasize institutional and political factors as 
opposed to ahistorical abstract economic theory, contend that Europe's post-war 
recovery and later economic take-offs among the NICs stemmed from appropriate 
sequencing by the state (e.g. MacMillan and Naughton, 1992; Hall and Elliot, 1999). 
For them, the disappointing performance of privatized sectors and popular discontent 
about radical transformation expose the limits of related shock therapy (Kregel et al. 
1992; Wei, 1997). Moreover, if state sector reform in formerly planned economies 
offers such widespread benefits, why then are reforms with this many winners and so 
few losers so politically difficult? Proponents here maintain that more gradual reform 
has the following five principal advantages, which helps explain why politicians so 
often choose it (Dewatripont and Roland 1995). First, recessions prolonged transitions 
themselves, making thoroughgoing privatization less favourable. In former socialist 
economies, they were attributed to the need to first reallocate resources away from 
certain industries and trade patterns originally inherited from the centrally-planned 
era.
15
 For Popov (2007) this included over-militarisation and over-industrialisation, 
contrived trade flows among former Soviet republics, and underperforming industrial 
plants and agricultural farms. Such problems were more pronounced among former 
Soviet Union than in Eastern European countries, irrespective of China and Vietnam, 
                                                 
15
 Transformational recession, to put in economic terms, was caused by adverse supply similar to the 
one experienced by Western countries after the oil price hike in 1970s, and similar to post-war 
recession caused by conversion of the defence industries. 
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and inevitably extended the period of transition while also making policy 
implementation more difficult (Roland, 2000; Pei, 2009). 
Second, the depth and length of transformational recession were exacerbated by 
institutional collapses associated with bang approach approaches (Popov, 2007). 
Where democratisation preceded economic reforms under shock therapy there were 
too few institutions able to enforce necessary laws and regulations (Zakaria, 1997). 
This could produce ‘illiberal democracies’ – countries where competitive elections 
were introduced before the rule of law had been established. Governments of these 
‘illiberal democracies’ were deprived of the authoritarian instruments which formerly 
ensured legal order, but still lacked all the mechanisms needed to guarantee property 
rights and laws, collect taxes and contain the shadow economy. For Popov, (2007) 
gradualist reforms in China and Korea were associated with the authoritarian regimes 
which maintained essential institutional frameworks while still bringing newer market 
institutions into existence (see also Shirk, 1993). 
Third, as regards the initial cost of reform, gradualism helps avoid excessive fiscal 
burden, and thus enhances the sustainability of reform (Dewatripont and Roland 
1995; Qian and Roland, 1998). Where the number of losers from partial reform is 
limited, compensation costs are made more manageable, and government becomes 
more credible in consequence (Roland, 1994a; Shirk, 1993). Through improving 
efficiency in certain sectors first, it can also produce more overall social benefits that 
in turn enhance the political sustainability of reform (Wong 1992). By comparison, 
outright privatisation often creates too many losers at the same time, not least 
regarding massive lay-offs. It thus incurs enormous compensations costs that the 
government may have no credible means to pay. Failure to compensate losers often 
causes excessive reduction in living standards, and thus arouses fierce opposition 
from the mass, making them politically less sustainable (Pei, 2009, p. 22).  
Fourth, gradualism allows greater flexibility by enabling more trial and error and also 
midcourse adjustments (Roland, 2002). Uncertainties about transition make actors 
reluctant to accept reforms “that may turn out to give disastrous outcomes and 
moreover be hard to reverse” (Roland, 2002, p. 32). Thus gradualism can make 
reforms easier to initiate because it retained the possibility of early reversal at lower 
cost (Dewatripont and Roland 1995; Martinelli and Tommasi, 1997). It is indeed less 
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costly for the population at large to experience a crackdown on limited segments in an 
otherwise unreformed economy than it is to reinstate price controls and renationalize 
(Roland, 2002). Moreover, gradualist reformers can target certain sectors for 
breakthrough reforms and thus acquire valuable experience and knowledge for 
applying reforms in other spheres (Rawski, 1995; Roland, 2000; Benczes, 2011). By 
making – and correcting – policy errors, policymakers are more able to avoid costly 
mistakes that can fatally undermine the support for reform (Pei, 2009). From an ex-
ante point of view, the high reversal cost of negative outcomes makes any big-bang 
approach politically doubtful (Dewatripont and Roland 1995). 
Finally, as a classic strategy of divide-and-rule, gradualist approaches may expand the 
constituency base for reformers by creating initial beneficiaries which further divides 
opposition (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995; Shleifer and Triesman, 2000; Pei, 2009). 
Fidrmuc (2000) found that support for reformist parties in Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
and Hungary to be positively affected by the existing size of private sectors and 
higher proportions of white-collar workers or those with university education. Thus a 
sequential and piecemeal reform can create more momentum by strengthening 
constituencies during the actual transition process. By comparison, populace are often 
confronted with large-scaled layoffs and dramatic recession under a big bang 
approach. These inevitably undermine popular support and may unnecessarily lead to 
costly reversal (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995; Pei, 2009).  
2.4.3 A Political-Economic Perspective on Chinese SSG: Static versus Dynamic 
As noted, neoclassical arguments can overlook certain important socio-political 
factors – ranging from the state's multifaceted role to the potential endogeneity of 
reforms to ex ante political oppositions (Roland, 1994a, 1994b; Megginsom and 
Netter, 2001) – which have particular bearing upon policy outcomes (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1991; Allen and Gale, 1999). As SSG reforms increase, it becomes important 
to study different institutional settings in order to understand what makes any 
particular transition distinctive (e.g. Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2005; Le 
and Buck, 2009).  
The prevailing idea of (sound) SSG is still relatively recent and not native to China, 
having often been imported into, if not obliged upon, East Asia following the 1998 
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crisis (Ritchie, 2008). Later studies (e.g. Xi, 2006; Berkman et al., 2012) of Chinese 
SOE reform duly investigated the mediating influence of political institutions. For Liu 
(2006), the Chinese SSG system reflects incremental changes where central 
policymakers and other political agents have been particularly influential. To better 
appreciate China’s emerging SSG problems it is important to recognize that its 
transitional nature is significantly different from its more developed counterparts. In 
addition to different redistributive effects and outcome uncertainty, there are distinct 
political factors underscoring Chinese SSG reform. Foremost, unlike those 
transitional economies where incremental reform and marketization have been 
accompanied or preceded by political democratization, China has maintained political 
continuity as its prevailing authoritarian regime remains relatively intact (Naughton, 
1996; Qian, 1999; Lin et al., 2003). The resounding reform success has provided the 
ruling elites with even greater resources to preserve the status quo and stave off 
democratisation (Yang, 2006). For Shirk (1993) the pursuit of economic 
modernisation without political reform meant that policies were “hammered” out 
among established authoritarian bureaucracies. In other words, policymakers' chosen 
path was not random but “laid out for them by the incentive and rules of the games of 
Chinese political institutions” (Tenev and Zhang, 2002, p. 336). To the extent that this 
authoritarian system is perpetuated, policy outcomes manifestly demonstrate the logic 
of leading political institutions at work. The lack of a well-defined reform strategy or 
concrete blueprint questions purely economic reasoning about this (Lin et al., 2003; 
Nolan, 2007; Naughton, 2008). In debates about the timing and sequencing of reform 
schemes, political factors have been used to justify the particular choice of strategy 
and related policy outcomes, and their importance accordingly requires more 
consideration of political constraints (Tomasic, 2010). 
On the other hand, where political autocracy continues, the political logic driving 
economic reform is based less upon coalition building than central regime survival 
(Pei, 2009). For the Chinese party-state, the state sector represents a vast patronage 
system to secure support from key constituencies – the CCP has around 5.3 million 
officials, or 16 per cent of its members, holding executive positions in the state sector. 
Radical market-oriented reform can reduce key constituency support, where 
privatization could lead to mass layoffs that further destabilize one-time communist 
strongholds where cadres and managers would lose their esteemed privileges 
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(Schucher, 2009). Therefore the advantages of a gradualist strategy appears self-
evident to the authoritarian regime where it helps retain control over vital sectoral 
developments. In the 6275 large and medium-sized SCCs classified as restructured as 
of 2001, the party-state owned on average 60 per cent of outstanding shares and 
appointed 70 per cent of board members (see Fan et al., 2007). For financial 
economists, most chronic governance defects such as political intervention and 
managerial slack arise mainly from the state’s reluctance to relinquish the control (Bai 
et al., 2004; Pei, 2009). In essence, if Chinese SSG is as much a social and political as 
well as economic process, then further research must and will accordingly reflect it. 
The discussion so far underscores the centrality of politics in explaining the 
distinctiveness of national SSG systems. Small wonder, then, that SSG practices are 
likely to be constrained and structured by the peripheral institutions and influential 
past (Hall, 2010). For Streeck (2009), an overemphasis on structural and historical 
embeddedness may risk overstating the constraining effects, and thus understate the 
potential of meaningful transformation (see also Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). For 
example, Pei (2009) argues that, the gradualist reform in China’s state sector involves 
significant hidden costs and persistent inefficiency under the autocracy’s overriding 
goal of self-perpetuation. In this vein the current governance model will be ultimately 
imperilled by the increasing rent dissipation and mounting inefficiency incurred by 
path-dependent partial reform (see Pei, 1994; Rawski, 2001). The inherent self-
destructive dynamics will most likely lead to the build-up of systematic risks and 
progressively attenuate the economic and political vitality of China’s state sector, as 
exemplified by the failures of other self-styled developmental autocracies (see Kim, 
1999; Pang, 2000). On the other hand, reform under the gradualism logic involves 
significant side-payments or concession to potential “losers”. In the lights of growing 
vested interests, sceptics believe that China’s state sector reform gradually crystallizes 
into a “crony capitalism deadlock” that halts further reforms (Duckett, 2002; Li and 
McElveen, 2013). Economists and commentators even term the leadership of Hu 
Jintao as the “Chinese lost decade” given the absence of any structural transformation 
(see Li and McElveen, 2013). This prompts growing concerns that China’s state 
sector reform will inevitably enter a prolonged period of stagnation while maintaining 
a deteriorating status quo. According to Pei (2009, p. 10), “symptoms of a trapped 
transition have become highly visible or even pervasive" (see also Yang, 2006).  
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However, such static assertion appears increasingly counterintuitive; and the more so 
the longer one looks at the reform trajectory of China’s state sector. For many, 
China’s enterprise reform, in particular, the formation of national champions, has 
close links with socio-economic transition (see Nolan and Wang, 1999; Yao and 
Sutherland, 2009; Lin and Milhaupt, 2013). It involves distinctive policy motivations 
including streamlining administrative control (Lin and Milhaupt, 2013), optimising 
industrial structure (Noland, 1995), securing scarce resources (Yao and Sutherland, 
2009), and enabling industrial growth (Nolan, 2007). It is not apparent that current 
large SCCs sprang fully from pre-specified blueprints (Naughton, 1996). Rather they 
resulted from policy experimentation and innovation ranging from the expansion of 
enterprise autonomy to the promotion of the ‘going out’ strategy (Naughton, 1996; 
Noland and Wang, 1999; Lin and Milhaupt, 2013). These reforms reflect policy 
makers’ responses to competitive pressure from market liberalisation and 
globalisation (Nolan, 1999). Recent research often points to the proactive 
involvement of the central and local governments in reform design and 
implementation (e.g. Naughton, 2006; Nolan, 2007; Saich, 2011). The ruling elites 
have been actively mobilising other actors and institutional recourses to overcome 
entrenched beneficiaries’ resistance, and thus help break the previous partial reform 
equilibrium (Hall and Thelen, 2009; Pei, 2009). For them, any improvement in 
sectoral performance and governance quality could yield significant political 
dividends and enhance the party-state’s ability to continue to allocate rents to 
favoured interests and maintain the loyalty of their different constituencies (Pei, 
2009). Thus there is no reason to assume China’s enterprise reform would be doomed 
to stagnation (see Yang, 2006).  
Given these “anomalies” further research needs to go beyond the static focus upon 
efficiency and embeddedness (Feng et al., 2011). More attention should be directed 
towards the “second-order problem” of explaining when and how China’s SSG 
institutions change (see Hall, 2010, p. 204). A more dynamic, political-economic 
perspective would pursue espoused changes in SGG in terms of whether and how 
those enacting them actually do so. Its potential usefulness is also evident in studies 
ranging from individual organizations (Pagano and Volpin, 2006) to economic 
governance systems (Streeck, 2009; Amable et al., 2010; Richardson and Eberlein, 
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2011) and, as Figure 2.2 illustrates, this also encompasses the defining “characters” of 
SSG system in terms of both economic rationale, and political embeddedness.  
Figure 2.2 Political-Economic Conceptualization of Chinese SSG 
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter has argued that Chinese SSG needs to be better contextualized to better 
illuminate and explain its political–economic embeddedness in principle and practice. 
While its espoused economic rationale clearly matters, so also does its institutional 
and political enactment, because this is what made Chinese SSG so particularly 
distinctive. China’s unique political-economic setting itself implies that such reforms' 
stated economic rationale has been distinctively mediated by communist bureaucratic 
institutions which have few parallels elsewhere. The introduction of political-
economic perspectives here strives to overcome the stylised dichotomy between 
economic liberalism and coercive central-planning. However, a (modernised) SSG 
regime with Chinese characteristics is only just emerging and not yet completed 
(Tricker, 2012). The discussion here suggests that specified institutional factors exert 
mediating effects upon, and even impose serious obstacles for, continued reform. 
From a political-economic perspective, the question is what direction has and will 
such reform now take? More specifically, will it be locked into structural and 
historical embeddedness, or could it continue to evolve differently instead? Moreover, 
regardless of the answer, what are the key social actors and their roles? Are they 
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leading reform or else just going along with it? How do they shape and advance their 
own interests within different institutional constraints? These questions deserve 
further consideration since neither economic impetus nor institutional determinants 
immediately convert into detailed governance practices. The following chapter will 
now seek a model to explain the possible and actual paths or trajectories which the 
Chinese SSG system might follow.  
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Chapter 3  
A Path-Generation Perspective on Chinese State Sector Governance  
3.1 Introduction 
Comparative research incorporates political and related institutional factors into analyses of 
cross-national variances in state sector governance (SSG). Such factors are held to be 
independent or intervening variables for explaining specified policy outcomes at one 
particular point in time. This poses the issue of "what a SSG system is now like” and not just 
“how it evolves and changes over time”. It assumes governance systems were originally 
constructed within a particular economic-political context and, once further established, 
subsequently exhibit an “enduring” or/and “constraining” logic of institutional 
(pre)determinism (Hay, 2005). This, however, raises the question: if emerging governance 
practices are, as political scientists argue (e.g. Roe, 1997; Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005), 
intrinsically rooted in socio-political institutions with the power to oblige enterprises and 
government agents to conform, how can different new systems and practices subsequently 
emerge (see Seo and Creed, 2002)? A path-generation approach suggests that the salience of 
political determinants would not necessarily obstruct the transformation of SSG institutions 
per se. This chapter now explores the different sources and modes of transformation which 
this approach takes into account. It puts a wide range of institutional changes into more 
specific thematic contexts by exploring: (1) why a path-based approach is needed, (2) what 
explains institutional continuity in SSG, (3) the primary sources and modes of any further 
transformation,
1
 and (4) the roles of social actors in them. It relates both path-dependence 
and path-generation perspectives to ongoing governance reform in China’s state sector, and 
then presents research propositions derived from such, and their further theoretical and 
methodological implications.  
3.2 A Path-Based Approach 
Like other institutions, SSG systems only persist if, and to the extent that, they continue to 
be produced and reproduced (Giddens, 1979). In explaining the distinct variety of national 
SSG systems, scholars embrace a process or “path-based” view (e.g. Rowthorn and Chang, 
                                                 
1
 This refers to two distinctive but interrelated stages of institutional transformation – the “deinstitutionalization 
of extant practices and norms” and the “emergence and diffusion of new institutional arrangement” (Thelen, 
2009, p. 16). 
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1994; Clarke and Pitelis, 1994) which considers how their initial origins impact upon their 
later form and conduct (e.g. Pannier, 1996; Hirst, 2000; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2002; 
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Here past origins become “a source of empirical material” (e.g. 
panel-data analysis or multiple case studies) rather than “a spur to serious investigation” of 
prevailing governance practices (Pierson, 2011, p. 4). Despite contentions that “history 
matters” (e.g. Gilson, 1996; Schmidt and Spindler, 2002; Clarke, 2004), limited attention has 
thus far been given to the temporal or evolutionary character of different SSG systems. 
Moreover certain key concepts regarding reform, such as path dependence, critical juncture, 
sequencing, unintended outcomes, and path generation, have also received similarly limited 
attention. While certain observers (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Roe, 2003; Gourevitch 
and Shinn, 2005) might explain cross-national diversity with particular reference to specified 
historical events, it is not yet clear what this might imply for reform-oriented research.  
A purely path-based approach emphasizes the importance of historical context, evolutionary 
trajectory, and co-evolution of organizations and institutions. The relative merits of this 
approach can be summarized as follows. First, it is important to examine if/how certain SSG 
practices change through different life cycles of state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
(Filatotechev and Wright, 2005; Uhlaner et al., 2007). This lifecycle includes not only 
specific stages and sub-stages of development per se, such as start-up, expansion and 
maturity, but also transformation through different legal and organizational forms, including 
leadership succession, restructuring, initial public offering (IPO), and 
nationalization/renationalization. Filatotechev and Wright (2005) noted the varying salience 
of conflict and disruption across different life cycle related transitions.  Second, while SSG 
practices are shaped by wider socio-economic intuitions, these institutions can undergo 
further transformations themselves (Lee and Mason, 2006). For example, where transitional 
economies have improved shareholder and creditor rights protection, related legal and 
administrative reforms have responded to wider socio-economic transformation rather than 
initiating and leading it (Pistor, 2006). The actual dynamics of such reforms, including 
public policy input and further legal implementation, need to be observed if different policy 
outcomes are to be understood (Fremond and Capaul, 2002).The issue of how SSG changes 
therefore requires fuller assessment of how it is shaped by both socio-economic transition 
and evolutionary trajectories (Delbridge and Edwards, 2007). Finally, the interaction of 
economic impetus and institutional determinants means that different causal processes and 
outcomes only unfold over substantial periods of time (Pierson, 2010, p. 13), implying that 
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SSG typically engages relatively slow-moving institutions (Roland, 2004). Given their 
possible redistributive effects, certain transformative changes attract opposition, and thus 
typically occur in an implicit and incremental manner. It can take time before reforms 
amount to anything substantial, with sizeable lags between their initiation and outcome. This 
is unlikely to be revealed by simply taking a ‘snapshot’ view of the current position alone, 
and inability to recognize cumulative and slow-moving reforms can lead researchers to 
“mistakenly construct temporally constricted causal accounts” (Pierson, p. 91).  
Thus static theoretical linkages between observed governance practices and institutional 
environments or/and historical roots may not generate further insights into Chinese state 
sector reform. Further research should shift away from such static typologies towards studies 
of how particular systems and environments co-constitute each other (Morgan et al., 2006). 
Given that inadequate analysis of different institutional pathways limits the ability to 
understand the emergence of novelty (Storz et al., 2013), a path-based approach is necessary 
to explain what is most distinctive about Chinese SSG reform. At the outset of economic 
reform past central planning still imprinted itself upon most SOEs. Once legally and 
commercially restructured, leading SOEs left their former domestic confines, and later 
looked towards becoming increasingly global after the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis (Li and 
Milhaupt, 2013). Continuing problems such as party-state intervention and disparate 
objectives could be traced back to central planning but other issues, including managerial 
autonomy and investor protection, were duly linked with their changing socio-economic 
environment. According to Ho and Young (2013), various stages of SOEs reform came to 
reflect shifting official policies. While the neoclassical literature would typically emphasise 
the merits of market-based governance in advanced capitalist economies, China’s SSG 
system clearly diverges from both, and still exhibits unique institutional features (Wu, 2005; 
Nolan, 2007). 
Moreover, gradualist reform implies that SSG practices may change dramatically “over 
extended periods of time but at a very low pace” (Pierson, 2010, p. 82). Its evolutionary 
trajectory contrasts strikingly with other radical political movements in Chinese history, such 
as the 1949 revolution and the end of the Cultural Revolution, where causes and outcomes 
were both temporally contiguous and rapidly unfolding. Such a slow-moving causal process 
can be termed as ‘incremental’ or ‘cumulative’ (Roland, 2004). Political scientists (e.g. 
Naughton, 1996; Pei, 2009) often conceive this strategy of "crossing the river by touching 
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the stones" as an evolutionary process with a stepwise endogenisation of the political 
constraints of economic reform. This cumulative process is often linked to the evolution of 
political and legal institutions, financial market development, the growth of non-state sector, 
and complementary reforms in other aspects of social life. Thus the evolutionary nature of 
Chinese state sector reform calls for in-depth understanding of the surrounding socio-
economic context. It becomes apparent that a path-based approach can provide the means to 
assess the relationship and connections between governance patterns and environment over 
time (Delbridge and Edwards, 2007). For Bathgate et al. (2006), this approach helps 
overcome the biases inherent in transplanting developed-economy “prisms” to a different 
environment where they appear less suited. 
When embracing a path-based approach, researcher often hold two distinctive views of 
institutional change i.e. path dependence versus path generation, which itself leads to 
different appreciations of SSG evolution. Earlier work on institutional evolution was based 
on a path-dependence model that also relied upon ‘external shocks’ and ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ (Delbridge and Edwards, 2007; Pierson, 2010, p. 134). With its emphasis on 
self-reinforcing mechanisms, this argued that previous institutional settings strongly 
impacted upon later development, as if to preclude major deviations or innovations. In this 
view, only exogenous shocks provide succinct phases and episodes where real opportunities 
for major institutional reform occur, even if these are followed by protracted stability. 
However, given an emphasis on institutional reproduction, this model makes it difficult to 
account for incremental but potentially transformative changes (Thelen, 1999, 2004). Pierson 
(2010, p. 153) notes that “institutions will generally be far from plastic, and that when 
institutions have been in place for a long time, most changes will be incremental”. Recent 
institutional research sees institutionalization in more dynamic, social process terms (e.g. 
Garud and Karnøe, 2001; Garud et al., 2010). The path generation literature sees important 
roles for particular social actors, considered as reflexive and proactive agents for initiating 
and implementing transformations. As this work develops, one key challenge is to find ways 
to capture alternative transformation paths, with respect to their complex inter-relationship 
with both the surrounding socio-economic context, and also specified social actors. 
However, to understand change, or the relative lack of change, it is important first to 
conceptualize how path dependence might operate (Thelen, 1999, 2004; see also Peters, 
2005, p. 77).  
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3.3 Institutional Continuity in SSG 
Emerging cross-national comparisons can reveal certain unique features of national SSG 
institutions while testing the assumptions derived from only one single country. Empirical 
evidence suggests that national SSG systems retain certain unique features and even 
comparative advantages in the face of globalization. Such striking and persistent variances 
reveal the deficits of efficiency-based arguments and the very institutional stability or 
continuity that inhibits further reform.   
3.3.1 A Path Dependence Perspective  
Path dependence theory has emerged to explain protracted institutional stability and 
continuity. Research in this genre is often viewed as part of a broader debate over 
convergence-or-divergence between different governance regimes (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; 
Schmidt and Spindler, 2002; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). Comparative research on state 
or public sector reforms raises two important questions for both researchers and policy 
makers: (1) what causes any variance in the national governance systems to persist, and (2) 
can and will such institutional variances continue in future (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999).  
In economic history, path dependence has been used to explain so-called “lock-in” 
tendencies.  Mahoney (2000) observed that the original conceptualization of path 
dependence by historical sociologists had certain defining features. First, path dependency 
was highly sensitive to events taking place in the early stages within an identified causal 
process, so that these events mattered more than others occurring later (Pierson, 2000). 
Second, these earlier events were contingent occurrences which could not be fully explained 
by prior historical conditions alone. Goldstone (1998, p. 834) noted that “path dependence is 
a property of a system such that the outcome over a period of time is not determined by any 
particular set of initial conditions. Rather, a system exhibits path dependency is one in which 
outcomes are related stochastically to initial conditions”. Third, once contingent events 
occur, path dependent sequences become relatively deterministic, tending towards what 
Mahoney termed “inertia”. This inertia may vary according to identifiable sequences: in self-
reinforcing sequences, it refers to stabilization mechanisms that perpetuate specified 
institutional arrangements; conversely, with reactive sequences, inertia involves counter-
reaction mechanisms or backlash forces that give events a logic where one event inevitably 
leads to another. 
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A common thread among definitions of path dependence is an assumption that “past events 
influence future events” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 510). However, path dependence theorists go 
beyond simply holding that “the past influences the future”. For example, Mahoney 
suggested that a path-dependent sequence should consist of contingent starting points and 
critical junctures as well as any subsequent self-reinforcing mechanisms which make initial 
institutional arrangements hard to refute.  
“Institutions that rapidly and decisively trigger mechanisms of reproduction are especially 
capable of seizing opportunities by contingent events and thus setting into motion self-
reinforcing sequences that are path-dependent. Efficacious mechanisms of reproduction 
enable an institution to take advantage quickly of contingent events that work in its favour, 
solidifying a position of dominance before alternative institutional options can recover. By 
contrast, with institutions that more gradually trigger mechanisms of reproduction, a 
contingent event may initially favour the institutions, but the institutions will not prevail in 
the long run over superior alternatives because mechanisms of reproduction are activated 
quickly enough or powerfully enough to capitalize on the early advantage”(Mahoney, 2000, 
p. 515). 
When examining salient differences in national SSG systems, comparative researchers often 
regard governance institutions as analogous to manufacturing technology, and treat observed 
institutional variations as having specific competitive consequences. Under globalization, the 
quest for competiveness and cross-national capital inflows would potentially eliminate more 
inefficient governance practice, and compel further improvements (Khanna et al., 2006) 
which would minimize, if not eliminate, undue rent-seeking and inefficiency. However, as 
well as efficiency, SSG necessarily embraces political institutions and developmental goals 
(Leftwich, 1995; Walder, 1995; Pierre, 2000; Lichet et al, 2005), and SSG regime diversity 
persists (Vagliasindi, 2008; Chung and Zhang, 2011). In addition to socio-political factors, 
emerging research seeks more dynamic explanations about how distinctive national SSG 
system emerge, and observes how earlier institutional settings and policy preferences 
influence subsequent institutional movements and policy shifts. 
Stark (1994) compared privatization strategies and policy outcomes of transitional 
economies using a path dependence framework that delimited those elements inherited from 
their socialist past, and found a significant source of the observed variances arose through 
identifiable socio-political imperatives (see also Nee and Cao, 1999). For Stark, the choice 
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between statist versus market strategies for dismantling the state sector was highly 
dependent on the path of extrication from state socialism, and the preceding differences in 
social structure and political organization in the given country. The latter meant that interest 
group politics, in particular mediation between state and civil society, differed significantly. 
Thus, in Czechoslovakia, a state interventionist past counterbalanced liberal-market reforms; 
the Polish tradition of workers’ self-management likewise restrained privatization efforts 
(see Kovács, 1994).  Nee and Cao (1999) emphasized the deterministic effect of the initial 
structure of property rights and governance system upon mixed ownership arrangements 
across different regions of China. These pre-existing patron-client ties linking state 
bureaucrats with other societal actors continue as highly fungible forms of political and 
social capital. For Nee and Cao (p.803), “economic liberalization releases the old communist 
elite from pre-existing organizational controls, enabling them to pursue rents in boundary 
transactions between the public and market sectors of the transition economies”. Bebchuk 
and Roe (1999) referred to this type of path dependency as “structure-driven” in that it 
encourages structural rent-seeking by beneficiaries. It explains how the private advantages of 
initial property rights arrangements present significant barriers against ownership 
transformation. In Chinese SOE reform, state bureaucrats may sacrifice private benefits only 
if they can be immediately and adequately compensated by any resulting transformation. 
They have both incentives and power to impede efficiency-seeking changes that reduce their 
interests. The relative political strength of entrenched interest groups can affect any 
legislative process that combines public-regarding features with interest group politics. For 
Roe and Bebchuk (p. 131), initial governance structure and property rights affording control 
to a particular group of stakeholders will “increase the likelihood that the country would 
subsequently have the rules favoured by this group of players” (Martin, 2006). 
3.3.2 Explaining Self-Reinforcing Institutional Stability 
Recent path dependence thought conceives institutional stability as a dynamic process where 
self-reinforcing mechanisms entrench and reproduce institutional frameworks through time 
(Djelic and Quack, 2007; Hall and Thelen, 2009; Martin, 2006, 2010).
2
 Using Mahoney’s 
(2000) categorization, the prevailing paradigms which explain institutional reproduction are 
classified as utilitarian, functional, power and legitimation-based as follows.  
                                                 
2
 Long before the introduction of a path dependence analysis, economists, sociologists, political scientists, and 
historians have made various contributions to account for the underlying mechanisms leading to the 
institutional stability (Ebbinghaus, 2005). 
P a g e  | 55 
3.3.2.1 Utilitarian Factors 
As the most frequently cited causes of continued institutional reproduction, these refer to a 
non-linear self-reinforcing process with strong rationalistic underpinnings (Arthur, 1989; 
North, 1990; David, 1994; Ebbinghaus, 2005; Djelic and Quack, 2007). This stems from the 
economic history literature regarding the lock-in tendency explained before. From this 
perspective, social actors “rationally” opt to maintain previous institutional arrangements 
where potential benefits outweigh the costs of transformation. North and Mahoney both 
identified a number of factors which perpetuate any given path: for example, large set-up or 
sunk costs, learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations. First, set-up 
costs lead to prolonged institutional stabilization where such investment provides actors with 
incentives to maintain initial structures in order to recover costs (Schmidt and Gerald, 2002; 
Deeg and Jackson, 2007). Second, beliefs that repeated institutional arrangements enable 
greater efficiency gains may themselves generate continuity, always assuming that actors 
become more adept and knowledgeable about prevailing arrangements. Third, coordination 
impacts upon maintenance of existing institutional arrangements where expanded usage of 
particular practices creates higher returns still. These effects are especially significant when 
institutions require high network externality.
3
 Finally, institutional continuity arises from 
self-fulfilling expectations in situations where incoming social actors are required to adopt 
and support institutions by those already conforming to them. As Deeg (2005) noted, the 
assumption underlying all such utilitarian explanations is that actors will choose to 
reproduce particular institutions through self-interest above all. 
While economists take this approach to explain issues such as the spatial location of 
production (e.g. Arthur, 1994) and expanded intra-industry trade in the post-WWII era (e.g. 
Krugman, 1996), North’s (1999) approach to emergent institutional change provided fresh 
explanations for related “stickiness” (Nee and Cao, 1999; Pierson, 2000). According to 
North, the approaches by which economic historians study technological returns were also 
applicable to institutional reproduction. Due to increasing returns, earlier contingent 
institutional arrangements, once adopted, can deliver increasing benefits through their 
repeated adoption. This makes it difficult to transform institutions or revert to previously 
available options despite any potential efficiency gains. Where switching costs exceed 
                                                 
3
 For example, if other firms within a same economy are featured by a diffuse ownership structure, it will be 
less costly and more efficient for a firm to choose such a structure (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). 
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potential gains, actors might rationally retain seemingly inferior institutional arrangements 
(Schmidt and Gerald, 2002; Gordon and Roe, 2004, p. 15). In this way, “established 
institutions generate powerful inducements that reinforce their stability and further 
development” (Pierson, p. 255). Bebchuk and Roe (1999) argued that, comparing a 
seemingly inefficient system with its counterpart, they could each have merits and flaws. 
Given that transforming one institutional structure into another involves added economic and 
social costs, even maintaining the status quo has its attractions, though high switching costs 
also foster institutional entrenchment (Schmidt and Gerald, 2002). 
3.3.2.2 Functional Factors 
Here Mahoney (2000, p. 519) interpreted self-reinforcing path dependence thus:  
“the institution serves some function for the (overall) system, which causes the expansion of 
the institution, which enhances the institution’s ability to perform the useful function, which 
leads to further institutional expansion and eventually institutional consolidation. Thus 
system functionality replaces the idea of efficiency in utilitarian accounts as the mechanism 
of institutional reproduction”. 
In this view, institutional elements are reproduced because each serves a particular function 
in an overall system where complementarity dominates. According to Schmidt and Gerald 
(2002, p. 319), elements are only regarded as complementary if there is potential “fit”, i.e. 
“take on values which mutually increase their respective benefit in terms of whatever the 
objective function or standard for evaluating the system may be, or mutually reduce their 
disadvantages or costs”. In this respect, factors enabling particular SSG systems (such as 
political institutions, legal and regulatory framework, administrative apparatus, corporate 
codes, and financial markets,) can all be regarded as complementary elements.  
For example, in the context of a market-based governance model, the role of competitive 
conditions for optimal resource allocation becomes central, making ownership 
diversification secondary (see Lin et al., 1998; Li et al., 2000). This requires active 
involvement of the private sector, regulatory efficiency and accountability, due corporate 
governance (CG) mechanisms, effective state-asset management, and well-developed 
financial sectors. Further complementary elements may include tradition and respect for 
private ownership, autonomous regulation and supervision, as well as effective policy 
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enforcement (Estrin, 1998; Perotti, 2004; OECD, 2005, 2011).The market-based governance 
model is thus a consistent configuration of specified complementary mechanisms which 
together constitute a distinctive SSG system in its own right. 
Given complementarity among different institutional elements, and also the advantages of 
consistency, partial changes to any individual element alone will not necessarily bring full 
systemic improvement. This has implications for the top-down transferability of reform 
strategies or governance practices from advanced emerging markets (e.g. Redding, 2004), 
and even between developed economies themselves (Berglöf and Thadden, 1999). Where 
such complementary institutions are inadequate, reforms are likely to be impeded. Given the 
necessary complementarity of those elements which comprise individual SSG systems, it 
would not necessarily make sense to import different individual elements from outside, 
especially where deeper differences about transplantation still prevail (Fleischer, 2005).  
For Lichet et al. (2005, 2007) undue emphasis on embeddedness and hierarchy among 
developing and transitional economies can be conducive to corruption and disregard of 
judicial independence. Thus the challenge for reform designers would be to “find 
mechanisms for encouraging pro-social conduct among state regulators and other power 
holders” (2005, p. 252) rather than to improve court legislation. Pareded (2003, 2005) 
suggested that the question of the "macro-fit" between transplanted governance practices and 
broader socio-cultural backgrounds of the "importing" country requires further research. To 
be effective transplantation of governance mechanisms relies upon their being suitably 
adapted to the pre-existing economic and social characters of the “importing” body. In this 
view, simply importing Anglo-American corporate codes, or another market-based model, is 
not necessarily viable for developing countries, especially where that model presupposes 
well-developed equity markets and legal infrastructures. In the case of CG reform, 
complementarity and consistency between different institutional elements suggests that “it 
would probably not make much sense to mix the outsider and insider control system and to 
combine those elements that appear to be particularly valuable in each of the two types of 
systems so as to create the overall optimum” (Schmidt and Gerald, 2002, p. 324).  
3.3.2.3 Power and Legitimation 
This argues that actors' differential resource endowments generate divergent interests vis-à-
vis institutional continuity given the likely redistributive effects of change. Mahoney (2000, 
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p. 114) suggested that “an institution can persist even when most individuals or groups 
prefer to change it, provided that the elite that benefits from the existing arrangement has 
sufficient strength to promote its reproduction”. The dynamics of power entrenchment are 
summarized thus: 
“Once the institution develops, however, it is reinforced through predictable power 
dynamics: the institution initially empowers a certain group at the expense of other groups; 
the advantaged group (thus) uses its additional power to expand the institution further; the 
expansion of the institution increases the power of the advantaged group; and the 
advantaged group encourages additional institutional expansion. Because early events are 
contingent, this sequence of empowerment can take place even though the group that 
benefits from the (later introduced) institution was initially subordinate to an alternative 
group that favoured the adoption of a different institution”. 
Nee and Cao (1999) observed that, even during dramatic social transformation, entrenched 
interests from previous institutional arrangements could still have incentives to maintain 
their former status quo. The inertia faced by reformers is not only interest-based but also 
locked into interrelated institutional arrangements (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This 
power-based approach can explain how pre-existing SSG institutions continue across 
transitional economies in Eastern Europe. For Nee and Cao, the party-state, as the axial 
institution of centrally planned economies, governs by fiat power and exerts direct political 
control over social institutions. The institutions of state ownership and extensive 
administrative networks linking various government departments and party bureaucracies 
induce continuing political-power dependence. The ability of actors to mobilize power 
resources firstly depends upon the particular institutional structure inherited from past 
central planning and, given state control over productive resources, early market transition 
can provide previous elites with opportunities for political-economic capital conversion to 
maintain their elite standing (Pierson 1993; Ebbinghaus, 2005; Martin, 2010). 
Parallel with power-based explanation, legitimacy-seeking emphasizes institutional 
continuity and entrenchment. Legitimacy-seeking accounts of institutional reproduction 
maintain that decisions which perpetuate pre-existing institutions are grounded in the actors’ 
subjective orientations and beliefs about what is most legitimate, appropriate or morally 
correct (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). The logic of “appropriateness” and the alignment of 
normative and cognitive institutional models therefore underlie the quest for legitimacy 
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(March and Olsen, 1998; Djelic and Quack, 2007). Mahoney (2000, p. 523) further 
elaborated that: 
“Institutional reproduction occurs because actors view an institution as legitimate and thus 
voluntarily opt for its reproduction. Beliefs in legitimacy of an institution may range from 
active moral approval to passive acquiescence in the face of status quo. Whatever the degree 
of support, however, legitimation explanations assume the decision of actors to reproduce an 
institution derives (mainly) from their self-understanding about what is right to do, rather 
than from utilitarian rationality, system functionality, or elite power”.  
A contingently introduced institution can be stably perpetuated through increasing 
legitimation even where alternative institutions might have differed. This is marked by a 
positive feedback loop in which a preceding institutional arrangement forms the basis for 
future normative evaluation. Under the logic of “appropriateness” contingent institutions are 
perpetuated and maintained by legitimacy-seeking social actors. Institutional initiatives are 
less likely to become stabilized if their legitimacy and constituencies remain limited. 
Greener (2005) argued that the feedback generated through their reproduction can preclude 
the emergence of different and competing understandings of institutional change and vested 
interests. Organizations adopt “institutional isomorphism” by replicating institutions not 
only for potential efficiency improvement but also for their acknowledged legitimacy and 
appropriateness, especially when “conditions of uncertainty typically reinforce old networks 
and patterns as people turn towards the familiar and the safe” (Johnson, 2001, p. 254). 
Institutional legacies thus shape the opportunity structure and strategic preference of social 
actors, but limit the range of normative repertoires invoked for institutional responses 
(Hausner et al., 1995; Streeck and Thelen, 2009). A sociological perspective would focus 
upon institutionalization with reinforcement: norms become further internalized when ruling 
cognitive schemata and taken-for-granted routines are relatively unchallenged (Zucker 1977; 
Ebbinghaus, 2005).
4
 
3.3.3 The Limits of Institutional Continuity 
Path dependence theory emphasizes how initial conditions further impact upon subsequent 
                                                 
4
 Deriving from the legitimacy argument, socialization is referred by Djelic and Quack (2007) as a 
complementary binding force that can reinforce and stabilize the emerging path-dependency. Under the 
socialization argument, institutional stabilization is essentially a process of social learning (see Hermann-
Pillath, 2009).  
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developments. However, the concept of institutional stability is criticized for being over-
static and neglecting the drivers of change (Thelen, 2009). Debates about its applicability 
spread across different disciplines, especially institutional and organizational studies (e.g., 
Pierson, 2000; Crouch and Farrell, 2004; Greener, 2005). The particular problem for 
researching China’s SSG reform however concerns the “fixity” and “rigidification” of 
institutional evolution (Martin and Sunley, 2006). 
Where characterized as “punctuated equilibrium” (Peters et al., 2005), institutional change is 
“a periodic and episodic process, wherein major (external) shocks cause system-wrenching 
change that then establishes a new phase of relative stability” (Martin and Sunley, p. 407). 
Path destruction and creation appear relatively serendipitous and exogenously induced. The 
ahistorical institutionalism of path dependence views institutional changes in a bifurcated 
manner, as either long-drawn institutional reproduction, or else radical and disruptive 
reorientation. The question thus arises where, if a defining characteristics of institutional 
evolution is “endogenously granted change” (Martin and Simmie, 2008, p. 188), does the 
punctuated equilibrium model capture the full variety of change? The descriptive account of 
path dependence emphasizes self-reinforcing processes but remains silent about “how and 
where institutional novelty comes from, or why one form of novelty gets selected over 
another” (Martin and Sunley, p. 407). Moreover, path dependence theory is criticized for 
adopting an “outsider” ontology that neglects the reflexive social actors involved. The 
paradigm asserts that “the past intrudes into the present and as a constraining force, 
contingencies that arise are experienced as unanticipated unprepared moment, and the future 
present itself as a fundamentally uncertain terrain” (Garud et al., 2010. p. 768; see also 
Streeck and Thelen, 2009). 
In sum, path dependence is not necessarily either the only or best source for explaining 
change in/of institutions (Peters, 2005, p. 79).  The notion of institutional stability or 
continuity can exaggerate how institutions evolve a “lock-in” that impedes further change, 
and can underestimate the possibilities of significant deviation and innovation. For Crouch 
and Farrell (2004, p. 5), this argument is in “danger of becoming excessively determinist and 
incapable of coping with major (institutional) innovations except as behaviours derived from 
imitation or completely exogenous learning”. To compensate, institutional theorists should 
focus on the endogenous attributes most conducive to path-deviation including how social 
actors “seek to adapt to changed environmental circumstances through changing their 
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institutional responses to that environment" (Crouch and Farrell, 2004, p. 6; see also Garud 
et al., 2010). Methodologically, researchers should investigate changes in “real time” and 
“follow the actors” to find out how they occur (Callon, 1986; Streeck and Thelen, 2009; 
Garud et al., 2010).  
3.4 Path Generation 
Although path dependence would explain how settled technological patterns generate self-
reinforcing mechanisms in order to continue, institutional transformation differs in several 
ways (Pierson, 2000). To further develop related theory and account for institutional 
evolution, this section asks: (1) what are the primary sources or mechanisms for institutional 
transformation, and (2) why should we apply path generation perspective to further studies 
of national SSG systems?  
3.4.1 Sources of Path Generation 
Dacin et al. (2002) argued for the importance of deinstitutionalization where extant 
institutions are deteriorating or/and being delegitimized while other innovative practices are 
emerging. Campbell and Pederson (2006) point out that “revolutionary change” among post-
socialist countries often embodies significant “evolutionary” qualities as well. Both Stark 
(1992) and Johnson (2002) emphasized the time dimension of institutional change and the 
importance of its sequencing in different stages. The available literature emphasizes the 
following major sources and mechanisms for inducing institutional changes and innovations: 
(1) functional pressure, (2) political pressure, (3) structural factors, including institutional 
embeddedness and openness.  
3.4.1.1 Functional Pressure  
According to Dacin et al. (2002), functional pressure for deinstitutionalization often arises in 
response to performance issues in regard to practices whose efficiency falls into question. 
DiMaggio (1988) and Zucker (1988) previously argued that deviation from an enduring 
practice is likely to occur as a result of changed technical instrumentality, rather than interest 
redistribution, although this practice may still have some worth. 
For Oliver (1992), the potential for performance problems to further deinstitutionalize 
enduring practices itself derived from competitive and functional considerations that 
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question their continuing instrumental value. Institutional deviation often occurs within a 
changing socio-economic environment in which heightened competition for scarce resources 
makes certain activities less advisable. The competitive logic underlying path-deviation 
means that “new organizations with more efficient structures will develop, and eventually 
replacing suboptimal organizations” (Pierson, 2000, p. 487). For example, at national level, 
Ananchotikul and Eichengreen (2009) highlight significant improvement in the quality of 
Asian CG practices and regulatory enforcement driven by the quest for financial stability and 
sustainable economic growth following the Asian Financial Crisis. At firm level, Lee and 
Penning (2002) found performance differentials among competing businesses served as an 
important source of feedback which further deinstitutionalized inefficient accounting 
practices.  
3.4.1.2 Political Pressure 
Established institutions and practices face erosion or replacement where their legitimacy 
becomes seriously questioned. Oliver categorized the political conditions where 
‘delegitimation’ or ‘deinstitutionalization’ can be predicted as: (1) deteriorating performance 
of extant institutions, (2) contention between emergent social actors and the status quo, (3) 
mounting pressure for institutional innovation and re-adjustment, and (4) reduced reliance 
upon institutional constituents requiring continued stringent conformity. In this view, to 
deviate from the entrenched institutions is either a defence against threatened failure or 
political response to power shifts between established and emergent social actors. Thus 
institutional innovation occurs through political efforts to revolve tension arising from the 
reduced validity or legitimacy of entrenched norms and practices such that survival needs to 
be assured. 
The first two mechanisms primarily concern the intra-institutional factors behind internal 
political dissensus or disputed norms and practices. Performance problems that threaten 
institutional legitimacy or viability question the validity of accepted norms and practices. 
Oliver (1992) noted that performance crisis can accentuate conflict and contention about 
appropriate institutional arrangements. Conformity with institutionalized practices also rests 
upon dependence upon specific environmental constituencies (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) 
and its  necessity may erode if that dependency diminishes as alternative constituents or/and 
‘institutional entrepreneurs’ emerge (Streeck and Thelen, 2009).  
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3.4.1.3 Structural Factors: Embeddedness  
Complexity increases as the focus shifts towards national institutional systems which also 
interact with each other transnationally (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Scott, 2001). 
Thus, the coupling of complementary subsystems may vary, as can the intensity of 
interactions among different national systems, suggesting multiple pressure points subjecting 
national institutions to change. 
Embeddedness or nestedness refers to co-existent institutions enhancing each other, i.e., 
institutional complementarity. Beyond perpetuating equilibrium, institutional 
complementarity can promote systematic transformation should interdependence wane. For 
Ebbinghaus (2005, p. 23) “while the interlocking between institutions may loosen, an 
institution may be also endangered through tight coupling with another institution if this 
complementary institution can no longer provide or else has changed its function”. This 
draws attention to the limited life span of specific institutional configurations and poses 
questions about off-path change. Deeg (2005) thus claimed that more tightly coupled 
institutional systems were more liable to change than others. For example, the insider 
character of Korean state-owned chaebols requires more congruent business strategies and 
linkages than so-called “parchment institutions” (see Kim, 1997). Thus, looser coupling 
among subsystems may not necessarily mean weaker path dependency, since these 
constituent systems may derive their stability from different sources. However, “institutional 
hierarchy” among complementary institutions suggests that, if the initial change occurs in 
the hierarchically “dominant” institutions and domains, the cascading effect of 
deinstitutionalization could precipitate systematic transformation (Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Boyer, 2006; Amable, 2009). Contrariwise, changes in “subordinate” subsystems exert less 
influence upon dominant or complementary institutions.  
3.4.1.4 Structural Factors: Openness 
Openness challenges conventional assumptions about the existence of sovereign, 
authoritative and autonomous national institutions presiding over their own territories. With 
regards to transitional economies, Sun and Tobin (2005) documented how international 
listing of Chinese SOEs provoked meaningful improvement in governance practices despite 
opposition from powerful entrenched interests. By opting into foreign stock exchanges with 
higher standards of CG, listed SOEs are mandated to improve investor protection in fear of 
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potential (state) asset depreciation (see Jia et la., 2005; Coffee, 2006). Surveys by OECD 
(2005b, 2011) indicate that both stock listing and market deregulation have induced further 
SSG reform across many advanced economies, including Germany, Fran, Britain, 
Switzerland, and Finland. Along with a long-term fiscal squeeze this means that the state 
sectors of these countries have been relatively open to competitive pressure and investor 
influence. In addition to a shrinking portfolio of SOEs, many governments have revised their 
ownership functions and enhanced investor protection to order to attract greater capital 
inflow.
5
 Change has been concentrated mainly in the areas of “the state acting as an owner”, 
“transparency and accountability and “the functioning of SOE boards”, paving the way 
towards a more coordinated SSG model (OECD, 2011, p7). In reviewing the legal and 
regulatory development of developing countries, OECD also highlights the importance of 
international standard-setting organizations for generating new paths. Evidence suggested 
that the increasing interaction and ideological homogenization of different standard-setting 
organizations helped generate and stabilize “an emerging transnational path of rule-setting” 
(Djelic and Quack, 2007, p. 181). In this case, local regulatory bodies often acted as 
“transmitters and mediators” to implement such international rule setting. An off-path 
change can thus arise through a pincer movement where “external pressure or solutions are 
connected with local stakeholders and their traditions” (Djelic and Quack, 2007, p. 181). 
3.4.2 Path-Generation Dynamics 
There is much emphasis on sources for incremental changes which are, at most, 
cumulatively transformative. However, sources for path generation, whether functional, 
political, or structural, will not automatically lead to the breakdown of entrenched 
institutions. An explicit theoretical framework is still needed to account for how institutional 
transformation occurs, i.e. how new and existing institutional arrangements interact so that 
other “innovative” structures and processes might emerge (Dacin et al., 2002). Discussion of 
institutional transformation is often linked to different claims about the relative merits of 
“agents” versus “structures” which now merit further consideration.  
The literature on “post-socialist countries” and “varieties of capitalism” would account for 
how institutional innovation occurs despite structural inertia and rigidity. The former is 
particularly relevant to Chinese state sector reform since it typically highlights institutional 
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 OECD (2011) observes that, with regards to empowering minority shareholders, significantly lowered 
ownership thresholds encouraged more German and Spanish investor litigation.  
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innovation through recombinant strategies in the face of powerful legacies from the 
command economy before. Streeck and Thelen (2005) discuss four different modes of 
change (i.e., displacement, conversion, layering, and drift) to grasp the evolutionary nature 
of institutional transformation (see also Thelen, 2009; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). This 
section traces certain potential theoretical antecedents for each mode of change, and 
discusses what this implies for the study of Chinese SSG reform.  
3.4.2.1 Displacement 
Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 18) denoted displacement as the process in which “new models 
emerge and diffuse, which call into question existing, previously taken-for-granted 
organizational forms and practices”. When “displacement” first appeared, it was barely 
elaborated and only drew limited attention, because it was considered “rare in the politics of 
reform in contemporary advanced capitalist economies” (Thelen, 2009, pp. 488; see also 
Heijden, 2010). However, research into economic reform in both transitional and advanced 
economies provides further evidence about the plausibility of effective institutional 
transformation through displacement. For these purposes, what is interesting about 
displacement is how institutional transformation can occur, not only through explicit 
readjustments and amendments among existing institutions, but through shifts in the relative 
salience of competing institutional arrangements (Streeck and Thelen, pp. 18-22).  
Crouch and Keune (2005) illustrated how displacement worked during the attempted 
liberalization of Hungary’s state-socialist economy, which for political reasons retained links 
with the previously dominant centrally-planned model. Even under Communist dictatorship, 
local political and economic actors in the Győr region enacted reforms intended to improve 
enterprise productivity and living standards. These included gradual decentralization of 
decision-making power to enterprise managers, legalization of private business activities, 
and policies to attract FDI. With the decline of state socialism, local elites advocated quick 
transition towards a market economy, and Győr here proved more adaptable because certain 
pre-1989 practices provided the necessary foundation. Campbell and Pederson (1996) 
observed similar reform elsewhere where market-oriented practices were attempted before 
being submerged under renewed state socialism. They used the concept of “institutional 
bricolage” to describe post-socialist transition across Eastern Europe where new institutions 
were selectively incorporated into pre-existing institutional settings through reform efforts. 
Such reform strategies commonly represent “the deliberate bricolage of rhetoric based on 
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principles of both market and communist economic discourses” (Campbell and Pederson, p. 
213). One common element concerned how various market-oriented policies first developed 
when leading local actors articulated notions of “market socialism” or “socialism market 
economy” in successive steps. In this respect, institutional change through displacement 
needs to be carefully cultivated by those key actors whose interests are better safeguarded 
and served by new arrangements.  
3.4.2.2 Conversion 
Tsai (2006) examined the emergence of China’s private sector through what Thelen (2004) 
termed “institutional conversion” requiring the redeployment of extant institutions for 
alternative purposes. This argues that, even though the formal attributes of previous 
institutions remain, their substantive orientation or purposes can change dramatically. For 
Beland (2007, p. 22), “(institutional) conversion is about adopting new goals or bringing in 
new actors that alter the institutional role or the core objectives of an institution”. The 
Chinese strategy of “wearing a red hat” can be viewed in this light. For Tsai this refers to 
registering a business as a collective enterprise which is nonetheless essentially privately 
owned and managed. Moreover, by paying an SOE for use of its name, private entrepreneurs 
disguise their own company as an appendage to an established government operation in 
order to avoid being socially and politically marginalized.
6
 Tsai (2006, p. 129) elaborates 
how this ‘red hat’ practice enabled private sector development in the face of both legal 
restrictions and ideological constraints. 
“On a day-to-day basis, entrepreneurs were also subject to arbitrary treatment by tax 
collector and harassment by other bureaucrats. By contrast, state and collective enterprises 
received favourable treatment relative to private ones in terms of tax breaks, bank loans, 
and use of land…As a result, hundreds of thousands of both state and non-state actors were 
complicit in popularizing the red hat phenomenon…Although conservative or “leftist” 
political elites would have preferred to restrict the non-state sector, both the popularity and 
economic effectiveness of wearing a red hat gave reformers concrete evidence and, thus, 
political support for expanding the scope of China’s nascent private 
economy…Camouflaging the true ownership structure of a (private) business rendered the 
formal distinction in nomenclature between collective and private enterprises virtually 
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 Such enterprises were termed as hang-on enterprises (guahu qiye in Chinese) during the first decade of 
China’s economic reform (Tsai, 2006). 
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meaningless” (Tsai, 2006, p. 129). 
By 1987, when private business obtained politically ceded legal approval,
7
  225,000 private 
enterprises employed over 3.6 million and average firm employment over 16 exceeded that 
permitted before. 
3.4.2.3 Layering 
Layering refers to “a process in which one institution is introduced either alongside or on top 
of existing arrangements” (Wentzel, 2011, p. 50). Thus by “grafting” new elements onto the 
pre-existing institutional framework, a series of small amendments may ultimately, and 
probably cumulatively, contribute to overarching reform (Thelen, 2004, p. 35; Wentzel, p. 
50). According to Wentzel, two important issues underpin this process, one the intensity of 
how different reform efforts are layered, the other the incentives for social actors to pursue 
change.  
The legislative reform of Germany’s capital market is one example. Deeg (2001) and Thelen 
(2012) illustrated how the strategic transformation of universal banks prompted regulatory 
bodies to accelerate change. Facing reduced corporate borrowing and potential profit from 
investment and fee-based services, German banks gradually switched from cheap credit 
provision towards a US investment banking model based more upon well-developed security 
markets.
8
 They formed a pro-reform coalition with the relevant regulatory bodies and then 
sought to promote stock market development. These included the establishment of 
“Frankfurt Coalition” in 1984, amended Stock Exchange Law in 1989, the introduction of 
IBIS electronic trading system and the first of three Financial Market Promotion Laws in the 
late 1989. While 1980’s reforms emphasized lower trading cost and financial innovation, 
further reforms “extended and expanded upon prior efforts” (Deeg, 2001, p. 26). Without 
radically displacing the traditional regulatory system, reform clearly impacted upon financial 
market development when both the regulatory efficacy of stock exchanges and transparency 
of listed companies were significantly improved. Deeg observed that “all these omnibus laws 
contained numerous and wide ranging statutory additions and amendments intended to 
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 At the 13
th
 National Congress of the CCP in October 1987, former Premier Zhao Ziyang declared that 
“cooperative, individual and private sectors of the economy in both urban and rural areas should all be 
encouraged to expand… [W]e must formulate policies and enact laws governing the private sector as soon as 
possible in order to protect its legitimate interests” (Beijing Review, November 9-15 1987, cited in Tsai, 2006). 
8
 Historically, relationship between large industrial corporations and commercial banks were largely long-term 
lending-based so that banks could grow and profit primarily from the close associations (Deeg, 2001). 
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stimulate the supply and demand of securities” (p. 25).9 Consequently, governance practices 
in many “insider-controlled” firms, in particular those owned by the federal government, 
became more shareholder-oriented, while the banks' traditional monitoring role was taken 
over by the security market.
10
 Therefore, by “patching-up” old institutions through 
establishing and expanding the regulatory basis for a well-functioned financial market, these 
innovative “layers” enabled further security market development while offering a more 
acceptable rationale for German banking reform. 
3.4.2.4 Drift 
Drift is not always how social actors intended to change existing institutions, “if it is about 
institutional change at all in the truest sense of the concept” (Wentzel, p. 51). It essentially 
refers to the environmental changes that transform the initial purpose of an institutional 
arrangement, as well as the inability of institutions to readjust to these changes. With 
conversion, institutional transformation through drift, while potentially consequential, may 
be masked by superficial stability. However, behind their seemingly static appearance, 
institutions still require active maintenance. 
“To remain what they are they need to be reset and refocused, or sometimes more 
fundamentally recalibrated and renegotiated, in response to the changes in the political and 
economic environment in which they are embedded. Without such ‘tending’…they can be 
subject to erosion or atrophy through drift…In cases like this, drifts occur without explicit 
political manoeuvring: the world surrounding an institution evolves in ways that alter its 
scope, meaning, and function” (Streeck and Thelen, 2005. pp. 120-121). 
An example of institutional drift occurred in the once centralized German wage setting 
system which originally implemented industry-wide agreements through works councils 
with quasi-statutory status. These councils consisted mainly of elected workplace 
representatives and even extended into the small-firms sector.
11
 As collective bargaining 
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 The departure of the German banks from their conventional business strategy and the growth of the financial 
market increased the demand on listed firms’ investment return and on their endowment with capital (Streeck 
and Thelen, 2005, p. 85). 
10
 Historically, Germany’s insider-controlled model was based on extensive business network and concentrated 
ownership structure, which encouraged “a stakeholder management approach to the management of German 
corporations” (Deeg, 2001). 
11
 In a large economy like Germany, the egalitarianism of collective bargaining system had been able to 
generate and maintain low wage dispersion until the late 1980s when the coverage of such a highly centralized 
system began to experience a cross-sectoral shrinkage.  
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agreements declined, this system drifted, and veto players neither sought nor were able to 
block further institutional innovations, including so-called “opening clauses” (Massa-Wirth 
and Seifert, 2004; Martin, 2006, 2010). Certain bargaining rights were essentially transferred 
to formally non-union works councils legally prohibited from detailed wage negotiating and 
setting. Such institutional flexibility gave individual actors more discretion over the choice 
and enforcement of alternatives, so that for Streeck and Thelen (p. 93) “the traditional 
bargaining regime ceased to be encompassing and turned into the shrinking and softening 
core of a new, much less unified, and much more diverse system”. 
3.4.3 Role of Social Actors 
For Seo and Greed (2002), institutional contradictions do not necessarily lead to path-
breaking transformations. Between institutional contradictions and change comes mediating 
human praxis where actors consciously acknowledge the need to overcome entrenched 
institutional resistance. In this view, path generation also refers to the proactive and 
conscious response by actors to evolving internal and external environments (Oliver, 1992). 
For Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 19), 
“Such changes often occur through the rediscovery or activation and, always, the cultivation 
of alternative institutional forms. As a growing number of actors defect to a new system, 
previously deviant, aberrant, anachronistic or foreign practices gain salience at the expense 
of traditional institutional forms and behaviours”.  
In other words, social actors are less passive receivers and more proactive makers of 
institutions when they infuse their actions with other meanings to reflect this (Dacin, 
Goodstein, and Scott, 2002; Zilber, 2002). Moreover, an emergent path implies that different 
actors together shape institutions (Morgan and Kubo, 2005; Morgan and Quack, 2005).  
Eisenstadt (1980, p. 14) introduced the idea of institutional entrepreneur for proactive actors 
proposing innovative policies and practices which provide “the opportunity to realize 
interests that they value highly”. However, efforts at imposing new institutions may not go 
uncontested. In path generation, institutional entrepreneurs face resistance and opposition 
from entrenched interest groups whose privileges are tied into prevailing institutional 
arrangements (Levy and Scully, 2007). Such social actors as institutional entrepreneurs 
operate in an institutional field subject to “the regulative, normative, and cognitive processes 
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that structure their cognitions, define their interests, and produce their identities” (Clemens 
and Cook, 1999, p. 9). Such an embeddedness based view implies that institutional 
entrepreneurs possess can both imagine alternative possibilities anf exploit social resources 
depending on the particular institutional projects they pursue. This involves both criticizing 
existing institutions and mobilizing other allies so institutional inhabitants can break the 
dominant ethos.
12
  
Certain researchers (e.g., Philips et al., 2004; Leca et al., 2008) suggest that institutional 
entrepreneurs commonly adopt a discursive strategy to promote institutions and practices 
that will resonate with potential allies. To initiate discursive transformation, entrepreneurs 
firstly specify existing organizational defects, and then assign blame and responsibility for 
such, thereby questioning the legitimacy of dominant practices. After asserting the 
superiority of their alternatives, they consolidate and expand their allies so that pre-existing 
institutional arrangements become de-legitimized. Their success can also depend upon their 
access to those scarce and critical resources judged indispensable to mount further political 
action (Lawrence et al., 2005). These resources may include finance (e.g. Leca et al., 2008), 
social capital (e.g. Fligstein, 1997), formal authority (e.g. Maguire et al., 2004), and previous 
earned legitimacy (Greenwood et al., 2002). Leca et al. (2008) suggest that the question of 
which resources are more useful is largely dependent on context. Such an understanding of 
path generation resembles how Garud and Karnøe’s concept of path creation highlighted the 
role of reflexive agents in gradual change, but differs regarding how social actors might 
create and shape off-path change. 
Luong (2002) underlined how established social elites shaped the form and degree of 
electoral reform adopted. Those who envisioned their interests expanding with transition 
duly adapt existing institutions in order to gain additional benefits whereas others perpetuate 
whatever maintains their existing distributional advantage. Hence, the extent of institutional 
change versus continuity fundamentally depends upon power shifting between different 
interest groups. In their historical analysis of active money management practice in US 
mutual funds, Lounsbury and Crumley (2007) employed the concept of “institutional 
entrepreneur” as powerful actors for bringing about innovative practice. Lounsbury (2001, 
2007) also criticized the structural emphasis on institutional stability for neglecting the role 
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 According to Emirbayer and Mische (1998), they have to “contextualize past habit and future projects within 
the contingencies of the moment. 
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of such actors as regulatory agencies, mutual funds, portfolio managers, as well as 
academics. Although academic theorization part enabled active money management practice, 
new innovations were still challenged by longstanding mutual funds and industry insiders. It 
was the further diffusion of new practice that made active money management more 
legitimate.  
3.5 Path Generation, Chinese SSG Reform and Further Propositions 
It is now important to link path-generation to Chinese SSG reform. A critical element in 
current reforms is the so-called “creation of the modern enterprise system” among state 
owned enterprises previously caught between responding to market incentives while 
complying with state directives (Ewing, 2005). Researchers (e.g. Qian, 1996; Nee and Cao, 
1999) often invoke the concept of path dependence to explain SOE's unaddressed problems 
regarding the legacy and interest entrenchment from the past communist era. In particular, 
they emphasize how the persistent influence of Chinese party-state in both firms and markets 
mediates efficiency-oriented goals and obstruct more radical institutional change (e.g. Tenev 
et al., 2002; Pei, 2009; Yeung and Liu, 2008).
13
 Although China’s SSG might change for 
both external and internal reasons, the “punctuated equilibrium” model favoured among path 
dependence theorists implies that institutional deviation can sometimes occur in 
revolutionary rather than evolutionary manner (Leca et al., 2008). This contrasts strikingly 
with the actuality of radical institutional reform being potentially precluded by incremental 
and cumulative transformation from the very beginning. Thus, by emphasizing the 
“stickiness” of China’s past institutional legacies, the path dependence perspective might 
better explain continuity, without specifying which particular forces have shaped or/and 
changed governance practices (Peters, 2005, p. 76).  
The transitional nature of China’s state sector suggests several interrelated aspects making 
institutional arrangements conducive to path generation. First, market transition has brought 
economic growth while intensified competitive pressure required many SOEs to readjust. 
Divisions between state influence and market efficiency have assumed greater significance. 
An expanding, if incomplete, market economy seeks greater economic and political 
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 The concept has further been extended to investigate linkages between current Chinese Company Law and its 
jurisprudential rootage (Deng, 2008). Along its evolutionary trajectory, current Chinese Company Law displays 
strong “rule-driven” path dependency regarding the commercial law system transplanted from the West during 
the 1920s. For Humphery-Jenner (2012), the distinctive governance problems faced by Chinese reformers are 
also rooted within those customary Chinese cultural characteristics which emphasize unity and uniformity. 
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participation, which itself requires more varied governance institutions. Even if path 
dependence accepts the dynamics of adaption (such as positive feedback and 
complementarity), there must be mechanisms to recognize and remedy any evident maladies 
(Peters, 2005, p. 79). A path generation perspective could help explain how changes in the 
broader socio-economic environment induce more innovative SSG practices. 
Second, political pressure pushes the SSG system to evolve differently (Dacin et al., 2002). 
A failure to foster effective regulation and sound governance practices could eventually 
jeopardize overall economic reform, and thus erode party-state legitimacy (Ewing, 2005; 
Pei, 2009). The adverse effects of regulatory failures and/or inferior governance practices 
can reduce the ruling party’s ability to secure and expand its own key constituencies. A series 
of scandalous corporate failures, such as the collapse of Guangdong International Trust and 
Investment Corporation (1998) and Sanlu Milk scandal (2008) have brought evident public 
discontent and calls for further governance reform (see MacGregor, 2012). In sum, the 
redefinition of the party-state's role in economic and political life clearly impacts upon 
China’s state sector, and path generation emphasizes the constraining as well as the enabling 
attributes of related political factors. 
Third, like other governance institutions, the SSG system has to manage and reconcile the 
different relationships and interests of various different constituents, including government 
agents, controlling and minority shareholders, managers, employees, customers as well as 
any wider public (Lipton and Rosenblum, 1991). The ownership diversification and growth 
of the non-state sector have increased the range of actors in SSG and their further interaction 
increases duly increases the possibility of further reform. With its emphasis upon political 
coalition and manoeuvring, path generation gives scope for more fruitful description and 
explanation for endogenous institutional change (Leca et al., 2008). Finally, gradualism has 
moved the current SSG system into something more like a hybrid mode where complexity 
and incoherence allows innovative actors to “spring path dependence traps” (Orren and 
Skowronek, 2004; Crouch, 2005, p. 94). This could bring about off-path changes with 
emergent qualities. For Crouch (p. 143), “it is an environment that maximizes institutional 
choices”. 
In sum, there are few compelling reasons why understanding of China’s SSG system should 
remain “locked in” to a static conceptual framework or preclude further inquiries into 
change. There is no necessary sense of regular periodicity where long periods of stability are 
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interspersed with rare moments of change. Political scientists (e.g. Garud and Karnøe, 2001; 
Campbell 2004; Streeck and Thelen, 2005) have lately moved away from the bifurcated 
typology of powerful institutional entrenchment and rare and radical change.
14
 In their view 
gradual but transformative institutional reforms generally occur in a series of successive and 
cumulative stages with a number of intra and extra-system mechanisms that “open up” the 
possibility for institutional transformation. Although less dramatic than abrupt and wholesale 
reforms, these slow and piecemeal transformations can be equally consequential (Mahoney 
and Thelen, 2010).  In the light of the above, this thesis proposes that: 
Proposition 1: Rather than become locked into self-reinforcement among entrenched 
institutions, China’s SSG system will progressively deviate from past central planning, 
leading towards other distinctive characteristics.  
As a powerful engine of interest redistribution, SOE reform often provokes contestation 
among social actors over “the size and incidence of its costs and the apportionment and 
generosity of its benefits” (Mahoney and Thelen, p. 123). Where the concept of path 
generation is proposed to facilitate more understanding of how reform occurs, more attention 
should be devoted to interactions among leading change agents. These are groups of 
individuals or an organized body who have the resources and power to shape how particular 
institutions or/and institutional change (Daci et al., 2002; Seo and Creed, 2002; Mahoney 
and Thelen, 2010). Although this process might prevent any single actor taking full control, 
path generation arguments suggest that deviation from existent institutions are often carried 
out by motivated change agents through deliberate manoeuvring (see Bercovitz and 
Feldman, 2008). For North (1993), such change agents are often actors who respond most to 
the incentives provided by current institutions.  
The history of economic reform suggests that Chinese central policymakers are influential 
players throughout (Wright, 2010). A continued interventionist approach has generated wide-
ranging debate with two competing assessments regarding the possible policy outcomes. 
Neoclassical economists see reform trapped in a semi-marketised and increasingly predatory 
development logic where reform measures simply revitalize and extend the legacy of central 
control and planning (see also Pei, 2009). Efforts to improve investor protection and 
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 Some path dependence theorists do recognize the possibility for incremental changes. However, they tend to 
conceive of these changes as fundamentally adaptive and serving to protect institutional continuity (see Thelen, 
2009).  
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operational efficiency have encountered the party-state’s reluctance to relinquish ownership 
and personnel control (Jung, 2011). The stated policy agenda is increasingly at risk of being 
hijacked by other entrenched interests (Smuthkalin, 2011). As noted by Pei (2009), China’s 
limited political reform makes it difficult to contrast those institutions elsewhere believed to 
be critical to well-functioning SSG. 
Nevertheless, the success of newly industrialised countries (NICs) (such as Japan, Korea, 
Singapore and Taiwan) suggests that a modern developmental state could also provide 
countervailing advantages for economic development (see Ortmann, 2011; Ringen et al., 
2011; Chang, 2012). In contrast to countries which adopt a laissez-faire approach to 
economic governance, countries whose governments are more interventionist often 
formulate and implement developmental goals in an authoritative and binding fashion. In 
designing or/and reforming institutions, policymakers are here able to prioritize strategic 
goals and mobilise others to implement them. Accordingly, these countries have transformed 
the structure of their economies, become more globally competitive, and grown rapidly 
through continued investment in human capital and infrastructure development (Evans, 
1995; Leftwich, 1995; Fine, 1999; Wong, 2004). For theorists of the developmental state 
(e.g. White and Gray, 1988; Nee et al., 2007), of China’s state secto reform could pursue the 
dominant developmental paradigm of Asian NICs, which rested upon strong authoritarian 
leadership and professional bureaucracies implementing developmentally oriented policies. 
For example, Walder’s (1995; 2002) argument of “local state corporatism”, as characterized 
by Peng (2001) as “corporate governance approach”, explained the prosperity of Town 
Village Enterprises (TVEs) as a result of fiscal decentralisation which provoked local 
officials to promote economic development within their jurisdiction. So, when government 
had “clear incentives and the ability to monitor firms and enforce their interests as owners”, 
it replaced the entrepreneur as the mechanism driving the firm’s performance improvement 
(Nee et al., 2007, p. 20). Empirical studies suggest that, with significant ownership stakes, 
state shareholders have both incentives and capacities to overcome problems such as 
information asymmetry and insider control elsewhere associated with dispersed 
shareholding, thereby ensuring decisions enhance firms’ long-term value (e.g. Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Bai et al., 2004; Tian, 2005; Culpepper, 2010). In this case, the state's 
“grabbing hand” has become a “helping hand” for promoting better regulatory oversights 
and CG practices (Frye and Shleifer, 1997), hence: 
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Proposition 2: Where the interaction between change agents determines policy outcomes, 
the significant economic and political interests of central policymakers make them leading 
change agents for China’s SSG reform.  
Although both policymakers and listed SCCs “have adopted the trappings of western 
companies”, research suggests that governance practices can still leave much to be desired 
(Thomas and Andrew, 2007). The observed gap between original intention and actual 
outcomes in governance reform has been attributed to mediating effects of the socio-political 
reality (Wu, 2005). Institutional complementarities impact upon the efficacy of chosen 
governance systems, and consequently the absence of necessary economic and political 
conditions makes it difficult to transplant governance mechanisms. For Naughton (1996) and 
Qian (1996) enterprise reform has often encountered resistance towards freeing markets in 
practice if not principle and, where bureaucratic control persists, SSG reform has been 
particularly contested, and held subordinate to other party imperatives. Resistance from the 
vested interests is most likely in sectors that bear significant economic rents. To the extent 
that interests groups became further entrenched, half-hearted and short-term measures have 
brought criticism of reformist leadership “shying away from decisive reforms” (Pei, 2009, p. 
131). Moreover, already inefficient mechanisms may be further manipulated by skilled 
actors to serve their own interests, where manipulation refers to the “purposeful and 
opportunistic attempts to co-opt, influence, and control institutional pressures and 
evaluation” (Oliver, 1991; p. 157), hence:  
Proposition 3: China’s SSG reform encounters constraining or/and mediating forces from 
prevailing socio-economic conditions, in particular entrenched interests from prior 
institutional arrangements.  
SSG systems shape how actors’ particular interests are defined, aggregated, and represented 
with respect to any given firm (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). From an actor-centred 
standpoint, chosen practices also result from strategic interaction between actors and their 
institutional environment, generating shared beliefs and norms that, in turn, affect whether  
and these interactions continue (Aoki, 2001a; Pretty and Ward, 2001; Aguilera and Jackson, 
2003; Huse, 2005). SSG institutions have thus been “continuously created and re-created by 
a great number of social actors with divergent interests, varying normative commitments, 
different powers, and limited cognition” (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, p. 16; see also Pearson, 
2007; Heilmann, 2011). It is reasonable to expect that change agents may resort to 
P a g e  | 76 
innovative policy options to overcome other powerful institutional constraints, particularly 
where the makes radical change difficult. A changing political-economic landscape can 
enable key social actors to be more active throughout the reform process (Bradley et al., 
1999; see also Heilmann, 2011; Rodrigues and Child, 2008; Jing and McDermott, 2012), 
thus: 
Proposition 4: To the extent that entrenched institutions exert powerful constraints, 
strategizers may resort to different path-generation mechanisms to create innovative 
policy options to ameliorate governance shortcomings.  
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has surveyed selected neo-institutionalist literature about change, with 
particular attention to progressive institutional transformation among transitional economies’ 
state sector. It has contrasted deterministic path dependence as a stochastic sequential 
process with more open and flexible alternative of path generation, arguing that the latter 
might better advancing existing understandings of Chinese SSG reform (see also Martin, 
2006, 2010). Although it is now becoming more widely applied, Crouch (2005, p. 79) 
cautioned that “path dependence should not be seen as necessarily characterizing all 
institutions” however.  Whether from a path-dependence or path-generation perspective, 
researchers encounter tension between developing a relatively simple model that forms the 
substance of institutional change while also portraying its actual complexities in more 
realistic ‘action’ terms. To this end they might employ concepts and formulations from 
multiple schools of thought and dwell at length on the insights available from more singular 
institutional perspectives.  As Hall (2010, p. 220) stated, “it seems short-sighted to cling to 
one at the expense of benefiting from the others”. Moreover, path generation requires a 
dynamic methodology to realize its potential advantage for studying Chinese SOE reform. It 
particularly requires more appropriate measures to capture the retrospective, prospective and 
real time narratives running through reform. It suggests the importance of applying a “real 
time” or chronological approach to capture both manifest details and the underlying 
(emerging) plots that give real meaning to changes occurring at different stages of 
institutional evolution, in closer approximation to where and when events actually occur (see 
Porac, 1997). Otherwise, it would be tempting to think of any sequence of events 
(retrospectively labelled as a path) as almost having been inevitable. The complexity of path 
generation suggests that these policy outcomes are far from uniform across different 
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engage and follow the key players to appreciate their own entanglements and actions (Callon 
et al., 1986; Latour, 1991). This now raises the question of how to customize the most 
appropriate research methods for this purpose (Herrmann-Pillath, 2010).  
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Chapter 4  
Research Design and Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The dynamic nature of institutional change poses significant methodological challenges. 
Hurmerinta-Peltomäki and Nummela (2006, p. 440) indeed argued that “if a narrow 
methodological approach were to be applied in this complex context, only a small slice of 
the reality would be revealed”. Moreover, state sector governance (SSG) in transitional 
economies is a relatively new field of research for which the necessary theoretical roadmaps 
have not yet emerged. Nevertheless, this provides scholars from various disciplines with the 
opportunities of applying innovative research methods to answer questions of growing 
importance. In this chapter, a mixed-methods approach has been proposed because it is an 
expansive and creative form of research that enables researchers to use multiple approaches 
and data sources to understand complex phenomena, including enterprise reform (Johnson 
and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Bazeley, 2008, p. 135). Research on reform of China’s state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) often focuses on the (statistical) correlation between enterprise 
performance and particular corporate governance (CG) practices at firm level. However, 
findings from such a ‘snapshot’ approach are limited in that they underestimate how 
systematic SSG can be, while the actual process and context whereby particular institutional 
arrangements emerge are not always sufficiently explored (Smoke et al., 2006; see also 
Williams and Zumbansen, 2011).   
The next section (section 4.2) considers the rationale of a quantitatively embedded case 
study and discusses the particular research context into which it fits. It specifies the research 
objectives and identifies the potential problems of overreliance on just a statistical approach 
alone. The relative merits of a mixed-methods approach is then discussed in terms of its 
potential to mobilize multiple theories and data sources when examining particular SSG 
practices, thereby combining breadth and depth in empirical inquiries while improving the 
validity of findings (see also Modell, 2010). The following sections (sections 4.3 to 4.6) 
detail the procedures followed for data collection and analysis in the “building up” of more 
general theoretical accounts. To generate meaningful insights, considerations are given to 
how to conduct interviews with Chinese social elites, and also to analyse qualitative data 
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gathered through largely unstructured interviews, with particular attention to ensuring its 
validity for these purposes.   
4.2 Strategy of Inquiry: A Quantitatively Embedded Case Study 
The context-dependent, cross-disciplinary and open ended character of SSG as a field of 
research and the wide variations in its theoretical underpinning are apparent (Hopt, 2011). 
Such conceptual variations have significant implications for the methodological approaches 
employed.  However, before detailed research design, the strategy of inquiry should 
primarily be driven by what questions research seeks to answer.   
4.2.1 Research Objectives and Implications for Research Design 
In prevailing finance and accounting studies, researchers often embrace a principal-agent 
perspective and thus focus exclusively on interest alignment/misalignment between 
corporate insiders and finance providers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). To the extent that socio-economic contexts vary, problems in 
China’s state sector differ significantly from developed markets, as do mechanisms for 
correcting governance failings (Berglöf and Thadden, 1999). It may therefore be less fruitful 
to test established finance and economic theories not carried forward far beyond more 
advanced economies. 
Such neoclassical theories affect methodological choices in the sense that the dominant 
approach has often been limited to positivist, quantitative methods, including the application 
of econometric techniques based on relatively large scale formal datasets (Megginson and 
Netter, 2001; Brennan and Solomon, 2008). They often emphasize selected facts and 
relationships between CG practices and particular performance proxies among reformed 
SOEs, where the former are delimited into measurable and common categories also applied 
to wider and/or similar research topics (Winter, 2000). A focus on statistical correlation may 
miss how CG arrangements are products of the broader SSG system (see Roe, 2003; Pagano 
and Volpin, 2005). These arise formally from set regulations and policies that in turn reflect 
the leading political institutions and developmental strategy of a given country (Anguilera 
and Jackson, 2003; Nolan, 2007). As a result, the systematic and embedded character of SSG 
can be underestimated. Moreover, where variables are measured and regressed over 
relatively short time periods, this approach may also neglect the ongoing dynamics of SSG 
reform and not fully capture the actual complexities in more realistic ‘action’ terms.  
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For SSG research in emerging economies, Lichet et al. (2005; see also Anguilera and 
Jackson, 2003) and Herrmann-Pillath (2008) suggest that research design should be 
receptive to how the SSG system has been shaped by interaction between multiple actors, i.e. 
actor-centred institutionalism, and evolves within the broader social-economic environment, 
i.e. institutional embeddedness. This research study differs significantly from prevailing 
finance and accounting studies. It seeks to explore the real dynamics of China’s state sector 
reform, with special attention to the context, process and actors involved. It does so by firstly 
examining the different sources and mechanisms for institutional change, as well as the key 
actors and other context-specific elements of special relevance to China’s specific 
institutional environment (Chapter 5). Using a firm-level case study, it also seeks to gain 
more insights into the reform process and interactions among the specific “local strategizers” 
who actually perform and even reform governance practices (Chapter 6). Both chapters 
apply embedded quantitative analyses to assess the policy outcomes of the ongoing reform. 
By examining the correlation between cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) – as proxies for 
stock market reaction on decision of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CM&As) – and 
governance variables, it is possible to interpret how public investors – the key corporate 
constituents – regard firm-level policy arrangements in an increasingly international context. 
These findings may foreshadow further institutional evolution, granted the rising influence 
of public investors. This approach can enable researchers to explore the main constraints and 
impetus underlying the transformation process, and how the intertwined forces of 
institutional entrenchment and economic liberalization have led Chinese SSG further along 
the path of institutional transformation. 
4.2.2 A Mixed-Methods Approach 
A mixed-methods approach has formally been defined by Johnson and Onwuebuzie (2004, 
p. 17) as “the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and 
qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single 
study”. Moving beyond previous debate, they claim that a mixed-methods design refers to a 
third research strategy which is situated in the middle. 
“The goal of mixed-methods research is not to replace either of these approached but rather 
to draw from the strengths and minimize the weakness of both in single research studies and 
across studies. If you visualize a continuum with qualitative research anchored at one pole 
and quantitative research anchored at the other, mixed-methods research covers the large 
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set of points in the middle area. If one prefers to think categorically, mixed-methods 
research sits in a new third chair, with qualitative research sitting on the left and 
quantitative research sitting on the right side”( Johnson and Onwuebuzie, 2004, pp. 14-15).  
Thus, by understanding the relative strengths and weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative 
methods, it is possible to mix these two strategies under what Johnson and Tuner (2003) 
term the fundamental principle of mixed-methods research. A range of well-rehearsed 
evaluative studies about the mixed-methods strategy emphasize its relative merits in 
validating data and analysis through triangulation, while gaining a fuller picture of the 
phenomenon under investigation (Mason, 2006).  
The choice of a mixed-methods approach for this research study can be justified by the 
following reasons. First, the mix of quantitative and qualitative methods, albeit with unequal 
emphasis on each, provides a more enriched and elaborate understanding of SSG reforms. 
Although the merits of quantitative analysis lie in its generalizing inference and making of 
predictions, the conclusions from such inferences can be too general and abstract to be 
applied among specific local situations, contexts, and actors (Onwuegbuzie and Johnson, 
2004). In other words, it runs the risk of premature theoretical closure (Modell, 2009). By 
conducting post-hoc qualitative research, researchers can uncover other complex dynamics 
and interactions behind statistical correlations. These may include tacit phenomena and 
processes related to the decision-making, implementation and further development processes 
of corporate governance.  
Second, SSG represents an institutional configuration that operates at multiple levels (i.e. 
firm, market and nation) where a series of different institutional, economic and 
organizational factors shape organizational and governance practices (see OECD, 2005; 
Judge, 2011). While a large sample based statistical analysis enables outline investigation of 
developing Chinese SSG practices at large, complementary in-depth and customized case 
studies are also necessary to elaborate the transformative process and actors’ interactions at 
both national and organizational levels.
1
 The configurational character (of corporate 
governance) suggests that a multi-level analysis employing both quantitative and qualitative 
methods is needed, with each contributing cumulative knowledge about reform dynamics 
                                                          
1
 As noted by Creswell and Clark (2007, p. 91), “the premises of this design are that a single data set is not 
sufficient, that different questions need to be answered, and that each type of question requires different types 
of data”.  
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(see also Bazeley, 2008, p. 134). 
Third, the integration of different data sources and analytical techniques may produce new 
and even surprising findings that would not have emerged otherwise. Paradoxical findings 
from quantitative analysis may prove helpful for designing the subsequent case studies and 
unstructured interviews; the findings from this may capture more about the key research 
questions. Thus differences in results generated through a mixed-methods approach can be 
welcomed as “it is in the tension that the boundaries of what is known are most generatively 
challenged and stretched” (Greene and Caracelli, 1997, p. 112; see also Bazeley, 2008).  
Although aligning any disparate findings thereby derived can requires more time and effort it 
can also expand knowledge and increase any theoretical contribution (Hurmerinta-Peltomäki 
and Nummela, 2006).  
Last, the so-called soft and/or invisible feature of certain governance institutions suggests the 
potential inappropriateness of solely relying on quantitative analysis (see Pierre, 2000). The 
decision-making and implementation of the particular corporate governance practices which 
this research study seeks to explore can be difficult to articulate, measure, and quantify. As 
noted, this is highly sensitive to the institutional environment and social actors’ interactions 
where “events are unpredictable and sporadic; outcomes are hard to specify; coalitions are 
transient; and the environment is extremely complex” (Shaffer, 1995, p. 509).2  This is 
especially the case for emerging and transitional economies where judgment upon new 
corporate governance institutions is still premature (Peng and Heath, 1996; Estrin and 
Prevezer, 2011). Quantitative researchers who overlook the mediating effects produced by 
institutional or cultural factors can find it difficult to account for the unintended effects of 
‘borrowed’ or ‘transplanted’ governance institutions. Thus, this research study will be 
contextually grounded, and seek to “understand process dynamics and not just outcomes” 
(Pettigrew, 2013, p. 124).  
4.3 Research Design: A Quantitatively Embedded Case Study 
Given the exploratory nature and the qualitatively-driven logic, a “quantitatively embedded 
research” has been chosen as the primary methodological design where quantitative analyses 
are “nested” within the predominant qualitative approach.  Whereas the qualitative analysis 
                                                          
2
 Moreover, the social-cultural embeddedness of corporate governance suggests that informal rules are of equal 
importance in understanding the actual functioning of institutions at work. 
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may “lean towards prevalence, generalizability, and calibration”, the qualitative case studies 
are designated to give greater emphasis to narration, description, interpretation, and 
exploration (Pettigrew, 2013, p. 124). 
4.3.1 Research Procedures 
Figure 4.1 indicates a mixed-methods notation which depicts these procedures. Prior to data 
collection and analysis a conceptualization of China’s SSG reform has been advanced 
whereby theories from various disciplines are fused into an orienting lens that shapes the 
types of questions asked, participants interviewed, and data collected (Creswell, 2009, p. 
207). The theoretical underpinning of this research study is largely drawn upon the political-
economic perspectives and emerging theories of institutional innovation, in particular path-
generation theory.  
Figure 4.1 Quantitatively-Embedded Design 
 
Theory building is then followed by data collection and analysis. In this stage, the 
quantitative data and analyses are embedded within two respective qualitative studies. 
Convergence of results from two different methods can help to generalize qualitative 
findings when quantitative data are based on random samples of sufficient size (Johnson and 
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Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Moreover, qualitative case studies allow the problem under discussion 
to be more exhaustively elaborated (Srnka and Koeszegi, 2007). For Patton (2005, p. 3), 
“qualitative findings in evaluation can illuminate the people behind the numbers and put 
faces on the statistics to deepen understanding”.  Such an elaboration model is considered 
effective for deriving deeper insights and building confidence from empirical evidence. The 
subsequent representative case study plays both exploratory and complementary roles. The 
purpose is to deepen inquiry into transformative dynamics through unstructured interviews 
with key decision makers (Creswell and Clark, 2007, pp. 86-91). For Morgan (1998), this 
embedded design is more applicable when testing the elements of an emerging theory (in 
this case, the path-generation perspective) derived from the qualitative phase before further 
generalizations are sought (Creswell, 2009, p. 211; Greene et al., 1989).  
Figure 4.2 Breadth of Research and Weight of Findings 
Research Breadth                                   Argument Weight 
 
It can be seen that such a quantitatively-embedded design operates on three levels (see 
Figure 4.2), each with such functions as conceptualizing, generalizing and exploring (Scholz 
and Tietje, 2002, p. 30-31). The qualitatively-driven logic implies that, as empirical 
investigation deepens (as indicated by the inverted triangle), the weight of research findings 
is gradually shifted onto the single case study, which affords more fruitful insights into the 
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dynamics of SSG, including important issues often omitted in the finance-economic 
paradigm (Bansal, 2013).  
4.3.2 Primary Qualitative Analysis 
This stage has similarities with clinical case study design where path-generation theory and 
other political-economic perspectives have been used to ‘diagnose’ the causal links between 
different reform schemes as well as their policy outcomes. It differs from other case studies 
in the sense that it focuses on the transformative dynamics and interaction with social actors 
of corporate governance reform.
3
 So far, research into Chinese state sector reform has often 
been limited to the chronological review of different regulatory stages. Attempts to trace the 
precedence of one particular governance practice or the other in terms of chronological order 
may prove less fruitful as isolated instances of similar occurrences can be found in other 
stages of state sector reform (Tunzelmann, 2003).  
Rather than imposing a “hypothesized end-state” onto China’s reform destination, this study 
uses path-generation theory as its conceptual anchor as it underscores the emergent nature of 
SSG reform. While the transformation of governance institutions can be highly situational, 
the concept of institutional entrepreneur highlights the role of actors’ self-awareness and 
self-interests, as well as their interaction with the existing institutional arrangements, in 
explaining the emergence and stabilization of certain practices. All these might require 
researching archive resources, including formal reports, government documents, newspaper, 
and documentary films where these are sufficiently rich to admit subsequent reinterpretation 
(Adelman et al., 2012). With synchronous (real time) information regarding institutional 
development researchers can situate themselves at the very time  when events occurred, even 
if looking at data gathered in the past (Bijker et al., 1987). Otherwise, it would be tempting 
to think of any sequence of events (retrospectively labelled as a path) as having been 
inevitable. It is also possible to follow different actors to study how actions become possible 
through mutual entanglements (Reven et al., 2011; Douglas, 2012). The qualitative inputs 
can illuminate their complexities and embeddedness from an action perspective which 
statistical regression cannot necessarily illuminate. The following study underscores salient 
governance features in a leading Chinese context in a way which could facilitate further 
empirical studies.  
                                                          
3
 It also seeks to provide the most updated overview of China’s corporate governance reform as the latest 
available research on the same topic were conducted during the early 2000s.  
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4.3.3 A Single-Case Study  
This provides a firm-level investigation into the actual evolution and implementation of SSG 
practices, with a particular focus upon the role of local actors. Its aim is to increase the 
thoroughness of previous research findings through a more comprehensive and intensive 
rooted in both the representativeness and practicalities of SSG institutions. The selected 
company is a leading large state-controlled corporation (SCC) in China’s insurance industry 
– China Life Insurance Company Limited. It is a leading representative example of the state 
governance movement among China’s larger SOEs and this research is exploratory because: 
 China Life has undergone critical developmental stages including establishment as a 
state-run unit, expansion of managerial autonomy, corporatization, spin-offs of non-
performing asset, and sock market listing. Its predecessor, i.e., People Insurance 
Company of China (PICC), was approved and established the same year as the founding 
of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 when it became the only officially 
approved insurer. With increasing deregulation and globalisation, China Life has 
transitioned from an administrative unit attached to the People’s Bank of China, to major 
market player faced with intensified competition. In certain respects the history of China 
Life mirrors the evolution of much of China’s state sector. 
 The Company has the prevailing concentrated shareholding structure of China’s state 
sector in spite of further attempted ownership diversification. It is near typical for Chinese 
SCCs that the majority ownership stakes are retained by intermediate shareholding 
agencies. The 2012 annual report showed that the shareholding group, i.e. China Life 
Insurance Group, maintains 68.37 per cent ownership control over the listed entity. In 
accordance with Company Law, China Life also adopted the dual-board system for 
internal corporate control, with the board of directors responsible for major decision-
making. A highly concentrated shareholding structure implies that the Company is likely 
to face the same problem of insider control found among other SCCs (see also Wu, 2005; 
Naughton, 2006).  
 In terms of administrative status and regulatory framework, the Company enjoys the same 
vice-ministerial level ranking as many other Chinese “national champions”. While most 
of these corporations are subject to State Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) supervision, the Company and state-owned banks have similar 
superior regulatory bodies, i.e. Chinese Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) and 
P a g e  | 87 
 
Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CRBC). With the party-state's continuous 
manoeuvrings to improve the state asset management system among non-financial 
corporations, there have been robust debates about whether the equivalent asset 
management body should be enacted and reconsolidate state control over the insurance 
and banking sectors (Naughton, 2006).  Thus, it will be intriguing to investigate how 
similar reform measures have been implemented within the state-owned insurance giant, 
which may shed light on future policy changes. So far there have been few firm-level 
studies about China’s insurance sector even while its regulation has undergone dramatic 
transformation. 
 The Chinese party-state adopted overseas listing as an important means of raising capital 
and imposing more effective corporate supervision. China Life was successfully listed in 
the New York Stock Exchange and Hong Kong Stock Exchange on December 17 and 18, 
2003, respectively. This made it the first state-owned financial enterprise to launch its 
overseas initial public offering (IPO), raising $3.5 billion and becoming the world's 
largest IPO of that year. The Company was also among the first group of China’s SOEs 
that voluntarily subjected themselves to emerging international corporate governance 
standards. The governance practices within these “pilot” companies at both national and 
firm levels may bear important policy implications for other national champions seeking 
overseas listing.   
 Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession in 2001, restrictions over many 
business sectors regarding ownership type, business scope, and geographical area were to 
be gradually diminished. It might reasonably be expected that the semi-monopolistic 
position of many large SCCs could be challenged by new entrants, including major 
international and domestic non-sate competitors. The increased ‘openness’ and 
competitive pressure of China’s insurance sector implies greater chances for off-path 
institutional innovation while also foreshadowing the further development of state 
governance amid intensified marketization.   
This sampling logic contrasts strikingly with hypothesis-testing research in which the goal of 
sampling is to obtain accurate statistical evidence on investigated variables within a large 
population (Eisenhardt, 1989).  As Pettigrew (1990, 2013) noted, due to the limited number 
of cases which can actually be investigated, it can make more sense to choose cases such as 
extreme situations or polar types where the process is "transparently observable" (see also 
Eisenhardt, 1989). So, by filling different theoretical categories or providing examples of 
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polar types, case sampling in theory-building research seeks cases likely to replicate or 
extend emergent theory.  Similar sampling strategies are observed among prevailing research 
into SOE reform (see Nolan and Wang, 1999; Nolan, 2002, and 2005; Naughton, 2006, 
2008). 
Qualitative data was here obtained from organizational documents and actors with 
appropriate specialized knowledge which will be discussed in the following section. In 
particular, in-depth interviewing, and repeated close contacts with, and observations of, key 
informants were employed. The character of this inquiry is therefore relatively unstructured 
and mainly composed of unstructured interviews. A formal pilot study was not conducted 
since the two preliminary studies were intended to serve a similar purpose. The primary 
research participants include 36 interviewees, mainly corporate managers and party 
committee members, whose positions ranged from top level board members and government 
officers to individual department managers. The research design of multi-level interviews 
also aimed to provide in-depth and comprehensive insights into ongoing regulatory and 
governance practices in China’s SCCs. For this purpose, the choice of a multiple case study 
approach has been rejected, as breadth might then be obtained at the expense of depth.  
The channels for elite interviews derived mainly from the researcher’s own relational 
connections within both SOE and government sectors, as well as past journalism work for a 
Swiss national newspaper, i.e. Neue Zürcher Zeitung. Furthermore, in order to gain due 
political perspective, interviewees included officials from the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) Central Finance Committee and China Insurance Regulatory Commission. Three 
interviewees from the Shareholding Group actively participated in the overseas IPO and 
were closely engaged in the initial preparatory stage of the subsequent lawsuit settlement. 
Table 4.2 shows the composition of the sample. For reasons of anonymity, names of 
informants and their detailed managerial tenure are not disclosed.  
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Table 4.1 Sample of Interviewees 
Positions of 
Interviewees 
Affiliated Companies and Departments Interview Site and 
Year 
Informant 
Code 
Director Investment Department of China Life Group 
Corporation 
Beijing, 2009, 2010 
and 2011 
IN1 
Director Resource Configuration Department Beijing, 2011 IN2 
Former Independent 
Director 
Board of Directors of China Life Beijing, 2010 IN3 
Former Secretary General Manager’s Office of PICC Beijing, 2009 IN4 
Former Secretary Board of Directors of China Life Beijing, 2010, 2011 
and 2012 
IN5 
Director President Office of China Life Beijing, 2010 IN6 
Former Supervisor Board of Supervisor Beijing, 2011 IN7 
Former Deputy 
Director 
HR Department Beijing, 2012 IN8 
Former member IPO Roadshow Delegation Beijing, 2010 IN9 
Former member IPO Roadshow Delegation Beijing, 2010 IN10 
Former Director Sales and Marketing Department of China 
Life 
Beijing, 2010 and 
2011 
IN11 
Deputy Director Audit Department of China Life Beijing, 2010 IN12 
General Manager China Life Guangdong Provincial Branch Guangzhou, 2010 IN13 
Former Manager Sales and Marketing Department of China 
Life Guangdong Provincial Branch 
Guangzhou, 2010 IN14 
General Manager China Life Beijing Municipal City Branch Beijing, 2010 and 
2011 
IN15 
Deputy General 
Manager 
China Life Beijing Municipal City Branch Beijing, 2010 and 
2011 
IN16 
Former Manager Sales and Marketing Department of Beijing 
Municipal City Branch 
Beijing, 2010 and 
2011 
IN17 
Former Manager Sales and Marketing Department of Yanqing 
County Branch 
Beijing, 2010 and 
2011 
IN18 
Deputy Director China Life Northern China Audit Centre Beijing, 2010 and 
2011 
IN19 
Deputy Director China Life Northern China Audit Centre Beijing, 2010 and 
2011 
IN20 
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Table 4.1 Sample of Interviewees – Continued 
Positions of 
Interviewees 
Affiliated Companies and Departments Interview Site and 
Year 
Informant 
Code 
Director China Life North-eastern  China Audit Centre Shenyang, 2010 and 
2011 
IN21 
Audit Group 
Leader 
China Life North-eastern  China Audit Centre Shenyang, 2010 and 
2011 
IN22 
Director China Life Southern China Audit Centre Shenzhen, 2011 IN23 
Deputy Director China Life Southern China Audit Centre Shenzhen, 2011 IN24 
Secretary General Manager Office of China Life Common 
Wealth Bank Insurance Corporation 
Shanghai, 2009 IN25 
Former member CCP Central Financial Work Committee Beijing, 2009, 2010 
and 2011 
IN26 
Former member CCP Central Financial Work Committee Beijing, 2009, 2010 
and 2011 
IN27 
Senior Official Law and Regulation Department of China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission 
Beijing, 2010 and 
2011 
IN28 
Senior Official Law and Regulation Department of China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission 
Beijing, 2010, 2011 
and 2012 
IN29 
Defendant lawyer Sidley Austin LLP Beijing, 2010 IN30 
Lawyer Debevoice & Plimpton LLP Beijing, 2010 IN31 
Manager Investment Department of Hutchison Whampoa Shanghai, 2011 IN32 
Manager Investment Department of Hutchison Whampoa Beijing, 2011 IN33 
Former Manager Investment Department of Hutchison Whampoa Shenzhen, 2011 IN34 
Senior Official National Audit Office Beijing, 2010 IN35 
Senior Official National Audit Office Beijing, 2010 IN36 
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4.3.4 Embedded Quantitative Analysis: Event Studies  
The quantitative analyses test findings derived from the preliminary qualitative research and 
single-case study set within an actively internationalizing context. Where the qualitative 
research examines the dynamics of SSG reform, complementary statistical analyses are 
expected to examine how international investors regarded observed different SSG 
arrangements, including corporate governance practices, given the growing influence of 
public investors in the key reform agenda (Green, 2003). The CARs are here intended to 
capture the reaction of international investors towards firms’ decisions about cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions shaped by the observed SSG practices. In actuality, CARs are 
widely adopted to examine investors’ ratings of particular institutional factors and 
governance arrangements that bear upon corporate strategic decision-making (e.g, Gubbi et 
al., 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2011). The raw data was shared in a recent  
publication co-authored with Dr Lutao Ning, Dr Jing-Ming Kuo and Professor Roger 
Strange.
4
 
4.3.4.1 Research Context  
The statistical analyses use a relatively unique, manually constructed firm-level dataset to 
examine the stock market’s reaction upon announcements of CM&As made by Chinese 
multinationals listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE). Hong Kong provided an 
ideal setting for the following reasons.  First, HKSE, owing in part to its geographic and 
historic links with the mainland, remains the favored hub for CM&A activities by Chinese 
MNCs (see also Sutherland and Ning, 2011). For example, statistics from Thomason One 
Banker reported that, among the 588 CM&As by November 2013, 171 were conducted 
through their listed entities in Hong Kong. Thus, research on CM&As by the mainland-listed 
MNCs often entail limited numbers of observations that could mean inconclusive findings 
(Zhao, 2001; Wang and Wang, 2011; Ning et al, 2014). For example, Boateng et al. (2008) 
examined a small sample of 27 Chinese cross-border acquisitions by mainland listed SOEs 
between 2000 and 2004 and concluded positive value creation for acquiring firms’ 
shareholders. Using a sample of 39 deals during 2000-2008, Chen and Young (2010) find 
that Chinese acquiring multinational enterprises (MNEs) with greater government ownership 
generate lower value returns in CM&As. A recent study by Kling and Weitzel (2011) 
                                                          
4 See Ning, L., Kuo, J., Strange, R. & Wang, B., 2014. International Investors’ Reactions to Cross-Border 
Acquisitions by Emerging Market Multinationals. International Business Review, forthcoming.  
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analyses 221 CM&A announcements by Chinese firms listed in the Hong Kong, Shanghai 
and Shenzhen and concluded that CM&As created less positive shareholder value  than 
domestic M&As. Such scarcity can be attributed to Chinese CM&As being a relatively 
recent phenomenon (Nolan and Wang, 1999; Naughton, 2008).  
Second, the mature and well-regulated Hong Kong stock market could provide more rational 
assessment of the governance characteristics of Chinese MNCs (Cheung et al., 2007). In 
contrast to mainland stock markets potentially dominated by inexperienced and speculative 
investors, Hong Kong has successfully attracted other international financial institutions and 
securities professionals. Their qualifications are internationally recognized with accumulated 
valuable trading experience to provide more critical financial and technical assistance to 
individual investors (Mei, et al., 2009). Moreover, Hong Kong has a well-developed 
financial market infrastructure reputedly known for relatively close and careful regulatory 
supervision (Cheung et al., 2007). In particular, more stringent corporate governance 
requirements ensure that investors have access to the more timely and transparent 
information necessary to appraise companies' position and prospects (Ho and Wong, 2001). 
In fact, international rating agencies often rank Hong Kong one of the most advanced 
markets in the Asian-Pacific region (Cheung et al., 2007).The announcement returns here 
reflect the more rational and objective responses towards individual CM&A decisions under 
different SSG arrangements (Lin and Wang, 2001).   
Finally, a Hong Kong stock market also dominated by firms with concentrated 
ownership and intertwined management may well mitigate the ‘home bias’ in share pricing 
(Kumar, 2009; Ning et al., 2014).  In contrast to the more dispersed ownership found in 
Anglo-American countries, Hong Kong listed companies exhibit a high level of ownership 
concentration among families, industrial groups, or governments (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; 
Cheung et al., 2007). This is obtained by dual class shares and/or pyramidal structures, as 
frequently found in companies from other East Asian economies, including the Chinese 
mainland (Ben-Amar and André, 2006). Governance problems and expropriation risk thus 
differ considerably from the conventional agency problem, as can the corresponding 
solutions and regulatory means (La Porta et al., 1998; 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; 
Claessens and Fan, 2002). Such contrasting ownership and governance arrangements could 
imply an inherent “home (local) bias” in stock valuation where investors exhibit greater 
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aversion to foreign securities (Tesar and Werner, 1995; Coval, and Moskowitz, 1999; Kilka 
and Webber, 2000; Kumar, 2009).  
4.3.4.2 Sample Size and Variable Definition 
The dataset combined both electronic sources and manually collected information. A near 
exhaustive sample of 504 CM&A announcements made between 1 Oct 1991 and 31 May 
2010 were extracted, mainly from the Thomson One Banker. Additional entries were 
collected from other databases, including the business information services from Factiva and 
LexisNexis, in order to develop a more comprehensive proprietary database, as there were 
more than 120 missing Chinese CM&A cases in the electronic database. The integration of 
multiple data sources effectively expands the sample size.  
The dependent variable of CARs measures the total returns to shareholders attributed to  
CM&As announcements (Boardman et al., 2010). It reflects investors’ judgments regarding 
the value-creation (or destruction) potential of particular institutional and organization 
factors (Chen and Young, 2010; Gubbi et al., 2010; Ning et al., 2014). To calculate the 
CARs, stock price data over a period of 100 days prior to CM&A announcements were 
obtained through DataStream. 405 CM&As were identified after excluding companies with 
missing stock data. As discussed later, the large, cross-sectional event sample and the long 
timespan can mitigate the estimation bias of abnormal returns (McWilliams and Siegel 1997; 
Binder, 1998).  
The independent variables include nature of corporate control, board characteristics, and 
other firm and deal-specific control variables. Where DataStream provided convenient 
access to control variables, the one-year lagged values regarding the governance 
characteristics were manually collected from each company’s annual reports so that 
endogeneity issues could be resolved. The stringent information requirement by HKSE since 
1999 enabled the researcher to extract important information regarding identity of corporate 
control, ownership structure and board composition (Chen and Young, 2010). The increased 
openness of e-government websites proved useful for verifying certain characteristics of 
SSG, including the inter-firm linkage and identify of ultimate corporate controllers. Thus, a 
subsample of 372 acquisitions over the period of 1999-2010 was used for the cross-sectional 
analysis. Table 4.3 provides the definition of variables adopted.  
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First, characteristics of corporate control formulate the institutional infrastructure of 
corporate decision-makings, and thus have significant influence over interest alignment 
among stakeholders and the value creation effect of CM&As (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). As the number of private enterprises was limited, two binary 
variables – central government control and local government control – were adopted to 
denote the nature of firms’ ultimate controllers (see also La Porta et al., 1999; Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003; Tihanyi and Hegarty, 2007; Chen and Young, 2010; Wielemaker and 
Gedajlovic, 2011). The preceding qualitative analysis suggested different roles and 
incentives structures of central and local governments in enterprise reform, thus providing a 
rationale for detailed variable selection. To identify the ultimate controllers, each firm’s 
largest shareholder was noted first and, if the greatest shareholder was a business entity, an 
attempt was made to identify the controlling organizations (see also Lien et al., 2005). If the 
organization was a shareholding agency authorized by central government, the firm was 
categorized as central government controlled (CGC). Similarly, if a firm’s ultimate 
controller was an agency authorized by local government, the firm was considered to be 
local government controlled (LGC). As noted, the integration of various information 
sources, including media news, administrative documents and even government websites, 
facilitated data coding and entry. In the context of emerging economies, group affiliation 
increases the risk of investor expropriation, as the affiliated enterprises are often associated 
with lack of transparency, unclear management structure and possibility of expropriation 
(Liu and Lu, 2007). Thus, dummy of group affiliation (GA) was adopted (coded 1 if the 
acquiring firm was affiliated to a business group). Finally, the presence of a large 
shareholding may help to overcome the “free-rider” problem among minority investors in 
monitoring corporate management. A significant equity stake implies a high degree of 
congruence between the controlling shareholders’ interest and firm’s interests. A significant 
ownership stake implies that the controlling financée have both strong incentives and 
capacities to overcome the ‘free-rider problem’ associated with dispersed shareholding 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Bai et al., 2004; Culpepper, 2010). Thus, the numeric variable of 
largest shareholding (LS) was included, given its positive role in managerial monitoring.  
The other set of explanatory variables relate to board’s characteristics. Corporate governance 
scholars have devoted considerable attention to examining the influence of boards on firms’ 
strategic decisions and performance. ‘Upper echelon’ theory suggests that board 
characteristics have considerable influence upon the outcomes of strategic decisions and thus 
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corporate performance (see Hambrick and Mason; 1984; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; 
Lien et al., 2005). While firm-level case research showed mixed results regarding the 
efficacy of board institutions, cross-sectional analysis here was designed to evaluate their 
roles within the context of internationalization. These include board of directors (BOD), 
Supervisory Board (SB), and audit committee. According to the Company Law, Chinese 
companies adopt a two-tier or hybrid board structure in which independent director and 
supervisory boards are intended to impose effective managerial oversight. To agency 
theorists, increased board independence, as measured by the proportion of independent 
directors on boards, can ensure that firms’ decisions are made in the interests of public 
investors and thus reduce the expropriation risks posed by corporate insiders. Research on 
corporate governance development outside an Anglo-American context suggests that 
independent directors may not mitigate insider control, give controllers’ dominance over 
boards (see Peng, 2004). Although corporate supervisors are necessary for improving 
governance quality, their efficacy needs to be endorsed (Dahya et al., 2002). For example, 
findings from the Chinese context suggest that SBs in Chinese companies are not effective 
enough to establish “institutional legitimacy” in curbing insiders’ malpractices. Corporate 
insiders can use their super voting rights to turn the board into a ‘rubber stamp’ authority by 
appointing members who would not challenge their decisions (Tam, 1995; Claessens et al., 
2002; Peng, 2004; Xi, 2006). To public investors, expanded SBs staffed by incumbent 
executives are likely to incur significant administration and communication costs.  
To gain a wider view, audit committee independence – measured by the proportion of 
external committee members – was included to proxy higher quality of internal control and 
information disclosure. Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong are often subject to more 
stringent information requirements and accounting standards imposed by foreign regulators 
and market participants. Higher committee independence is expected to positively discipline 
incumbent insiders (Chan and Li, 2008). In the light of the above discussion, variables of 
BOD independence (BI), supervisory board size (SBS) and audit committee independence 
(ACI) were included (see Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). Brickley et al. (1997) found that 
CEO/chairman duality (CD) can effectively enhance managerial monitoring through 
improved transparency of board meetings and information flow. In the Chinese context, 
Chen et al (2011) suggest that the role of duality may remain rather limited as board 
members and executives are commonly dominated by the unified “leading team” of 
shareholding agencies. Thus CD was included as a dummy variable to examine how 
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international investors judge the board efficiency of Chinese MNEs. In addition to the 
specialist literature, variable selection here drew upon preceding case research, and statistical 
inference was expected to enhance the generalizability and/or validity of such qualitative 
findings (see also Ning et al., 2014). 
Meanwhile, drawing upon research on CM&As, the cross-sectional analysis controlled for 
both firm and deal-specific variables that might affect short-term deal performance. Firm age 
(FA) was included due to the positive effects of the learning curve on firms’ 
internationalization performance (Sapienza et al., 2006). To control for the influence of 
firms’ past financial and operational performance, the 3-year averages of return on assets 
(ROA) operating profit margin (OPM) have also been adopted. Firm size (FS) has often been 
interpreted as a value-creation indicator of firms’ available resources and capability for 
achieving economies of scale (e.g. Bontin, 2001; Lien et al., 2005; Du and Boateng, 2012). 
However, existing international business literature suggests that expanded firm size may 
have significant value-destruction effects due to managerial hubris, information asymmetry 
and coordination challenges over post-acquisition integration (e.g. Stulz, 2005; Gubbi et al., 
2010). This study did not have a direct measure of how much these factors took effect, but 
used Tobin’s Q (TQ) as a proxy. The reasoning was that the above-mentioned effects could 
arguably become reflected in different market capitalization (Bontin, 2001; Doukas and 
Lang, 2003; Lien et al., 2005; Dong et al., 2006). Higher leverage, measured as debt-equity 
ratio (DER), may have a positive effect on CARs as financial leverage may reduce 
managerial discretion and indicate firms’ capabilities to access external financial resources 
(Masulis, et al., 2007). As to the deal-specific effects, the nature of target firms is reflected in 
the dummy of target status (TS) (coded 1 if a target firm is private) (Fuller et al., 2002; 
Moeller et al., 2004). It has been documented in the M&A literature that status of target 
firms (i.e. private vs. public) is likely to influence acquisition performance (Capron and 
Shen, 2007; Gubbi et al., 2010). Acquisition of a private target fails to enjoy a reputation 
similar to that of public firms and is less likely to result in overpayment, implying greater 
wealth gains to acquirers’ shareholders (Gubbi et al., 2010: Uddin and Boateng, 2011; Du 
and Boateng, 2012; Ning et al., 2014). The regression model also controls the impact of 
time-varying market-wide performance and re-adjusts t-statistics for the effect of industry 
clustering. A one-year lag was also assumed between the CM&A announcements and all the 
control variables.  
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4.3.4.3 Regression Procedure 
Both analyses follow a two-step procedure in which (1) a standard event study methodology 
is used to access the value creation effect of corporate investment decisions;
 5
 and (2) the 
resulting cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are regressed on a series of explanatory and 
control variables regarding specific governance features in Chinese companies. This design 
has frequently been used in OFDI research into emerging economy corporations (e.g. 
Filatotchev et al., 2007; Gubbi et al., 2010). The statistical analysis here, including the CAR 
calculation and subsequent cross-sectional analysis, uses STATA as the primary research 
tool. The original syntax commands and statistical result are presented in the attached 
appendices.   
To calculate the CARs, it is necessary to obtain the estimated coefficients. The standard 
approach of the market model in which the daily stock returns of a firm are regressed against 
the returns of a benchmark market index is applied for this purpose. The market model has 
been widely employed by the prevailing research on CM&As by emerging multinational 
enterprises (e.g. Filatotchev et al., 2007; Chen and Young, 2010; Gubbi et al., 2010; Ning et 
al., 2014). Its high    suggested the great ability of detecting event effects (MacKinlay, 
1997; Desai et al., 2005). The model is expressed as follow: 
   ( )                     
where     is the observed return on  firm i’s share price on day t.      is the return on the 
selected market index, i.e., Hang Seng Index, on day t. The coefficient    is denoted as the 
intercept term and    captures the systematic risk of firm i’s share prices.      is the random 
error term. Thus, the daily abnormal return on firm i’s share price within the event window 
can be expressed as: 
   ( )           (  ̂     ̂    ), 
where   ̂ and   ̂  are the parameter estimates of     and    from the single-factor market 
model. They were computed through the ordinary least squares regression of     on     
over the predetermined 90-day estimation period, commencing from t=-120 to t=-30 prior to 
the event announcements. These two estimates, together with the observed return on firm i’s 
                                                          
5
 Event study has been widely used by financial economists to investigate the financial impact of an 
unanticipated event, such as investment decisions and senior personal changes (McWilliams and Siegel, 2011). 
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share price  and return on Hang Seng Index on day t, were then plugged into Eq. (2) to 
compute estimation error as a proxy for the daily abnormal return      .  
However, the simplicity of market model may lead to severe estimation bias, as any 
omittance of firm-specific characteristics may increase the variance of abnormal returns 
(Binder, 1998). In this case financial economists (e.g. Sharpe and Sharpe, 1970; Bailey and 
Chung, 1995) have proposed multifactor models to incorporate sector- and/or size-related 
indexes in addition to the market benchmark. However, as noted by MacKinlay (1997), the 
gains from employing such models are questionable due to the limited explanatory power of 
the additional variables, leading to little reduction in error term variance (see also Brown and 
Warner, 1980, 1985). Variance deduction will typically be greatest in cases where sample 
firms are clustered in one industry or concentrated within one market capitalization group 
(MacKinlay, 1997). Binder (1998, p. 119) noted that variance of abnormal returns will 
average to zero “when a large sample of unrelated securities is used or the event dates are 
not clustered in calendar time”. In either case, the market model estimator of abnormal 
returns is generally unbiased.  
The abnormal returns were further aggregated over the event windows period to obtain the 
cumulative abnormal returns. This event study employed the parametric t-test to test whether 
the CARs were significantly different from zero. To address issues of information leakage, it 
is necessary to test the CARs over different event periods (see Milevsky and Song, 2008; 
Chen and Young, 2010). Thus, various event windows, such as (-5, +5), (-2, +2), (-1, +1), 
and (-1, 0) were employed with the announcement date denoted as 0. According to 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997), these event periods should be long enough to capture the 
significant effect of the events, while short enough to exclude the confounding effects (see 
also Chen and Young, 2010). Binder (1998) suggested that bias in hypothesis test about 
average CARs depends on the number of observations in both the estimation period and 
event window. As the event period expands, the bias becomes substantial thanks to the time-
series dependence (Mikkleson and Partch, 1988). For example, Cowan (1993) found that the 
uncorrected test statistic is the correct value by 1.6 per cent under the 100-day estimation 
period and 5-day event window. As the event window increases to 60 days, the bias will rise 
to 25.2 per cent (see also Binder, 1998). Thus, the shorter event window relative to the 
estimation period can also reduce the bias in hypothesis test (see also Karafiath and Spencer, 
1991; Sweeney, 1991; Salinger, 1992).  
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At the second stage, the resulting CARs of the sub-sample were regressed on a series of 
control and explanatory variables to measure how international investors perceive the 
characteristics of corporate control, and the efficacy of the internal corporate governance 
mechanisms. The results can further validate the qualitative findings derived from case 
studies. The cross-sectional regression models are given by:  
   ( )                                            
    
                    
                                                 
                                          (              )
                                          
                                (              )
                              (              )      
   ( )                                             
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Table 4.3 Variable Definition 
Variables Definition 
CARs (-1, +1) Cumulative abnormal returns of acquiring firms over the 3-day event window 
Central Government Control (CGC) Dummy variable: 1 for companies controlled ad supervised by central government agencies, 0 otherwise 
Local Government Control (LGC) Dummy variable: 1 for companies controlled ad supervised by local government agencies, 0 otherwise 
Group Affiliation (GA) Dummy variable: 1 for group affiliated, 0 otherwise 
Ownership of the Largest Shareholder (LS) Shareholding Percentages of the Largest Shareholder 
Board Independence (BI) Proportion of independent directors in the boards 
Supervisory Board Size (SBS) Number of supervisors in the acquiring firm 
Audit Committee Independence (ACI) Proportion of independent auditors on the audit committee 
CEO/Chairman Duality (CD) Dummy variable: 1 if the bidder CEO is also chairman of the board, 0 otherwise 
Firm Age (FA) Years of incorporation for the acquiring firm 
Firm Size (FS) Natural log of total assets at the end of last fiscal year 
Return on Assets (ROA)  3-year average of acquirer’s return on assets 
Operation Profit Margin(OPM) 3-year average of acquirer’s operating profit margin 
Tobin’s Q (TQ) Market value of assets over book value of assets 
Debt-Equity Ratio (DER) Acquirers’ debt-equity percentage  
Target Status (TS) Dummy variable: 1 for public target firms, 0 otherwise 
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4.4 Qualitative Data Collection in the Single Case Study  
Qualitative data were gathered through a combination of elite interviews and document 
analysis. As noted by Thurmond (2001, p. 254), the merits  of data triangulation entails 
“increasing confidence in research data, creating innovative ways of understanding a 
phenomenon, revealing unique findings, challenging or integrating theories, and providing a 
clearer understanding of the problem”. Moreover, the use of multiple data sources in a single 
study can often elicit various perspectives on a single issue or elaborate upon different 
aspects of research questions (Turmond, 2001). Guion et al. (2011, p. 3) suggest that the 
benefit of data triangulation relies on “the diversity and quantity of the data that can be used 
for analysis” and the scope reflected. 
4.4.1 Elite Interviews 
Field research was largely interview based. It differed from prevailing studies where there are 
few similarly first hand, in-depth, up-to-date studies of real top-level actors actually “doing 
strategy” in any kind of organization, let alone in an internationalizing Chinese business 
group. The need to access high level organizational actors as “strategizers” calls for the 
corresponding research methods, and therefore includes upper echelon theory, open-ended 
interviews, problem focused methods, rather than more conventionally “standardized”, 
impersonal, and non-customized questionnaires. The actor-friendly character of this inquiry 
makes elite interviews the preferred strategy for research, primarily because interviewees 
included high ranking key informants, ranging from company managers at provincial level to 
department directors in shareholding groups. Too much reliance on survey or other structured 
interviews could have constrained in-depth inquiries in the sense that informants may not 
answer the questions in their own freely chosen, open ended way.  
To gain a grounded appraisal of SSG practices in the state-owned insurer, face-to-face onsite 
interviews with elite managers and officers were conducted between June and September 
2009, as well as between August and October 2010. Chinese society was shaped for a long 
time by Confucianism and then by Communist ideology where structure and hierarchy have 
been very important. Organizational members – whether from government agencies and 
business entities – are expected to observe rank and show deference and humility to their 
superiors. By so doing, they tend to raise their own position in the view of others rather than 
lower it. For these reasons, a top-down interview strategy was employed, one which refers to 
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starting elite interviewees at the top and then working down the formal hierarchy. The 
researcher’s own relational connection with the managers offered an established social 
network for identifying and contacting potential elite informants.  While finding an initial 
correspondent can be difficult in initiating the “referral chain”, cooperation from some board 
members and senior executives was first achieved by building contact with the board’s own 
secretary. Other senior staffs were thought more likely to participate if they could see their 
referrals had been approved beforehand. Such a snowball sampling approach was found to be 
economical and effective in enabling real-time access to other organizational actors.  
The background to each research topic was investigated before individual interviews were 
conducted. More importantly, demonstrable expertise on such topics proved an effective way 
to gain the confidence of higher status informants (Arksey and Knight, 1999, p. 123). As  
Arksey and Knight (p. 123) recommend, drawing on the researcher’s own social-cultural 
capital helps generate “greater symmetry in the interviewer-interviewee relationship” and 
establishes more “trust and rapport” with informants. For example, it was not possible for the 
interviewer’s knowledge to be checked out by the informant when interviews began. If the 
researcher appeared unfamiliar with the issues involved, and therefore unable to hold an 
informed discussion, the efficacy of interviewing would have been reduced, as informants 
could have been less willing to respond.  
Interviews were normally conducted on each week’s Thursday and Friday, since 
interviewees’ schedules were found to be less full as weekends approached. Each interview 
was scheduled to last for no more than three hours, and indeed averaged about two and half 
hours, not including conversational “small talk” prior to dinner. It relied on a number of 
open-ended enquiries where the interview questions could be modified or expanded to other 
areas contingent upon informants' interests, profession, and educational background. This 
type of questioning allowed flexibility regarding what additional questions could be asked, or 
what sensitive topics should be avoided as the session progressed. The distinctiveness of such 
open-ended questioning can be interpreted in three respects: 
 Most interviewees were departmental decision-makers in China Life’s headquarters and 
also senior officers in regulatory agencies. Such Chinese social elites are highly esteemed 
and accustomed to having others defer to them. They are also used to being respectfully 
asked what they think and also conversing freely and at length without undue interruption 
(Arksey and Knight, 1999, p. 124).  They often resist any structured interview where they 
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feel unduly constrained by pre-prepared interview schedules. As Arksey and Knight (p. 
124) put it, “they do not want to be pigeon-holed into particular categories, or become part 
of some statistical aggregates”. 
 Open-ended questions are suitable for discussing topics of interest in more depth (Berry, 
2002). Researchers often encounter situations where interviewees become evidently terse, 
cautious, and unsure about what, and how much detail, should be disclosed. This was  
evident with sensitive topics such as business irregularities and personnel control by party 
committees. When this happened, an interviewee might provide an answer lacking the 
information needed. It was then important to ask a follow-up question, since silence 
created tension, disrupting how the interview flowed. 
 Open-ended questioning creates space for unanticipated topics which could reveal findings 
which might not surfaced under structured interview conditions. Thus the researcher can 
explore the scheduled topics while adding new variations as the interview progressed. As 
Berry (2002, p. 681) put it, “this kind of branching can be very rewarding and is one of the 
main benefits of open-ended questioning”. In particular, open-ended questions can allow 
corporate elites to disclose what they - not the researcher - consider most relevant. 
Such flexibility can come at the cost of reduced validity and reliability. A risky but 
potentially valuable type of interview technique requires the interviewer to decide whether 
the informants are offering “distracting digression” or “an interesting avenue to pursue” 
(Berry, 2002). For example, during a trip to Beijing, a former board secretary actively 
involved in the defence of class action lawsuit was interviewed. He responded to the question 
about the role of the Shareholding Group with a two-hour review of the group restructuring 
(jituan chongzu in Chinese) process prior to China Life’s overseas IPO. He repeatedly 
denounced the previous remuneration scheme for encouraging misleading and exploitative 
sales practices. However, he also referred to changes in monetary policy since the mid-1990s 
and the impact of lowered interest rates which significantly reduced investment returns. He 
proceeded to review the pervasive non-performing asset problem in China Life in a way 
which would have been inappropriate to interrupt in order to return to other scheduled 
questions.   
4.4.2 Archival Data 
Extensive use was made of archival data to prepare interview questions, prompt interviewees 
to elaborate, or corroborate other interview findings. The usefulness of such data was 
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therefore not limited to verifying the correct spellings of names and titles of the informants 
and departments that would be included. Systematic searches for relevant documents and 
other archival data were conducted both prior to and after each fieldwork visit. As an 
overseas listed company in the public spotlight, there is an obligation to provide accurate and 
reliable Company information, since records are also referred to by institutional investors and 
stock exchanges for investment and regulatory purposes.   
First, the archival data, both numerical and non-numerical, afforded more time for in-depth 
inquiries within each interview's limited time span. Second, although some archival data were 
not sufficiently detailed, other data – such as media reports and internal organizational 
records – complemented further exploration and probing, serving as dialoguing media for 
issues brought up during unanticipated in-depth discussions. For example, the business 
irregularities in China Life revealed by the National Audit Office of PRC allowed the 
researcher to probe issues concerning internal control and governmental supervision. 
Corporate managers themselves introduced topics which might not have been discussed 
otherwise. Finally, documentation and archival data were used to corroborate other data 
sources (Yin, 2011). While this helped limit the difficulties associated with possible 
interviewees’ selective retrospective biases, it also recreated the informants’ “temporal and 
contextual frame of reference,” which can otherwise benefit case study research (Gibbert, 
2004, p. 671; see also Gibbert and Probst, 2011). 
4.5 Qualitative Data Analysis and Generalization 
The phase of data analysis requires further elucidation (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). It can be 
challenging due to the intangible nature of regulatory implementation and CG practices, 
which poses significant difficulties for coding and analysis purposes, and questions currently 
available qualitative software programmes. This section presents set procedures for the 
analysis of interview data that parallel Alexiadou’s (2001) accommodated to the particular 
type and content of research questions adopted. The first step concerns the integration and 
analysis of individual interviews, the second the generalization of detailed research findings 
(see also Potter and Wetherel, 1995; Wetherell et al., 2001). The focus is on how corporate 
managers and regulators sought to make sense of change, and the types of discourse they 
employ for that purpose. 
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4.5.1 Analysing Individual Interview Transcripts  
The aim of this stage is to summarize the interview records of individual informants in order 
to capture the essential meanings and characteristics of what they disclose (Alexiadou, 2001). 
The 31 multi-level elite interviews and the secondary data gained from various archival 
records produced rich data in either Chinese or English. Rather than being converted into 
processed data or translated into a unified language before analysis, all narrative data were 
coded and interpreted in their native languages to maintain their original meanings. The 
following procedures demonstrate how individual accounts have been constructed in order to 
encapsulate such rich data. 
Stage 1 This involved reading and re-reading interview scripts together with archival records 
in order to develop a sense of the whole for each interview. The time immediately following 
the interview was usually the most appropriate to conduct revisions and complete fast-written 
transcripts. At times this required more detachment from the fieldwork to identify other 
aspects needing to be explored or/and classified.  
Stage 2 This involved identifying those words or phrases most relevant to research topics. It 
highlighted the part of the text that was considered to bear “weight” of the meaning, while 
putting aside but not deleting what was deemed to further amplify an existing argument, or 
introduce another, possibly ancillary topic. Since certain judgments were likely to be 
premature at this early stage, the whole transcript would then be re-examined so that the data 
initially excluded as “insignificant” could be duly reconsidered. At this point, words and 
phrases deemed marginal to “the participants’ experiences, and perceptions, as well as to the 
understanding of the context within which they work” were put into parenthesis (Alexiadou, 
2001).  
Stage 3 This represented a preliminary attempt to code data by “encapsulating the meaning in 
the form of a word or a phrase that represents a theme” (Alexiadou, 2001, p. 58). The main 
theme was abstracted from the conversation transcripts by asking the question “what does 
this part of conversation tell me about the research topic under discussion?” The example 
below exemplifies the abstracting process. 
“…In our regional audit centre, we are expected to investigate both the financial and 
business irregularities. Conventionally, we have to conduct field inspection to find out the 
malpractices and loopholes. According to the Codes for Internal Audit Staff, we are required 
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to examine the business financial records of those branch companies, from provincial level to 
country level…”(IN35, 2010). 
In this paragraph, the theme has been depicted as “responsibility”, which reflected the 
researcher’s definition of the informant’s implicit assumptions guiding inspection and audit 
activities in branch businesses. The theme can be directly quoted from an informant’s talk or, 
in most of cases, represented the researcher’s conceptual definition of what has been read 
from the data.  
Stage 4 After initially identifying themes, the ‘data bits’ related to similar research topics 
would be synthesised or clustered together into the same categories. Thid has been termed 
“second order constructs” where the researcher intends to integrate or separate the different 
interview contents or paragraphs into mutually exclusive and clearly defined categories while 
recognising the links between them (Alexiadou, 2001). Instead of evaluating the status of 
various categories, at this stage the focus shifts towards defining themes as precisely as 
possible, and trying to ensure that different categories, including subcategories, are distinct 
from each other. The requirement of mutual exclusiveness stipulates that unclear boundaries 
between themes are best avoided to limit possible overlaps of meaning between different 
“data bits”. The following criteria were adopted to categorize different ‘data bits’: if the 
paragraphs refer to a research phenomenon that is encapsulated under a particular theme, but 
at the same time serves as the illustrative or explanatory for another broader theme, such 
paragraphs will be clustered under the latter.  
Stage 5 This meant linking different themes disclosed by informants. Such a sense-making 
ordering of data entails the unravelling of different themes. For Alexiadou (2001) and 
Charmaz (2006), the different 'data bits' clustered under respective themes often represent 
different levels of meanings even for the same informant, so that they differ in importance 
and serve different purposes within the whole conversation. Thus, the researcher should be 
concerned with “how do people coordinate with their talk” (Wetherell et al., 2001, p. 5). 
Using the same example, when a regional audit centre manager was asked “what are the main 
functions of the regional auditing centre”, the answer illustrated certain aspects of the 
centre’s main responsibilities. While these aspects were used as yardsticks for assessing the 
extent to which the centre fulfilled its duties, the theme of “responsibility” as a whole served 
as the basis from which further discussions were derived: 
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 It underpinned his appreciation of the audit committee's role and its associated 
departments regarding corporate governance;  
 It structured his further appraisal regarding the formal and informal accountability  of 
internal audit in China Life; 
 It preluded discussion of the paramount but undisclosed Part influence in such governance 
practices.    
Stage 6 Informants’ accounts could be inconsistent or contradictory. For Potter and Wetherel 
(1995, p. 88), “we do not expect individuals to be consistent in their discourse – indeed, it 
would be very surprising if they were. Variation of this kind was expected, as “people 
perform different actions with their talk … as they construct locally coherent versions of the 
social and moral world”. These internal inconsistencies and contradictions could usefully 
expand upon particular themes when they indicated their different meanings or unexplored 
aspects. 
Stage 7 While others focus upon the character and structure of individual themes, this stage 
attempted to establish links between different themes by interrogating the data from the 
research perspective.  Alexiadou (2001, p. 62) noted that it reflects “the specific purpose of 
the study as well as some of the principles of social constructivism”. In this way, similarities, 
patterns, contradictions, inconsistencies, and different statuses of data bits were sought.  
Stage 8 The links established above helped to construct a summary account for each 
informant. By depicting the essence for each informant, these summaries provided an 
overview of individual informants' position along with contextual information which could 
enable further inferences to be constructed.  
4.5.2 Generalizing Individual Experiences 
The second step of qualitative data analysis sought to synthesize individual experiences to 
enable both “naturalistic and theoretical generalizations” (Alexiadou, 2001). As to the 
former, the researcher sought to draw conclusions with respect to the changes which 
informants and the company reported, so as to make more informed judgements about how 
these findings might apply in other contexts, i.e. Chinese state controlled corporations. The 
different socio-economic contexts this crossed (i.e. domestic vs. overseas and pre-reform vs. 
reform) gave confidence to the detailed findings (Milesa and Huberman, 1984; Alexiadou, 
2001). At the same time claims and interpretations of the findings were set against path-
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generation theory and other political-economic perspectives. This meant drawing theoretical 
inferences on the basis of the emerging findings related to the transformative dynamics of 
corporate governance institutions using the following procedures:  
Stage 1 Based on the summaries above, statements about individual participants were 
formulated to encapsulate their thinking and experience about specific aspects of the research 
questions posed. Such statements often varied, reflecting their varying roles, and differing 
regard for the changes concerned.  For example, statements concerning senior managers 
mostly appertained to them, and not the entire management hierarchy. For validation 
purposes, detailed statements were set against the summary accounts made before, and 
confirmed or re-formulated accordingly. 
Stage 2 Statements made in the last stage were clustered according to their point of reference, 
and encapsulated into given research inferences. While some statements would appear 
applicable in particular contexts, others underscored more than one thematic area. In that 
case, the order of data was constructed according to structure of the final report where 
detailed research findings were presented.  
Stage 3 It was here that meta-inferences were drawn and included in the larger conclusion. In 
an embedded research design, inference integration relates primarily to the timing of 
embedding (Creswell and Clark, 2007; Creswell and Tashakkori, 2009; Carmeron, 2009). 
While the inferences derived from quantitative analysis answered specific research questions 
regarding how international investors judged SOEs’ governance practices, the follow-up case 
study helped generate further insights via detailed firm-level investigation. 
4.5.3 Follow-up Reviews  
Upon the completion of data analysis, summary reports in native languages were sent to key 
informants for further feedback. This tested whether the quotations used were sufficiently 
accurate and whether further insight could be provided (Gubrium and Holstein, 2002). 
Succinct summaries which captured the essence of interviews were particularly desirable, 
since most elite interviewees disliked over-detailed documentation. Moreover, senior 
corporate managers and other government officials were cautious about written 
communication. Sending feedback to them was a sign of respect and courtesy which proved 
useful for sustaining long-term commitment for future research purposes.  
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Since data analysis and report writing lasted over twelve months, informants did not 
necessarily recall all that they said before. While further valuable confirmation and comment 
were received from 8 informants, most did not offer further responses. Table 4.3 depicts the 
fieldwork procedures adopted over this period: 
Table 4.3 Field Work Timetable 
Time Field Work Content 
April and May 2009 • Identifying the main research topics; 
• Gathering background information regarding the selected company and 
its business sector. 
June 2009 First Field Trip to Beijing and Guangzhou 
• Preliminary contacts with the initial key informants; 
• Gathering information about the potential elite interviews; 
• Expanding personal connection with other elite interviewees via the 
initial key informants. 
July and August 2009 • Designing research questions 
• Initiating the first stage of data collection via 12 elite interviews; 
• Reviewing and analysing the first phase empirical data. 
June  and July 2010 Second Field Trip to Beijing, Shenyang, Shanghai, and Shenzhen 
• Undertaking 15 elite interviews with corporate managers, ranging from 
board members to branch managers; 
• Negotiating access to government officers via corporate elites; 
• Gathering archival records as part of data triangulation. 
August and September 
2010 
• Reviewing and analysing the first phase empirical data; 
• Identifying and consolidating neglected research topics; 
• Designing further interview questions. 
March 2011 Third Filed Trip to Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen 
• Undertaking interviews with the rest of the elite interviewees; 
• Revisiting key elite informants and discussing unexplored research 
topics; 
• Analysing the third phase empirical data. 
June 2011 and  March  
2012 
• Consolidating and comparing all the empirical and secondary data; 
• Consolidating findings from different analysis; 
• Summarizing research findings and sending the preliminary reports 
selected  informants; 
• Modifying reports according to feedback and integrating them. 
 
4.6 Validating Procedures 
As the research strategy was qualitative-driven, the focus of validation was naturally placed 
onto cross-checking the qualitative case study findings. As Jocher (1928) noted, the validity 
and reliability problems of case studies research can be open to question. 
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“It can be seen how carefully all evidence must be weighted, tested, and sifted to eliminate 
fictions and false statements, and as far as possible, rationalizations. It is hardly conceivable 
that the case study can ever be made wholly objective, for in the very nature of it is inherent a 
certain subjectivity, not only on the part of those from whom the data are obtained but also in 
the interpretations of the research specialists” (Jocher, 1928, p. 205).  
Although a variety of ex post checks have been suggested, the context-sensitive and 
interactive nature suggests that there are no infallible rules for establishing the validity of 
case study research (Miles and Huberman, 1994). As noted by Kvale (1996, p. 242), 
validation should not be limited merely to the final verification or quality control of research 
findings; it essentially refers to a dynamic process “built into the research process with 
continual checks on the credibility, plausibility, and trustworthiness of the findings”. The 
validating approaches here adopted included: defining the scope and boundaries of the 
research topic while checking the representativeness of elite interviewees in the research 
design phase, using multiple sources of evidence, offering guarantee of anonymity to key 
informants, checking rival explanations and employing a context-aware approach in the data 
collection phase, as well as seeking feedback from key informants and comparing the 
evidence with the extant literature in the data analysis phase. These tactics were incorporated 
into each research stage to address issues of conformability, credibility, transferability, and 
dependability (Riege, 2003).  Key tactics are discussed in detail below. 
First, data and methodological triangulation can remedy the potential weakness of case study 
in constructing validity, since it increases “the credence in the interpretation” and 
demonstrates “the commonality of an assertion” (Stake, 1995, p. 112; Yin, 2003, p. 92). With 
triangulation, different data sets provide supplementary and complementary information. For 
example, the researcher sought to link informants’ verbal expression to their behaviours 
through field observation while comparing arguments and interpretations from different and 
regulatory managerial positions along the governance hierarchy in order to generate “a spiral 
effect”. The latter refers to an interpretative process in which each set of data, when 
combined with others, displayed dynamic “interconnectedness” (Caracelli and Greene, 1993). 
In this way, research findings and conclusions derived from the convergence of multiple 
sources of evidence can be made more convincing and accurate; the reconciliation of 
different types of data led to a synthesis which enriched understanding.  
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Second, rather than relying solely on a theoretical framework, the tested hypotheses and 
interview questions were also derived from the preliminary research on China’s corporate 
governance reform. A nondirective questioning style can alleviate the problem of “observer 
bias” or “observer-cased-effects” so that interviewees were not unduly influenced by pre-
conceived arguments. Indeed, during this fieldwork, most informants did not ask how the 
researcher regarded particular governance practices during interviews, though this could 
surface after. Many emphasized that their answers were based on their own judgments and 
experience. In this way, the conceptualization of corporate governance dynamics itself 
emerged ‘live’ and on-site.   
Third, to encourage more openness from corporate elites and government officers, anonymity 
and confidentiality were guaranteed so that the interviewees would not feel constrained by 
issues that were politically sensitive and conceived as threatening. Moreover, interviews were 
often conducted outside office buildings, usually in restaurants outside office hours. This 
proved essential to ease any tension with informants from the very beginning of interviews 
and thus overcome any “cover up” in the office site.6 It also provided an opportunity to 
establish rapport with the informants. In a highly status-oriented culture, an invitation to 
dinner can be related to the need for elite interviewees to maintain positive face – to feel 
respected by those who are listening to them – and thus serves as a bonding ritual and 
strategy for narrowing any interpersonal distance between researcher and informants (Bogdan 
and Biklen, 1982). Moreover, the question-embedding strategy enabled the researcher to lead 
up to the key questions via other, less threatening ones (Arksey and Knight, 1999, p. 111). 
For example, questions regarding the decision-making power of party committees were not 
posed at the start because they could induce unease and reduce cooperation. To gain more 
chance of being answered, questions were “hidden” or “embedded” in the larger set regarding 
certain practices.    
Fourth, unlike structured questionnaires in survey interviews, participants’ accounts via 
opened-ended questions were contextualized in order to enhance the richness of data and 
minimize interpretive bias (Mason, 2006). Before fieldwork began, data regarding the 
analytical units and key informants was collected and reviewed. This helped create a context 
of “conversational intimacy” in which the interviewer and informants could “share 
information or give validation just as two other human beings might do” (Corbin and Morse, 
                                                          
6
 For example, attention from other colleagues would generate a constraining effect on elite informants. 
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2003). As with a good fiction, the narration usually starts with background information about 
the subject’s own life experience which gradually leads up to the event of interest.  This 
helped researchers and interviewees become easily “immersed in the unfolding drama of the 
story” (Cooper and Burnet, 2006).  Such enriched understanding could result in more 
interactive interviews which involved not only the asking of questions but also better 
recording and documenting of informant responses. In this way, notes about the interview 
process, and verbal and non-verbal expressions from informants were written down 
immediately, during or after the interview and used to contextualize participants’ accounts.  
Fifth, the cooperative style employed addressed the problem of “power asymmetry” between 
interviewer and elite interviewees (Welch et al., 2002). Researchers conducting elite 
interviews can become “supplicants” so humbly grateful to obtain an interview opportunity 
that they are reluctant to ask more demanding or critical questions (Cochrane, 1998; 
Macdonald and Hellgren, 2004). Researchers may also display a form of “hostage syndrome” 
in which they suspend their clarifying questioning in the face of elites’ display of hierarchical 
power and social status. Thus, interviewers may risk “overestimating the importance of what 
elites have to say, assuming, for example, that they necessarily know more and better what is 
going on in an organization” (Ostrander, 1993, p. 19; see, also, Macdonald and Hellgren, 
2004; Welch et al., 2002). Here this research contingently sought to develop participation 
with elite informants from the very beginning. Certain senior corporate managers and 
government officers with particular academic backgrounds sought to use the researcher as a 
“facilitator of their own thinking and a sounding board of ideas”, since they lacked time for 
academic study (Welch et al., 2002, p. 625). They could also tend to be more introspective, 
thoughtful and have an open mindset towards interviews than others with different 
backgrounds. On occasion some revealed more about themselves when expressing their 
thoughts and feelings, at the same time seeking validation or recommendation. Such an 
interviewing strategy has created “a space for intellectual dialogue and reflection” and thus 
differs in nature from the managers’ and officers’ day-to-day routine of meetings (Welch et 
al., 2002).  
Finally, in a single-case study, measures for ensuring the generalizability penetrate through 
all research stages, in contrast to quantitative research where such measures rely upon large 
sample sizes. Since this study focuses on corporate governance reform in China’s state sector, 
these measures sought to identify all those attributes that are common between the selected 
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case and the population of interests (Kennedy, 1979). These common attributes enable the 
findings to be applicable beyond the immediate case study. As previously observed, the 
selected company is particularly representative, and thus exemplifies “a stable, cross-case 
relationship” with the population under study (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). At the data 
collection stage, multiple evidence sources also increased the breadth of information 
collected regarding the selected case, and thus assisted understanding of the full  
circumstances surrounding the target corporate governance system (Kennedy, 1979). It is 
important to bear in mind that “the investigator’s goal is to expand and generalize theories 
(analytical generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)” (Yin, 
2003, p. 10). 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter has considered the rationale underlying the chosen mixed-method strategy and 
presented the measures taken to address certain specific operational issues. It has examined 
the value of the mixed-method design often associated with integrative data analysis.  The 
detailed design of both the case study and statistical analysis, including sample selection, data 
collection methods, analytical models, and validating instruments, has been discussed and 
assessed in detail.  Although mixed-method research can incorporate the strengths of 
different methodologies, it is still important to select methods or approaches “with respect to 
their underlying research questions, rather than with regards to some preconceived biases 
about which methods should have hegemony in social science research” (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2006, p. 23).  In other words, the choice of a mixed-methods research should 
be driven by the nature of research questions rather the instrumental value and status of 
different methods.  
The qualitative single case study – a combination of elite interview, participant observation, 
and archival reviews – revealed a number of context-specific, hard-to-measure and difficult-
to-articulate characteristics of corporate governance (Mason, 2006). This includes the social 
embeddedness of its development, firm and industry-specific barriers during implementation, 
and the corresponding manoeuvrings of local actors to overcome certain obstacles. It has 
shown the important contribution made by elite interviews, supplemented by archival data, 
which enabled more elaborate understandings of a little-known and hard-to-explore research 
problem. As noted by Mason (2006), case studies have both the explanatory and exploratory 
edge, precisely because they are concerned with more in-depth investigation than statistical 
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measurement or causation.  It highlights the role of the researcher as “the carrier and 
interpreter of the lived meaning of the key people in the study” (Pettigrew, 2013, p. 124). 
However, such research also bears certain limitations. Since it was conducted mainly by the 
author, a single researcher observing elite interviewees within a limited number of settings, 
and despite the validating measures taken, it necessarily relies on hid communication skills 
and interpretive ability. Systematic bias therefore still occurred. Although this problem can 
be addressed by single-case replications (Yin, 2003, p. 36), the nature of this study made this 
unduly difficult.  
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Chapter 5 
Path-Based Explanations for China’s State Sector Governance 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter uses a path-based approach to illuminate the transformative dynamics of 
China’s state sector governance (SSG). It seeks to answer the following questions: to what 
extent and how has Chinese SSG been changed? In more theoretical terms, does the current 
system effectively perpetuate past central planning, given continued state influence? Or have 
accumulated incremental reforms already led to a more distinct, though still state-centric 
model? If so, who are the most proactive change agents? What constitute the major obstacles 
to reform? Which strategies have they employed to achieve it? The chapter will explore 
these questions and, in particular, use path-generation arguments in examining state sector 
reform in action. It suggests that path-generation theory can explain observed SSG reforms 
once due attention is paid to the surrounding political-economic context and leading social 
actors’ interaction. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 introduces an actor-based analytical framework 
which identifies the critical stakeholder dimensions and associated institutional domains in 
China’s SSG system. Sections 5.3-5.6 present four parallel narrative accounts of the 
transformative process in individual domains. It demonstrates how changes in an individual 
domain, elsewhere taken to be inconsequential or passively adaptive, may also be 
recognized as a part of a broader systematic transformation once other changes are also 
taken into consideration (Streeck, 2009). Section 5.7 tests the findings derived from 
preceding narrative account with simple statistical regression about how international 
investors judge or perceive prevailing SSG practices, which foreshadows the direction of 
future reform. The last section summarizes the relevant research findings and future research 
priorities. 
5.2 An Actor-Based Analytical Framework 
Empirical inquiries here require an analytical framework regarding the ‘embeddedness’ of 
China’s SSG system. The prevailing finance-accounting literature has elsewhere been 
criticized for its ‘thin’ view of the institutional environment actually influencing real 
governance practices (see also Heidenreich, 2012; Stroz et al., 2013). Consequently, the 
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actual interaction among various actors has not been fully specified, and the coherence of the 
national SSG system unduly exaggerated (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). While political 
economists have insisted that “institution matters”, they may risk applying an over-
socialized perspective which constitutes institutional effects too broadly for more precise 
empirical determination. To bridge the gap between under and over socialization Aoki 
(2001, p. 18) deemed it necessary to “make explicit the mechanisms of interdependencies 
among institutions across domains in each economy”. Aguilera and Jackson developed an 
actor-centred institutional model to capture the most critical institutional domains associated 
with each stakeholder group. In their view, although institutional environment is not the only 
determining factor, it nevertheless shapes how the interests of various stakeholders are 
defined and represented. The resultant institutional arrangements in turn generate different 
types of conflict and/or coalitions for further development.
1
  
Figure 5.1 An Actor-Centred Analytical Framework 
 
Figure 5.1 depicts an actor-centred analytical model which includes the critical stakeholders 
with the most direct relevance to SSG practices. The framework seeks to encompass 
                                                 
1
 As Stark and Nee (1989) pointed out, the great uncertainty of changing corporate institutions forces the 
reform leadership to form a political coalition in order to keep enterprise reform on the agenda.  
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stakeholders in terms of authority, finance and management, drawing upon the existing 
reform directed literature (e.g. Shirk, 1993; Naughton, 1996; Qian, 1996; Tenev et al., 2002; 
Wu, 2005; Pei, 2009; Jung, 2011; Tricker, 2012). These key players are further categorized 
into central, intermediate and organizational levels in order to reflect different governance 
hierarchies. In this way, the associated institutional domains can be further identified and 
analysed. Where the prevailing finance-accounting literature may view the government as if 
a monolithic stakeholder, certain studies have already suggested that the political interests 
and reform imperatives of central government, ministries and local authorities can each 
differ significantly, calling for much more fine-grained analysis (e.g. Oi, 1992; Blanchard 
and Shleifer, 2000). Following this convention, Chinese SSG stakeholders have been 
represented as existing in central government, individual ministries and other agencies, as 
well as local governments. Although different stakeholder groups and institutional domains 
are analytically separable, they can be closely interwoven (see Naughton, 2006; 2008). Thus 
the double-ended arrows with solid lines indicate strong and frequent interplay between two 
groups, while the arrows with broken lines suggest that the parties’ mutual influences are 
rather limited.  
Underpinning this framework is the idea that institutions are influencing the roles of 
stakeholders toward the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and/or state-controlled corporations 
(SCCs) without necessarily determining further outcomes (Aoki, 2001; Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003). Institutions shape the political process of how participants’ interests and 
responsibilities are defined and represented with respect to the SCCs. Strategic interactions 
among stakeholder groups generate different types of issues which in turn impact upon 
institutions in a self-sustaining manner (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). This synthetic model 
aims to complement the under-socialized limitations of the conventional neoclassical 
arguments by highlighting the institutional embeddedness of the SSG system under 
investigation. On this basis it helps to investigate and explain the distinctive dynamics of 
Chinese enterprise reform by specifying interplays among stakeholders interacting with the 
institutional environment. It is elsewhere argued that due SSG requires balancing the 
different interests and power of diverse stakeholder groups (Mallin, 2011). 
5.3 Central Government and SOEs 
According to China’s Constitution, central government is the ultimate owner and 
administrator of the state sector on behalf of the Chinese people. Meanwhile, as the key 
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institution for China’s state-led developmental strategy, it has also played multiple roles as 
the planner, executor, monitor and coordinator of reform. The state sector’s restructuring has 
avoided a dramatic “Big Bang” approach and instead pursued incremental institutional 
reforms. For systematic reform without outright privatization changes in the core 
coordinating institutions are potentially critical (Jung, 2011). Changes in the broader social-
economic contexts significantly redefine central government’s relation to the state sector as 
indicated in the renewed focus upon different stages of reform.  
Central planning has its origins in a State Syndicate model in which several functional 
commissions – notably the State Planning Commission (SPC) and State Economic 
Commission (SEC) – once assumed the leading role in directing and administering the state 
sector. As the power of drafting and implementing specific operational plans was delegated 
to line ministries, functional bureaus and regional governments, SOEs – known as state-run 
units (SRUs) (guoying danwei in Chinese) of that time – were essentially the grass-root 
productive units within the ruling administrative fiat. In that model, the various economic 
and productive parameters that determined the size of residual income such as wage and 
taxation levels were arbitrarily determined by the government itself. State ownership rights 
had been highly segmented or fragmented since the very beginning (Wu, 2005, p. 141).The 
complexity of different and even conflicting directives across various spheres almost made it 
impossible for central government to craft one clear developmental strategy. Nevertheless, 
with its extensive administrative infrastructure, the system claimed some superiority in 
mobilizing resources across China’s vast territory. This was of vital importance for the new-
born regime of the “people's democratic dictatorship” which formally sought to achieve 
maximum growth of the country’s industrial and military capacity over a relatively short 
time (Shirk, 1993, p. 25). In particular, the urgent task of reconstructing the national 
economy, following decades of foreign invasion and civil war was combined with the 
military threat from the West and later the former Soviet Union. From 1956 to 1976, the 
estimated average growth rate of industrial output nevertheless reached 10 per cent per year.  
However, the price of maintaining such growth was high. In the chaotic aftermath of the 
Cultural Revolution, measures designed to restore the deteriorated national economy only 
achieved limited success.  Over the “rehabilitation” period, the central leadership represented 
by Hua Guofeng and those supporters known as the “Two Whatever” Gang (liangge fanshi 
pai in Chinese), opted for a series of recentralizing measures via stronger administrative 
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discretion. As shown in Figure 5.2, during the centrally-planned era, the annual increase of 
fixed asset investment in the state sector (13.44 per cent) exceeded the annual growth rate of 
industrial and agricultural output (8.30 per cent). Ma (1981) observed that the gross output 
value per every RMB 100 of industrial fixed assets fell by 25.4 per cent over the same 
period. Based on restored statistical records, Dernberger (1982) estimated that total factor 
productivity declined at an annual rate of 2.75 per cent from the 1950s to the 1970s. Shirk 
argued that the Chinese economy was then producing self-consuming growth, i.e. industrial 
growth was offset by an ever larger portion of industrial investment (see also Hirszowicz, 
1980). Moreover Chinese central planners encountered the same problem with low mass 
living standards also found among other socialist economies. For Ma, average individual 
income remained low, although the gross output value of industrial and agricultural 
production increased by over 800 per cent, and national income by more than 400 per cent 
between 1952 and 1980. Average grain consumption was less in 1976-1977 than in 1956-
1957 (Xue, 1983). Thus China’s heavy industrialization was accomplished without really 
improved living standards. 
Figure 5.2 Growth Rate of Fixed Assets Investment in the State Sector (1956-1980) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1986 
Right across this era, excessive power concentration among central bureaucracies was 
deemed the primary cause of low efficiency. Over the centrally-planned era, the party state 
had wrestled with the competing goals of pursuing political and social policies that were 
consistent with Marxist-Maoist ideology and the more immediate and pragmatic task of 
improving economic production (Dickson, 2003, p. 7). Although both goals were important 
for legitimizing the ruling CCP, they required rather different set of strategies that, in 
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practice, were often potentially counter-productive. Moreover, central government’s ability 
to draft and implement effective economic planning had been overestimated. Policymakers 
did not realize that efficiency concerns actually arose from rigid administrative planning 
along with illicit governance mechanisms.
2
 For Naughton (1986), the weaknesses of central 
planning were clearly demonstrated by soaring inflation and inability to implement long-
term development plans for the oil industry.  
In this vein, state sector reform had largely focused on readjusting the relationships between 
central and provincial governments, and thus administrative decentralization had only 
seemed viable until performance repeatedly deteriorated. In contrast, as administratively 
directed economic planning required consistency, power decentralization inevitably 
exacerbated certain problems, and finally ended with recentralization.
3
 By the late 1970s, 
these “pendulum” swings between administrative decentralization and recentralization were 
widely regarded as highly problematic in themselves. The dissolution of the Ten Year Plan 
in 1978 demonstrated that the rigid State Syndicate Model was so incompatible with 
economic development that central leadership underwent a legitimation crisis that further 
divided “reformists” from “conservatives”. This duly enabled Deng Xiaoping – allied with 
other reform-minded leaders – to discredit hard-line central planners (Shirk, p. 35). For 
“reformists”, the initial success of the household responsibility system in rural reform then 
suggested that economic backwardness was rooted excessive administrative overload and 
lack of independent initiative. 
Within central government, advocacy of greater enterprise autonomy had inevitably pitted 
reformists against opponents, and the State Planning Commission (SPC) and Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) both saw administrative planning as better for organizing national 
production (Shirk, 1993, pp. 197-204). Hence, the reformists initiated further enterprise 
reform with a series of particularistic experiments in order to overcome political risks and 
resistance (Heilmann, 2011). Such experimentation allowed enterprises to sell their extra 
output at higher market prices and retain a share of their profits after fulfilling the stipulated 
production quotas or financial targets (Wu, 2005). In most cases, these experiments were 
                                                 
2
 Economically, it was impossible for the technically unsophisticated Chinese planners to incorporate so many 
into a unified central plan, though ministerial command could provide effective nationwide coordination 
through its integrated top-to-bottom linkages.  
3
 Xue (1983) noted that “a recurring cycle in which centralization leads to rigidity, rigidity leads to complaints, 
complaints lead to decentralization, decentralization leads to disorder, and disorder leads back to 
centralization” (see also Unger, 1987).  
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complemented with special fiscal and regulatory treatments based on the economic and 
political conditions of regional governments and enterprises (Oi, 2011; Zeng and Tsai, 
2011).
4
 In this way, reformist leadership utilized local experimentation to generate 
innovative policy options for national policy-making. The selective allocation of these 
“lucrative” experiments to localities and enterprises helped the reformist leadership to 
expand the pro-reform constituency consisting of those “fortunate” officials and managers. 
A brief but painful episode of contraction induced readjustment by orthodox central 
planners, “by teaching industrial officials the potential benefits offered by the market and by 
giving them a recovery rationale for demanding more profits and more market freedom”, had 
ironically actually accelerated reform (Shirk, 1993, p. 219). Although central government 
initially directed that profit-retention experiments be a small, specially authorized number, 
the actual number exceeded 6,000 by 1980. These experimental enterprises, albeit 
constituting less than 20 per cent of all SOEs, contributed 60 per cent of total national output 
value and 70 per cent of enterprise profits. The SEC took up the cause of experimental 
success and became the leading bureaucracy for promoting further nationwide enterprise 
reform. Beginning in 1982, the official goal of SOE reform was to enhance incentives for 
managers and workers, and thus increase state revenue. Programs based upon power 
delegation and profit retention subsequently became the mainstream approach throughout 
the 1980s. 
The policy emphasis on expanding managerial autonomy could claim a credible economic 
rationale. It essentially represented central government’s attempt to change incentives for 
managers and workers without also making far reaching structural changes. For central 
government, granting managers and/or cadres part of the residual control improved 
enterprise incentives, productivity and technological innovation, and thereby promised 
increased state revenues (Zhao Ziyang’s speech to the Fourth Session of the Fifth national 
People’s Congress, December 1981, quoted in Shirk 1993). However, its effects were still 
mixed. Without effective governance mechanisms, expanded managerial autonomy further 
dissevered state ownership and created more opportunities for insider control, economic 
corruption and illicit privatization of state assets (MacNally, 2002). Asymmetric power and 
                                                 
4
 The main purpose of the reform policy was to further expand enterprise autonomy, by which enterprise 
directors were granted a broad range of rights concerning enterprise operation. These included production, 
pricing, sales, procurement, foreign trade, investment, disposal of retained profit, mergers and acquisitions, 
labor, personnel management, wages and remunerations, inter organizations, and finally refusal of the 
unnegotiated profit remittance to the government (Qian, 1996). 
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responsibilities encouraged short-term profit maximization, where it was essentially assumed 
that the state was the ultimate bearer of risk and loss (Chen, 1995; Choe and Yin, 2000).  
Both Chinese officials and economists (e.g. Qian, 1996) then admitted that reforms 
throughout the 1980s had failed to transform SOEs into profit maximisers. As shown in 
Figure 5.3, rising losses since the late 1980s demonstrated that initial enterprise reform had 
only limited success.
5
 Apart from encountering unprecedented competition from the non-
state sector, diminished enterprise profitability could often be attributed to illicit governance 
mechanisms, especially flawed incentive structures. As state subsidies to loss-making SOEs 
reached untenable levels, the SRUs – once major revenue sources – were “depleting” the 
treasury and legitimacy of the party-state in an unsustainable way (You, 2002, p. 173). With 
a declining revenue base, the central government could not offer the same scale of bailouts. 
It also made it difficult for SRUs to carry out their full range of social obligations and even 
regular salary payments. This in turn intensified the need for pension, medical and housing 
reforms (Saich, 2011). The anxiety of the central leadership was clearly conveyed by Chen 
Yuan, former PBOC vice governor, who openly asserted that the loss-making state sector 
was not just a serious economic problem, but also one that could not be neglected politically 
(Chen, 1991, p. 18).  
Figure 5.3 Profit Losses in China’s State Sector (RMB Million) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1996 
                                                 
5
 The losses of SOEs in fact increased steadily since the eve of the reform. The first quarter of 1996 even 
registered RMB 3 billion across the state sector (see Wu, 2005). While more than 27 per cent of the SOEs 
recorded losses in 1990, this figure rose to 43 per cent in 1995. For example, in 1991, it was estimated that the 
state had to RMB 254 billion to cover the total loss and unpaid investment loans in the state sector. This 
amounted to 12.6 per cent of GNP, 62 per cent of the state revenue, 75 per cent of the national wage funds, and 
more than 45 per cent of the total social capital investment of the same year (see Pei, 2009). 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994
P a g e  | 123 
 
Nevertheless initial enterprise reform claimed some success where it successfully created 
newly vested interests and thus expanded the constituency for reformist leadership 
(Naughton, 1996). A decade of power delegation and fiscal decentralization made more local 
officials and enterprise managers aware of profit motives and the need for institutional 
innovation. Material incentives were seen as the major means to stimulate extra effort if the 
socialist principle of ‘to reward each according to his work’ was reapplied (see also Saich, 
2011, p. 267). Egalitarianism had been repeatedly challenged as a dangerous notion 
hindering economic growth and productivity improvement.
6
 With the thriving non-state 
sector and the collapse of Soviet Communism, central leaders realised that simply stressing 
technological up-grading and granting managerial autonomy did little to improve the health 
of SRUs unless the more fundamental reforms were implemented (Saich, 2011). There was a 
growing consensus that government intervention should be further separated from enterprise 
management in order to “make sure the owner is present” (quebao suoyouzhe zaiwei in 
Chinese). This required further structural changes in the State-SOE relationship. However, 
reform measures had not been carried out until the “socialist market economy” was launched 
during the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 
(CCPCC). Amid such major ideological breakthroughs, central government viewed 
corporatization as the appropriate strategy for economic development. It advocated the 
conversion of SOEs into western-type corporate entities predominantly in the form of 
limited liability companies and joint-stock companies. Corporatization was here intended to 
address through structural reform the failings of the previous SSG system that were blamed 
for inefficiency, multiple goals, and absence of an effective ultimate principal (Clarke, 
2003). The ultimate intention was to establish a modern enterprise system “with clearly 
established property rights, well-defined power and responsibility, separation of enterprise 
from government, and scientific management” (Decisions on Issues regarding the 
Establishment of a Socialist Market Economy System, 1993; see Tenev and Zhnag, 2002, p. 
7). After the promulgation of 1993 Company Law, the State Economic and Trading 
Commission (SETC) – another incarnation of the former SEC – was established and further 
empowered to direct and implement corporatisation schemes (Jung, 2011, pp. 121-123). The 
idea of the modern corporation was then closely linked to what Chinese central policymakers 
considered to be superior performance (Tam, 2002). 
                                                 
6
 This can be reflected in Deng Xiaoping’s much-quote phrase “to get rich is glorious” (zhifu guangrong in 
Chinese).  
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Since the early 1990s, the focal point of the Chinese corporatisation has been the 
transplantation of the market-based corporate governance (CG) model through a top-down 
legalistic approach (Tam, 2000). In this vein, newly corporatized SOEs are required to form 
the statutory and essential corporate governing bodies, including (1) general meeting of 
shareholders, (2) board of directors (BOD) and the chairman, (3) supervisory board (SB), 
and (4) chief executive officer (CEO). For Tam (2000), this has gone against the tenet of 
China’s gradualist approach to overall enterprise reform: these highly prescriptive laws and 
regulations are replicated primarily from the stylised Anglo-American model notionally 
based upon suitably competitive markets. Consequently, CG is considered by the Chinese 
policymakers and economists as: 
“The organisational structure consists of the owner, board of directors and senior 
managers. A check and balance relationship is formed within that structure, through which 
the owner entrusts its capital to the board of directors. The board of directors is the highest 
level of decision making of the company and thus has the power to appoint, reward and 
panelise, and dismiss senior managers” (Wu, 1994, p. 185; see also Tam, 2000, p. 53). 
As the key element of corporatisation, CG assumed increasing prominence for reform as the 
party-state tried to “promote enterprise performance and to look after its ownership stakes in 
various forms” (Tam, 2002, p. 304; see also Nolan, 2007). For some (e.g. Szamosszegi et al., 
2011; Lin and Milhaupt, 2013), corporatisation reflected the desire to building modern 
enterprise institutions more compatible with the competitive market economy. However, for 
Heilmann (2011, p. 95), the redistributive nature of enterprise reforms encountered “very 
strong political inertia and oppositions that are inherent in a socialist and post socialist 
political economy”. In particular, the divesture of state capital has been politically sensitive 
considering previous doctrine emphasizing the unchallengeable status of public ownership.  
Where the rule of law remained rudimentary at best, the country’s state sector simply lacked 
many other supporting institutions for an effective transition towards a marked-based model. 
These include a competitive non-state sector and active markets for corporate control and 
managerial manpower (Tam, 2000). Most notably, the national social security system had 
been underdeveloped, and unable to serve as an alternative source of pensions and 
unemployment insurance for laid-off workers. Central government had feared that this 
would result in large-scale social unrest which would undermine the legitimacy not only of 
the reformist leadership itself, but also the CCP as a whole (Jung, 2011).These problems 
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have been cited by entrenched interests groups in bargaining for continuing soft budget 
constraints and other preferential treatment.    
Given reform inertia, leading policymakers adopted an experimentation-based approach to 
avoid possible deadlock and also reduce political frictions.
7
 Local officials and enterprise 
managers become “initiators and active participant in the reform drives”, while ultimate 
control over revising, terminating and expanding local experiments rested among superiors 
above (Heilmann, 2011, p. 99). In this way, development came only after experimentation. 
Many innovative policy instruments constituting the post-1997 breakthrough in SOE reform 
– including corporatisation and the state asset management system – had been pre-tested in 
experimental sites (Heilmann, 2011; see also Wu, 2005). Meanwhile, rather than rely solely 
upon market institutions to corporatize SOEs, central leadership employed potential political 
and administrative means to orchestrate corporate restructuring in an ad hoc manner. In the 
absence of specified entities representing the state’s ownership rights, central government 
used administrative streamlining to transform several different line ministries and bureaus 
into shareholding agencies (Tam, 2000). These agencies, together with the newly established 
state assets management commissions, constituted the cornerstone of the new state asset 
management system. Finally, policymakers adopted a dual track approach that allowed 
seemingly contradictory systems to coexist to without undermining each other. This strategy 
is evident with regard to the implementation of “grasping the large and relinquishing the 
small” (zhuada fangxiao in Chinese). This policy allowed the party-state – afflicted by 
mounting fiscal deficits – to divest numerous small and medium-sized, primarily loss-
making SOEs in non-core industrial sectors through bankruptcy and outright privatization, 
diverting economic resources to a smaller population of large firms of “commanding height” 
where ownership diversification was still rather limited. The coexistence of different 
ownership types allowed the party-state to publicly adhere to socialist ideology while still 
adopting new institutions imported from market systems elsewhere (see also Oi, 2011). This 
marked a clear commitment to a mixed or hybrid SSG system, with the continued dominance 
of the state ownership and attempts to shift towards state capitalism (Lin and Milhaupt, 
2013).  
However, such an unsynchronized, piecemeal process of reform also had its costs. For Wu 
(2005, pp. 158-159) the governance structure of China’s state sector bore “grave institutional 
                                                 
7
 This differs significantly from the conventional legislation-centered policy process. 
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defects”, including ever-fragmented ownership rights and more-prevalent insider control. As 
a coalition building strategy with hard-line opponents, most state asset management 
commissions and shareholding agencies were actually staffed by incumbent bureaucrats 
from abolished ministries and administrative bodies. The remaining governmental apparatus 
thus still influenced major investment and production decision makings, as well as personnel 
appointments. Corporatisation, combined with the more general decentralisation of state 
administration, allowed multiple interventions at different levels, although this might have 
clarified the central and local governments as de jure owners (OECD, 2005b). All this 
further fragmented state ownership rights. At firm level high ownership concentration 
allowed state-authorized investment agencies persistently influence personnel appointments 
in the operation of listed business entities. The “leading team” members of the shareholding 
agencies often assumed a dual-role as both the intermediate principals vested with state 
authority and the salaried executives entrusted by listed company shareholders. They 
represented the state shareholder to supervise state assets and motivate themselves as listed 
companies' executives (Wu, pp. 160-161). This increases the capacity of corporate insiders 
to abuse and divest state assets (OECD, 2005b). As indicated by corporate corruption and 
state asset stripping, ever-aggravated insider control left both state and public investors 
highly vulnerable. In addition to revealed governance problems, pressures from economic 
globalization, as represented by both the 1998 Asian Financial crisis and China’s WTO 
entry, provided important economic and political imperatives for accelerating reform. For 
Gallagher (2005), these exogenous events created a powerful rationale for more 
comprehensive restructuring – building a globally competitive state sector became “a matter 
of national survival” even if it meant the sacrifice of most non-competent enterprises (Jung, 
2011, p. 129). To serve as both the “development stimulator” and “strategic choice maker” 
required central government to establish better control over the state owned sector 
(Wettenhall, 1996; Thynne, 1998, p. 246; Chan, 2009). 
The establishment of the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) in 2003 was essentially another institutional embodiment of the central 
leadership’s pursuit of improved SOE competitiveness (Green and Ming, 2005; Naughton, 
2006: Chan, 2009). It also reflected the conviction that “full privatisation will take quite 
some time and that the state will remain active, if not dominant, in a number of sectors and 
enterprises” (OECD, 2005b, p. 131). Chinese authorities repeatedly affirmed their belief that 
SOEs can operate better with more effective governance (Mallin, 2011). A ministry-level 
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agency has a broad mandate from the State Council, including rationalizing resource 
allocation and ameliorating current governance institutions. According to the 2008 State 
Council Circular on Institute Establishment (Number 11), SASAC can exercise ownership 
rights on behalf of the central government, including: (1) preserving and increasing the value 
of state assets; (2) appointing, removing and remunerating  key executives on the basis of 
performance indicators; (3) supervising enterprise management and enforcing related laws 
and regulations; and (4) implementing the state asset management budget and securing 
capital gain on behalf of the state. These stipulated missions imply more direct and 
integrative control over individual enterprises, according to “the 2007 guiding opinion of 
carrying forward the regulation of state capital and the reorganization of (non-financial) 
SOEs”. Despite this, SASAC “should not interfere directly in corporate management and 
operation” activities but should rather take major decisions on behalf of the state shareholder 
in the general meetings of shareholders and boards of directors. Thus SASAC’s vision of 
ownership consolidation clearly involved imposing effective checks-and-balances on 
corporate management and enhancing the role of boards.  
These new functions for SASAC were supported by several other institutional changes (see 
OECD, 2005b). First, amidst deepening marketization and economic globalization, SASAC 
followed a strategy of “selection and concentration” which allowed it to discard non-core 
businesses and focus on building nationally strong and competitive firms around a select few 
national champions (Oi, 2005; Naughton, 2007; Jung, 2011).
8
 The statist thrust of cultivating 
global competitiveness can be shown in the announcement by the State Council that state 
capital would have absolute control over seven strategic industries, including armaments, oil 
and petrochemicals, civil aviation, power, coal, shipping, and telecommunications. Second, 
by integrating functions previously performed by several line ministries and commissions, 
SASAC’s institutional power has been further enhanced. In particular, part of the MOF’s 
authority over equity and revenue disposal was merged into SASAC, which enabled 
combined regulatory and ownership functions. Although the MOF retained authority over 
general capital management budgets, SASAC compiled more detailed budgets for central 
enterprises under its authority, giving it de facto control over actual enterprise revenues. 
Moreover, it was given greater power to limit management buy-outs among large SOEs, 
reflecting concern about corruption and 'insider privatization'. Last, although the CCP 
                                                 
8 
In 2012 after a series of mergers and consolidation, the number of centrally controlled corporations was 
reduced to 107 from 196 in 2003 upon SASAC’s establishment. 
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Central Organization Department retained control over central SOEs’ top leaders, SASAC 
could still appoint and dismiss key managerial staff below vice-ministerial level. Like 
Temasek, SASAC duly found that China’s state sector could move towards “a modern and 
professionally managed system of public ownership” (Naughton, 2006, p. 8). In this view, 
managerial compensation should be gradually adapted to include stock options and other 
links to share prices, aligning managers’ incentives more with state owners, without ceding 
managers undue control over state assets. For Jung (pp. 133), “although the scope of central 
state direct control might have been narrowed, the efficiency and intensity of state control 
and monitoring over targeted SOEs have increased”.9  
However, as economic liberalization and enterprise reform has greatly changed the de facto 
distribution of political and economic power between the state and SOEs, ownership 
consolidation inevitably faced resistance from influential stakeholders including the pivotal 
corporations and even the government apparatus. In October 2007, the State Council finally 
approved detailed regulations which authorized SASAC to extract dividends from profitable 
SOEs. Economic growth has produced hitherto unprecedented returns for large state owned 
corporations, particularly in semi-protected monopoly sectors. Although considered a 
desirable move to curb excessive investment and maintain growing public expenditure, 
SASAC has encountered strong resistance from entrenched interests among large 
corporations (Shi, 2007). Behind slow implementation lay intense lobbying, as central SOEs 
argued with their patrons that unremitted profits were necessary to make them 
“internationally competitive”. As a result, the budget system came into effect at least two 
years behind schedule, and SASAC settled for a lower rate of return than expected. As to the 
disposal over remitted dividends, other conflicts emerged. For SASAC, remitted profits 
provided resources for detailed corporate restructuring. Although SASAC reached a 
preliminary agreement with the MOF in 2004 regarding a unified state assets management 
budget system, it was only in mid-2006 that more detailed implementation began (Naughton, 
2008). The intra-bureaucratic tensions arose from the MOF's reluctance to let SASAC be the 
first collection and management agency for capital gains. Both parties finally agreed that all 
the post-tax dividends should first be remitted to the MOF with the corresponding portion 
then remanded to SASAC.  
                                                 
9 
Fukuyama (2004) stressed the need to distinguish between the scope of government activities and the strength 
of government institutions.  
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The central government’s vision of instituting sound CG mechanisms while maximizing 
state asset value coexists with yet another vision in which state ownership is used to advance 
national interests (Szamozzsegi and Kyle, 2011). Although the number of central SOEs was 
reduced by over 30 per cent, their total asset value increased from RMB 7 trillion upon 
SASAC’s establishment in 2003 up to RMB 27 trillion by early 2013. This questioned the 
“traditional” or “pessimistic” view of Chinese SOEs as “industrial and financial dinosaurs fit 
only for dismembering or bankruptcy” (Hassard et al., 2010). In this respect, SASAC has 
arguably secured better state asset values and improved global competitiveness. However, 
the growth of the non-state sector and widening economic inequality have triggered further 
debates regarding how much state control and influence is really necessary and beneficial 
(Naughton, 2006).  
Certain economists and officials view any increasingly powerful government bureaucracy as 
constituting recentralization with mixed (up) outcomes (Mattlin, 2007). Imposing more 
stringent supervision over ownership transfers and investment can nevertheless bring the 
problem of state asset stripping and corruption under better control. Experience in the NICs 
suggests that, by channelling necessary resources into the “dragon-head enterprises” 
(longtou qiye in Chinese), state-led industrial restructuring can further improve performance. 
However, since the state plays conflicting roles as the drafter and enforcer of regulations, as 
well as being the controlling shareholder, it can change policy choices whenever necessary 
(Sun and Tobin, 2005; Shi, 2007). The often repeated phrase of “the state advancing, the 
private sector retreating” (guojin mintui in Chinese) implies resentment against the 
rising dominance of China’s SOEs at private sector expense.10 Failure to address these issues 
not only exacerbates public tensions, but further questions the legitimacy of the state’s role 
in economic development. In particular, large SOEs are still required to carry out a wide 
spectrum of social political objectives ranging from regional poverty reduction to the 
promotion of foreign policies.
11
  
Summing up, changes in the state-enterprise relationship over the past three decades 
involved a continuous redefinition of state ownership in policy and practice. Where the 
                                                 
10
 This momentum has been further enhanced after premier Wen Jiabao announced a major stimulus package of 
RMB 4 trillion (US$ 570 billion) to sustain the country’s economic expansion amidst the financial crisis.  
11
 On 13
th
 May 2012, the Agricultural bank of China (ABC) signed a cooperative agreement with the Ministry 
of Agriculture (MOA) to provide no more than RMB 50 billion to support economic development in pastoral 
areas (People’s Daily, 16th May 2012). Meanwhile, a series of overseas investments in Sub-Saharan countries 
by central SOEs, including railway construction and oil field development, were deemed associated with 
China’s foreign policy for enhancing energy security (Naughton, 2008). 
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unintended and even self-destructive logic of administrative intervention has led to persistent 
operational inefficiency and mounting fiscal burdens, the role of central policy makers has 
been transformed, from the ultimate planner and administrator of socio-economic activities 
towards the more realistic and effective principal of state assets. Those who see centralized 
control and pervasive statist intervention being preserved have gone to great lengths to 
argue that the relationship is still stable at its core. However, with the progressive divesture 
of ownership control and erosion of ideological compliance, the emergence of new economic 
actors, including corporate managers and public investors, in essence renders the corporate 
landscape increasingly contestable. To reconsolidate fragmented ownership rights, central 
government seeks more efficient and intensive oversight against entrenched corporate 
insiders. In particular, performance evaluation for corporate management and/or cadres 
becomes increasingly market-driven, where the party-state seeks to readapt political control 
to other socio-economic changes. As the extant SSG system and its practices continue to be 
challenged, this narrative account suggests that China’s SSG reform still relies heavily upon 
administrative and regulatory coordination. In most cases, the exploitation of existent 
administrative and political resources, such as fiscal decentralization and administrative 
restructuring, has enabled reformist leadership to orchestrate enterprise reforms in face of 
other, constraining factors. 
5.4 Ministries, Local Governments and SOEs 
In a centrally-planned system, ministries and local governments were economic and political 
agents which central government employed to design and implement specific plans. As part 
of the vertically integrated government command chain, they enjoyed considerable 
autonomy and flexibility in decision making. This dichotomy of authority is referred to as a 
crisscrossing governance matrix in which the vertical hierarchy of sectoral command 
(tiaotiao in Chinese) coexists with horizontal territorial authority (kuaikuai in Chinese). 
While line ministries were authorized to organize production activities according to specific 
industrial sectors, local governments could also intervene with reference to the localities they 
govern. Such ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ differed strikingly from the more unitary and 
centralized control found among other socialist economies, while the unitary system of 
control depicted in the pure Soviet model never materialized in China (Wu 2005; Lieberthal, 
1992). 
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The intersection of vertical and horizontal lines of control furnished the basic institutional 
structure of SOEs’ governance system throughout the centrally planned era. Along the 
vertical line, ministries held the decision-making power, and directives were issued through 
their hierarchical chain of command. Ministerial commands dominated regional authorities 
in terms of supervising large-scale productive and economics activities due to their technical 
expertise and coordination capabilities (Unger, 1987). This was particularly the case for 
large-sized SRUs that required nation-wide resource input and well-specified technology. 
Orthodox central planners generally conceived “Branch Dictate” (tiaotiao zhunzheng in 
Chinese) – a slogan which encapsulated the superiority of ministerial commands – as an 
appropriate organizational formula for making investment and production decisions which 
could reduce possible dissent and conflict (Shirk, 1993, p. 95). 
Under the “Area Dictate” (kuaikuai zhuanzheng in Chinese) system, local governments and 
party committees had direct authority and responsibility over the SRUs within respective 
administrative areas. Given the prevalence of small and medium-sized enterprises, “Area 
Dictate” was arguably better suited to coordinate those industrial projects which required 
local resource mobilization within an immediate area. Decentralized planning power meant 
that enterprise production and industrial development policies would be promulgated more 
in favour of local authorities than other ministerial functionaries – the so-called “reds” rather 
than the “experts”. Politically, a regional party committee was better positioned to initiate 
mass mobilization and manage political campaigns through its direct command over grass-
roots party cells. During the Great Leap Forward (1958) and Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976), Mao Zedong adopted a power decentralization strategy with local party officials, to 
overcome the resistance from orthodox central planning bureaucracies a represented by vice 
Chairman Liu Shaoqi (Shirk, p. 151). The “Area Dictate” model implied that enterprise party 
committees were judged less rigidly in meeting their gamut of quarterly and monthly quotas, 
giving them leeway for political study sessions. Local officials and Party secretaries saw this 
“Area Dictate” facilitating “Politics in Command”, while disparaging “Branch Dictate” for 
mechanically putting “Economics in Command” (Unger, 1987).  For Lin (2001) the plethora 
of pseudo-principals in such a crisscrossing governance structure created further contention 
among different authorities. Two lines of authorities stood juxtaposed in ways that induced 
deep-seated institutional clashes, or “struggles between two lines” (liangtiao luxian 
douzheng in Chinese) (Unger, 1987, p. 12). Thus, although unified state ownership was 
stipulated in the Constitution, actual control and/or authorities could be dissevered vertically 
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and/or horizontally (Wu, 2005, p. 152).
 12
 Conflict resolution between these two lines tended 
to be pushed up to a supra-bureaucratic body – such as the central Politburo and its standing 
committee – which could coordinate responses with more leverage.  
For reformist leadership, ill-defined institutional arrangements helped overcome orthodox 
central planner resistance. As stated, reformists faced daunting internal challenges from 
conservative bureaucracies among line ministries and functional commissions. From the 
early 1980s, central leadership promulgated fiscal decentralization (e.g. incremental 
contracting, basic proportional sharing and tax-for-profit) intended to alleviate inflation and 
budgetary deficits. Under the initial profit-contracting scheme, regional governments 
retained a portion of, or even all, above-quota revenues remitted by local SOEs; they also 
bore a higher proportion of local public expenditure, including subsidies for local SRUs. The 
rearrangement of residual control over SRUs was vividly described as “eating in separate 
kitchens” (fenzao chifan in Chinese). The quest for fiscal revenue that formerly flowed into 
the national treasury gave rise to the deregulation of local markets and non-state investment; 
it also induced local governments to grant local SRCs greater autonomy for further 
efficiency improvement. Enlarged fiscal and political power brought reformists into a tacit 
coalition with the provincial leaders to push reform experimentation forward. Local 
politicians benefited from revenues generated by reform experiments as well as political 
resources through national publicity and competitions for preferential treatments (youhui 
tiaojian in Chinese).   
Meanwhile, the combination of fiscal decentralization and enterprise profit retention raised 
doubts about the potential fiscal and political consequences. In the context of budgetary 
deficit in 1979 and 1980, decentralizing fiscal power to provinces appeared an attractive 
option for relieving central budgetary strains without surrendering proprietary directives 
(IN33, 2011). However, under expansionary fiscal and enterprise reform, central ministries’ 
access to financial resources was further reduced and dispersed, and their financial base 
appeared to be eroding. Officials from ministries, notably the MOF, became less confident 
of controlling the state sector. As of 1982, the Finance and Tax Reform Group in the MOF 
publicly complained that it bore almost two-thirds of total national financial investment with 
                                                 
12
 Such division of authority and responsibility within regional government bureaucracies held various 
government agencies accountable to certain aspects of SOE management and operation on one hand, on the 
other hand, allowed them to exercise considerable influence over both productive and non-productive affairs at 
firm level.  
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only one-third of total national revenue at its disposal (Ma, 1981). To strike a balance 
between different ministries and localities, central leadership promulgated a tax-for-profit (li 
gai shui in Chinese) scheme which formalized tax obligations. Reducing negotiability while 
guaranteeing revenue flows helped reformist leadership gain credibility during the CCP 
leadership succession in the early 1980s (Wong, 2001).   
However, there were serious disincentives about this profit-for-tax scheme, since quotas and 
tax rates were still arbitrarily determined by the bureaucratic apparatus and enterprise 
insiders (see Shirk, pp. 245-278). Under agreed rules, financial obligations were still subject 
to bargaining between local governments and central ministries, and enterprises could still 
rely on government subsidies to cover losses (Shirk, pp. 250; Wu, 2005). As regional 
governments often afforded local enterprises generous tax concessions and low-interest 
lending, they were obliged to employ redundant workers and subsidize social services in 
return. Using their proprietary fiscal autonomy, local governments could channel their off-
budget capital into redundant and inefficient processing plants. Industrial duplication under 
regional protectionism seriously fragmented economic linkages with further resource 
wastage, leaving central government with mounting economic problems, including non-
performing loans (NPLs), reduced central revenue, and interregional disparities. By not 
developing clearly defined property relations between the state and managers initial 
enterprise reform left room for unchecked insider control and bureaucratic interventions 
(You, 1998, p. 175). 
Reform went into brief but painful downturn after Tiananmen Square. Many recentralization 
schemes faced open opposition from local officials and enterprise managers, and eventually 
collapsed following the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and Deng's 1992 Southern 
Tour campaign.
13
 Local governments subsequently actively promoted privatization while 
changed political-economic conditions impacted upon the political calculus of local 
economic development decision-making: 
 The promulgation of a “socialist market economy” explicitly permitted ownership 
diversification. This fundamental ideological and paradigmatic shift in developmental 
thinking significantly reduced the political challenges faced by promoters of privatization. 
                                                 
13
 The tour challenged the conservative-dominated central leadership and reinstated the economic reform 
agenda, which further accelerated the process of institutional transformation in the state sector (see Goodman, 
1994; Gregory, 2010). 
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 While the institutional legacy of “tiaotiao kuaikuai” implied that local bureaucrats were 
relatively more immune from traditional ideological constraints, the Party’s cadre 
evaluation system had become increasingly market-oriented, and local governors 
promotion prospects became closely linked with economic performance during their 
tenure.  
 Central government had enforced fiscal and monetary recentralization to rationalize 
central budget management and credit control, and the budget constraint upon local 
government was significantly hardened (see Lardy 1998).  
 Deepening marketization further integrated different national markets. Intensifying 
market competition made it increasingly difficult to subsidize local state-owned industries 
through trade barriers (Liu and Garino, 2001; Bai et al., 2004). Meanwhile privatization 
had been facilitated by private sector growth where it presented “an alternative and ready-
made source” for laid-off workers (Oi, 2011, p. 10).  
 Emerging patron-client relations between local authorities and the private sector ensured 
the control benefits for local governors continued after privatization (Boycko et al., 1996; 
Hellman et al., 2003). Such governors could translate their continued political influence 
into individual shareholdings and/or other assets (see Cao et al., 2003; Tsai and Zeng, 
2011). 
Within this environment a new class of local, entrepreneurial officials emerged – officials 
whose success was increasingly dependent on their ability to mobilize resources and 
generate revenues rather than on their ideological "correctness" (see Duckett, 2001, 2002; 
Hillman, 2010).  Privatization and deregulation became more likely where changing loss-
making industrial sectors – mostly dominated by small-and medium-sized SOEs – might 
reduce regional potential economic growth (see Qian and Stiglitz, 1996). Reform 
experiments accelerated after the mid-1990s when central leadership again pushed for fiscal 
decentralisation and state sector restructuring, which began as early as 1992 in counties such 
as Yibin, Shunde and Zhucheng. Given control over key factors of local production, local 
officials gained the power to deploy assets in ways that increased local comparative 
advantage. For Hillman (2010, p. 4), “the local economy began to grow and revenues began 
to flow, but in a political system predisposed to rule by man and administrative fiat, 
opportunities for self-enrichment abounded”. In contrast, local governments' authority over 
large SCCs receded into being largely consultative (Tenev et al., 2002). Under  “grasping the 
large and relinquishing the small”, large SCCs and their regional branches, including the 
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“Four Big” state owned banks, no longer depended upon local governments. The latter often 
operated loose checks upon enterprise management but did not challenge the ownership right 
or management control of state authorized shareholding groups (Saich, 2011). Many local 
politicians regarded restructuring as an opportunity to shed responsibility to central 
government and raise much-needed capital through privatization (Qian and Stigliz, 1996). 
At the same time, large SOE restructuring appeared less efficient in comparison to 
administrative decentralization and local privatization experiments (Heilmann, 2011, p. 101). 
Traditionally these enterprises came under the control of central planners represented by line 
ministries and various functional commissions. Zhu Rongji, premier from 1998 to 2003, 
recalled that the proposal to restructure large SOEs and administrative streamlining 
“received fierce opposition from almost every ministerial leaders” (see Jung, 2011). There 
was not just an economic division between central bureaucracies but also, with regard to 
their extensive social functions (including kindergartens, schools, hospitals, 
accommodations, pension funding and so forth), “were comparable to self-contained 
municipalities” (Heilmann, 2011, p. 102).  Therefore, corporatization and even bankruptcy 
here posed more difficulties than elsewhere, going far beyond ownership transfer, debt 
restructuring and liquidation. As noted, political resistance coupled with the absence of 
complementary institutions led the central policymakers to opt for a partial or incremental 
approach to overcome reform deadlock (Oi and Han, 2011).  
Up to 1997, corporatization of the ministerial apparatus and their subordinate enterprises had 
been implemented as only “a formalistic exercise” based on re-naming and re-arranging old 
structures and redistributing staff but without transforming actual operations (Heilmann, p. 
102). After 1997, the restructuring of these key industrial sectors often took the form of 
shareholding where the ministerial controls were preserved via concentrated ownership. 
Shareholding reform was conducted in a way called “first have sons, and then have fathers” 
– the parent corporations, as represented by various shareholding agencies and group 
corporations, were created only after better-performing assets were ‘carved out’ or ‘spun off’ 
to more financially attractive entities. While the latter would then be listed on stock markets, 
parent companies often remained purely state-owned. These quasi-administrative bodies still 
carry non-performing assets, redundant personnel and similar. Thus parent corporations 
required resources from listed companies and preferential treatment from the central 
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government to cope with the financial difficulties created by asset spin-off (zizhan boli in 
Chinese).   
To a certain extent, corporatization through shareholding reduces government intervention in 
enterprise management. Changes in state ownership status meant that it was no longer so 
responsible for profits and losses and could not guarantee continued investment (Tenev et 
al., 2002; Wu, 2005). Such hardened budget constraints reduced central fiscal burdens and 
made companies, not the state, responsible for performance. However, the preservation of 
intermediate control agencies also produced “a complex property-right mixture” even within 
a single enterprise group, and thus principal-agent problems in China are now multiple (Oi 
and Han, 2011, p. 32; see also OECD, 2005b). While central government acts as the ultimate 
administrator of state assets, supervisory and monitoring power is delegated to shareholding 
agencies in the intermediate layer. Such highly concentrated ownership leaves shareholder 
meetings and board composition dominated by quasi-administrative bodies which could act 
at the expense of both state and minority shareholders. Where both entities operated in the 
same industry, related-party transactions became unavoidable. Shareholding agencies 
likewise have their own agendas and goals. To the extent that insiders’ interests diverge from 
those of other stakeholders, including minority shareholders and central government, the 
latter’s rights and interests can be potentially overridden and sacrificed, as illustrated by 
frequent cases of insider trading and asset tunnelling (Aharony et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 
2011; Peng et al., 2011).
14
  
Since the mid-2000s, most restructured SOEs – in particular those under central control – 
have formally reported significant increases in their production, profits and tax payments. 
Enough performance improvement had occurred for central leadership to announce that 
corporate restructuring had come to a successful end. As Figure 5.2, demonstrates, despite 
their reduced numbers, aggregate profit in industrial SCCs increased over 30-fold, from 
RMB 52.51 trillion in 1998 to RMB 1645.76 trillion in 201l. Although profit declined by 10 
per cent during 2008 amid the wider financial crisis, RMB 90 billion remained considerable. 
Where these corporations already represented the entrenched interests of pre-corporatization 
era, enterprise reform has produced “a vast, tangled mass of economic and bureaucratic 
relations” (Naughton, 2006). In particular, as a result of the 1994 tax treaties, most dividends 
                                                 
14
 Aoki (1994) pointed out that such insider control is a prevalent phenomenon inherent in the transitional 
economies. 
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and after-tax profits became “bottled up” within the intermediate layer of shareholding and 
group companies –  for example, the actual profits submitted to central government in 2010 
accounted for less than 2.2 per cent of total profit. While share listing did not return any 
dividends to the state, rising corporate power has been further extended by the central 
leadership’s endorsement of nurturing the “commanding heights” or “national champions” 
(Szamozzsegi and Kyle, 2011). Anecdotal evidence – such as the prolonged restructuring of 
the telecommunication industry – suggested a tendency for ministries and large enterprise to 
develop near monopolies reliant upon political connections to ensure privileged subsidies. 
Therefore, with expanded economic and political clout, the objectives of the state and SCCs 
are not necessarily synonymous.  
Figure 5.3 Total Profits and Number of Industrial SCCs (1998-2011) 
 
Source: China Statistical Year Book 2011 
The growth of corporate power has raised concern about ability of central government to 
pursue reforms that challenge large business interests. For example, the severe and persistent 
air pollution which enveloped Beijing in January 2013 raised particular public anger towards 
the country’s two largest oil companies, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and 
Sinopec. Although central government issued IV Diesel Emission Standards in 2005, 
implementation was repeatedly delayed by both oil producers. To CNPC and Sinopec, the 
costs of upgrading refinery facilities should be carried or subsidized by the state. While 
others criticized these two companies for pursuing economic self-interest at the expense of 
public health, certain ministerial-agencies including the Ministry of Environment Protection 
find it difficult to make challenges them. Open disputes between central government and 
SOEs appear unusual where corporations become more adept at handling central government 
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directives. One prominent example was the slow withdrawal of central SOEs from real estate 
markets. In March 2010, SASAC ordered 78 central SOEs to exit property market 
investment in order to curb a possible housing bubble. However, reports suggested that their 
compliance was mixed at best. Six months after the stipulation, Business China indeed 
reported that, in order to circumvent SASAC’s mandate, central SOEs were trying to 
remarket on-going projects as low income housing, while continuing to sell them as 
commercial residential units. The same month, Shenzhen Newspaper reported that these 78 
enterprises retained over RMB 110 billion (US$15 billion) in real estate assets and were 
moving slowly towards disinvestment due to lucrative returns. In February 2010, SASAC’s 
Deputy Director Shao Ning acknowledged that only 14 enterprises had fully complied, and 
half had only complied two years later. This reveals the emergence of major corporate 
entities as stronger political players and explains the difficulty which central government 
faces when establishing more effective governance mechanisms for the state sector (Dong, 
2011).  
The increasing entrenchment of corporate interests slowed reform and impaired the 
legitimacy of the ruling party. Since 2012, a series of corporate scandals and corruption 
cases aggravated public discontent about excess managerial perks in the state sector.
15
 The 
widening wealth gap and rising social inequality contradict normative political guidelines for 
“Building a Harmonious Society” (Jianshe Hexie Shehui in Chinese). 16  While social 
disparity undermines party legitimacy it only has more direct impact once it is finally 
uncovered and/or disputed. These unchecked remuneration schemes increase the legitimacy 
deficit when they clearly only privilege selected enterprise insiders (Beetham, 1991). Certain 
high-income sectors such as financial service, public utilities, transportation, and 
telecommunications have arguably higher growth rates of income per capita compared with 
other non-state sectors. For certain observers, corporate insiders and their politician allies are 
the primary beneficiaries of 30-year enterprise reform, even if this threatens to delegitimize 
ongoing economic liberalization (Dickson, 2003). A noticeable incident occurred in April 
                                                 
15
 It is noteworthy that ever since the centrally planning period, the privilege enjoyed by the enterprise 
managers were not merely based on salaries and bonuses, but also on sizable perks, including assignment of 
better and larger apartments, private use of cars, availability of "corporate accounts" for business lunches and 
dinners, entertainment, domestic touring and the like (Qian and Stiglitz 1996). A senior managerial position 
often entails distinguishable and non-explicit discretion over a huge amount of control rents, especially in 
large-scaled enterprises and industrial sectors stipulated as “commanding height”. With increasing managerial 
power delegated to enterprise cadres, they tended to abuse their power over remuneration and exercise 
favoritism to a much greater extent (IN5, 2012). 
16
 President Hi Jintao’s concept embodied the ideas of social justice and improving the life standard of those 
who were marginalized by the reforms and were unable to receive enough public attention.  
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2011, when Tianya, one of the most popular Chinese internet forums revealed Sinopec’s 
Guangdong branch of spending hundreds of thousands on luxury wine and alcohol. The 
unveiled scandal reinforced a widespread belief that the state owned assets in large 
corporations are being used to serve the interests and lavish lifestyles of a tiny group of 
corporate insiders (Higgins, 2011).  
To sum up, China’s SSG reform involved the re-delineation of authority and responsibility 
between the central ministries and local governments. The transformation of their roles, 
from the supervisors implementing administrative directives to the ‘intermediate principals’ 
overseeing enterprise management, reflected expanding markets. The re-delineation of 
governance authority focused upon the three key lines of residual rights, i.e. revenue 
remittance, asset disposal and personnel appointment. It took place simultaneously with 
legislative reform of the state budget and capital markets, for which the inherited 
fragmented authoritarianism provided the institutional base. In light of rising central fiscal 
burdens, local governments reclaimed their fiscal and administrative authority over small 
and medium-sized SOEs. However, ownership control allowed the restructured ministries to 
continue their influence and/or discretion over large SCCs. The entrenchment effects of 
ownership concentration adversely impacted upon investor protection. The rise of large 
corporations as powerful political actors exacerbated managerial malpractice and 
conspicuous executive perquisites and challenged the reconsolidation of state ownership 
rights. It is reasonable to expect that China’s SSG reform will be politically contested each 
step of the way.  
5.5 Managers and SOEs 
The Chinese party-state traditionally adopted a Leninist nomenklatura system upon its 
original establishment, in which the party chief commissions appointments at various levels 
and retains the ultimate authority over the key personnel concerned. Managers in SRUs were 
appointed or dismissed through various bureaucratic apparatus and enjoyed the same 
remuneration as government officials or “state cadres” (guojia ganbu in Chinese). In the 
centrally planned era, the primary task for enterprise cadres was to perform a complex 
repertoire of production quotas and administrative directives imposed by their administrative 
superiors.  Between 1955 and 1985, China’s state sector employed a highly centralized 
eight-grade remuneration system in which the social status and political prestige enjoyed by 
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managers was determined by their administrative rankings in the stratified hierarchy.
17
 In 
this case, productivity and other financial objectives had little influence on managers’ 
remuneration and promotion prospects. For Kornai (1992, pp.223), an egalitarian, grade 
based seniority system had filled the disciplinary vacuum left by the abolition of private 
property. It also maintained ideological compliance among enterprise managers though party 
cells (You, 2002, p.111). Party Committees decided which pro-party activists were rewarded 
and who were the “backward elements” (luohou fenzi in Chinese) to be discriminated 
against. As material incentives and political performance became more closely linked, 
enterprise managers became bureaucratic agents committed to socialist tenets. 
Reform since 1979 changed relationships between managers and SOEs. Faced with new 
economic pressures, managers were initially “shaken out of their dependence on the plan” 
and forced to compete more along market lines (Shirk, p. 211). Reform then permitted 
managers to produce and sell products which the plan had not specified. They became 
gradually detached from administrative directives and became more responsible for firm 
operation and performance above all (see also Wu, 2005, p. 153). In particular, grade-based 
seniority wage allocation was dismantled as enterprise managers created incentives from 
retained profits.
18
 Throughout the 1980s, incentive pay and other performance-linked 
programs spread, and their share of total remuneration increased steadily from 2.3 per cent in 
1978 to 24 per cent in 1992, while average nominal wages in state and collective sectors 
almost tripled (Hussian and Zhuang, 2000). 
For Walder (1991), managerial autonomy and market-oriented incentives transformed the 
politics of the state sector (see also Tam, 1999, 2000, and 2002). Given their experimental 
nature, managers did not treat reforms as legal commitments, and thus bargained to revise 
contractual terms instead. Without effective auditing, managers might inflate costs and hide 
profits. If the enterprise performed poorly, blame was shifted to “objective reasons” (keguan 
yuanyin in Chinese) – such as changes in prices and demand – and there were appeals to 
revise profit remittance obligations downwards (IN9, 2010; IN34, 2011; see also Shirk, 
1993; Sun and Tong, 2003). Enterprise managers sought bonuses for profit, but not 
responsibility for losses (Wu, 2005, pp. 150-151). Moreover, for Walder (1989, 1994) and 
                                                 
17
 The aggregate national wage bill and growth were both arbitrarily decided by the MOF.  
18
 By 1986, wage reform created a dual-track incentive structure in managers’ salaries: the fixed part of 
standard wages which were still based on the past eight-grade wage scheme, and the decontrolled part which 
was made up of bonuses. 
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Huang (1995, 1996), under fiscal decentralization local bureaucracies had particular 
financial incentives to collude with enterprise managers. Local industrial bureaus bargained 
on behalf of subordinate enterprises against central ministries to ensure that more revenue 
would be kept at the local level. As Xu (1989, p. 26) put it, “a tacit agreement … to dilute 
the canter’s interests and strengthen the interests of the local government and enterprises” 
had emerged. By spotting ideological differences among central bureaucracies, certain SOE 
managers, allied with local political entrepreneurs, could refuse to comply with any 
initiatives detrimental to their own and local interests. 
However, enhanced managerial incentives could be achieved at the expense of more 
fragmented ownership rights, while still leaving the relationship between managers and the 
party-state relatively intact. So-called power delegating and profit sharing referred to sharing 
residual control and other claims between the state and enterprise insiders (Wu, 2005, pp. 
150). Under more modern CG systems, most rights delegated to SOE managers are normally 
exercised by the board of directors as entrusted by shareholders. Without effective 
supervision, power delegation inevitably left enterprise managers relatively unchecked 
(Faleye et al., 2006). Moreover, when the 1988 Enterprise Law designated the general 
manager as “legal-person representative”, that legal person was assumed to be one man due 
to the lack of relevant legal tradition. Opportunistic managers reportedly used such 
ambiguity to project themselves as the personal incarnation of the corporations which could 
dispose of corporate property at their own discretion. Examples of state asset stripping and 
insider corruption suggested enterprise insiders often used distorted ownership to convert 
their de facto partial ownership into a de jure complete one (Frydman et al., 1993; Dobrinsky 
1996). Once the party-state retained ultimate power over vital operational and personnel 
decision making, managers were never completely detached, either financially or politically, 
from the corresponding hierarchy. The inheritance of the bureaucratic hierarchy, interwoven 
with cultural tradition of personal connections (guanxi in Chinese), still impinged upon 
managers’ career progression. The power of the Party in personnel selection and job 
allocation restricted the mobility of enterprise managers and discouraged further initiatives 
and innovations (Wong and Slater, 2002). 
Since the early 1990s, corporatization sought to “replace a pliant and negligent state owner 
with profit-seeking shareholders to monitor management more effectively” (Clark, 2003, p. 
499). By transforming SRUs into business entities with limited liabilities, central 
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government sought to impose hardened budget constraints which would make managers 
more accountable (Lin and Zhu, 2001). However, under highly concentrated ownership 
structures, different quasi-administrative agencies such as shareholding agencies and group 
corporations could still intervene in the appointment and dismissal of key managerial staff as 
well as remuneration schemes (Wu, 2005, pp. 159-163). In particular, they could appoint and 
supervise themselves and affiliates as salaried directors of listed companies, even though 
their nomination and evaluation was held secret within this intermediate layer (Wu, 2005, p. 
160). Naughton (2006) used a “black box” to depict this middle layer as “the least 
transparent” and “least reformed” part of SSG structure. This made certain managers collude 
with the “leading members” from parent companies, making insider control even more 
problematic (IN1, 2010). Directors and managers within a unified “leading team” were often 
left unchecked and able to pursue their own interests at the expense of both state and 
minority shareholders’. Such insider collusion emerged in the absence of effective external 
monitoring: SOEs and SCCs were not all covered by the legal and regulatory framework for 
listed companies (OECD, 2005b).
19 
Moreover, mainland stock markets did not impact upon 
the disciplining and supervising of directors and senior managers under concentrated 
ownership. This created opportunities for further managerial opportunism to misuse state 
assets for private purposes and lower operational efficiency (Yeo, 2013).  
At one time, central government relied upon political oversight to address insider control. 
The nomenklatura system was preserved largely through corporatization reform and 
paralleled with SSG hierarchy in many corporatized SOEs. Directors and managers may 
regard the party’s final endorsement of appointments and dismissal as the only and most 
viable mode of discipline. However, economic liberalization has reduced conventional 
ideological oversights for curbing managerial malpractices (Walder, 1991; Naughton, 2006). 
The party-state struggles to coordinate political control with the very market-oriented 
institutions which it claims to seek. With regards to corporate managers, it faces the dilemma 
of a dual identity in which the fiduciary relationship between corporate managers and 
shareholders is overshadowed by the party’s persistent influence, subordinating economic 
efficiency to the pursuit of political objective (Pei, 2009). Reform leadership thus 
increasingly realized that corporate managers needed the discipline and transparency of 
improved SSG and therefore sought a substantial but incremental combination of market-
                                                 
19
 By the end of 1004, none of the 189 central SCCs directly under SASAC’s control and only a minority of 
their partially owned subsidiaries are listed (see OECD, 2005b).  
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based governance with continued party-state oversight over strategic state enterprises 
(Pearson, 2005; Yeo, 2013). In remaking its legitimacy, the party-state required new 
channels to institutionalize oversight over corporate management. The effectiveness of 
China’s SSG thus depends on not only the up-stream functioning of state ownership rights, 
but also the organisational set-up within SOEs, i.e. the relationships and distribution of 
power among the company organs” (OECD, 2005b, p. 311). 20   
Current policies also seek to strengthen the function of BODs, using comprehensive listing 
(zhengti shangshi in Chinese) to change the intermediate layer where various quasi-
administrative shareholding agencies will be listed or simply abolished.
21
 In the 16th 
SASAC-Temasek Directors Forum, Li Bing, General Director of Bureau of Enterprise 
Restructuring of SASAC depicted a well-functioning BOD as follows: (1) an increased 
proportion of independent directors accounting for more half of all board members; (2) 
clarified rights and responsibilities between BOD chairs and CEOs; (3) an increased 
proportion of employee representatives and improved employee democracy; (4) separated 
roles for policymakers and corporate management; (5) improved monitoring of corporate 
management via supervisory panels; and (6) a more active and influential role for BOD 
committees (Sun, 2012). Certainly the idea of BODs is not entirely new in Chinese SOEs, 
but what makes it unique is that the Party’s ever stronger supervisory power is increasingly 
linked into market-oriented governance institutions (Yeo, 2013).  
First, directors and corporate managers are subject to renewed selection and evaluation 
criteria that are increasingly economic-oriented. The “Interim Regulations for Operation 
Performance Assessment of Central SOE Legal Representatives” stipulated that managerial 
remuneration and career progression should be based on several business performance 
indicators including total profit, economic value added, growth rate of state asset value, 
social responsibilities and total asset turnover. Under the new system, there are five levels of 
performance, ranking from A to E (A being the most satisfactory). While technological 
innovation is well weighted in assessing managerial performance, negative indicators 
include severe investment loss, failures in operational safety and product quality, as well as 
financial irregularities (Leng, 2009). At the National State-owned Assets Supervision and 
                                                 
20
 Qin Yongfa, the deputy director of the Working Group Office for the Experiment of Board of Directors of 
SASAC, claims that institutionalizing the channels of the party’s political role in central SOEs is the primary 
concern for the leadership.  
21
 Since 2005, 30 central SOEs including Baoshan Steel and Datang Telecom Corporations have been chosen to 
implement BOD reform according to international standards. 
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Administration Work Conference in early 2009, Huang Shuhe, deputy director of SASAC, 
explicitly asserted that managerial assessment must further take into account such issues as 
liquidity, investment risks and operational cost.  
Second, political oversight has been further institutionalized. Along with the corporatization 
of quasi-administrative agencies, central leadership employs a “two-way intervention” 
(shuangxiang tuijin in Chinese) approach in order for oversight over corporate executives in 
the intermediate layer. The context for this was a sense that excessive power delegation (or 
decentralization) caused the ‘state owner’ to “lose control over the key macroeconomic 
levers and that prudent recentralization is necessary” (Saich, 2011, p. 285). As Figure 5.4 
shows, two-way intervention occurs when Party Committee members join the BOD, while 
other BOD members join the committee at the same time. This provides an institutionalized 
channel to maintain the CCP’s political supervision (see also Yeo, 2013). Rather than rely 
upon administrative and political arms as before, regulatory bodies supervise corporate 
managers/state cadres using renewed criteria for managerial appointments and evaluation. 
Third, external directors become proxies for central-leadership and thus play an increasingly 
important role in managerial supervision. Elsewhere independent/external directors formally 
ensure that corporate management is both accountable and effective, having been selected by 
votes at the general meetings of shareholders and paid for by the company, but not in China. 
Here internal and external directors in shareholding agencies and listed companies are 
nominated and appointed by corresponding regulatory agencies. The limitations of 
supervisory boards (SB) in managerial monitoring have led the party-state to reconsolidate 
its authority over external director appointments.
22
 Thus external directors reflect and pursue 
its stated desire to safeguard and enhance state asset value. Meanwhile such directors 
constitute the majority of the standing committee which appears only in non-listed 
shareholding agencies and has assumed responsibility of making major business plans while 
overseeing performance. More external directors have been considered to be the linchpin for 
enhancing regulatory capacity. For Yeo (2013), reform leadership does not reflect either a 
purely market-based nor control-based system; instead it has followed western practices, and 
skilfully adapted them to China’s institutional environment. As central leadership regulatory 
capacities have been further enhanced, BODs appear like market-oriented institutions being 
                                                 
22
 For the central leadership, the SBs are simply insufficient because supervisors often have less business 
expertise and are not involved in managerial appointments.  
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adapted to serve party-state’s interests. For Naughton (2006), the state’s renewed focus on 
governance reform can make it both the ally and adversary of corporate managers. It is an 
ally of large corporations in that the continued interventionist approach aims to increase the 
value of state assets and their international competitiveness. A vital strand in achieving this 
goal is to enhance oversight over the managerial stratum and reduce agency costs. In this 
political environment, reformers become entrenched management's most evident adversaries. 
Figure 5.4 Managerial Oversights in SCCs 
                           Before                                                        Present 
 
 
To summarize, the demise of central planning and rise of a market-based economic order 
changed Chinese enterprise politics. With fewer directives and resources coming from the 
center, managerial initiatives were enhanced, and thus ideological compliance became less 
binding upon individual managers. However, their expanded autonomy did not bring greater 
responsibility for enterprise performance. Under highly concentrated ownership, quasi-
bureaucratic executives often dominate. Hence, the efficacy of transplanted governance 
mechanisms, including boards of directors and supervisors, has been largely compromised. 
Given a tendency to insider entrenchment, once-rigid and all-encompassing nomenklatura 
control has changed, as can be inferred by increasingly market-oriented cadre evaluation 
criteria. In pursuit of a more globally competitive state sector, the existing governance 
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framework helps the party-state institutionalize its chosen political safeguards against 
management corruption and other malpractices. 
5.6 Public Investors and SOEs 
The emergence of public investors in China is linked into the development of the non-state 
sector and corporatization reform. Since embarking upon economic reform, China has 
witnessed the rapid emergence of private business and dramatic inflow of foreign capital. 
Changed rules and institutions governing the state sector and national economy have 
provided foundations for continued economic growth. Increased industrial and agricultural 
output, coupled with high-standing household saving rates – estimated at 23 per cent of 
disposable income – enabled the emergence and proliferation of non-state investors, most 
notably, institutional investors. Over the restructuring of the state sector, the party state 
allowed the non-state sector to take over small and medium-sized SOEs while seeking to 
channel non-state capital, in particular foreign institutional investors, into large SOEs.  
By quietly dismantling the economic and administrative structure that was supposed to 
restrain it, market forces and profit motives increasingly impact upon economic development 
in both urban and rural areas, increasing opportunities for private business. With economic 
liberalization, the legal position of the private sector was further secured by the CCP 15th 
Congress in September 1997 when recognized as “the important component of the socialist 
market economy with Chinese characteristics”. Given this ideological breakthrough, non-
state investors entered the state sector to address its daunting capital problems. However, the 
“ownership diversification with Chinese characteristics” does not intrinsically imply 
unequivocal asset transfer into private hands overturning the continued dominance of state 
ownership in large corporations (Cao, 2001). Accumulated non-state capital is put to state 
use and subjected to the control of dominant shareholders under the euphemism of 
“corporatization” or “securitization” (Cao, 2001).  
However, expropriation by insiders concerns public investors under concentrated ownership 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Leuz et al., 2003; Gul et al., 2010). A most widespread abuse is 
asset stripping by shareholding entities at the expense of listed companies and minority 
shareholders through abusive related party transactions among firms of the same group, 
intra-group lending or guarantees, and excessive cash dividends (OECD, 2005b). As noted, 
parent companies typically transfer productive assets to their listed subsidiaries, retaining 
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liabilities and redundant staff (Green, 2003).This makes it likely that, lacking a proper fiscal 
system to socialise such burdens, parent companies exploit subsidiaries to meet their fiscal 
commitments. These problems have been characterized as resulting from “ownership 
without constraint”, and have lately resulted in major losses for individual shareholders 
(OECD, 2005b, p. 314). Although Chinese regulatory bodies and stock exchange officials 
acknowledged the importance of investor protection, there are still significant barriers 
preventing minority shareholders from asserting their rights (Tomasic and Andrews, 2007). 
Based on the investor protection index developed by La Porta et al. (1999, 2000), MacNeil 
(2002) calculated a score of 2 for China compared with a 'normal' global average of 3 and 
maximum of 6. The World Bank found that China scores only 5 out of 10 in the index of 
investor protection with a global average of 5.2, as indicated in Table 5.1.
23
 Wu Jinglian, 
arguably China’s most prominent economist, publicly claimed that “China’s stock market is 
no better than a casino, since in a casino there are rules”. Green (2003, pp. 5-6) depicted this 
poor investor protection situation thus: 
“minority shareholders are ignored at the shareholder’s meetings, and frequently abused 
outside them. Company disclosures are so unreliable as to make real supervision of 
corporate activities impossible. In terms of transfer of ownership, there are also important 
limits: individuals face huge obstacles in gaining influence over listed firms, state 
shareholders do not yet have the right to sell their shareholdings and changes of ownership 
are usually negotiated through, and approved by government bodies. Few dividends are 
paid and company funds are often siphoned off by majority shareholders, because of these 
deficiencies, no true market in corporate ownership yet exists”. 
For emerging economies, lack of investor confidence can induce stock market volatility 
which hampers capital-raising (Johnson et al., 2000; Prasanna and Menon, 2012; Brooks et 
al., 2012). The Chinese market has been notably narrow, dominated by small retail 
shareholders and short-term speculative trading, with significantly inflated valuations 
(OECD, 2005b). For central leadership, underdeveloped financial markets obstruct 
corporatization and state sector restructuring, creates further legitimacy concerns. Since 
2000, the Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has pursued successive new market-
oriented policies in the name of restoring stock market confidence, including strengthening 
                                                 
23
 This index is the average of a series of investor protection indicators including the extent of information 
disclosure index, the extent of director liability index, the ease of shareholder suits index. Each of them ranges 
from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating stronger investor protection. 
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minority power, imposing duties on controlling shareholders, restricting related-party 
transactions, improving board independence and information disclosure. 
Table 5.1 Regional Comparison of Investor Protection 2011 
Regions and 
Economies 
Disclosure 
Index 
Director Liability 
Index (0-10) 
Shareholder 
Suit Ease 
Investor 
Protection index 
East Asia & Pacific 5.0 5.0 6.0 5.4 
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia 
7.0 4.0 6.0 5.7 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
4.0 5.0 6.0 5.1 
Middle East & North 
Africa 
6.0 5.0 4.0 4.9 
OECD high income 6.0 5.0 7.0 6.0 
South Asia 5.0 4.0 6.0 5.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.0 4.0 5.0 4.5 
China 10.0 1.0 4.0 5.0 
Hong Kong SAR, 
China 
10.0 8.0 9.0 9.0 
Russian Federation 6.0 2.0 6.0 4.7 
Taiwan, China 7.0 4.0 5.0 5.3 
United Kingdom 10.0 7.0 7.0 8.0 
United States 7.0 9.0 9.0 8.3 
Global Average 5.3 4.5 5.7 5.2 
Source: World Bank, Doing Business Project (2011) 
For example, in 2000, the CSRC issued regulations to restrict controlling shareholders’ 
involvement in related power transactions, including voting power in shareholder meetings 
and issuance of loan guarantees. In 2002, it formulated its “Code of Corporate Governance” 
for listed companies specified principles for investor protection and related guidelines for 
BODs and SBs. In particular, every listed company should have at least two independent 
directors and, by June 2003 had to account for at least one third of all board members. 
Disobedience brought administrative warnings, heavier fines and possible criminal 
prosecution, since the Supreme People’s Court has allowed private suits against listed 
companies. Such regulatory endeavours indicate the senior leadership’s concern to protect 
public investors and improve CG. For Tricker (2012), although these codes and regulations 
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for investor protection largely mirror those in the West, detailed requirements were even 
stricter than in Hong Kong and other developed markets (Tenev et al., 2002). 
However, there were gaps between actual implementation and the CSRC’s original vision. 
Many of the regulatory difficulties faced by transitional economies stem from the absence of 
economic-political conditions conducive to effective investor protection. This is especially 
so for China where judicial independence and civil rights are limited. In practice, the 
enforcement of disciplinary provision can arouse resistance from these enterprise groups 
who regard themselves as “selfless parents” bearing the tremendous sacrifice of non-
performing assets and unproductive employees. They implicitly assume that listed 
companies, representing the most profitable “carved out” assets for IPO financing, are 
obligated to fulfil their financing needs at minority shareholder expense. Such a parent-child 
type relationship can encourage investor expropriation, including soft loans from listed 
companies on a long-term basis, the use of listed companies as guarantors for further bank 
loans, and the sales of listed companies’ assets at inappropriate prices. In reforming the 
“split share structure” (guquan fenzhi in Chinese), and notwithstanding the concession of 
protecting the interests of those tradable-share owners backed by central bureaucracies, 
parent companies have been challenged about dishonouring promises to holders of tradable-
shares. For example, certain companies that promised to buy back shares, or offer cash 
compensation in the event of a price drop, have not done so. For example, Shanghai’s 
Baoshan Iron & Steel Corporation, a central SOE selected to conduct share reform, was 
roundly criticized for failing to keep its promise to intervene if its share price fell below 
RMB 4.53 (SinaFinance, 2005). Cooper (2008) found that concentration of shareholding on 
the part of parent companies was generally associated with lower cash compensation to 
minority shareholders. Vulnerable minority shareholders also encounter lack of judicial 
independence. Local People’s Courts are reportedly reluctant to accept cases in which 
powerful political entities, such as state shareholding agencies, are involved (see Lin, 2001; 
Braendle et al., 2005). Arguments about whether party hegemony will dissolve aside, public 
investors are still vulnerable against controlling shareholders’ expropriations (Lubman, 
1999; Lin, 2001; Potter, 2005; Braendle et al., 2005). Guo Shuqing (2011), Chairman of the 
CSRC identified the key difficulties as follows: 
“Insufficient judicial assistance for investor protection, together with the absence of a 
vibrant and highly efficient market for corporate control and the nonexistence of market of 
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professional managers, has resulted in ineffective restraint of the market mechanism over 
corporate management. Lack of awareness of value investment among individual and 
institutional investors also weakened the supervision of listed companies.” 
In 2007, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and CSRC also increased 
ownership ceilings for foreign capital in listed securities traders, enabling overseas 
institutional investors to act as external disciplinary mechanisms (Wu, 2010). In January 
2012, the CSRC established an investor protection bureau to conduct relevant research and 
handle investor complaints, in particular individual investors (Lu et al., 2010). The CSRC 
also sought to merge the bureau with several institutional investors so that the resulting 
agency could participate in shareholder meetings and file complaints or lawsuits on behalf of 
individual investors (Lu et al., 2011). With increasing complaints and criminal prosecutions 
against expropriating insiders, the CSRC publicly stated that “the policy of ‘zero tolerance’ 
should be practiced for insider trading, market manipulation and other violations, all of 
which will be prosecuted” (CSRC, 2013). 
In searching for reform motivations, observers such as Green (2003) have noted that 
regulatory endeavours and statutory improvement of public investors' position were closely 
linked with shifting government priorities in enterprise reform, welfare development and 
budgetary conduct. Previously China’s securities markets financed SOE restructuring (see 
Green, pp. 171-172). Regulatory priorities would curb potential malpractices during state 
asset transfer, whilst public investors and market confidence were of less concern. However, 
the agenda has lately changed as existing regulatory structures faced other issues regarding 
SOE performance deterioration, pension reform urgency, and mounting budgetary deficits. A 
year after the enactment of CSRC’s major reform measures, private research by one Chinese 
securities company estimated that the gap between funds available and needed in mainland 
stock markets ranged anywhere between RMB 20 to 80 billion. It is therefore clear that, in 
order to attract more investors on a larger scale, the government had to do more than just 
detain further A-Share issuance. In addition, faced with an ageing society, it is important to 
diversify investment channels and increase return rates for pension assets in China, estimated 
to grow from RMB 125 billion in 2001 to 8.3 trillion by 2020. Whether privately or publicly 
managed, capital from pension, mutual funds and insurance funds needs to be invested in 
well-regulated securities markets with effective investor protection in order to achieve better 
investment returns. Although Chinese stock markets can offer quick returns, they appear ill-
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suited to managing national pensions. Financial fragility associated with weak investor 
protection could negatively impact upon firms’ access to external finance, and hamper 
economic growth and social stability, as in the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis. The reform 
leadership increasingly realized that maintaining investor confidence is important for both 
economic and legitimacy concerns. Indeed, continued investor protection improvement 
relied upon the central leadership’s priorities for economic reform and regulatory practices. 
A recent compelling example was SASAC’s unsuccessful nomination for the BOD chairman 
of Gree Electric Appliances (Qi, 2012).
 
Although SASAC retained a majority shareholding 
of 20 per cent, minority investors, including several mutual funds and insurance companies, 
jointly exercised veto power over its nomination. As central leadership relinquished control 
over less important enterprises, SASAC’s shareholding in Gree Electric Appliances became 
less dominant compared with other central SOEs. In its case, selective withdrawal of state 
capital enabled more proactive governance practice by institutional investors.  
To summarize, rapid economic growth and the improved income levels led to the rise of 
public investors in the reform agenda. Where complementary institutions for sound 
governance practices, such as developed capital markets and judicial independence, have 
yet to emerge, Chinese public investors remain vulnerable to expropriation risks and 
managerial malpractices often associated with highly concentrated ownership. However, 
changes in the economic environment introduced other stakeholders, bringing pressure upon 
existing governance institutions: inherent expropriation risks and persistently low 
investment returns not only prolonged corporate restructuring, but hindered the 
development of a national pension system. In order to nurture sufficient demand, stock 
markets are required to attract small investors on a larger scale than before, due to the 
rising influence of formal institutional investors. The resultant economic and legitimacy 
concerns further prompted central policy makers to initiate successive regulatory reforms in 
order to restore the trust and confidence of market participants. This, in turn, has 
contributed to the growing aversion to insider control and investor expropriation.  
5.7 Overseas listing and International Expansion 
International listing has been designated as providing leverage for more stringent governance 
institutions in addition to accessing external capital (Coffee 1999, 2002; see also Licht, 
2003, 2007; Sun et al., 2013). National policymakers envisioned its increasing importance 
for pursuing an internationally competitive state sector (Sun and Tong, 2003; Hung et al., 
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2008; Guest and Sutheland, 2010). Moverover, these listed companies provide exemplars for 
others to follow, and thus advance SOE reform. Zhou Daojiong (1995), a former CSRC 
chairman, remarked: 
“recommending medium and large-sized SOEs for overseas listing is useful in raising 
necessary foreign capital; but more importantly, it prods SOEs to learn from the successful 
experience of foreign companies, helping them match international standards and making it 
possible for them to compete in the international market” (Ifeng, 2008). 
Hong Kong is a favoured hub for overseas listing. For Sun et al. (2013), H-share firms 
dominate in terms of both number and size compared with other firms listed elsewhere, such 
as New York (N-share) and London (L-share).
24
 Besides its status as the regional financial 
center, Hong Kong is an attractive listing venue for Chinese SOEs because it is “blended 
with the cultural, historical and linguistic factors” arising from the proximity of the East and 
West (Meng, 2011, p. 256; see also Pagano et al., 2002; Xu, 2011). In May 1993, the State 
Council promulgated the Mandatory Provisions of Articles of Associations for Companies to 
be listed in Hong Kong. These Mandatory Provisions delineated the rights and obligations 
between the Chinese SOEs and investors inter se, and minimized the discrepancies of legal 
origins and authorities between these two jurisdictions regarding such aspects as share 
repurchase, shareholders’ general meeting, directors’ duties, board structure, information 
disclosure, corporate restructuring and dispute resolution (see Meng, 2011). On 15 July 
1993, Tsingtao Brewery made history as the first restructured SOEs to float shares in Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), followed by eight more companies in the first batch.
25
 On 8 
August 1994, the Hang Seng China Enterprise Index was launched to track the performance 
of all H-share companies.  
Figure 6.1 shows the number of Chinese companies listed in the Main Board and Growth 
Enterprise Market of HKSE between 1993 and 2012. During this period, a total of 175 IPOs 
were successfully launched, raising capital of more than HK$ 11.3 trillion (US$ 1.47 
trillion). While the last decade has witnessed a sharp increase of H-share IPOs, the average 
raised capital increased considerably from HK$ 2.5 billion over the 1990s to HK$ 10 billion 
                                                 
24
 In fact, most N-share firms are traded in the form of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) with the 
underlying shares listed Hong Kong. 
25
 The other eight companies were Shanghai Petroleum, Maanshan Iron & Steel, Beiren Printing Machinery, 
Guangzhou Shipyard, Sinopec Yizheng Chemical Fiber, Jiaoda Kunji High-Tech, Dongfang Electrical 
Machinery and Tianjin Bohai Chemical Industry.  
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hereafter. Successful experimentation with medium-sized, largely local SOEs provoked 
more large-sized SOEs to list shares abroad (Ewing, 2005; Meng, 2011). In 2006, the 
world’s largest and fourth largest IPOs, namely the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China and the Bank of China, elevated HKSE to the world’s second largest stock exchange 
for IPO financing, ahead of New York and just behind London (Yang and Lau, 2006). 
Figure 5.4 Number of H-share IPOs (1993-2012) 
 
Source: Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
The overall geo-economic context and accelerated pace of overseas listing meant that the 
entire Chinese state sector becomes increasingly open to international influence (see Deeg, 
2005; Djelic and Quack, 2007). The involvement of international capital could provide 
further impetus for sound CG practices, in particular effective investor protection and 
information disclosure (Coffee 1999, 2002). In particular, to prepare for international listing, 
many SOEs have progressively restructured in line with international standards, emphasizing 
information disclosure and board independence (see Jia et al., 2005; Sun et al, 2006). With 
the state’s continued pursuit of better managerial oversight, overseas listings arguably 
impose more stringent legal requirement and monitoring upon corporate insiders. This in 
turn addresses interest misalignment between state owners and public investors, where 
policymakers believe that entrenched insider control limits efficiency and competiveness 
improvements (Madera and Sun, 2005; Sun et al, 2006). Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
listed SOEs claim to align governance practices with global standards. Domestic regulatory 
agencies and listed companies have been pressured to improve corporate transparency and 
guarantee investor rights following accounting scandals. The direction of China’s SSG 
reform, to a certain extent, hinges upon how market participants regard the governance 
6 
8 
1 
6 
15 
2 3 
4 4 5 
14 
10 10 
17 
9 
6 6 7 6 
9 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 2 
9 
4 
5 
2 
2 
0 
1 0 
0 
0 
0 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
MB GEM
P a g e  | 154 
 
system and prevailing practices (Clarke, 2003). In one comment on a lawsuit against a state-
owned chipmaker, the Nasdaq-listed Semiconductor Manufacturing International 
Corporation, attorney Omer Ozden, asserted that: 
“Chinese companies are very sensitive to their valuation. With valuations so key to Chinese 
companies; we should expect to see considerable efforts on their part to improve their 
disclosure, corporate governance and accounting standards over the next few years so as to 
avoid similar drops in trading prices. American and other international investors will also 
begin to understand Chinese companies better and they will be less inclined to paint Chinese 
companies with the same brush, as has been the case over the last few years” (Asianlaw, 
2004). 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CM&As) by Chinese multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) provide a particular testing ground to assess similar judgments by international 
investors. The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around CM&A announcements have 
been widely used to infer value creation (destruction) effects associated with firm and deal-
specific factors (see Mock and Yeung, 1992; Chen and Young, 2010; Gubbi et al., 2010). 
Although this effect is often discussed using the language of cooperation and synergy, its 
variation can also be attributed to the organizational structure and SSG features of acquiring 
firms (see Lien et al., 2005; Buckley and Casson, 2009; Buckley and Strange, 2011; 
Filatotchev and Wright, 2011). The current majority-voting rule generates shared concerns 
that rights of minority shareholders will be easily overlooked, particularly when 
concentrated ownership structures enable corporate controller to dominate (Xi, 2006; Hovey 
and Naughton, 2007). Accordingly, minority investors choose to ‘vote with their feet’, given 
their negligible influence upon corporate controllers. In this way, CARs, as proxy for stock 
market reaction, are essential tools to examine how (international) investors judge prevailing 
governance practices in Chinese SOEs (Del Guercio et al., 2008; Fischer et al., 2009; Ning et 
al., 2014). 
Tables 5.2a presents the CARs of different samples over 2-, 3-, 5- and 11-day event 
windows. After excluding companies with missing stock data, an entire sample of 476 
CM&As have been identified, of which more than 50 per cent were via companies controlled 
and/or supervised by central government. To the extent that the observation period covers 
nearly more than two decades, several discrete event breaks – including the 1993 corporation 
reform and the 2000 “Going Out” Policy – may affect the decision-making mechanism and 
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quality of CM&As. In this case, the post-1993 (Table 5.2b) and post-2000 (Table 5.2c) 
subsamples were constructed so that the potential influence of these reform initiatives can be 
further assessed. The sizes for both the entire and subsamples (476, 472, and 402) are 
arguably sufficient for the parameter t-test (Brown and Warner, 1985; McWilliams and 
Siegel 1997). 
Table 5.2a CARs around the Announcement Date (the Entire Sample) 
CAR Mean % Median % % Positive T-statistics W-test 
CAR (-1, 0) 0.85 0.11 52 2.98*** 2.01* 
CAR (-1,+1) 1.00 -0.02 50 2.98*** 2.06** 
CAR (-2,+2) 0.71 0.12 51 1.82* 1.25 
CAR (-5,+5) 0.92 0.04 50 1.67* 1.13 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Table 5.2b CARs around the Announcement Date (the Post-1993 Subsample) 
CAR Mean % Median % % Positive T-statistics W-test 
CAR (-1,0) 0.83 0.10 51 2.88*** 1.86* 
CAR (-1,+1) 0.97 0.02 50 2.85*** 1.88* 
CAR (-2,+2) 0.66 0.07 51 1.68* 1.09 
CAR (-5,+5) 0.85 -0.02 50 1.54 0.967 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Table 5.2c CARs around the Announcement Date (the Post-2000 Subsample) 
CAR Mean % Median % % Positive T-statistics W-test 
CAR (0,+1) 0.65 0.07 51 2.81*** 1.65* 
CAR (-1,+1) 0.84 -0.02 50 2.90*** 1.95* 
CAR (-2,+2) 0.66 0.18 52 1.86* 1.50 
CAR (-5,+5) 0.89 0.28 51 1.70* 1.53 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
For the entire sample, the mean CARs range from 0.71 to 1.00 per cent. While the mean 
CARs over the wider event windows are positive at the significance level of 0.10, the 
observed positive market reaction turned out to be particularly significant over the 2-day 
(p<0.01, positive yield 0.85 per cent) and 3-day event windows (p <0.01, positive yield 1.00 
per cent). As noted by McWilliams and Siegel (1997), the t-test statistics in event studies are 
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often sensitive to outliers and thus the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test has been 
employed to examine both the signs and magnitude of CARs. The W-statistics indicate the 
generally higher proportion of the positive CARs, suggesting investors’ positive perception 
of CM&As by Chinese MNEs (see also Ning et al., 2014). Such statistical results remain 
robust and significant for both subsamples.   
Results from the cross-sectional regression are presented in Table 5.3, with CARs over 3-day 
event window used as dependent variables. From Model 1 to Model 7, effects of both time 
trend and industrial clustering are controlled. Model 1 contains the control variables drawn 
from the prevailing CM&A literature (see Chen and Young, 2010; Gubbi et al., 2010), and 
show significantly negative correlations between acquirers’ announcement returns and firm 
age (FA) and size (FS), return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (TQ). For Winter (1998), as 
firms age, routinized behaviours create obstacles to adapt changes associated with 
internationalization, thus partially or wholly offsetting the theoretical benefit of accumulated 
experience (see also Zollo et al., 2002). The negative coefficients of FA echo this (see also 
La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Berglöf and Claessens 2006). McCardle and Viswanathan (1994) 
showed that large firms are more likely to make acquisitions, as they may exhaust their 
internal growth opportunities (the growth opportunities signalling hypothesis, see Jovanovic 
and Braguinsky, 2002). Jensen (1986) postulated that large firms’ managers would rather 
manipulate free cash flows and pursue empire-building than increase pay-outs to 
shareholders. As noted, large state-owned corporations in China often entail a complex web 
of bureaucratic relations and politics inherited from the centrally-planning era (Naughton, 
2006). Such organisational complexity creates bureaucratic and societal vested interests that 
may seek to maintain the status quo at the expense of public investors (Duckett, 2001). For 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997), strong recent firm performance, measured by high ROA, 
gives rise to managerial hubris and overconfidence in investment decision making. That 
managers may overestimate potential synergies and undertake value-destroying acquisitions 
concerns public investors. This is particularly so given insiders’ dominance over corporate 
agendas, as often occurs in Chinese MNEs (Brown and Sarma, 2007). Moreover, TQ of 
Chinese acquirers is found to have a significantly negative effect on the announcement of 
returns. Financial economists attribute the former to firms' monopolistic power in addition to 
overvaluation effects (see Lindberg and Ross, 1981; Smirlock et al., 1984; Barton, 1988; 
Lang and Stulz, 1994). This high market valuation, akin to what economists label ‘monopoly 
rents’, are in part due to financial privileges and regulatory exemptions, and thus less 
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warranted by the acquirers’ fundamentals (Moller et al., 2004; Yao et al., 2008). This often 
leads the managers to overbid to the detriment of public investors (Su and Fung, 2013).  
The six remaining models examine the effects of governance characteristics on 
announcement returns. For public investors, the presence of large shareholding blocks may 
mitigate the “free-rider” problem in decision making and management monitoring (Burkart 
et al., 1997; Bai et al., 2004). This can be inferred from the positive and significant 
coefficients of largest shareholdings (LA) (Model 3 and Model 7). However, the complex 
governance structure and associated expropriation risk still concern international investors 
(Liu and Lu, 2007). The negative coefficients of the group affiliation (GA) dummy are 
statistically significant in almost all cases (except in Model 2). International business (IB) 
researchers maintain that group affiliation brings particular benefits (e.g. Khanna and Yafeh, 
2007; Guest and Sutherland, 2010) where business groups substitute for imperfect or under-
developed markets in finance, labour and products. This facilitates firms’ international 
expansion by reducing transactions costs and business risk, as in the Japanese keiretsus and 
Korean chaebol (see Chang and Choi, 1988; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998). However, group 
affiliation may also generate problems related to rent-seeking activities, crony capitalism, 
and inefficient investment (see La Porta et al., 1999). In particular, the pyramid structure 
affords shareholding agencies considerable economic influence over corporate affairs, such 
as overseas investment decisions, without necessitating commensurate capital investments 
(Guest and Sutherland, 2010). As regards the Chinese state sector, most intermediate 
principals are transformed line ministries that inherited vested interests and bureaucratic 
politics from the centrally-planned era,  and can still pursue their own objectives in the guise 
of “national interests” (Naughton, 2006, 2008). The World Bank (2005) has warned of 
resource tunnelling where proceeds from investment projects and listed companies fuel intra-
group restructuring or ill-advised investments. Officials and executives of shareholding 
groups often act as if the “owner” on behalf of the state, and secure private benefits not 
shared with ordinary investors, such as political influence and opportunities for patronage or 
corruption (Lin and Milhaupt, 2013). The negative coefficients suggest that GA increases the 
risk of insider entrenchment and investor expropriation. 
The positive and significant coefficients of the central government control dummy (both at 
5% level) suggest that state ownership involvement is positively evaluated by public 
investors. To them, strategic state intervention may benefit the international expansion of 
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Chinese MNEs through low-cost capital and broad technological support (see Nolan and 
Wang, 1999; Nolan, 2007). Prior studies suggest that well financed firms (as reflected by 
abundant assets power) are more capable of committing resources and weathering the 
uncertainties of foreign operations (Aulakh and Kotabe, 1997; Madhok, 1998). These firms 
are more likely to enter foreign markets through integrated channels (Aulakh and Kotabe, 
1997) and conduct wholly owned operations (Madhok, 1998). For public investors, financial 
and political supports by the central government may help these corporations “overcome the 
liabilities of emergingness, and serve as a mechanism for competitive catch-up through 
opportunity seeking and capability transformation” (Du and Boateng, 2012, p. 33). 
Meanwhile the positive coefficient of largest shareholding becomes insignificant after the 
central government control (CGC) dummy is added, suggesting that the beneficial effects of 
LA may derive partially from state strategic intervention. Cheung et al. (2008) maintained 
that minority shareholders in firms controlled by central government (or with a large 
proportion of central government affiliated directors) would benefit from reduced 
expropriation risk, given stringent supervisory criteria and high press visibility. As argued in 
Section 5.4, central policy makers and regulators have sufficient incentives and power to 
alleviate governance problems caused by entrenched insiders given significant financial 
stakes and legitimacy concerns. Continued reform, including the two-way intervention 
approach and more independent directors, could impose checks and balances that safeguard 
state and public shareholders' interests (see Yeo, 2013). This adds to previous research about 
the state actively promoting business expansion while curbing managerial malpractices (see 
Bai et al., 2004; Tian and Estrin, 2008; Mallin, 2011). These findings are consistent with the 
‘helping hand’ interpretation of related state intervention (see Nee et al., 2007; Cheung et al., 
2008).
26
 
In contrast local government control (LGC) appears to have a negative significant effect on 
stock market reaction (Model 6).
27
 Bureaucratic interference and insider expropriation 
constitute concern public investors (see Cheung et al., 2008). For Opper et al. (2002, p. 108) 
fiscal and administrative decentralization provides local governments “a certain leeway to 
continue to continue their involvement and interventionist activities” in enterprises. They 
can exercise some discretion through the approval process for overseas investment (Cui and 
                                                 
26
 That the (negative) impact of GA is increased after the CGC dummy is partialled out (in Models 4 and 5) 
indicates the potential positive role of central government in curbing insiders’ malpractices. 
27
 The negative coefficient of LGC dummy becomes statistically significant at 10 % level in a one-tailed T-test. 
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Jiang, 2009). MNEs controlled by local governments are mandated for pursuing multiple, 
conflicting objectives which could be detrimental to shareholders’ interests (Che and Qian, 
1998; Fan et al., 2012). At the same time local bureaucracies’ intervention concentrates more 
on personnel policy issues such as recruitment, evaluation and dismissal of key managers 
(Wong et al., 2004). In major corporate decision makings, the executives therefore “have 
strong incentives to collude or maintain good relations with local elites due to the quasi-
market institutional environment” (OECD, 2005b, p. 312; Hillman, 2010). Such 
“asymmetric dependence relationship” can aggravate insider control, and leave both state 
and public investors vulnerable to expropriation (Lin, 2002, p. 68; see also MacGregor, 
2012). On the other hand, as OECD (2005b, p. 310) noted, “(local) SOEs were filled local 
politicians with no business experience or other relevant expertise and thus did not act as a 
check on management” (see also Chen et al., 2002). This may further aggravate investors’ 
concerns when these firms are entering more competitive, sophisticated global markets (Lin, 
2002). In many cases the complexity of pyramid and/or cross-shareholding structures helps 
expand the personal patronage and influence of local bureaucrats, while providing 
opportunities for personal enrichment (Cheung et al., 2008).
28 
The statistical evidence here 
confirms other claims about widespread investor expropriation and asset stripping by local 
bureaucrats and managers, including the failure of Guangdong International Trust and 
Investment Corporation (GITIC) and the Guangxia-Lantian scandal. 
                                                 
28
 Given their continued influence over the local press and judicial authorities, local bureaucrats may feel less 
likely to be prosecuted for corruption and other business malpractices (Cheung et al, 2008).  
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Table 5.3 Announcement Returns and Governance Characteristics 
        Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Local Government Control      -0.0173* 
(0.00953) 
-0.0156 
(0.00989) 
Central Government Control    0.0228** 
(0.00902) 
0.0203** 
(0.00966) 
  
Largest Shareholding   0.000345** 
(0.000161) 
 0.000193 
(0.000162) 
 0.000302* 
(0.000168) 
Group 
Affiliation 
 -0.01000 
(0.00815) 
-0.0183* 
(0.00927) 
-0.0196** 
(0.00951) 
-0.0232** 
(0.00995) 
-0.0181** 
(0.00903) 
-0.0246** 
(0.00971) 
Firm Age -0.000773*** 
(0.000292) 
-0.000568** 
(0.000236) 
-0.000488* 
(0.000249) 
-0.000589** 
(0.000237) 
-0.000541** 
(0.000244) 
-0.000592** 
(0.000237) 
-0.000519** 
(0.000250) 
Firm Size -0.00513*** 
(0.00170) 
-0.00442*** 
(0.00162) 
-0.00481*** 
(0.00158) 
-0.00625*** 
(0.00172) 
-0.00627*** 
(0.00172) 
-0.00528*** 
(0.00167) 
-0.00553*** 
(0.00164) 
Return on 
Assets 
-0.00187*** 
(0.000602) 
-0.00186*** 
(0.000521) 
-0.00181*** 
(0.000518) 
-0.00179*** 
(0.000489) 
-0.00178*** 
(0.000488) 
-0.00180*** 
(0.000525) 
-0.00176*** 
(0.000522) 
Tobin’s Q -0.00250*** 
(0.000946) 
-0.00243*** 
(0.000877) 
-0.00241** 
(0.000937) 
-0.00235*** 
(0.000782) 
-0.00235*** 
(0.000821) 
-0.00255*** 
(0.000844) 
-0.00253*** 
(0.000895) 
Debt-Equity Ratio 4.95e-05 
(4.78e-05) 
3.48e-06 
(3.20e-05) 
1.56e-05 
(3.10e-05) 
3.49e-06 
(3.18e-05) 
1.03e-05 
(3.08e-05) 
6.52e-06 
(3.24e-05) 
1.68e-05 
(3.15e-05) 
Operating Profit 
Margin 
0.000215 
(0.000143) 
0.000374*** 
(8.71e-05) 
0.000364*** 
(9.08e-05) 
0.000381*** 
(8.76e-05) 
0.000374*** 
(8.91e-05) 
0.000404*** 
(8.98e-05) 
0.000392*** 
(9.33e-05) 
Target Status 
Dummy 
-0.0103 
(0.00646) 
-0.00435 
(0.00673) 
-0.00444 
(0.00678) 
-0.00337 
(0.00642) 
-0.00352 
(0.00649) 
-0.00271 
(0.00626) 
-0.00295 
(0.00636) 
Constant -0.0129 
(0.0529) 
0.0611* 
(0.0332) 
0.0508 
(0.0325) 
0.0805** 
(0.0340) 
0.0726** 
(0.0348) 
0.0839** 
(0.0369) 
0.0726* 
(0.0377) 
Observations 432 375 375 375 375 375 375 
R-squared 0.114 0.108 0.116 0.130 0.132 0.118 0.125 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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This section has examined the impact of various SSG variables upon the announcement 
returns of CM&As. It provides a tentative appraisal of how public investors regard 
prevailing SSG features, given their rising influence over the reform agenda (Green, 2003). 
Three aspects of SSG structure are considered: the degree of ownership concentration, the 
presence of group affiliation, and the nature of ultimate controller. Two general conclusions 
emerge from these empirical results, which are broadly consistent with the qualitative 
findings. First, inside entrenchment and expropriation become more pronounced, as the 
economic and political jurisdiction of shareholding agencies, i.e. intermediate principals, has 
further expanded (Yeo, 2013). The beneficial effects of large shareholding should be 
considered within the broader context of SSG features, including the group structure and 
ultimate controller. Second, the statistical results confirm the proactive role of central 
policymakers in promoting effective SSG practices, as opposed to local bureaucracies. For 
Shirk (1993), the decentralized structure of China’s political institutions gives rise to the 
different interests and motivations among central and local officials, and creates a richer set 
of potential outcomes. Beijing’s renewed commitment to fostering a competitive and well-
governed state sector has aided investors’ quest for more effective protection. In this regard 
central government itself becomes a key player alongside emerging public investors in 
China’s state sector reform. Indeed, without the administrative and regulatory push, progress 
in establishing more modern governance institutions would have faltered (Tam and Yu, 2011; 
see also Saich, 2011). It is reasonable to believe that further governance reform depends 
largely upon how central policymakers reconcile the espoused policy agenda with the actual 
interests of these emerging economic actors. Some (e.g. Saich, 2011; Lin and Milhaupt, 
2013) would suggest that the governance practices arising from the changing political-
economic landscape may not mount to a market-oriented system but instead resemble ‘state 
corporatism’. As noted by Baum and Shevchenko (1999), the key attraction of this model is 
the state’s ability to adjust and accommodate party-state control to the pluralizing socio-
economic changes induced by market reforms. The significance of these initiatives and 
measures can be expected to produce a more “profound and far-reaching impact” on 
China’s SSG system and practices (Tam and Yu, 2011, pp. 234; Lin and Milhaupt, 2013). 
5.8 Summary 
The chapter reviews the trajectory of China’s state sector reform with special attention to the 
interplay between key stakeholders. It emphasizes that China’s SSG is at a crucial new stage 
P a g e  | 162 
 
where the focus is shifting from introducing “formal rules and regulations (over the 1990s) 
towards more comprehensive institution-building” aimed at protecting the interests of 
shareholders, including state and public investors (Tam and Yu, 2011. P. 224). Successive 
reforms have led to a state-dominated governance model relying upon regulatory and market 
coordination. Despite its still-pervasive influence, rigid central planning is no longer an 
option for central policy makers. Although ideological constraints and entrenched interests 
both impinged upon reform, these are not the only influential factors. In light of fading 
revolutionist ideology, the Chinese party-state has proactively sought to institutionalize its 
control amid increasingly market-oriented change. Increased marketization and 
administrative streamlining have re-shaped the respective interests and authority of 
ministries, localities and corporate managers. In the pursuit of these interests, the once 
unilateral and authoritative relationship between the government and enterprises has become 
more bilateral and contestable. The extant governance system and practices have often been 
exploited by local governments and quasi-administrative agencies to entrench their vested 
interests, giving other opportunities for management indiscretion and insider expropriation. 
As the influence of capital markets continues to grow, further SSG reform will largely hinge 
upon the institutional capacity to reconcile the state’s policy imperatives with investors’ quest 
for more effective protection.  
State sector reform pursues both efficiency and legitimacy. Where policy makers are seeking 
financial resources necessary for restructuring the state sector, they need to ensure that the 
transparency and openness of the governance systems are sufficient to satisfy investors. How 
investors then judge emerging governance practices foreshadows further institutional 
evolution. This chapter also made a preliminary attempt to answer this question by examining 
the impacts of various SSG features upon stock market reactions to Chinese MNEs’ CM&A 
announcements. The statistical results confirm the preceding qualitative findings, in 
particular the positive role of central government in pursuing SSG reform. The combination 
of continued state control and incremental marketization could lead to more distinctive 
practices in Chinese SSG. In particular, the increased intuitional openness associated with 
overseas listing implies multiple pressure points where prevailing governance shortcomings 
are open to changes that will need further empirical investigation (Djelic and Quack, 2007).  
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Chapter 6 
State Sector Governance Reform at Individual Firm Level:  
The Case of China Life  
6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter suggested that state sector governance (SSG) practices are not so much 
the outcomes of priori choices, but rather are shaped by wider social and political forces that 
determine institutional character and conduct. From a path-based perspective, SSG 
transformation should be a stated goal and progressive learning and adaptive process 
“whereby people, organizations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and 
maintain capacity over time” (OECD, 2006, p. 53). This chapter presents a dynamic 
contextual analysis of the actual SSG development of an individual firm. It will elaborate 
upon its conduct and highlight the proactive role of change agents and other enabling 
conditions. By examining governance reforms in China Life – the world’s largest life insurer 
in terms of market capitalization – it will address the questions:  (1) to what extent had China 
Life’s governance system and practices changed despite continued state control? (2) What 
are the results so far? (3) Who were the key reform actors and/or change agents? (4) How 
did they overcome the organizational and institutional obstacles encountered? This chapter 
proceeds with a review of the China Life’s historical development in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 
introduces the governance system prior to its overseas listing. Sections 7.4-7.6 then examine 
the post-listing dynamics of China Life’s governance reforms in regard to interactions 
among key stakeholders and the socio-economic environment. The narrative covers the key 
institutional domains in which innovative governance practices emerged: capital markets, 
board mechanisms, and regulatory bodies. Section 7.7 finally summarizes the key research 
findings.   
6.2 Historical Development of China Life 
China Life formally dates back to the establishment of the People’s Insurance Company of 
China (PICC) by the State Council on October 20
th
 1949. While most pre-revolutionary 
insurers fled overseas and often re-established operations there, the state-operated insurance 
institute sought to integrate the remaining assets and expand into most Chinese provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities. After the national insurance sector had been 
nationalized, PICC monopolized all mainland insurance interests. By 1958, PICC had over 
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4,600 business branches and 50,000 employees. Meanwhile, the population participating in 
employee group and simple life insurance reached 3 million and 1.8 million respectively. 
The end of the First Five Year Plan (1953-1957) marked the accomplishment of the officially 
designated “transition to socialism”; commercial insurance was publicly considered 
contradictory to socialist ideology and superfluous in a socialist state that aimed to provide 
social welfare services “from cradle to grave”. During the Great Leap Forward and the 
People’s Commune Movement, the Work Conference on Finance and Trade of the State 
Council in 1958 proposed that: “after people’s commune system is established, insurance is 
no longer needed, and domestic insurance business shall be immediately suspended”. Thus, 
restrictions on the private ownership of property linked to wider political movements 
challenged concern for private insurance, culminating in the PICC's suspension of 
underwriting (Thomas, 2002). When insurance services were abolished in 1959, PICC had 
been further streamlined into a subordinate administrative department of the People’s Bank 
of China (PBOC), with a reduced role in the provision of overseas services, such as marine 
and aviation insurance support for state foreign policies (IN4, 2009).  
The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central 
Committee in April 1979 advocated the “resuming the domestic insurance business” as part 
of official efforts to re-invigorate the national economy. In November, the National 
Insurance Work Conference in Beijing officially restarted the domestic insurance business 
formerly suspended for more than 20 years. In 1979, PICC officially separated from PBOC, 
and resumed as an independently operated, state-controlled company under central bank 
supervision. In 1982, PICC began offering life insurance policies again, targeting small but 
growing numbers of middle-class and wealthy Chinese, including better-off farmers. As a 
state-owned monopolist, PICC became both supplier of property and life insurance, and 
regulator of all insurance activities. In the early 1990s, PICC’s gross insurance premiums 
even reached RMB 17.82 billion with an annual growth rate of 45.4 per cent compared to the 
1980s (China Statistics Yearbook, 2004). Although life insurance was still insignificant in 
comparison to non-life insurance, the nominal growth rate of life insurance premiums during 
the second half of the same period exceeded 800 per cent, and market share reached 23.23 
per cent in 1991 having been 0.16 per cent in 1982. 
According to the 1995 Insurance Law, domestic insurers were required to specialize in 
particular market segments, and property and life insurance businesses operated separately 
afterward. As individual insurance companies could only provide one of these two, PICC 
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had been restructured into a holding company – PICC Group – with businesses transferred to 
three different subsidiaries: PICC Life Insurance, PICC Property Insurance, and PICC 
Reinsurance. As a prelude to corporatization, PICC Group and its subsidiaries duly became 
four independent business entities. By taking over existing life insurance business from the 
former PICC Life Insurance, China Life Insurance Company finally came into being in 
March 1999 as a solely state-owned enterprise. 
In 2000, China Life announced planned ownership restructuring in preparation for future 
international listings.  In June 2003, with the State Council and China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission’s (CIRC) approval, China Life was further split into two business entities, the 
China Life Insurance Company Limited (China Life or the Company), and the China Life 
Group Company (the Group Company or the Group). On 17th and 18
th
 December 2003, the 
Company launched initial public offering (IPOs) on both Hong Kong (HKSE) and New York 
Stock Exchanges (NYSE). This made it the first state-owned financial institution launching 
its overseas IPOs, raising US$3.5 billion and becoming the world's largest IPO of the year. 
As the 2002 amended Insurance Law allowed a single insurance group to have both life 
insurance and property insurance subsidiaries, China Life expanded into new market sectors 
including property insurance, asset management and brokerage services. In 2003, China Life 
Asset Management Company was jointly founded by the Group Company and China Life. 
Under “the conglomeration strategy of being exceptionally strong in core businesses and 
appropriately diversified in operation”, another two subsidiaries, i.e. China Life Property and 
Casualty Insurance Company and China Life Pension Company, were successively 
established in 2006 (IN6, 2010). By the late 2009, China Life’s market capitalization totalled 
US$ 54.22 billion, putting it ahead of major international competitors, i.e. AIG and AXA. 
China Life thus became the world’s largest life insurer in terms of market capitalization. 
6.3 Governance System of China Life Prior to Overseas Listing (1949-2000)  
Over the centrally-planned era, PICC was designated as an administrative unit (xingzheng 
danwei in Chinese) under the direct leadership and supervision of PBOC and the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF). Meanwhile the State Planning Commission (SPC) and State Economic 
Commission (SEC) assumed a leading role in directing and administrating the financial 
sector. Thus the governance system of PICC was essentially embedded within the extensive 
bureaucratic infrastructure of the state. Figure 6.1 depicts the governance framework of 
PICC under the centrally-planning system.  
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6.3.1 Governance Structure 
The governance structure of PICC largely mirrored those of state-run units (SRUs): 
enterprise management and daily operation relied upon the “old three committees”, i.e. the 
party committee, labour union and employee representative committee. Where most 
economic and sales parameters were arbitrarily determined by different ministries and 
planning commissions, the party committees assumed the leading role in implementing 
superior directives and conducting ideological indoctrination. The party’s nomenklatura, i.e. 
the Central Committee of the CCP, acted as the headquarters of numerous party cells at the 
intermediary and grass-root layers, retaining the ultimate authority over the promotion and 
dismissal of enterprise managers and/or state cadres. For Schurmann (1966, p. 1) communist 
China could then be conceived as a politically and ideologically constructed society which 
was “like a vast building made of different kinds of brick and stone”, and what held this 
building together was bureaucracy and ideology. Political correctness and/or party 
membership constituted the major criteria for managerial evaluation and supervision. They 
were necessary for most managerial positions and thus conferred significant advantages 
(IN4, 2009). For central planners, an indispensable ideological ingredient served as a 
substitute for scarce capital and backward technology (Oksenberg and Tong, 1991). Two 
retired managers of PICC here elaborated: 
 “The party committees existed at almost all levels of enterprise operation, from the centre 
to the township units. The committee members evaluated the staff according to their 
performance in political activities (zhengzhi huodong biaoxian in Chinese), including the 
study of Marxism and Maoism, as well as the guidelines from the planning commissions. 
The backward elements (luohou fenzi in Chinese) would be deprived of the changes of 
career promotion. Since remuneration was based on administrative rankings, this was the 
only viable way to discipline state cadres” (IN5, 2012);  
 “Unlike industrial SRUs, (state-owned) financial institutions did not require much 
technical expertise. Thus, the secretary of a party committee often combined the role of a 
branch or department manager. The appointment, evaluation and removal of managers 
were determined by the party committee members based on their political performance, 
in particular, whether they had carried out the guidelines imposed by the superior 
agencies” (IN22, 2010).  
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Figure 6.1 Governance Structure of PICC Prior to the 1980s 
 
In this way, the combination of bureaucratic hierarchy and ideological conformity penetrated 
and governed every dimension of the enterprise operation. Alike the  imperial past, the CCP 
had once again brought a political system that relied upon strict bureaucratic hierarchy, this 
time in the form of the nomenklatura system integrated with the once pervasive ideologies of 
Marxism and Maoism. Although Confucianism and Communism sustained their distinctive 
belief in hierarchical order and state-society relationships, both appeared remarkably 
monolithic, with political action centred upon the directives from top leadership. For Pye 
(1992, pp. 11-16), both the imperial bureaucracies and the CCP explicitly stressed the 
importance of authority and order in procedural practices and ideological cultivation. Thus, 
enterprise governance became a self-contained system with little influence from grassroots 
employees and/or other non-party elites; enterprise managers or state cadres had little 
concern to keep higher governmental authority in check (Pye, 1992, pp. 11-16, p. 25). 
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Unsurprisingly the role of workers’ participation in enterprise governance had been 
subordinated to high profile party committee members (see also Morris et al., 2002). 
Although the principle of “democratic management by workers” entered the Chinese 
Constitution, it did not articulate how labour unions and employee representative committees 
at all levels were subordinate affiliates of party committees (IN5, 2012). Union officials and 
representatives often need the authority of party bureaucracies to attain their own agenda, 
including the appointment of union leaders (Xi, 2006). Labour union and employee 
representative committees generally adopted the role of mass adjunct to the party-state 
apparatus and functioned as surveillance organs and transmission belts for internal stability 
and promoting the CCP’s ideological goals (see Kornai, 1992, pp. 219). At times of tight 
political control and production-mobilization campaigns, they often sided with the CCP’s 
bureaucrats to push through top-down industrial policies and political movements (Chan, 
1993). The dual functions of safeguarding workers’ rights and being surveillance organs 
often led to ambivalence. In striving to channel employees’ discontent, representatives had 
to satisfy their superiors by suppressing alternative voices, thereby making their allegiance 
evident. As one former union official commented, “while the party committee was 
responsible for evaluating and monitoring the state cadres, the company’s labour union was 
merely another party committee for supervising grassroots employees” (IN3, 2010). Such 
practices remained largely intact over the pre-restructuring era, though they contrasted 
significantly with the CCP’s long-cherished concept of workers’ political status as “the 
masters of the enterprises”.1 
The expansion of market mechanisms further eroded employee involvement. Although 
managerial remuneration remained largely undifferentiated, “expanding market shares was 
often imposed as a political task of commanding height” (IN22, 2010). In this process the 
role of the labour union and the employee representative committee in balancing corporate 
management was minimized.
2
 The following statements reveal the lack of a necessary power 
base and relevant expertise to continue due oversight: 
 “In most cases, these union officials and employees’ representatives were the senior 
cadres in the grassroots units. Their work focus was to advance employees’ welfare; their 
                                                 
1
 Under the rhetoric terms of socialism ideology that “workers are the masters of enterprises”, appointing 
employees’ representative as the supervisors became the new form of workers’ participation in the enterprise 
management. 
2
 In other SRUs, the workers’ protest s arising from enterprise restructuring frequently appeared even in the 
state media. This reflects employees’ strong opposition to governance practices process that excluded their 
participation, ignored their interests, and infringed their rights. 
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expertise was employees’ mobilization rather than business management and sales 
expansion. Many of them were unable to understand the operation of an insurance 
company” (IN5, 2011); 
 “Moreover, most of the representatives themselves were serving in middle-level 
management positions. In this case, they were subordinate to the senior managers and 
members of the party committees.  This joint posting caused interest conflicts and thus 
prevented them from overseeing enterprise management” (IN4, 2009); 
 “The role of employees’ representative became rather symbolic” (IN1, 2009).  
With the shifting emphasis towards sales growth, the traditional political goals pursued by 
party bureaucracies also became increasingly questionable. During interviews, informants 
often claimed that party committee members generally lacked the business expertise 
necessary for due oversight. This led party bureaucracies to identify themselves with 
enterprise managers. A former secretary of a provincial party committee here noted: 
“The party committee had its advantage in mobilizing the masses and implementing political 
education. However, as to sales expansion, it lacked the necessary expertise. In this case, we 
could only play a supportive role for the sales staff. Evaluation of managers and/or cadres 
was based on whether they met sales targets. Party members knew little about the procedure 
of selling insurance policies, not to mention the inherent risk. They could only rely upon the 
numbers in the receipts presented by the managers… what we could do was to support their 
sales activities and repeatedly check sales expansion. Political education became 
secondary” (IN15, 2011). 
Indeed party committee members confided to oversee the implementation of “political study 
campaigns” (zhnegzhi xuexi yundong in Chinese). For managers, these political activities 
simply “wasted their precious time for increasing premium sales” (IN14, 2010; IN18, 2011). 
In many cases cadres of the party committees repeatedly complained that the task of 
implementing political initiatives were widely disliked (IN15, 2011). The prominence of 
egalitarianism and compliancism thus became increasingly incompatible with the 
competitive pressure from market deregulation.  
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6.3.2 Managerial Tasks and Incentives  
Like other state-run units, PICC adopted a highly centralized eight-grade remuneration 
system with seniority-based rankings (IN5, 2010). Due to direct fiscal grants from central 
government, PICC provided lifetime employment with welfare coverage ‘from cradle to 
grave’. The following statements suggested that these practices should be examined within 
the broader social-economic context: 
 “The staff’s remuneration was basically determined by their administrative rankings. 
This was the same with other state-run units and administrative apparatus. The financial 
sector in the centrally planned era supported industrialization. It was more like a 
financial or accounting department in a giant state-owned factory. Thus there was no 
reason why its remuneration should differ from others” (IN5, 2010); 
 “If someone was lucky enough to be allocated work in a state-run unit, that means that 
not only he or she, but also the whole family would benefit from the welfare provided by 
the state. At that time, this was the main motivation for us to work in PICC” (IN4, 2009); 
 “The end of cultural revolution brought lots of young people who used to work in the 
rural areas back to the city. The state-run units became the main organs to absorb the 
radical increase in labour force. Every month, my department was assigned quotas to 
recruit these young people. The welfare benefits clearly attracted lots of them” (IN22, 
2012). 
As noted, the job security and other welfare benefits underwritten by the bureaucratic 
apparatus were important political assets for the ruling party to assert the superiority of a 
socialist state. For Wu (2005), such a paternalist labour regime was also the key to 
maintaining the administrative order throughout the centrally planned era (Chen, 2003). As 
productivity and other financial objectives had little influence upon managers’ remuneration 
and promotion, their primary task was to execute a complex repertoire of financial and 
administrative directives imposed by the superiors (IN4, 2009). One senior executive vividly 
illustrated this thus: 
“In the summer of 1980, I was given the task of promoting the first property insurance 
products aimed at the rural masses. I had to communicate with county and village 
governments prior to my arrival, and asked their help to mobilize the masses. I spent the 
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whole week in a town and managed to sell only one insurance policy.  However, I was highly 
praised by my managers as I had successfully fulfilled the task of ‘helping our peasant 
brotherhood’” (IN20, 2011). 
Figure 6.2 Governance Structure of PICC during the 1980s 
 
In 1979, PICC was officially separated from PBOC and resumed as an independently 
operated, state-controlled company under PBOC’s direct supervision. Figure 6.2 illustrates 
its changed organizational structure. Although the industrial sector embarked upon reforms   
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supervised state-owned financial institutions. Provincial branches of PBOC were 
responsible for supervising and monitoring the operation of PICC’s business units at 
different levels” (IN4, 2009); 
 “Senior officials in PBOC and other ministries often help their children to find jobs in 
state-owned financial institutions. As relational factors often help them achieve relatively 
high administrative rankings, they were the main beneficiaries of the seniority-based 
system. They were strongly opposed to the introduction of market-oriented remuneration” 
(IN19, 2010).   
Nevertheless, market transition created new opportunities for the domestic insurer. In 
particular, rising income levels, demands for higher life quality, and a more market-oriented 
social security system all increased demand for life insurance policies. In 1982, PICC began 
offering life insurance policies again, targeting small but growing number of middle-class 
and wealthy Chinese, including better-off farmers. Although PICC’s gross life insurance 
premiums totalled only RMB 1.6 million in 1986, both the non-life and life insurance 
markets then grew significantly, with respective growth rates exceeding the national GDP 
growth rate. However, a significant share of insurance policy sales continued to be planned, 
with policy-oriented insurance products (zhengce xing baoxian in Chinese) having priority 
over those serving private needs (IN11, 2010). 
Although the company progressively shifted its focus towards premium growth, 
remuneration of managers remained determined by the administrative rankings until the mid-
1990s (IN15, 2010). General managers of the headquarter and provincial branches were 
categorised as senior state cadres, and thus entitled to significant perks and prestige 
compared with managers at the grass-root level. The bureaucratic-centred governance 
structure indicated that the managers were hardly self-motivated economic agents when they 
were still obliged to enforce the premium-growth targets imposed by the central bank. Even 
if rigid sales targets were eliminated, they were subsequently replaced by more flexible (yet 
also more unpredictable) directives rather than genuine market indicators (IN26, 2010). This 
compelled managers to constantly bargain with administrative superiors for preferential 
financial treatments and sales quotas (IN15, 2010).  
In the mid-1990s PICC introduced a bonus scheme to “improve managerial incentives and 
stimulate premium growth” with increasing decision-making rights delegated to branch 
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and/or department managers, (IN19, 2011). However, the absence of real ownership stakes 
left the asymmetric relationship between power and responsibility largely unaddressed 
(Tenev and Zhang, 2002). Thus, changes in incentive structure simply increased the 
likelihood of pursuing managerial self-interest at others’ expense. It appeared that, ever since 
the centrally planned period, managerial privileges were not only based on salaries and 
bonuses, but also on sizeable perks, including  better and larger apartments, private use of 
cars, "corporate accounts" for business lunches and dinners, entertainment, domestic touring 
and suchlike (see also Qian and Stiglitz 1996). A senior managerial position then often 
entailed distinguishable and non-explicit discretion over substantial quasi-rents. This was 
particularly so for large-scaled enterprises which operated in those industrial sectors 
designated as of “commanding height”. The increased managerial autonomy provoked 
certain enterprise cadres to abuse their power over remuneration and exercise favouritism. 
While such malpractice might bring significant financial loss, the higher directors, who 
considered themselves politically-motivated party bureaucrats, lacked the ability and 
incentives to conduct due managerial oversight and risk assessment, so that penalties for 
poor performing managers were largely softened. Moreover, the absence of a genuine system 
of accountability meant that enterprise managers at all levels were in a unique position to 
turn professional work relationships into personal connections for rent-seeking activities (see 
also Saich, 2011, p. 141). A sales manager of PICC’s Guangdong branch here acknowledged 
the prevalence of related malpractices over the 1990s thus:  
“In the past, the receipt of an insurance policy normally consisted of two parts – one was for 
the policy holder, the other for the company. Before the computer record system was 
introduced, receipts were all written by the accounting staff. You just needed to write down 
two different amounts respectively. The one with the smaller amount was given to the 
company; the other one with the bigger amount which was the actual amount insured was 
kept by the client. Any difference could then be kept by the sales staff… Of course, you had to 
share the ‘rent’ with the accounting staff and your department manager and even the branch 
director, so that they would just ‘open one eye and close one eye’. ‘Dragging them into the 
water’ would help to gain their tacit permission. This was so prevalent that we all knew that 
was ‘the implicit rules of the game’. As the premium growth became the priority for the 
bureaucrats, who would actually care about the inherent problems?” (IN14, 2010).  
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6.3.3 Regulatory Reform and Administrative Streamlining 
In contrast to the stagnant enterprise reform, the deepening of market deregulation induced 
several structural transformations, which would in turn call for regulatory reform. In 1988, 
the establishment of Ping An Insurance Company (Ping An) and China Pacific Insurance 
Company (China Pacific) signalled the disruption of the state monopoly in the domestic 
insurance sector. The former grew into the second largest life insurer in the mainland market 
and, once the American International Group (AIG) was licensed to operate its self-standing 
business branches in 1992, domestic insurance opened to foreign companies for the first time 
since the end of the civil war. Thus further specialization and wider regional fragmentation 
in the mainland insurance market challenged PICC’s combined role as both the supplier and 
regulator of insurance services.  
In 1995 the National People’s Congress (NPC) promulgated China’s first Insurance Law as a 
major step in establishing a comprehensive framework for regulating the domestic insurance 
market. Observers then noted that the law was ‘‘a very good start in the implementing of an 
internationally acceptable standard of insurance regulation’’, and that it would ‘‘lay a firm 
foundation for a healthy insurance environment’’ (Thomas, 2002, p. 418). In 1998, the 
supervisory and regulatory arm of the mainland insurance industry was transferred to a 
newly formed regulatory agency, i.e. CIRC, from PBOC. The specialist agency, which 
aspired to wider international standards, was expected to further enhance the state’s 
regulatory capacities over the fast-growing industry (IN26, 2010). Under the Insurance Law, 
this semi-ministerial institution has been empowered to:  
 Formulate policies, strategies and plans regarding insurance industry development; 
 Examine and approve the qualifications of senior managers in all insurance-related 
organizations;  
 Supervise the solvency and market conduct of individual insurance companies; 
 Supervise the business operation of public-policy-oriented insurance and statutory 
insurance; 
 Investigate irregularities such as unfair competition by insurance organizations and 
practitioners and  direct engagement or disguised engagement in insurance business by 
non-insurance organizations, and impose penalties accordingly;  
 Establish due risk-assessment, risk-warning and risk-monitoring systems. 
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As noted by Thomas (2002), CIRC had broad enough powers to investigate violations of the 
Insurance Law. Insurers were likewise required to submit monthly statistical reports and 
annual reports to the regulator. In addition, CIRC was authorized to inspect the business, 
financial and capital conditions of insurers and to require additional written reports or 
information. Agents and brokers were also subject to these inspection and reporting 
requirements.
3
 
Accelerated regulatory restructuring enabled governance reform to be continued; corporate 
restructuring was designed to distance enterprises from government interventions. China 
Life had been converted formally from an administrative subordinate of PBOC to an 
independent business entity. This was expected to alleviate the mounting fiscal burden of 
central government as corporatized SRUs assumed the sole responsibility for profit and loss 
(IN3, 2010; IN2, 2011). Meanwhile, it also allowed China Life to “focus on business 
operation and further enhance its competitiveness” (IN26, 2009). Following China’s WTO 
entry in late 2001, China’s insurance market has become one of the most open financial 
sectors. According to the timetable for China’s WTO accession, most restrictions on 
ownership, business scope and geographical areas were to be abolished by late 2004.  
Successive corporate restructurings over the late-1990s reflected the new regulator’s 
ambition of “forging a globally competitive insurer” (IN26, 2009). A number of senior 
officials concluded that, without the strong disciplinary power of external mechanisms, 
enterprise reform might grind to a halt as vested interests would then resist further forward 
momentum (IN28; 2010; IN29, 2010; IN26, 2011; IN27, 2011; see also Saich, 2012). In 
essence, there was little in the WTO agreements that hindered the central policy makers’ 
stated desire to establish more effective governance institutions, in particular in the financial 
and other monopolistic industrial sectors (IN26, 2011). As elaborated by the former senior 
executive from PICC: 
“The fact that the fiscal income contributed by the insurer had been traditionally smaller 
than the banking industry meant that reform oppositions from the conservatives would be 
less fierce. Moreover, (financial) problems in PICC were less mounting and difficult than in 
the state-owned banks. One thing for sure was that the establishment of new regulator had 
                                                 
3
 Although sales and claims practices were not explicitly subject to CIRC’s discretion, the statutory 
requirements are sufficiently vague to give CIRC a significant amount of room to interpret them. For example, 
the statute requires that insurance must be entered on a ‘‘fair, voluntary and mutually beneficial basis’’, and 
that insurance contracts could not ‘‘infringe upon the public interest’’.  CIRC had the right to interpret what 
was ‘‘fair’’ or in the ‘‘public interest’’ (see Thomas, 2002). 
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greatly alleviated the opposition from PBOC. The regulatory reform and choosing PICC as 
the breakpoint of restructuring the state-owned financial institutions greatly reduced the 
reform difficulty. To a certain extent, this was a political choice” (IN5, 2010). 
Summing up, China Life’s governance system over the re-restructuring era reflected the 
legacy of administrative planning. With the highly stylised enterprise hierarchy, 
bureaucratic intervention was designed to advance political rather than economic 
objectives, thus distorting managerial incentives. The inherent self-destructive effects were 
reflected by inefficient monitoring and the prevalence of fraud and corruption. The decline 
of centralized planning was due not only to the rigidity and disincentives under stratified 
control, but also to the corrosive effects of managers’ rent-seeking behaviour. Although the 
vested interests and monopoly practices constituted formidable adversaries to governance 
reform, rising competitive pressure and growing regulatory complexity provoked successive 
legislative reforms and the fundamental transit of regulatory functions. In addition to 
governance defects revealed, pressures from economic globalization, in particular China’s 
WTO entry, created a powerful rationale for more comprehensive restructuring – building a 
globally competitive state insurer became “a matter of national interests” for the central 
policy makers (IN29, 2011). The abolition of PBOC’s oversight function weakened the once-
insurmountable power of entrenched bureaucracies, thus preparing the ground for 
subsequent corporate restructuring.  
6.4 Restructuring, Board Institutions and Overseas Listing (2000-2004)  
In 2000, China Life encompassed corporate restructuring as part of continuous efforts at 
enlarging enterprise autonomy. Ownership diversification, together with more basic steps at 
“establishing modern enterprise institutions” (jianli xiandai qiye zhidu in Chinese), were 
intended to reduce government intervention from enterprise management, and thus hold 
China Life more accountable for its profit and loss (IN5, 2010; IN9, 2010; see Sun and 
Tobin, 2005; Sun and Hong, 2006). It is envisioned that expanded capital base and improved 
governance system would serve to transform the domestic insurer into a globally competitive 
brand (CIRC, 2001; Cao, 2005; IN4, 2009; IN9, 2010). Nevertheless, the concern for policy 
makers before then was the imminent danger of insolvency given the size of spread loss. 
Thus much reform effort, including “caving out the non-performing assets” (boli buliang 
zichan in Chinese) and related fiscal arrangements, centred on the resolution of potential 
capital shortage.  On the other hand, effectiveness of corporate restructuring depends both on 
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the organisational set-up upstream, i.e. the streamlining of administrative apparatus and 
development regulatory framework in the Chinese case, and on the actual function and 
practices of governance mechanisms (OECD, 2005b). Ownership diversification has 
clarified central government as de jure owner but here allowed the Group Company to retain 
its ownership control and influence over the corporate agenda. Politics among self-interested 
insiders thus mediated the efficacy of transplanted governance institutions. In this regard 
much remained to be accomplished in firm-level institutional building.  
6.4.1 Capital Shortage and Corporate Restructuring  
China Life’s capital shortage was largely due to the mounting spread of losses from 
insurance policies with high guaranteed rates of return. Spread loss occurs when the 
investment return rate of insurance premium becomes less than the assumed interest rate 
already embedded in mid- or long-term insurance policies. In a typical scenario of spread 
loss, insurers find it increasingly difficult to gain investment returns greater than returns 
guaranteed due to declining interest rates. As investment returns become compressed, these 
insurance products tend to cause spread losses that further undermine corporate solvency. 
The insolvency issue might then deteriorate so seriously that the insurers eventually go 
bankrupt (see Yao et al., 2005).  
A leading example was the successive bankruptcy of Japanese life insurers over the late 
1980s. With fast-paced growth, Japan’s Ministry of Finance grew concerned about 
prospective inflation rate, and accordingly, tightened money supply by raising interest rates. 
Insurers then responded to successive interest rate hikes by continuously raising their own 
assumed interest rates to a peak of 6.25 per cent. As economic growth faltered in 1991, asset 
deflation, rising unemployment rates, and falling corporate profitability and shrinking 
investment activities followed. Between 1996 and 2005, the collapse of Japan’s asset-
inflated “bubble” economy led to a period of extremely low interest rates and stagnating 
stock prices. Japan’s life insurance companies saw their own financial situations deteriorate 
rapidly as their asset investments fell short of the guaranteed yields already promised to their 
policyholders. Since 1991, severe spread losses occurred among almost all life insurance 
companies, and ultimately caused the bankruptcies of major large insurers from 1997 to 
2000, including Nissan Life Insurance, Chiyoda Life Insurance, and Kyoei Life Insurance. 
The spread loss encountered by China Life had its own particular political-economic origins. 
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Over the early 1990s, artificially low interest rates were adopted as a major policy tool to 
stimulate stagnant domestic demand and industrial investment. In this context, insurance 
products with high guaranteed rates of return had been applied by the grass-root business 
units as the major means to stimulate premium growth and expand market shares. Between 
1993 and 1997, premium income derived from those high yield insurance products (above 
7.5 per cent) totalled more than RMB 80 billion. However, investment overheats and 
redundant production capacity had already brought interest rate reductions to curb high 
inflation. Therefore, investment return rates for China’s life insurance companies went into 
persistent decline and fell to a record low of 3.4 per cent in 2003 (IN26; 2011; IN27; 2011). 
Interviews with two senior officials of CIRC conveyed the great concerns of central policy 
makers: 
 “Under the Hong Kong Accounting Standards, China Life’s net loss in 2002 was 
estimated to reach RMB 2.25 billion, mostly attributed to the huge amount of negative 
spread. Although the assumed interest rate of the subsequent long-term insurance policies 
has been reduced to a much lower level of 2.5 per cent since 2004, the financial risk 
derived from the still-growing spread loss significantly impaired the Company’s 
competitiveness” (IN29, 2010); 
 “China Life is the flagship of our country’s insurance industry. The Company’s success or 
failure matters not only for the fate of thousands of its employees, but also the sound 
development of China’s insurance industry. An insurance company with questionable 
solvency would be impossible to compete with their international counterparts when 
mainland insurance is entirely opened for foreign insurers” (IN26, 2009). 
Officials from the regulatory body often attributed the spread loss to wider monetary policy 
changes. Other responses provided by the managers of provincial branches revealed that the 
problem was also deeply rooted within the poor governance practices. Commonly expressed 
statements by several senior marketing managers in Guangdong provincial branches 
indicated that ill-defined incentive schemes and the absence of a real owner were regarded as 
the root causes: 
 “Since the mid-1990s, Guangdong has been the earliest regional insurance market opened 
to foreign competition. The provincial headquarter and local branches faced furious 
market competition with the non-state insurers. ‘Fighting for the market, competing for 
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the share’ had become the chief business goal. In this case, the remuneration of sales staff 
and executives started to be closely bound to the premium growth” (IN13, 2010); 
 “‘Premium First’ had actually become the slogan of our sales teams. However, 
profitability and other risk factors of various insurance products had basically been 
neglected” (IN14, 2010); 
 “The branch’s sales staffs were generally unaware of the risk characteristics of the 
(insurance) industry, or they did not care about them at all. A simple and the most 
fundamental reason was that China Life was solely state-owned. This meant that 
whenever there were troubles, they would definitely be taken care of and solved by the 
state” (IN11, 2010). 
As noted, an over-emphasis on premium growth had unexpectedly given rise to short-
termism in firm performance. As the negotiations of sales targets were conducted annually, 
there was tendency for managers to concentrate primarily on the basic quantitative 
parameters while neglecting the inherent risk and the enterprise’s long-term strategy. The 
asymmetry between power and responsibilities provoked grassroots sales staff to pursue 
their private interests at the expense of the state.  The resultant managerial malpractices and 
business corruption would further jeopardize the financial soundness of the company. While 
rent-seekers often captured the economic benefits, the ultimate bearer of cost and risk could 
only be the state. 
In preparation for overseas listing, central policymakers have received several different 
proposals regarding the restructuring of non-performing assets since early 2001. The 
complexity and uncertainty of corporate restructuring suggested that it was unwise to pursue 
many political objectives at the same time (IN1, 2009, 2010; IN3, 2010). Where the task of 
addressing mounting spread losses and preventing the potential insolvency appeared the 
most urgent, the State Council faced difficulty in accommodating divergent interests within 
its bureaucratic apparatus. On the one hand, continuous subsidies to loss making SOEs 
drained significant financial resources. In this case, a large injection of capital would 
inevitably aggravate fiscal burdens and thus the proposal encountered strong oppositions 
from the MOF. In fact, the MOF preferred to accept proposals by Goldman Sachs, which 
advocated increasing the proportion of insurance policies with high profit margins over the 
longer term (IN9, 2010). However, CIRC expressed concern that a loss-making state-owned 
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insurance giant doubted its vision of “fostering a world-class insurance company”. As noted 
by one senior CRIC official: “by the time the spread loss problem was addressed, the 
Company may have already been in a disadvantageous position compared with the newly-
entered foreign insurers” (IN28, 2010). 
To align different reform visions, central policymakers devised a “spin-off” scheme drawn 
from banking reform. With “Chinese Heat” in foreign stock markets, policymakers hoped 
that a radical improvement in asset quality could help China Life pick the best IPO timing 
for raising external capital.
4
 Like other banking restructuring schemes, this spin-off scheme 
paralleled a series of administrative reorganizations. As a result, premium assets consisting 
mainly of long and medium-term insurance policies issued after June 10
th
 1999 were 
diverted to the soon to-be-listed business entity, i.e. China Life Insurance Company 
Limited.
5
 Meanwhile, the carved-out parent company, i.e. China Life Shareholding Group, 
took over the remaining loss-making policies issued at high-assumed interest rates 
amounting to US$ 6.38 million.
6
 With the State Council’s approval, an investment fund co-
managed by the Group Company and MOF had been established to fulfil the payment of 
spun-off insurance policies. The fund was designated to guarantee sufficient capital inflow to 
address the spread loss problem. Its capital sources consisted mainly of: (1) insurance 
premiums of the renewed taken-over insurance policies; (2) refunded tax payments from the 
MOF; (3) remitted dividends from  the listed insurance company; and (4) income from the 
liquidation of non-tradable shares. The restructuring of China Life initiated in 2001 was 
finally accomplished in September 2003. EuroMoney Magazine commented that the spin-off 
scheme was the best restructuring design of the Year. The former BOD secretary further 
commented about the success of the spin-off programme:  
                                                 
4
 A senior executive revealed some details that were unknown by the pubic before regard to the selection of 
stock-listing proposal: 
“According to the original (listing) plan, the introduction of non-state strategic investors via private placement 
should have proceeded prior to the overseas listing. The equity participation allowed the strategic investors to 
take hand of the corporate operation and management. This in turn would have introduced new management 
approaches, better incentive systems and thus improved the corporate governance level of China Life before its 
listing. This becomes the most generally used method in the later restructuring of the state’s banking sector… 
However, the time-consuming characteristic of this method would have caused the Company to miss the best 
opportunity for the overseas listing. As we know, the China Concept Shares were one of the most favoured 
investment choices by foreign investors during the time. The limited capital raised via stock listing would have 
in turn impaired the resolving of spread loss. In this case, the State Council and CIRC decided to accelerate 
the IPO process so that China Life would set an example for the reform of China’s financial sector” (IN9, 
2010). 
5
 These include all the assets and debt deriving from those unexpired main insurance contracts, their attached 
contracts, and other reinsurance contracts, which were approved by CIRC since the June of 1999. 
6
 The number is from a restricted document issued during a senior executives’ meeting on June 30 2003. 
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“According to the actuaries’ estimation, the insurance premium from the taken-over 
insurance policies’ renewal, together with the income from asset sales and our investment 
returns would be enough to cover the annual insurance claims of these old insurance 
policies before 2023. After 2023, the capital gap could be filled in with refunded tax 
payments from MOF and   dividend payments from the listed company” (IN5, 2010).  
For the central policymakers, the programme did not work in the sense of clearing up the 
non-performing asset, but it did postpone the insolvency risk until China Life’s financial 
condition was healthier. 
6.4.2 Board Institutions and Insider Control 
Modern corporate governance (CG) institutions were formally introduced alongside 
administrative streamlining, as depicted by Figure 6.3. Following Company Law, China Life 
adopted a dual-board system for internal corporate control, with the board of directors (BOD 
or the Board) responsible for major decision-making. The central policy makers sought to 
transform China Life into “a truly independence business entity which is responsible for its 
own profit and loss” (IN3, 2010; IN2, 2011). A survey conducted by the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in early 2000 suggested that the top three shareholders of mainland listed 
companies controlled on average 59.0 per cent of shareholdings while appointing 79.0 per 
cent of directors. Such a disparity suggested that various shareholding agencies were often 
decisive in general shareholders’ meetings.  By early 2007  when China Life’s A-Share IPO 
was launched, these shareholding agencies controlled on average 70.0 per cent of board seats 
on the mainland listed companies through direct or indirect means (Wan and Gelsi, 2003).  
According to China Life’s annual reports, the Group Company had controlled, on average, 
69.7 per cent of the total share capital of China Life since its overseas IPO; this was 
significantly higher than its domestic counterpart Ping An, with 14.5 per cent. Despite the 
structural changes, the primacy of hierarchical controls has largely been preserved through 
corporatization (IN1, 2010; IN26; 2011; IN27; 2011). The following statements of several 
senior executives from both the Group and listed companies have exemplified such a legacy 
of superior-subordinate relationships: 
 “The role of the Group Company is to represent the state – the ultimate and the real 
owner of the state asset – to supervise and manage the listed company. As the main equity 
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provider, we certainly need to control the enterprise management and personnel 
appointment in China Life” (IN1, 2009); 
 “However, the Group Company should not be interpreted merely as a shareholding 
agency. It is a semi-administrative, semi-business institute through which the state 
exercises its control” (IN15, 2010). 
Figure 6.3 Governance Structure of China Life after Restructuring 
 
Afflicted by the spread loss burden and other administrative functions, the Group Company 
was perceived to be the least reformed and marketized entity (see also Naughton, 2008). The 
reformist leadership allowed the perpetuation of “administrative treatments” (xingzheng 
daiyu in Chinese) to neutralize the opposition from the entrenched interests. As the Group 
Company senior executives elaborated: 
 “The Group Company … plays its role as the autonomous shareholding agency. In fact, 
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its main duty was to take over the burden of spun-off assets and administrative functions 
of the PICC. The restructuring inevitably caused many incumbent staff to be laid off. The 
Group Company could absorb the negative impact and reduce oppositions against 
corporate restructuring” (IN9, 2010); 
 “Staffs in the Group Company often were still within the welfare system of the Service 
Units and the Enterprise Social Organization (shiye danwei in Chinese)… In this case, 
they often required persistent welfare subsidiaries, including housing benefits and 
transportation reimbursements, in exchange for taking over the non-performing 
assets…Issues regarding profit remittance made the relationship between the listed and 
parent companies traditionally tense” (IN22, 2010). 
Under the highly concentrated ownership, directors selected by the shareholding agency 
often dominate the board of directors of the listed company. By the end of 2012, more than 
60 per cent of the directors have served as the “leading team members” of the Group 
Company (China Life, 2003, 2004, and 2012). Tables 6.1a – 6.1c present the directors' 
biographies, with members of the “leading team” highlighted. In “the absence of real owners 
or principals”, executive directors and other senior executives usually become de facto 
controllers of the Company. They have powers of control, execution, and supervision, and 
thus become the ultimate decision-making body in corporate affairs (see also Nakamura, 
2008). They can act as sole representatives of the controlling shareholder, with little regard 
for minority shareholder rights (IN1, 2010; IN4, 2011). 
Table 6.1a Biographical Backgrounds of China Life’s Board Members (2003)7 
Directors Positions in the Board Other and Previous Positions 
Wang Xianzhang Chairman of the Board 
and President 
Former General Manager of PICC, President and 
Secretary of the CCP Committee of the Group Company 
Miao Fuchun Director and Vice 
President 
Vice President and Member of the CCP Committee of the 
Group Company 
Wu Yan Non-Executive 
Director 
Vice President and Member of the CCP Committee of the 
Group Company 
Long Yongtu Independent Non-
Executive Director 
Vice Minister of the Ministry of Commerce 
Chau Tak Hay Independent Non-
Executive Director 
Special Consultant of the Ministry of Commerce 
Source: China Life 2003 Annual Report and Interviews 
 
                                                 
7
 The highlighted rows suggest that the BOD members were transferred from the pre-corporatized PICC. 
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Table 6.1b Biographical Backgrounds of China Life’s Board Members (2007) 
Directors Names Positions in the Board Other and Previous Positions 
Yang Chao Chairman of the Board President and Secretary of the CCP Committee of the 
Group Company 
Wan Feng President Vice President and Member of the CCP Committee of 
the Group Company 
Shi Guoqing Non-Executive Director Vice President and Member of the CCP Committee of 
the Group Company 
Zhuang Zuojin Non-Executive Director Vice President and Member of the CCP Committee of 
the Group Company 
Long Yongtu Independent Non-
Executive Director 
Former Vice  Minister of the Ministry of Commerce 
Sun Shuyi Independent Non-
Executive Director 
Executive Vice President of China Federation of 
Industrial Economics 
Ma Yongwei Independent Non-
Executive Director 
Former General Manager of PICC and former Secretary  
the CCP Committee of PICC 
Chau Tak Hay Independent Non-
Executive Director 
Special Consultant of the Ministry of Commerce 
Source: China Life 2007 Annual Report and Interviews 
Table 6.1c Biographical Backgrounds of China Life’s Board Members (2012) 
Directors Positions in the Board Other and Previous Positions 
Yang Mingsheng Chairman of the Board President and Secretary of the CCP Committee of the 
Group Company 
Wan Feng Executive Director Vice President and Member of the CCP Committee of 
the Group Company 
Lin Dairen Executive Director Vice President and Member of the CCP Committee of 
the Group Company 
Liu Yingqi Executive Director and Vice President and Member of the CCP Committee of 
the Group Company 
Miao Jianmin Non-Executive Director Vice President and Member of the CCP Committee of 
the Group Company,  Chairman of both China Life 
Asset Management Company 
and China Life Franklin Asset Management Company Zhang Xiangxian Non-Executive Director Vice President,  Member of the CCP Committee, and 
Secretary of Commission for Disciplinary Inspection of 
the Group Company 
Wang Sidong Non-Executive Director Vice President and Member of the CCP Committee of 
the Group Company,  Chairman of China Life 
Investment Holding Company 
Sun Changji Independent Non-
Executive Director 
Vice Chairman of Bank of China (Hong Kong) 
Bruce Douglas 
Moore 
Independent Non-
Executive Director 
Partner-in-charge of Asian actuarial services for Ernst & 
Young 
Anthony Francis 
Neoh 
Independent Non-
Executive Director 
Member of the International Consultation Committee of 
the CSRC 
Tang Jianbang Independent Non-
Executive Director 
Chairman of the Supervisory Committee of ABC-CA 
Fund Management 
Source: China Life 2012 Annual Report and Interviews 
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Accordingly, managers consider themselves as subordinate staff appointed by the superior 
shareholding agency who must accordingly act in best interests of the parent company 
instead of minority shareholders and/or creditors (IN1, 2010; IN9, 2010; IN4, 2011). The 
following statements from senior managers reflect this:   
 “(The interviewer asked: When you are making major managerial decisions, do you feel 
that you have to be responsible for the interests of other public investors?) No, we do not 
have to. We just need to implement the business and managerial tasks issued by the 
Company’s headquarters and/or the shareholding company” (IN14, 2010); 
 “The Chinese media often emphasizes that managers in listed companies should 
prioritize the interests of public investors and take their interests into consideration. 
However, for the managers in China, the shareholding company is the most influential 
investor. As our major equity provider, we should act in its interests” (IN16, 2010). 
Outside director independence was seen as impaired by ownership concentration and 
nomination mechanisms (IN4, 2011). According to the CSRC guidelines, independent 
directors should be nominated by current board members and those shareholders with more 
than 1 per cent of outstanding shares, and needs further approval from shareholders’ 
meetings. While the “leading team members” retain the veto power over independent 
directors’ nomination and remuneration, the Company Law and other regulations impose no 
restriction on corporate controllers’ power and grant no special privilege to minority 
shareholders. Such constituency base had an adverse impact the independence of outsider 
directors. Although these directors appear free from insiders’ influence, they are less 
“independent” than expected. One former independent director pointed out that the “leading 
team members” of the Group Company often wished them to be satisfied with “just raising 
their hands”, and “helping the Company merely comply with regulations” (IN3, 2010). In 
this case, their access to corporate information is also highly questionable. As they can 
hardly monitor the activities of these key personnel, the roles of independent directors 
remain large consultative and supplementary (IN4, 2011).  
In addition, lack of business expertise restricts independent directors' potential oversight. 
Senior executives commented: 
 “When some retired enterprise cadres and officials were appointed as non-executives 
directors, the biographical section of annual reports often stated that they had extensive 
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business experience in insurance and other industry over the past decades. During this 
period, they were serving as senior executives in the large state-run units, the 
predecessors of many restructured corporations” (IN9, 2010); 
 “With limited market competition, these large state-run units operated more as the 
administrative agencies than as business entities. Therefore, their senior managers had 
limited knowledge and/or expertise about how to manage an insurance company in an 
increasingly competitive environment. In this sense, the unveiled malpractices cannot 
wholly be attributed to the grass-root managers. Even the Company’s leading team 
lacked a sense of risk control” (IN5, 2010).  
The Chinese supervisory board (SB) is also limited in terms of monitoring corporate 
management.  According to the 2005 Company Law these should play two major roles: (1) 
supervise the corporate management and (2) examine company financial and accounting 
affairs. However, informants here judged their role largely symbolic, raising questions about 
such SB’s own composition. Under concentrated ownership, controlling shareholders could 
select “insiders” to serve as supervisors “so that they would not question directors’ 
decisions” (IN4, 2009). Two senior executives commented on such boards' nomination and 
composition thus: 
 “The monitoring and decision-making power of the SB in Chinese companies is much 
weaker than their German counterparts. A main reason is that the Chinese supervisors 
are nominated and appointed by the directors, whilst a German supervisory board 
consists of supervisors elected by the employees… Ownership control allows the ‘leading 
team members’ to appoint the people they favoured insiders as supervisors, whilst other 
people, including investors and employees have no influence over the nomination and 
approval process” (IN1, 2010); 
 “The SB usually consists of government officials, other senior managers, and cadres from 
the non-functional committees, such as the labour union and employee representative 
committee. Their administrative rankings of supervisors are usually half-class lower 
(than directors). Organizationally, the supervisory board is subordinate to both the board 
of directors and the party committee” (IN4, 2009). 
As the appointment and remuneration are determined by the directors, supervisors have 
virtually no independent from the corporate management. The former secretary of the board 
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also added: 
“The (2005) Company Law does not stipulate that boards of directors and other senior 
executives have to report regularly to the supervisory board. In addition, since the directors 
and other senior executives are nominated by the parent Company and have to be approved 
by CIRC, supervisors, in essence, have little influence in the selection of directors and 
managers and by no means can discipline them. All these disincentives deter the Company’s 
supervisors from actively carrying out the monitoring function” (IN5, 2011).  
Lack of financial and business expertise also causes the role of Chinese supervisors to be 
more “decorative” than functional (Lin et al., 2009). It has often been complained that the 
supervisors’ professional qualifications are inferior to those of the Company’s senior 
executives, rendering it impossible to make informed corporate decisions (IN7, 2011). As an 
attempt to retain the legacy of “democratic management by workers”, more than 40 per cent 
of the BOS positions are traditionally held by “the reallocated government officials and 
labour union cadres”. In fact, the published announcements by the supervisors rarely contest 
the decisions made by boards of directors and company executives (IN5, 2011). The passive 
role of supervisors can be reflected by the fact that the meetings of China Life’s SB are less 
frequent and less well attended than the BOD, as indicated by the minutes of board meetings. 
All these lead supervisors to undermonitor enterprise operation (see also Xi, 2006; Gan, 
2001). While the introduction of BOD and SB may fall short of expectations by policy 
makers, responses to questions regarding their actual functions suggest that the transplanted 
institutions have been purposefully manipulated by corporate insiders: 
 “The leading members (of PICC) occupied the important positions of the BOD. Being the 
top executives of a listed company meant a significant increase of power and financial 
income. These lucrative positions should be allocated to their allies… The appointment of 
directors and other senior executives essentially represent the interest reallocation 
(among the insiders)” (IN11, 2011); 
 “If you look at the career background of the independent directors in large SOEs, most 
are senior government officials and influential scholars. For these top executives, having 
them serve on the BOD as their colleagues can help them strengthen their ties with the 
other senior government officials and bolster their lobbying power” (IN13, 2010); 
 “The independent directors and supervisors can help the executives build up their 
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personal connections and advance their bureaucratic career path (shitu in Chinese)” 
(IN5, 2010). 
Where the “guanxi-based” cultural environment is still prevalent in contemporary Chinese 
society, an executive can become a fast climber by his previous accumulation of intra-
organizational network. Widely cultivated, and constantly reinvented, such personal 
connections were used to pursue the interests of particular actors (Lin, 2001). Given the 
resultant institutional vacuum from board inefficacy, they became the essential ingredient in 
the expectations and strategies between corporate executives and their political allies. It was 
mainly through their personal connections with the officials that many interviewed 
executives sought career development opportunities and/or regulatory penalty exemptions. 
Legacy of bureaucratic hierarchy and ownership concentration further foster a corporate 
culture in which executive-official collusion is accepted or even condoned. Having the 
bureaucratic elites seated in the boards further institutionalized such informal connections 
and/or collusions, thus:  
 “Some of the supervisors and (independent) directors were senior government officials 
with higher administrative rankings than the directors. Servings as the board members 
can bring them extra income while increasing their publicity in business sector” (IN4, 
2009); 
 “Outside directors have always been indispensable social resources for the listed 
companies. They not only help the executives get acquainted with the relevant policy 
concerns and business opportunities, but also expand their personal network with the 
national leadership… These are invaluable resources for the executives’ career 
advancement” (IN1, 2010); 
 “The reallocation of some veteran cadres, in particular those who have been working 
since the PBOC era, constituted one of the biggest challenges for corporate restructuring. 
In spite of their limited business expertise, their influence and bureaucratic connection 
must not be overlooked” (IN27, 2009); 
 “Newly elected BOD members often allocated senior executives and other senior party 
cadres into the SB in exchange of their support in corporate affairs. Serving as the 
supervisors, they were still considered senior executives. This was to show respect to, or 
to “give faces” (gei mianzi in Chinese) to the veteran cadres. (IN7, 2011); 
P a g e  | 189 
 
 “While their administrative rankings remain the same, they received the higher 
remuneration than they did during the pre-restructuring era. In exchange, they would not 
raise appropriate objections during corporate decision-making. The formation of BOD 
and SB was essentially a political process. It was a process of interest redistribution” 
(IN11, 2011).  
These statements suggest that the institutions of independent directors and supervisors 
brought between incumbent corporate insiders and powerful government officials; as a 
result, insiders captured and expanded their personal connections while others increased 
their monetary rewards (see also Xi, 2006). Such collusion was closely coupled with 
providing material benefits to the officials concerned (see also Lin, 2001). This inevitably 
limited the neutrality and objectivity of BOD and SB in management oversight. Such 
accounts also indicate how the implementation of board institutions had been shaped by the 
calculation of corporate elites’ self-interest, further linked with the mutual benefits cultivated 
by favour seekers (see also Lin, 2001). In this regard, the formation of boards could be 
conceived as a complex process in which agents were organized in coalitions and even sub-
coalitions (Huse, 2007). The coalition patterns and/or strategies have distinctive preferences 
and objectives, which make negotiation and bargaining among corporate insiders common 
practices (Huse, 2007). Goal conflicts, including the personnel reallocation and profit 
remittance, were solved through political bargaining in the guise of ‘introducing modern 
enterprise institutions’. The board institutions became a network of bureaucratic and 
corporate elites of which the primary purpose was to retain power to protect their own 
interests (Saich, 2011, p. 140). Such competing informal institutions subverted or even 
diminished the efficacy of formal enterprise institutions, which in turn shaped the 
organizational design, goal-setting, and problem-solving processes in China Life (Estrin and 
Prevezer, 2011). 
6.4.3 Overseas Listing, Transparency and Further Reform Drive  
In July 2003, China Life selected China International Capital Corporation, Citigroup, Credit 
Suisse, and Deutsche Bank as the chief underwriters, Lehman Brother as the financial 
advisor, and PwC as the external auditor. China Life’s roadshow in Hong Kong witnessed 
particular interest and participation from foreign investors. On 17th and 18
th
 December 2003, 
the company launched IPOs on both the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) and the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to attract as wide a pool of investors as possible. The IPO 
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proved a huge success, raising US$ 3.48 billion and becoming the world's largest IPO for 
that year. The number of issued shares totalled 7.441 billion, of which 6.765 billion were 
newly issued and 900 million were the liquidated shares by the Group Company. 
Although the overseas listing of China Life has been effective in terms of capital raising, 
there has been some debate about whether cross-border listing leads to a meaningful 
improvement in the Company’ governance practices. This is because IPO success could be 
partly due to the high asset quality and business prosperity in the mainland insurance market.  
On February 2 2004, publication of the 2003 Annual Audit Report by the National Audit 
Office (NAO) revealed that the pre-restructured company had business and financial 
irregularities involving RMB 5.4 billion (US$ 652 million) (Chan, 2012). These included 
RMB 2.5 billion (US$ 302 million) in unauthorized investments and loans, RMB 2.38 
(US$ 287) billion in illegal agent services and the overpayment of insurance policies, as well 
as RMB 31.79 million (US$ 3.83 million) in hidden cash reserves (xiaojinku in Chinese). In 
a statement on the NAO’s website, Li Jinhua, head of the NAO, claimed that, up to 2002, 
China Life’s state-owned predecessor had made investment decisions not permitted by the 
Chinese Insurance Law, and employed unqualified insurance agents. In addition, several 
branch companies of China Life were found to have misreported their expenses and income 
for tax underpayment. On the same announcement date, China Life made its own statement, 
stressing that these financial irregularities only occurred in the pre-restructured company and 
had no connection with the newly listed company. 
On 16
th
 March 2004, a class-action lawsuit by Roy Van Broekhuizen was filed in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of purchasers of China 
Life’s publicly traded securities covering the period between December 22, 2003 and 
February 3, 2004. Another eight class-action lawsuits had been filed over the first half of 
2006. According to the consolidated amended complaint filed on January 19 2005, the 
company, together with some of its former directors, including Wang Xianzhang (former 
president), Long Yongtu (former independent director), Chau Takhay (former independent 
director), Miao Fuchun (former executive director), and Wu Yan (former executive director), 
were charged with the violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. It was alleged that these defendants failed 
to disclose and indicate that China Life and its predecessor company had engaged in a huge 
financial fraud, including illegal and unauthorized loans, investments and payments.  
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Meanwhile both the US Securities and Exchange Commission (USSEC) and Hong Kong 
Securities and Futures Commission (HKSFC) launched informal inquiries into the issue. 
David Webb, independent director of HKSE urged immediate suspension of China Life’s 
share trading unless related accounting problems were properly resolved. China Life thus 
became the first Chinese SOE to encounter the disciplinary force of international financial 
markets. Risk of expropriation and other governance malpractices, including governmental 
influence concerned both public investors as well as regulatory bodies. The revealed 
financial irregularities also raised further concerns about state-led restructuring, as expressed 
thus: 
“The restructuring was largely completed through administrative means. Investors were 
simply unfamiliar with such a non-market-based method. The revealed problem severely 
impaired the image of Chinese SOEs already listed overseas and those about to be listed” 
(IN5, 2012). 
The Company’s defendant lawyer from Sidley &Austin LLP added:  
“What the investors were concerned with was the complexity of the spinning-off process. 
They believed that ownership dominance would allow the Group Company to extract the 
profit (from the listed company) in order to cover the spread loss” (IN30, 2010).  
Company financial statements did not disclose the full detailed process of corporate 
restructuring, so public investors could not discern their exposure to financial risk. Managers 
of Hutchison Whampoa – one of the earliest strategic investors in China Life – expressed 
their further concerns thus: 
 “Top executives in the Group Company consisted mainly of former officials from different 
government agencies. They were unfamiliar with the operation of the insurance business. 
Their bureaucratic mind-set was the major obstacle to communication with other 
institutional investors” (IN32, 2011); 
 “Most of these senior executives carried a dual-identity as both as corporate manager 
and as state cadre. Many (investors) were worried that the listed company would be used 
as an instrument for implementing policy goals. When superior officials issued  orders or 
set guidelines, you can hardly guarantee that they would reject them” (IN33, 2011); 
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 “We worried that the government might use its control to allow tunnelling of the profits in 
order to accelerate the settlement of the spread loss problem. If it was determined to do 
so, the listed company could hardly say no” (IN34, 2011). 
These concerns suggested that the spin-off scheme, as an innovative policy option, was 
pressured from public investors and regulatory bodies (IN25, 2009). Over the following 
weeks, China Life’s N- and H-share prices plummeted by approximate 30 per cent – 29.8 per 
cent for H-shares and 32.2 per cent for N-shares – from their respective post-IPO highs. The 
unexpected capital loss and potential regulatory sanctions and payment of legal fines caused 
particular concerns: 
 “Losing the lawsuit would not only incur significant financial losses to the company, but 
also hinder the process of restructuring the financial sector. This damages the image of 
Chinese SOEs. In this sense, this issue is also of great political concern” (IN28, 2011); 
 “This (the share price decline) represented a depreciation of state owned assets. If we lost 
the case, the newly listed company would carry a huge financial burden onwards. This 
would hinder its business expansion in both domestic and overseas markets” (IN29, 
2011).  
China Life was forced to improve information disclosure. To cooperate with the SEC’s 
informal inquiry, it had provided the required documents and other materials related to the 
settlement of spun-off assets. These included official agreements regarding the investment 
return distribution between the MOF and Group Company. While such information was once 
classified as “business and political secrets”, officials and executives now felt obligated to 
disclose such “soft information” in an attempt to restore investors’ confidence and trust. A 
former independent director of China Life pointed out that the complexity of Chinese SOEs’ 
restructuring has needed to be more transparent thus: 
“China Life’s Level-3 ADRs already represent the highest level of regulatory requirements 
for non-U.S. listed companies. This means that China Life is required to adhere to the 
equally stringent rules followed by U.S. companies. We did not expect that the foreign 
investors’ requirement on information disclosure would be so strict and attentive. This 
required significantly higher standards of information disclosure” (IN3, 2010). 
The former secretary of the Board had a similar perspective: 
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“Providing adequate information disclosure, especially the resolution arrangement between 
China Life and MOF, was a prerequisite for easing doubts and restoring confidence. Due to 
the complexity of the restructuring program, we need to supply enough information to 
reassure public investors. The resultant higher levels of corporate transparency will 
certainly help repair China Life’s image” (IN5, 2012).  
On June 2, 2006, the enforcement division of USSEC announced that its almost 2-year long 
investigation had ended without future actions being recommended. On 3 September 2008, 
the New York Southern District Court found that the plaintiffs’ claims lacked merit and 
therefore dismissed the complaint (Oliver, 2008). Thus class-action lawsuits against China 
Life concluded. In response to USSEC’s decision to end its probe, the chief representative of 
the Beijing office of Sidley Austin LLP at that time commented: 
“As far as the stock listing procedures are concerned China Life's IPO in 2003 was in full 
compliance with the requirements of the regulators of the stock exchanges where the 
Company is listed. We believed that USSEC's final decision is due to China Life's active co-
operation during the investigation. Through our communications with USSEC staff, we 
learned that they are very appreciative of and satisfied with the assistance and co-operation 
from China Life” (IN30, 2010). 
However, as a former non-executive director in the BOD noted, concerns about financial risk 
control and potential expropriation by the controlling shareholder have never been 
dismissed. The case put the corporate governance of overseas-listed SOEs under the 
international spotlight for the first time. Although China Life was exempted from certain 
legal liabilities and potential fines, the higher standard of corporate governance imposed by 
advanced capital markets challenges both China Life and the Chinese government. As a 
former Board secretary put it: “despite little influence in the BOD, public investors may 
choose to vote with their feet and cause a dramatic share price decline. This raises both 
financial and political concerns for the government” (IN5, 2011).  
Financial economists often contend that the state sector makes the party-state better 
equipped to bear the risk than the normal investors do as a class, thus leading to its passive 
role in curbing malpractices. However, the narrative accounts here suggest that the 
(negative) signalling effect and political significance of any corporate scandal was simply 
non-diversifiable. The regulatory arbitrage and disciplinary power of capital markets make 
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the state-owned insurer opt for higher levels of information that put the spotlight firmly on 
governance practices. One prominent example was the immediate suspension of previous 
welfare benefits following overseas listing. Amid intensifying market competition, 
incumbent managers found it increasingly difficult to promote their own interests by 
improving the profitability to which their salaries and bonuses were tied (IN3, 2010; IN5, 
2011). They could still accommodate such disciplinary power by appropriating enterprise 
assets for welfare expansion and counting personal spending as sales cost (see also Lin, 
2001). Nevertheless, overseas listing and higher disclosure standards increased the exposure 
of executives and officials to legal liability for financial irregularities and other malpractices. 
In light of this, housing has no longer been provided as an occupational benefit since 2004 
(IN1, 2009; IN3, 2010; IN5, 2011). Other “non-salary welfare” (feigongzi fuli in Chinese), 
including shopping cards with prepaid deposits and car provision for retired managers, were 
also curtailed. Executives observed that “the abolition of these welfare benefits not only 
alleviated the Company’s financial burden, but also reduced the possibilities of hidden 
malpractices”, as “many welfare provisions were drawn from the hidden cash reserves held 
in different branch companies”. (IN15, 2011; IN17, 2011). As indicated by Table 6.2, 
international listing and the improved governance practices significantly improved the 
Company’s profitability and operational efficiency over the following years. 
Table 6.2 Profitability and Efficiency Comparison  
 Operating Profit Margin (%) Return on Assets (%) 
 China Life  Ping An  China Pacific China Life  Ping An  China Pacific 
2008 15.41 18.18 10.52 2.28 0.04 0.6 
2007 24.85 16.38 11.08 4.69 3.18 2.96 
2006 15.99 10.38 18.45 3.13 1.95 0.77 
2005 11.96 8.25 6.18 2.84 1.46 0.81 
2004 10.36 1.65 -11.23 2.74 1.33 NA 
Source: DataStream  
Summing up, China Life introduced modern governance institutions in light of the looming 
capital shortage and regulatory pressure. Where the ownership remained highly 
concentrated, such formal compliance alone did not translate into essential improvements in 
the Company’s governance practices. In spite of the huge success in capital raising, the lack 
of essential constituencies – including qualified executives and supervisors – and 
complementary institutions mediated the board’s monitoring duties and thus hampered its 
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ability to fulfil strategic functions. Skilled executives purposefully and systematically 
exploited the lax governance structures and institutional vacuum to expand their political 
interests and wealth. In short, transplanted board institutions failed to discharge their full 
governance responsibilities. Nevertheless, changes in capital structure and regulatory 
environment provoked the open clashes between the market-oriented governance 
mechanisms and the administrative-driven approach of corporate restructuring, as indicated 
by the class-action lawsuits. The improved information disclosure and abolition of 
traditional welfare benefits suggest that the newly empowered stakeholders brought in not 
only the normative credibility pressure, but also the cognitive reorientation among the 
corporate executives and officials. Where these changes in the periphery did not pose a 
direct threat in the eyes of the vested interests, they continued to have profound effects on 
China Life’s governance system and practices. 
6.5 Power Tension, Party Control and Internal Audit (2004 up to now) 
In addition to investor concerns, the partial stock flotation and translation of western CG 
system have been problematic, while most market-based SSG instruments are still emerging 
(OECD, 2005b). The legacy of ownership control, combined with more decentralized state 
administration, has enabled the semi-bureaucratic Group Company to dominate major 
decision-making. Such enlarged economic and politic influence has increased the leverage of 
the intermediate principal, and thus resulted in power tensions with the listed company and 
the state (see Lin and Milhaupt, 2013). One distinctive feature of reform since 2004 has been 
the reconsolidation of state ownership rights, particularly regarding managerial monitoring 
and performance evaluation.  
6.5.1 Rising Power Tension 
As stipulated by the agreement between the MOF and CIRC, dividends remitted by the listed 
entity constitute a major part of capital inflow to resolve spread loss. In 2012, the dividend 
remitted to the Group Company totalled RMB 2.7 billion (USD 441 million).  Such financial 
reliance formally suggests that “major decisions (of the Group Company) have traditionally 
been made in accordance to the business interests of the listed company” (IN5, 2012). Over 
the period 2003-2012, the asset base and premium income of China Life have increased 578 
and 509 folds. Meanwhile, the share issuance in 2007 alone enabled the shareholding agency 
to raise more than US$ 3.8 capital. Where ownership control allows the Group Company to 
capture the largest benefit of the growing business, the parent company was no longer the 
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“dying dinosaur” draining the state’s fiscal subsidies (Rolston et al., 2006). As noted, years 
of remitted share dividends and stock market booms have significantly improved the 
financial soundness and asset quality of the parent company, which in turn may “mitigate 
investors’ worries regarding expropriation” (IN5, 2012). For the “leading team members” 
once besieged with the financial fragility, the unprecedented business prosperity simply 
brought in the invaluable chances to enlarge their political influence (IN28, 2011; IN29, 
2011). The ownership control enabled these already politically well-connected executives to 
channel the necessary resources for fulfilling their ambitious business expansion. 
On 4th March 2009, the Group Company was rumoured to have bought out AIA’s Asian 
Pacific business division as part of its overseas expansion plan (Financial Times, 2009). This 
came not long after Pin An’s huge loss incurred from its investment in Belgium insurer 
Fortis, and thus triggered controversy regarding the reckless expansion of Chinese financial 
institutions (Rabinovitch and Fontanella,-Khan, 2012).
8
 For the regulator, the acquisition 
proposal was rather “immature” and “unprepared”. In addition to the overwhelming spread 
loss, the Company still needed to overcome a myriad of challenges, including the lack of 
technocratic and managerial competence, as well as financing and regulatory barriers (IN1, 
2010; IN28, 2011; IN29, 2011). On the other hand, the unprecedented overseas expansion 
would inevitable escalate the managerial burden that was already struggling under the fierce 
domestic competition (IN15, 2011; IN21, 2011; IN14, 2010). It is noteworthy that since 
2006, there has been a growing tendency to promote top SOE executives to provincial 
governors and central ministers. In the eyes of many managers, the “leading team members” 
were simply pinning their hope on the expanded asset base as the springboard towards 
national leadership (IN20, 2010; IN23, 2011). The following divergent views regarding 
overseas expansion among regulatory officials and corporate executives reflect such tension:  
 “AIA has always been a model for China Life since the 1990s… The financial crisis 
provided the company with a unique chance to acquire the premium assets at a lower 
price. However, the current management and administrative expertise was simply 
incompatible with its expansionary pace” (IN28, 2011); 
 “The Company has been actively expanding its investment channels in order to resolve 
the spread loss. But the current regulatory framework takes a rather prudent and 
restrictive attitude towards insurers’ overseas investment. The evaluation and approval 
                                                 
8
 The investment loss was estimated US$ 3 billion by September 2012. 
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process tend to longer and stricter. This is particular so following the significant 
investment loss of China Aviation Oil and Ping An” (IN29, 2011); 
 “This acquisition would have caused great pressure upon the listed company. In addition 
to the efficacy of risk control, the personnel training system and managerial expertise 
required significant improvement to match international standards. They (decision-
makers in the Group Company) obviously have not taken into account the Company’s 
‘soft skills’” (IN14, 2010); 
 “Apart from the managerial burden, the significant cash outflow would impair the 
Company’s solvency capacities towards international customers. The limited reserve of 
foreign currencies was large contributed by the overseas share sales” (IN1, 2010).   
The sales and marketing manager of a Beijing municipal city branch provided this 
cautionary tale: 
“In 2009, a delegation consisting of the general manager and other sales and marketing 
staff arrived in Moscow seeking to expand the cooperation with local insurer on tourist 
medical services. One week preceding the delegation’s arrival, the Group Company 
announced its acquisition proposal of a major Russian iron miner. This news aroused much 
controversy among the Russian media regarding the Chinese SOEs’ 'neo-colonialist' 
expansion. Such sentiment inevitably impaired the reputation of the listed company and 
hindered the negotiation process” (IN17, 2011).  
Examples of this sort were abundant. Large Chinese SCCs now attract more such criticism 
regarding their economic privileges and investment spending. Where such activities are 
found to contradict public interest, it is said to have ‘hijacked’ the stated reform policies 
(Wu, 2005; Dyer and McGregor, 2008). All these reveal “the emergence of major corporate 
entities as strong political players” in China’s economic life (Saich, 2011, p. 288). The trend 
has drawn not only upon the government-sponsored programme of “fostering national 
champions” but also rising independent initiative amidst continued economic growth. 
While such misuse was cited as an indication of their expanded economic and administrative 
privileges, rising executive compensation attracted other criticism as well. Wage reform has 
been a key component of China Life’s governance reform. Under the transition process, the 
past seniority-based system was rejected, and a firm and/or branch-determined, individually 
differentiated and merit-based system employed instead. One noticeable change was how 
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incentives became progressively more open-ended, with a fixed base being supplemented by 
a “floating element” linked to premium growth. With increased power over wage 
determination, executive salaries indeed increased threefold over the early 2000s (IN21, 
2010; IN19, 2011). In political terms, excessive managerial compensation – like unregulated 
managerial buyouts – pointed criticism towards the CCP elites in particular. In economic 
terms, if executives could determine their own compensation, they may lack incentive to 
improve business performance in response to other shareholder demands. In December 2006, 
China Life introduced an option scheme as an attempt at “linking executives’ remuneration 
with firm performance” (IN1, 2009). Various stock options were granted to senior 
executives according to their administrative rank. With the predetermined exercise price of 
HK$ 6.86, holders may exercise their options on a number of pre-specified dates (IN5, 
2011). The introduction of equity-based incentives occurred just when China Life’s H-share 
price rose on the country’s booming economic growth. Many observers believed this could 
signal convergence of remuneration practices towards international standards. In the 
regulator’s view, the option scheme might fail to mimic the same function found elsewhere 
however. It was largely based on executives’ opportunism amidst bullish market sentiment 
(IN28, 2010). In particular, the absence of an effective regulatory framework increases the 
probability of opportunistic timing, and creates an incentive to manipulate share price though 
accounting accruals (IN29, 2010). Executives driven by speculative (financial) gains can 
only have short-term self-interest at heart, and lack wider loyalty to shareholders and 
employees (IN29, 2011). For MacGregor (2010, p. 103), the options are essentially the 
“calculated ruse” to ensure that entrenched insiders can capture the biggest financial gains 
possible from selling shares offshore. CIRC feared that the unchecked increases in 
managerial compensation would exacerbate already growing national discontent over 
widening income disparity. In October 2007, CIRC formally suspended China Life’s options 
scheme. This showed central policy makers' caution over experimenting with market-
oriented governance mechanisms in large SCCs – a political sensitive issue in which various 
forms of rent-seeking can occur under the guise of “establishing modern enterprise 
institutions”.  
6.5.2 Renewed Political Control and Management Oversights  
Since the mid-2000s, the party-state has repeatedly asserted that further reform initiatives 
will alleviate insider entrenchment (see Naughton, 2006, 2008). For central policymakers, 
reforms, in particular the empowerment of the State Asset Supervision and Management 
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Commission (SASAC), challenge shareholding agencies’ ability to extract the traditional 
private benefits of control, and perhaps to a lesser extent, senior executives’ ability to serve 
personal interests (Xi, 2006). The fundamental idea underpinning these is to safeguard, as 
well as exercise, state ownership rights in a centrally unified manner while complying with 
relevant laws and regulations (IN9, 2010; IN10, 2010). They represent an important step 
towards reinforcing the role of the state as an owner and shareholder of the state sector 
(OECD, 2005b). For China Life, three policy priorities appear key for achieving this aim: 1) 
maintaining and strengthening political oversight; 2) improving recruitment procedures for 
corporate executives as well as performance evaluation; and 3) restricting irregular conduct 
through professional regulatory bodies.  
Where the party-state maintains control over large SOEs, it chooses to do this not by direct 
intervention, but by strengthening its control over personnel selection and dismissal. While 
privatization and ownership diversification were restricted to “small and medium-sized 
enterprises with severe deficits”, they were often popularly termed the ‘dross’ of the state 
sector beyond salvation (McGregor, 2010, p. 39). In a speech to China Life’s top executives, 
Yuan Li, the former assistant President of CIRC stressed: 
“The relationship between the Group and listed companies is a ‘mother-and-son’ 
relationship; the relationship between the two commissions in CIRC and China Life is a 
‘superior-and-subordinate” relationship” (IN1, 2011).  
In the Investment Department of the Group Company, a Director serving as member of the 
party commission added: 
“China Life will represent more than RMB 1,000 billion assets (by the end of 2010). Its 
importance in sheer fiscal income, financial market development and employment means 
that the state will not easily relinquish its control over such an important company” (IN1, 
2011).  
The following quotes typify the party’s persistent influence over the corporate agenda. 9 
They elaborate upon decision-making within related party cells thus: 
 “Party committees in regional branches and headquarters are under the direct control 
                                                 
9
 As noted by some senior executives, “when you are talking about the decision-making process in an SOE, it 
is essential to bear in mind the ‘second identify’ of the corporate executives: they are not merely business 
managers; more importantly they are party cadres” (IN4, 2009).  
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and supervision of the superior committees of the Group Company and CIRC. Both are 
under the direct supervision of the Central Organization Department of the CCP” (IN27, 
2011); 
 “As stated, the party manages the cadres, most of the middle and senior managerial 
positions are held by the members of the party committees at various levels. For example, 
in a municipal branch, the branch director is often the secretary of the corresponding 
party committee. Members of the leading team of this branch must serve as the members 
of this party committee” (IN28, 2010);10 
 “While daily business decisions are discussed and decided within business meetings with 
other managers, decision regarding the appointment or dismissal of managerial 
personnel must be submitted and approved by the party committee beforehand” (IN4, 
2009); 
 “Since most of the middle and senior executives are members of the party committees, 
major and important business proposals submitted to various departments including the 
BOD and the BOS are actually decisions that have already been ‘filtered’ and approved 
by the party members” (IN16, 2010). 
For McGregor (2010, p. 69), “the party’s control over personnel was at the heart of its ability 
to overhaul state companies, without losing leverage over them at the same time”. In 
actuality, numerous policy decisions, ranging from restructuring of the financial sector in the 
late 1990s up to regulatory reform of the security market were accomplished with the 
political authority exercised through centre Party leadership’s power over grass-roots units 
(McGregor, 2012). However, decades of economic liberalization and rapid growth have 
undermined Maoism and central planning. From the “New Generation with Four 
Qualifications” by Deng Xiaoping to the “Three Representativeness” of Jiang Zemin,  Party 
leadership pursues ideological shifts for maintaining political legitimacy (Holbig, 2006) 
reflecting a delicate balance between continuity and change.
11
 At enterprise level, 
                                                 
10
 As a retired senior executive of the Group Company exemplified, “for example, the administrative ranking 
of the Company’s president is equivalent of a vice-minister in the central government, while the heads of the 
Company’s provincial branches are ranked the same as the mayors of municipal cities. In the past, 
redeployment across different systems occurred regularly. Leaving their administrative posts, some former 
local officials had often been reappointed as the managers or deputy managers of the branch companies, while 
their new rankings were dependent on their previous administrative posts” (IN6, 2010). 
11
 Wu (2005, p. 170) remarked that “this common practices of the corporate system is incompatible with 
China’s current system of the party’s organization department and the government’s personnel department 
appointing the officers of enterprise.” However, underneath the “staticness” of the control hierarchy is a 
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competition has brought further ideological reconstruction among party cadres, shifting from 
once highly decorated political loyalty towards more exclusively economic priorities. One 
prominent example of this shift concerned the different evaluation criteria for enterprise 
cadres, as illustrated by former members of the CCP Central Financial Work Commission 
thus: 
 “Our commission was founded in 1998 when most regulatory bodies (in the financial 
sector) were still absent. Thus the commission was empowered to supervise the country’s 
financial system on behalf of the CCP’s central leadership” (IN27, 2010); 
 “There were two major criteria for personnel evaluation. One was political performance 
and discipline; the other was business expertise and leadership capability. While the first 
criteria were often referred to as ideological loyalty to Maoism and Socialism in the past, 
it has been reinterpreted as managers' compliance with relevant laws and regulations. 
For example, we would cooperate with the state’s audit department and other judicial 
bodies to investigate whether the nominated executive has been connected with any 
illegal practices or other business misconduct through their career. Once any of these 
deviations was found out, the nomination would definitely be rejected”(IN26, 2010); 
Two senior executives explained business expertise and leadership thus: 
 “Business expertise is mainly judged by whether the manager can fulfil the business 
target assigned the superior department. Apart from the sales quotas, the soundness of 
insurance product structure, the control of administrative cost, and financial management 
are all included” (IN15, 2011);  
 “At the same, the party committee will also consider the candidate’s professional 
qualifications and experience. Nowadays, most middle and senior managers in China Life 
have the bachelor-level education or even above. This contrasts significantly to the pre-
restructuring era when the majority of the staff only finished their secondary schools and 
colleges” (IN8, 2012);  
 “In fact, business expertise and leadership become the more important criteria for 
managers’ promotion and appointment compared with the past. Although political studies 
                                                                                                                                                      
significant transformation in both ideological and practical fronts. On the one hand, the criteria for personnel 
evaluation and appointment show a high degree of adaptability in the light of the changing social-economic 
reality. 
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remain indispensable for party cadres, and conventional socialism ideologies are still 
often emphasized on important political occasions, for us, the only way to put the latest 
socialism principles into practice is to improve the profitability of the company and 
maximize the returns to the shareholders, in particular our controlling shareholder” 
(IN5, 2012).  
For McGregor (2010, p. 67), the notion that the maximization of shareholders’ interests is 
connected to the socialists’ ideology is “novel”, whether for advanced capitalist countries or 
China, but competitive pressure from marketization also offers new opportunities for 
revitalizing CCP’s political control. It will no longer be necessary to rely upon socialism 
and/or Maoism but as the ruling party it can operate on the basis of national interest and 
stress the indigenous nature of the “Chinese revolution” (Saich, 2011, p. 93).  
However, the comprehensiveness of the nomenklatura system and the innovativeness of 
ideological reconstruction do not directly translate into consolidated control over the state 
sector. Unlike other industrial sectors, banking and insurance do not come under the 
oversight of SASAC, leaving a gap in the central leadership’s supervision of lenders and 
insurers. For some time this vacancy was filled by a vice-ministerial-level regulator, i.e. 
CIRC. While CIRC’s ability to improve corporate governance practices remained in 
question, central leadership was concerned that the “close-knitness” (or bangpai guanxi in 
Chinese) of this regulatory connection may further entrench insiders’ interests (IN5, 2011; 
IN21, 2011). On May 22 2012, the leadership of China Life significantly changed. Apart 
from the reassignment of two non-executive directors, the central party leadership once 
appointed Yang Mingsheng, former president of Agricultural Bank of China as its new 
chairman, replacing his predecessor (i.e. Yuan Li) merely two months after the former 
regulatory official first came to office. One senior official in CIRC here commented: 
“The meaning of this personnel change is two-fold. It is generally acknowledged that Yuan’s 
appointment as the China Life’s Chairman was largely due to his close personal connection 
with the CIRC’s former president, Wu Dingfu. As the longest tenured president of CIRC, the 
interest and influence of Wu’s fraction has been deeply entrenched within the insurance 
sector. This reallocation can alleviate the problem of interest groups. As the Chinese 
proverb says, ‘every new sovereign brings his own courtiers’ (yichao tianzi yichao chen in 
Chinese), the reallocation of Yuan was expected. On the other hand, China Life’s profit 
decline further enhanced the state’s determination to improve the competitiveness of the 
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state-owned insurers. Yang’s comprehensive experience in the large-sized financial 
institutes, including the banking and insurance sectors is considered to be highly beneficial 
for China Life” (IN29, 2012).  
Some senior executives in China Life echoed this thus: 
 “Yuan’s experience is reflected more by his work experience as a regulatory official 
rather than as a corporate executive. Most of the time, he appeared more as a 
government official than business leader. In contrast, Yang has sufficient work experience 
as the high-level corporate executive of a state owned financial institute” (IN5, 2012); 
 “As the former director of the Agricultural Bank of China, Yang has extensive experience 
in resolving the non-performing loans and leading a large-sized financial institute. His 
business expertise helped him outcompete other candidates for this position” (IN1, 2012); 
 “ The central policy makers hope that he can use his experience and expertise to help 
China Life addressee the mounting problems of market share declining (as indicated by 
Figures 6.4a-6.4c) and (insurance product restructuring” (IN8, 2012). 
Rather than solely rely upon political means, policymakers have sought to institutionalize 
better oversight over corporate management. The party-state’s new stance of cadre 
management and the empowerment of the NAO would make them the adversary of 
entrenched insiders and their political allies.  In April 2010, several working groups from the 
NAO were deployed to China Life and its Group Company to carry out routine state 
auditing. A senior official from a working group here commented: 
“We have the right and responsibilities to implement a thorough investigation into 
company’s business performance and financial soundness. Our work will focus not only on 
verifying the financial accounts of its provincial branches, but also detecting the potential 
business risk and financial irregularities” (IN35, 2010). 
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  Figure 6.4a Market Shares among the Major Life Insurers in 2005 
 
Source: China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
 
Figure 6.4b Market Shares among the Major Life Insurers in 2008 
 
Source: China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
Figure 6.4c Market Shares among the Major Life Insurers in 2011 
 
                          Source: China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
A senior official of CIRC added: 
“The consolidated financial statements provided by external auditors often omit some 
important information concealed at grass roots level. In this case, we cooperate with the 
working groups to carry out a thorough investigation whether the business activities are in 
compliance with the accounting standards and relevant regulations” (IN29, 2012).  
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A sales manager of the Company’s Beijing municipal city branch recalled the time when a 
working group arrived in the Beijing municipal city branch: 
“They (the auditing personnel) were empowered to scrutinize all the business accounts and 
financial procedures, and even freeze the capital accounts of the audited department that 
allegedly violate official regulations, if they deem it necessary. From top executives to sales 
representatives at grassroot levels, managers across the branch were instructed to co-
operate with the working group” (IN18, 2010).  
Managers of a provincial branch accompanying the working group thorough the entire 
investigation period further commented: 
 “Nowadays the NAO has obtained a much broader range of power and responsibilities 
than in the past. As the government agency directly affiliated to the State Council, its 
administrative status allows it to carry out inference-free investigation” (IN8, 2012); 
 “Our grassroots business units have to provide the working groups and our internal audit 
staff with unrestricted access to the bank accounts and record of business transactions. In 
this case, business irregularities and managerial misconduct can  hardly be 
concealed”(IN14, 2010); 
 “Inspection working groups, consisting of accounting and industrial professionals, are 
deployed to large state owned corporations regularly at a 5-year interval. The 
authenticity of business revenues and cost is the main theme of the auditing programme. 
For insurance companies, business irregularities prohibited by CIRC, such as insurance 
policies with excessive premium rates, will be its other focus” (IN11, 2011).  
The growth of state audit capacity has been associated with significant cognitive 
reorientation. This implies that the state audit goes beyond “simply examining the regularity 
of financial transactions” and “engages such criteria as effectiveness, efficiency and 
performance as its evaluation standards” (Gong, 2009, p. 37). Indeed, a senior executive 
from the Group Company here added: 
“In addition to the verification of financial accounts, scrutinizing the operational efficiency 
and business profitability of the audited companies is also at the top of the (inspection) 
group’s priority list. The assessment criteria include the growth of premium income, the 
appropriateness of (insurance) product mix, as well as cost control. After all, SOEs are state 
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owned assets. It is the state’s biggest concern whether the managers are properly held in 
check and the company is being managed and operated in the best interests of the equity 
provider. This differs significantly from the past when audit activities were used for ensuring 
the implementation of directive plans” (IN2, 2011).  
Although the managers are still not the de facto owners of state assets, improved internal 
monitoring thus realigns business and managers’ interests. A former deputy general manager 
in Beijing municipal city branch observed that audit results have therefore become closely 
linked to managerial promotion or dismissal: 
“As the evaluation results indicate an executive’s business leadership during his (or her) 
tenure, auditing activities are now more conducted in conjunction with promotions, 
dismissals, reappointments, and retirements among many SOEs’ top executives”(IN16, 
2011). 
A senior party committee member from a provincial branch, responsible for internal 
discipline and control, also pointed out that the frauds and irregularities uncovered would 
hold restrict managerial promotion and even force senior executives to leave. He 
commented, in reference to the recent removal of Sinosteel’s Chairman, Huang Tianwen, 
due to a series of financial malfeasances and investment losses, that: 
“The disclosure of financial irregularities and business misconduct suggests that the 
convicted executives’ business leadership is problematic and that they are no longer capable 
of leading and managing the business unit” (IN13, 2010). 
The deputy director of a regional audit centre here contended that: 
“On the one hand, it is important for the board to comprehend the magnitude of financial 
irregularities and other business misconduct in provincial branches. On the other hand, by 
imposing disciplinary actions or administrative punishments to convicted managerial 
personnel, the Company hopes that business risk can be reduced as low as reasonably 
practicable” (IN20, 2010).  
The use of existing apparatus to regulate CG reinforces the already strong hand of the central 
government in the politics of corporate control (see also Culpepper, 2010, 2012). For Power 
(1997) the causes of enhanced state audit capacity are multiple, including not only the 
imposition of harder fiscal constraints on enterprises and curb abusive business practices, but 
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also public demand for more accountability and declining public trust in government at 
large. Although there is little intention to turn the NAO into an independent audit agency to 
oversee the central authority itself, especially leading cadres, state audit has still been 
institutionalized as an additional instrument to ensure that state owned corporations' business 
conform to central authority intentions (see Gong, 2009).  
While China Life received no regulatory warnings or penalties, the following story regarding 
the malpractices unveiled in another state-owned insurer reflected the enhanced regulatory 
capacities of the NAO. By end January 2011 when most interviews were completed, the 
NAO charged PICC with offences including the illegal sale of policies, overstating policy 
sales, improper claim settlements, illegal distributions of commissions, and managers’ off-
the-books gains (grey income or huise shouru in Chinese). PICC was found to engage in 
about RMB 1.95 billion worth of illegal activities in 2009 (South China Morning Post, 
2001). In 2012, according to the NO.109 Notice issued by the NAO, managers from PICC’s 
Guangdong provincial branch were found to have falsified insurance cancellations and 
extracted premium funds worth more than RMB 29 million by means of forging the seal of 
the China Grain Reserves Management Corporation, fabricating cancellation approval data 
and deleting or reducing insurance liability terms. Accordingly, the General Manager of the 
provincial branch, Yu Zheng, was expelled from his managerial position and the party 
committee of Guangdong branch (Ren, 2012).  
6.5.3 Internal Audit and Risk Control 
Along with the rapid development of mainland insurance markets, Chinese regulators 
appreciate the growing risk factors associated with rapid expansion of insurance products 
and investment channels (IN21, 2010; IN22, 2010, 2011). To improve the performance of 
state-owned insurer, “an effective risk control system and organisational rearrangements are 
must be undertaken and solvency requirement must be raised” (IN22, 2010). Policy makers 
have become increasingly aware that regulatory shortfalls here can lead to a systemic risk in 
the same way that large private financial institutions have done in Europe and the US (IN21, 
2010; IN23, 2011).  
Between 2006 and 2007, CIRC issued the “Opinions of China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission on Intensifying Insurance Fund Risk Management” (2006) and the Risk 
Management Circular (2007). Both documents not only specify the principles of a sound risk 
management framework, but also identify the risk categories to be assessed and discuss the 
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composition of effective risk controls (KPMG, 2009). On April 9 2007, CIRC released the 
“Guidelines for Insurance Companies Internal Audit”, providing detailed stipulations 
regarding the establishment and responsibilities of the internal audit departments, staff 
professional qualifications, and the relationship between these departments and regulators 
(SinaFinance, 2007). In May 2008, China Life’s regional audit centres were duly founded. 
Its once-fragmented internal audit function was centralized for the first time under the direct 
management of the audit committee of its BOD. Two senior internal auditors illustrated the 
changing mission of China Life’s internal audit system thus: 
 “Prior to the corporate restructuring, the main role of internal audit was to provide the 
relevant financial and accounting information to the government to formulate and 
enforce the economic plans and control economic activities. These units were required to 
cooperate with the annual financial examination led by MOF. More work focus had been 
placed on the compliance of enterprise operations with economic policies, financial 
regulations, and the profit (or tax) submission schemes” (IN23, 2011);  
 “As a result of corporate restructuring, remuneration for corporate managers started to 
be linked with the business performance. Many managers inflated the premium income to 
their own benefit and provided false financial information to conceal embezzlement and 
other business irregularities. Thus we had to check whether the insurance business 
transactions were conducted in accordance with the relevant regulations and whether 
there were hidden business profits that were supposedly remitted” (IN21, 2010). 
Changes in the social-economic environment impacted upon China Life’s internal audit 
system. However, for some time, this had adopted the director responsibility system within 
where internal auditors came under the direct supervision of a provincial or municipal 
director. A former secretary of the BOD pointed out how independence was thereby 
impaired: 
“Inevitably, the independence of internal audit activities had largely been compromised, 
since audit findings often contained some unfavourable information to these directors” (IN5, 
2012).  
A senior audit staff-member of North-Eastern China Regional Audit Centre added that: 
“Facing the risk of being demoted and even dismissed, the (internal) auditors were seeking 
to avoid any conflict of interest with their superiors and chose to keep silent, since they 
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would be the responsibility holders for the uncovered frauds… As the Chinese proverb says, 
‘the mountains are high, and the emperor is far away’. The phenomenon of frauds and 
irregularities is especially severe in county-level branches” (IN19, 2010).  
As the auditors’ own career prospects and interpersonal connections were not damaged, it 
was clear that frauds and irregularities had been omitted deliberately. This highlights the 
importance of due independence and objectivity in internal audit. To overcome these 
problems, the audit committee has reconsolidated internal audit within individual provincial 
branches. Meanwhile a nationwide internal audit system has also been established. Parallel 
to the provincial business branches there are now six regional audit centres.
12
 These centres 
hold direct responsibility to the BOD, and remuneration and appointment of internal auditors 
are determined by it. In this way, internal auditors can be insulated from the underlying 
pressure and/or motivation for prescribing a particular outcome or recommendation. The 
existent organizational and personnel resources enabled the more independent supervisory 
function to quickly come into being, thus changing the previous superior-subordinate 
relationship between internal audit units and regional branches. The director of Southern 
China Shenzhen Audit Centre here commented on the positive effects this organizational 
change brought thus:  
“The directors of the regional (audit) centres hold the same administrative rankings to the 
general managers of provincial branches. Thus, our (internal) auditors can be isolated from 
the political interference from provincial and municipal branches. The uncovered 
managerial misconduct and accounting irregularities can be directly reported to the audit 
committee by regional auditing executives in an unrestricted manner” (IN23, 2011).  
In addition to this organizational change, internal audit staffs are tacitly mandated to rotate in 
a 2-4 year interval. According to a BOD statement regarding recent personnel rotation, “the 
movement of internal audit staff facilitates the communication of audit experience among 
the regional centres and thus helps to develop a better understanding of risk control among 
the corporate managers”. Another and perhaps more important consideration underlying the 
rotation of internal auditors is the fear that the over-long tenure of regional auditors may 
generate a localism where auditors abuse their supervisory powers given local interest and 
their personal networks. In contrast, through regular personnel redeployment, shorter tenured 
                                                 
12
 They are: North-Eastern China Shenyang Audit Centre, Northern China Beijing Audit Centre, Eastern China 
Shanghai Audit Centre, Southern China Shenzhen Audit Centre, North-Western China Xi’an Audit Centre, and 
South—Western China Chengdu Audit Centre. 
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auditors have less incentive to collude with branch management and thus reduce the risk of 
insider entrenchment.
13
 A senior member of the audit committee thus added: 
“The BOD has mandated that a cross-regional audit scheme should be conducted on a 
seasonal basis. In this way, the regional (audit) centres are left with even less incentive to 
conceal any frauds and irregularities under their jurisdictions” (IN19, 2010).  
The statutory and structural improvement of internal audit also challenges internal auditors’ 
expertise. In the discussion of the initial impacts of financial crisis on the insurance industry, 
international regulatory bodies, including OECD and the Geneva Association, suggested that 
the direct exposures to the crisis for most insurers have been relatively limited compared 
with their banking counterparts. Insurance sector representatives regularly emphasize that 
the ongoing economic upheaval is primarily a banking crisis which does not threaten the 
solvency of the insurance sector as a whole (Schich, 2009). Nonetheless, as the crisis spread, 
insurance companies have encountered certain adverse effects. Their exposures to 
unexpected return reductions have come primarily through their investment portfolios 
(Schich, 2009). This is because insurance companies’ assets are generally held in bonds and 
stocks. It is against this background that expertise of internal audit and risk control has 
become the focus of international regulators and business practitioners. In the introductory 
section about the internal auditing profession, the Institute of Internal Audit (2011, p. 6) 
(IIA) specifies that “the audit committee should comprise independent non-executive 
directors, at least one of whom has significant accounting or related financial management 
expertise”. Financial expertise here refers generally to the specialised skills “in the arena of 
financial reporting, corporate governance, and internal control” (IIA, 2011, p7).14 Having 
such skills arguably “helps to ensure more effective management oversight, fosters financial 
statement accuracy and transparency, and places an appropriate focus on business risks and 
internal controls” (IIA, 2011, p. 7). To perform effective fraud detection and risk control 
requires specialist financial expertise in addition to organizational independence.  
                                                 
13
 In fact, the personnel rotation has conventionally been an important form of the CCP’s cadre management. In 
1990, "The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party about Rotation Party Leaders and 
Government Leaders of China" mandated that provincial levelled cadres should be rotated among the provinces 
or between the provinces and the departments in the central governments. In 1999, a document named "The 
Temporary Regulation for Rotating Party Leaders and Government Leaders" had been promulgated and 
provided a detailed instruction about implementing cadre rotation. Later in 2006, such a temporary document 
has become a formal regulation. It requires that the cadres, who have been working in a region for a long time, 
for example 10 years, should be reallocated in order to increase their working experience. The personnel 
rotation scheme should be implemented among regions, governmental departments, as well as SOEs. 
14
 Specified requirements about auditor’ expertise are not found in the Sections of SOX. Instead, great 
emphasize has been placed on ensuring the independence nature of internal auditing. 
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In 2009, the BOD elected an independent director as the Chairman of the Audit Committee, 
one with extensive actuarial work experience with Ernst & Young. It was the first time that 
the audit committee head had been a financial specialist since its establishment. The deputy 
director of Southern China Shenzhen Audit Centre here commented: 
“The audit committee for a long time had been regarded as rubber stamp… The increasingly 
intensified competition and more stringent regulation suggested that the committee needed a 
qualified leader with in-depth knowledge of both, who had studied the insurance industry as 
well as accounting and other issues relevant to the industry. From this point of view, Mr 
Moore was the perfect candidate” (IN24, 2011).  
For an insurance giant with a vast geographical base, the efficacy of its internal audit system 
relies largely upon the effective functioning of grass-root audit units. The deputy director of 
a regional audit centre further explained: 
“Proper familiarity with the insurance business is a critical attribute of an effective internal 
audit system. We have come across several similar cases where local managers required 
their staff to buy certain insurance policies in order to fulfil the monthly business quota 
designated by their superiors. These policies will be surrendered sometime in the future. In 
this case, attention must be paid to the changes in cash flow and cancellation rates. Without 
a solid understanding in the relevant financial and business procedures, these frauds may be 
well concealed” (IN20, 2011).  
Senior officials of the NAO echoed this point of view: 
 “Conventionally the role of internal audit has been limited to ex post fraud detection. 
However, a well-functioning internal audit system will certainly play an effective role  in 
supervision and warning against managerial malpractices ex ante”(IN35, 2010);  
 “In other words, the internal audit system should not be limited to play a detective role. 
To achieve this, the internal audit system must undergo a comprehensive change in the 
fonts of both ‘structure’ and ‘quality’” (IN36, 2010).    
Elsewhere, more stringent solvency requirements in the insurance sector reflect growing 
concern about capital inadequacy in the banking sector. This has been reflected by Basel II 
with more emphasis on refined differentiation between different risk profiles and increased 
reliance on incentives for internal risk management (KPMG, 2009). In China, the 
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requirements of insurers’ capital adequacy remain at a relatively low level. In the light of 
declining asset prices and investment returns, the focus of China Life’s internal audit 
progressively shifted towards more comprehensive ex ante risk appraisal, away from 
conventional ex post accounting verification. While observers deemed the Company’s 
solvency risk relatively low, China Life’s executives and internal auditors had more nuanced 
understanding: 
 “According to the solvency requirement of CIRC, China Life has always been regarded 
as ‘capital adequate’. On the one hand, this is mainly because of less stringent 
requirement regarding capital reserves for domestic insurers. Otherwise, a more 
important reason is that the investment portfolio and products structures for domestic 
insurers are not as complicated as for our western counterparts, implying a relatively 
lower financial risk” (IN1, 2009); 
 “As the current foreign-reserve administration system is highly centralized, insurers have 
to apply for the quotas issued by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. All these 
have considerably limited our investment channels. However, this does not mean the 
Company is not exposed to any significant market risk. With an increasing number of 
investment instrument approved by CIRC, the investment channels will be significantly 
enlarged. This inevitably impose the new challenge on the risk management of China, in 
particular, it internal control system. Correspondingly, the role of internal audit must 
further be incorporated with the Company’s business and investment strategies” (IN1, 
2010); 
 “The insolvency risk (of a life insurer) derives also from its product structure. During our 
recent cross-regional audit, we have found problems of cash shortage in some provincial 
branches. For example, the cash reserve of Guangdong provincial branch declined 
significantly. For a province with the highest sales income, the problem of cash shortage 
sounds inconceivable”(IN21, 2011); 
 “Along with the rapid increase of asset, there is always a significant rise in obligations. 
Thus in the pursuit of the expansion of market share and asset size, senior executives have 
to be cautious about whether the capital reserve, in particular the cash reserve, can 
match the pace of business expansion”(IN20, 2011); 
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 “For years, the premium income of most provincial branched displayed M-shaped 
pattern, which causes similar patterns of claims payment as insurance policies approach 
their expiry date. The uncovered cash shortage is mainly attributed to the sudden 
increase in claims payment and irregular premium growth model” (IN19, 2010); 
 “For top decision-makers, factors such as investment return trends, premium growth 
model, as well as the incentive structure for regional business units must be jointly 
considered”(IN23, 2011). 
Such improved independence and business expertise significantly enhanced the efficacy of 
China Life’s internal audit. Over 2010, internal audit units have detected more than 200 
financial irregularity problems related to sales and marketing, product structure, agency 
business, claim payment, and accounting recording (IN19. 2011; IN23, 2011). As to liquidity 
and risk control, the company’s solvency capability ratios remain on average 86.5 per cent 
higher than the regulatory requirement over the period of 2008-2012. While persistent low 
investment returns have caused severe cash pressure for most domestic life insurers, 
solvency capabilities of China Life experienced a steady increase of 11.3 per cent over the 
last three years. Table 6.3 presents changes in China Life’s solvency margin in comparison 
of its major peer competitor, i.e. Ping An Life Insurance. As noted by executives, the 
shifting from “sales expansion” to onto “perfecting product structure and asset quality” has 
led to the decelerated premium growth (IN1, 2011; IN16, 2011; IN21, 2011). Nevertheless, 
China Life’s capital adequacy ratios remain consistently higher than other domestic life 
insurers, including China Pacific (211 in 2012) and New China Life (192.56 in 2012). While 
other insurers are planning to ease the capital strain through share and debt sales, China Life 
repeatedly asserted “its cash reserve is enough to fulfil the radical rise in repayment” (China 
Life, 2012).  This is largely attributable to improved risk control and asset quality (IN5, 
2012). As stated in the minutes of the annual general meeting, “the corporate governance 
level has significantly improved in recent years with the audit committee that is more active 
and diligent and possessing greater expertise and power to fulfil its responsibilities”.  
The Company’s continuous efforts in improving governance practices received positive 
recognition from both legal professionals and market participants. In the “Most Valuable 500 
Chinese Brands” survey jointly conducted by the World Brand Laboratory and the World 
Economic Forum in 2006, China Life was among the Top Ten Most Valuable Brands in 
China for six consecutive years. In 2007, China Life won the Hong Kong Corporate 
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Governance Excellence Awards founded by the Chamber of Hong Kong Listed Companies 
and the Centre for Corporate Governance and Financial Policy in Hong Kong Baptist 
University. In the “Asia Best Companies 2009” organized by Finance Asia, the company 
was given with the Best Corporate Governance and Best Investor Relation Awards. Mrs Wu 
of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP thus commented: 
“Although Section 303A.07 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual does not specify the 
requirements regarding the independence and power of internal audit for foreign listed 
companies, the perceived independence of China Life’s audit system has significantly 
improved the reliability and validity of (internal) audit findings. The business misconducts 
revealed recently against US-listed Chinese companies have once again put the reliability of 
their financial information under the governance spotlight. The improved independence of 
the internal audit units certainly would help the Company regain investors’ confidence” 
(IN31, 2010).  
In December 2012, the China Institute of Internal Audit awarded the prize of “internal audit 
leader” to China Life “by virtue of its innovative organizational design and outstanding audit 
efficacy” (China Life, 2012). The case here highlighted hoe Chinese SOEs claim to improve 
internal audit practices. Since early 2000, internal audit reform had accelerated across the 
state sector largely due to growing concern with risk and transparency for investors and 
regulators (China Institute of Internal Audit, 2012). It is increasingly acknowledged that 
effective internal audit plays a key role in assisting the BODs to discharge its governance 
responsibilities, particularly in risk control and fraud detection (KPMG, 2009).  
Table 6.3 Solvency Margin Ratio of China Life (per cent) 
Year China Life Ping An 
 Solvency Margin Premium Growth Solvency Margin Premium Growth 
2012 235.58 0.16 190.6 26.15 
2010 211.99 12.15 180.2 28.82 
2008 310.00 5.77 183.7 -4.89 
2006 350.00 13.11 183.1 32.46 
2004 315.00 -2.28 123.1 -3.62 
Source: China Life and Ping An Annual Reports (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012) 
6.5.4 Assessment by International Investors and Implication 
Unlike board institutions, improved internal audit in China’s state sector has largely been 
driven by competitive pressure and firms’ imperative for risk control. In China Life, both it 
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and regulators have identified particular risk factors associated with rapid business 
expansion and market volatility. As noted, the quest for an effective risk control system 
brought a noticeable shift in the norms guiding audit activities, from the “conventional 
compliance audit” towards “performance audit” in which “more attention is accorded to 
actual performance or outcome, rather than simply the legal compliance and regularity of 
financial activities” (Gong, 2009, p. 27). Notably, the empowerment of internal auditors has 
been underpinned by a series of organizational changes, which transformed the system from 
the subordinate units of corporate management to perform more independent appraisal and 
supervision. With increased expertise, a more preventive and corrective role of internal audit 
became possible.   
Using the same raw data set outlined in Chapter 5, the following quantitative analysis 
examines how international investors judge the efficacy of the board and audit practices 
mentioned above. The explanatory variables of board independence (BI), supervisory board 
size (SBS), and audit committee independence (ACI) are now included as proxy for the 
efficacy of different CG practices. First, it is argued that independent directors should be 
motivated to work in the best interests of minority shareholders as they bear substantial 
reputation costs if they fall short in their duties (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Srinivasan, 2005). 
In the context of CM&As a higher degree of board independence would provide effective 
defence against the excessive risk taking and exploitative behaviour by the controlling 
shareholders and directors (Hu et al., 2010). Moreover their expertise and external 
knowledge may provide the essential advice and resources that are particularly appropriate 
for overseas expansion (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Yoshikawa and McGuire, 2008; Hilman 
et al., 2009). Both the agency and resource-based perspectives endorse the important role of 
independent directors in safeguarding and maximising shareholder interests (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003; Gillan, 2006; Luan and Tang, 2007). Secondly, under China’s two-tier 
board system, supervisors do not participate in the decision-making or the voting process but 
are designated to monitor the board of directors. They are responsible for scrutinizing 
decisions made by directors, reviewing and auditing the reports provided by directors, and 
resolving any disputes arising between shareholders and directors. A large SB is more likely 
to resist managerial malpractice, and improve the informativeness of public investors in 
major decision-makings (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Firth et al., 2007). Finally, prevailing CG 
research also suggests that independence of an audit committee, as measured by the 
proportion of independent auditors, can play a positive role in disciplining incumbent 
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insiders (see Chan and Li, 2008). It allows auditors freedom from the influence and pressure 
of corporate management and thus avoids potential conflicts of interest (Kalbers and 
Fogarty, 1998; Lin et al., 2008). Such monitoring is expected to increase shareholder gains 
for acquiring firms, as presumed independence can ensure that investment decisions are 
suitably aligned with the interests of public investors. It therefore seemed reasonable to 
expect a positive correlation between the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and CG 
practices of the acquirers. Likewise, the CARs are used to infer how public investors regard 
the observed CG practices among Chinese MNEs. In the meantime dummy variables of 
group affiliation (GA) and CEO duality (CD) are included as proxy measures of potential 
insider entrenchment, for problems of insider control and the associated expropriation risk 
remain the major concerns for public investors in the Chinese context (Sanders and 
Carpenter, 1998; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Kim and Yi, 2006). Table 6.4 presents the key 
statistical findings. 
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Table 6.4 Announcement Returns and Board Practices 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Audit Committee Independence   
0.000248* 
(0.000138) 
  
0.000254* 
(0.000141) 
Supervisory Board Size  
-0.00173 
(0.00108) 
  
-0.00189* 
(0.00113) 
 
Board of Directors Independence 
-0.000140 
(0.000522) 
  
-0.000127 
(0.000507) 
  
CEO Duality    
-0.00149 
(0.00750) 
-0.00508 
(0.00806) 
-0.00312 
(0.00794) 
Group Affiliation Dummy 
-0.0103 
(0.00806) 
-0.0122 
(0.00773) 
-0.0160* 
(0.00818) 
-0.0103 
(0.00806) 
-0.0125 
(0.00749) 
-0.0162** 
(0.00805) 
Firm Age 
-0.000595** 
(0.000239) 
-0.000713*** 
(0.000269) 
-0.000473** 
(0.000237) 
-0.000599** 
(0.000237) 
-0.000743*** 
(0.000273) 
-0.000481** 
(0.000234) 
Firma Size 
-0.00455*** 
(0.00166) 
-0.00292 
(0.00189) 
-0.00406** 
(0.00162) 
-0.00454*** 
(0.00165) 
-0.00276 
(0.00190) 
-0.00404** 
(0.00162) 
Return on Assets 
-0.00192*** 
(0.000522) 
-0.00191*** 
(0.000506) 
-0.00194*** 
(0.000513) 
-0.00190*** 
(0.000529) 
-0.00184*** 
(0.000520) 
-0.00190*** 
(0.000525) 
Tobin’s Q 
-0.00255*** 
(0.000860) 
-0.00235*** 
(0.000812) 
-0.00253*** 
(0.000848) 
-0.00253*** 
(0.000858) 
-0.00226*** 
(0.000825) 
-0.00248*** 
(0.000854) 
Debt-Equity Ratio 
-2.16e-06 
(3.04e-05) 
-1.52e-06 
(3.16e-05) 
3.38e-06 
(3.19e-05) 
-2.20e-06 
(3.04e-05) 
-1.91e-06 
(3.13e-05) 
3.27e-06 
(3.18e-05) 
Operating Profit Margin 
0.000384*** 
(8.48e-05) 
0.000352*** 
(8.31e-05) 
0.000397*** 
(8.50e-05) 
0.000382*** 
(8.58e-05) 
0.000346*** 
(8.54e-05) 
0.000396*** 
(8.64e-05) 
Target Status Dummy 
-0.00543 
(0.00694) 
-0.00467 
(0.00670) 
-0.00406 
(0.00662) 
-0.00543 
(0.00694) 
-0.00475 
(0.00667) 
-0.00410 
(0.00659) 
Constant 
0.0694* 
(0.0407) 
0.0486 
(0.0330) 
0.0531 
(0.0320) 
0.0693* 
(0.0407) 
0.0484 
(0.0331) 
0.0536* 
(0.0320) 
Observations 372 372 372 372 372 372 
R-squared 0.116 0.123 0.122 0.116 0.124 0.123 
   Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
P a g e  | 218 
 
The negative coefficients of BI and SBS here suggest the perceived inefficacy in 
safeguarding investors’ interests during investment decision making (see Xi, 2007; Tomasic, 
2010). In opting for stylized features of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance, 
policy makers and executives attach particular importance to the structural and/or formal 
compliance while neglecting such ‘soft’ issues as appropriate informal institutions and 
constituency base (Tam, 2002). However, as noted above, effective functioning of 
transplanted CG mechanisms has been hindered by the social-political environment in which 
they operate (Peng 2004; Xiao et al., 2004; Ning et al., 2014). Under concentrated ownership 
independent directors simply lack de facto power of veto over ill-advised investment projects 
(see Byrd and Hickman, 1992). Moreover, with a shareholding group acting as the 
intermediate principal, the pool for key executive positions is restricted and subject to 
bureaucratic influence from the intermediate layer (Jefferson et al., 2003; Naughton, 2006, 
2008).
15
 For Tomasic (2010) board members in China’s SCCSs generally lack the sense of 
fiduciary obligations to shareholders given the legacy of superior-subordinate relation 
between the shareholding companies and listed entity. Thus objectivity and business acumen 
of independent directors are unduly impaired, though they are deemed particularly important 
in monitoring the acquisition process when managers’ empire-building ambitions or 
executive pride conflict with investors’ interests (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). The case of 
China Life suggests that institutions of independent directors (as well as supervisors) may be 
further purposefully manipulated as leverage to entrench vested interests, and thus did not 
discharge their full governance responsibilities. In the context of CM&As, such collusion 
encourages corporate insiders to pursue their self-interests at the expense of public investors 
(Bontin, 2001; Lien et al., 2005; Ning et al., 2014).  
As noted, Chinese supervisory boards are often staffed with retired bureaucracies and 
incumbent managers. Such a constituency base of supervisors suggests a general lack of 
expertise for effective business monitoring and investment decision-making. It is claimed that 
Chinese SBs are merely playing a “window dressing” or “rubber stamp” role (Shan and Xu, 
2012, p. 20). For public investors the expanded size is likely to incur significant coordination 
costs to investment decision making and operation (see also Xi, 2007). The negative and 
significant coefficient of SBS (Model 5) confirmed the perceived expropriation risk and cost. 
In contrast, the coefficients of ACI are positive and statistically significant in every 
                                                 
15
 In China Life, board members generally lack the sense of fiduciary obligations to shareholders given the 
legacy of superior-subordinate relation between the Group Company and listed entity. 
P a g e  | 219 
 
specification (Model 3 and Model 6). The narrative account suggests that reform of internal 
audit has gone beyond structural compliance, and adopted a more comprehensive approach 
that integrates significant organizational and cognitive reorientation (see also Yi et al, 2012). 
Although mainland stock exchanges provide no mandatory requirement regarding ACI, 
international investors assume an increasingly critical role for the audit committee in risk 
control and restricting malpractices (Vijayakumar and Nagaraja, 2012). Where emerging 
MNEs are characterised by unsophisticated markets, and limited exposure to global 
competition, effective and independent internal audit systems provide assurance against risk 
associated with international expansion (Ramamurti and Singh, 2009; see also Du and 
Boateng, 2012). The beneficial effects of improved ACI in Chinese MNEs can be inferred 
through the positive market reaction on CM&A announcements. 
To summarize, the on-going reforms of China Life reflected the state’s continuous 
manoeuvring in curbing managerial entrenchment and fostering a globally competitive 
insurance giant. In this process, effective ownership rights and national interests constituted 
the major policy imperatives. The rising economic and political influence of the Group 
Company exacerbated the agency problems by weakening the control of the ultimate 
principal, its paternalistic control further led to the rising tension with the listed company. 
These vested interests, coupled with the absence of complementary institutions preluded the 
possibility for more structural changes in the near future. Faced with these challenges, 
central policymakers, driven by economic and legitimacy concerns, became leading change 
agents across different SSG domains. They chose to revise and reinterpret the evaluation 
criteria for executives and/or state cadres in order to shore up their political oversight 
function and to accommodate the competitive pressure. What was clear was that the previous 
nomenklatura framework facilitated the transformation even as the framework as a whole 
remained remarkably stable. In this process, the state audit apparatus provided the latent 
resources – structural, procedural, and personnel – that the central policy makers were able 
to utilize for imposing more effective monitoring. Likewise, the Company’s internal auditors 
exploited the linkages within existing governance frameworks to establish new procedures 
and mechanisms that would achieve more effective risk control. The empowerment of internal 
audit function received broad recognition from international capital markets. In this regard, 
policy makers and corporate strategizers have gone beyond the technical and administrative 
to the more market oriented initiatives to induce systemic changes. 
P a g e  | 220 
 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter provides firm-level evidence regarding the transformative dynamics of the SSG 
system by exploring the role and political skills of relevant stakeholders, in particular central 
policy makers and corporate strategizers. The qualitative narrative account explains the 
remarkable transformation of China Life’s governance system – from centralized 
administrative control towards a coordinated governance model with increasing emphasis on 
profit and risk monitoring, and from serious initial scepticism towards substantial 
improvements receiving outside recognition. Broad consensus over such matters as political 
stability and state ownership control ultimately crystalized important features of the state-
centric governance system. Hence, the reflectivity and institutional capability of policy 
makers and other strategizers played a key role in the enterprise reform. Where initial reforms 
often began with cognitive reorientation among key stakeholders, the success was also 
subject to the availability of indigenous structural and personnel resources. The findings here 
contrast significantly with the monolithic and static view of state-centric model in the 
prevailing finance-accounting literature.  
However, progress in governance improvement brought significant side payments; the 
resultant vested interests in turn constituted the major obstacles for further reform. The 
radical displacement of modern governance institutions proved to be a poor fit with the socio-
cultural context in which the governance system operates, as inferred from the mediated 
efficacy of board institutions (see also Jing and McDermott, 2012). Nevertheless, as 
increased capital market pressure and regulatory stringency brought further reform drives, 
skilled strategists exploited existing governance frameworks and personnel to orchestrate a 
series of organizational changes despite the constraining factors. The reforms have been 
substantial and are still ongoing, involving significant changes in regulatory frameworks, 
business practices, and cognitive reorientation of participants. Given the changes in market 
conditions and the corporate landscape, strategists have shifted focus from notional structural 
compliance towards more comprehensive institution building aiming at more effective 
internal control and shareholder protection. The complementary statistical inference further 
confirmed that reforms based on endogenous imperatives and existent resources are more 
likely than structural compliance to bring in essential and meaningful improvement in 
governance practices. For Mahoney and Thelen (2010), the final policy outcomes reply upon 
the complex interaction of change agents with changing social-economic conditions. Thus, 
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the next chapter uses the path-based approach to discuss the transformative mechanisms 
and/or strategies adopted by different social actors. 
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Chapter 7  
Discussion: Path-Generation Explanations on China’s State Sector Governance  
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter employs a path-based approach to explain the evidence about the reform of 
Chinese state sector governance (SSG) while also reflecting upon the essential 
methodological issues raised by doing the necessary high level fieldwork, in situ, with elite 
actors. It is organized as follows. Section 7.2 reprises the dynamics of reform with particular 
reference to the different institutional settings, reform drives, change agents, transformative 
skills and eventual policy outcomes. Section 7.3 summarizes the key research findings in 
regard to the original research propositions. Section 7.4 then discusses the methodological 
implications of using a path-based approach for these purposes. It suggests that an approach 
that focuses on the dialectical interactions between situated actors and wider meta-
institutional contexts over time can be useful in understanding institutional change processes 
(Bell and Feng, 2013).  
7.2 Dynamics of China’s SSG Reform  
Using the lexicon of path generation, Tables 7.1 and 7.2 summarise the key findings at both 
national and firm levels respectively. They show how political-economic settings, reform 
drives, change agents and their transformative skills influence eventual SSG practices and/or 
patterns. These include entrenched managerial interests and the regulatory state as well as 
rising, but still limited, public investor influence. Changed political-economic settings and 
actors’ strategies both influenced how Chinese SSG evolved (Wu, 2005). To frame these 
observations more generally: the gradual expansion of market mechanisms and specific 
institutional characteristics are jointly shaping the type of transformative dynamics expected. 
The varying tensions and pressures for change across different institutional spheres determine 
which types of change agents most likely emerge and flourish, as well as the strategies they 
choose to effect transformation (Wu, 2005; Streeck, 2009; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 
15).  
As noted, Chinese authoritarian political institutions are stable enough to matter, but not so 
much that “path dependence can carry the entire explanation” (Slater, 2010, p. 164). 
Consequently, institutional analysis of SSG must expect not “order in equilibrium”,
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Table 7.1 Transformative Dynamics at National Level 
Events 
Political-Economic 
Setting 
Reform Motivation Change Agents Reform Measures Strategies Policy Outcomes 
Initial enterprise 
reform 
(1980s) 
The periodic chaos of 
central planning 
Unsustainable development 
model, economic and 
legitimacy concerns 
The reformist 
leadership, local 
governments, and 
enterprise 
managers 
Power delegating,  profit 
sharing, and contract 
responsibility 
Layering/experimentation, 
coalition building 
Expanded enterprise autonomy 
created newly vested interests. 
Asymmetry between power 
and responsibility remained 
unaddressed. 
State sector 
restructuring 
(early-1990s) 
Marketization and 
restoration of reform drives  
after political upheavals 
Mounting fiscal burden of 
fiscal subsidies and 
limitedness of initial 
reform 
The reformist 
leadership, local 
governments, and 
enterprise 
managers 
Fiscal decentralization 
and 
“grasping the large,  
letting go of the small” 
Coalition building, 
converting, and 
layering/experimentation, 
Authority relationships 
between the central and local 
governments were clarified; 
reform drives were continued. 
Administrative 
streamlining 
(early-1990s) 
Deteriorating state-owned 
enterprises’ (SOEs) 
performance  and 
ideological breakthrough  
Separation of enterprise 
from government 
intervention 
The reformist 
leadership, line 
ministries, and 
enterprise 
managers 
Promulgation of the 
Company Law and 
transformation of 
ministries into 
shareholding groups 
Converting and 
compromising 
The ministries were 
transformed into shareholding 
groups while allowed to retain 
their ownership control. 
Bureaucratic interests were 
perpetuated.  
Corporatization 
(mid- and late-
1990s) 
Increased marketization, 
entry of World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), and 
financial market 
development 
Making SOEs truly 
independent by imposing 
modern governance 
institutions 
The reformist 
leadership, 
shareholding 
groups, and 
enterprise 
managers 
Asset split-off, 
introduction of board 
institutions, overseas 
share listings, and set-up  
of regulatory bodies 
Converting, layering, 
displacement, and ad hoc 
measures 
Modern corporate governance 
(CG) institutions were 
formally enacted. Enterprise 
autonomy was enhanced. 
Insider control problem started 
to emerge. Influence of public 
investor remained weak.  
Reconsolidation of 
state ownership 
rights 
(early-2000s) 
Economic growth, rising 
corporate power, further 
development of financial 
market, and the transition 
of state role in governing 
economic activities 
Recentralizing its fiscal 
resources to implement 
other reform schemes, 
addressing the insider 
control, maintaining 
financial market 
development 
Regulatory and 
supervisory bodies,  
party committees, 
and public 
investors 
Dividends remittance, 
“two-way intervention”, 
reorientation of 
managerial evaluation 
Increased institutional 
openness, converting and 
drifting 
The party-state is pursuing to 
regularize and institutionalize 
more professional oversight 
over corporate insiders. 
Influence of investors emerges.  
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Table 7.2 Transformative Dynamics at Firm Level  
Events 
Political-Economic 
Setting 
Reform Initiatives Change Agents Reform Measures Strategies Policy Outcomes 
The settlement 
of the spread 
loss problem 
Legitimacy concerns, 
limited fiscal capacity, 
and initial public 
offering (IPO) timing 
Declining fiscal income 
and  major spread loss 
The State Council, 
China Insurance 
Regulatory 
Commission 
(CIRC), and the 
Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) 
Spinning off non-
performing assets, 
administrative cooperation, 
and  administrative 
restructuring 
Experimentation and 
ad hoc approaches 
The listed company consisting of high 
quality assets obtained IPO success, while 
leaving the transparency concerns 
unaddressed. 
Class action 
lawsuit 
The complexity of 
spinning off, 
impossibility of 
structural reform  
Major financial loss, 
prospect of SOE overseas 
listing, and legitimacy of 
state-led restructuring 
CIRC, the MOF, the 
executives, 
international 
investors and 
regulators 
Administrative cooperating 
and 
voluntary information 
disclosure 
Increased 
institutional 
openness and ad hoc 
approaches 
A higher standard of information disclosure 
gained widespread recognition from 
international investors. 
CG institutions 
Ownership 
concentration 
Regulatory compliance 
“Leading team” 
members and 
incumbent managers   
of the Group 
Company 
Structural compliance with 
transplanted mechanisms 
Displacement and 
converting 
The rubber stamp role of the boards 
suggests that the efficacy of these 
governance mechanisms was largely 
mediated, and utilized by corporate insiders 
to serve their sectional interests. 
The 
improvement of  
party control 
efficacy 
Legitimacy of the 
Chinese Communists 
Party (CCP) control 
and ideological 
challenge from 
marketization 
Increasing insider control 
CCP Central 
Organizational 
Department, CIRC 
and the National 
Audit Office (NAO) 
Cognitive changes in 
evaluative criteria and craft 
coalition with regulatory 
bodies 
Converting 
More institutionalized and effective control 
by the party-state against entrenched 
sectional interests. 
Developing 
internal audit 
Organizational defects 
and lack of 
independence 
Regulatory compliance 
and inherent business 
risk 
CIRC and the 
executives 
Utilizing existing internal 
audit resource 
Displacement and 
converting 
A more independent and effective internal 
control plays an increasingly important role 
in corporate decision-makings. 
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but what Beckert (1980) termed “dynamic disequilibrium” (see also Streeck, 2009, p. 246). 
These findings here also suggest that the character of SSG is not necessarily determined by a 
collective and consensual quest for increased efficiency as orthodox neoclassical economics 
might imply. It can instead be an outcome of struggles between increased market and 
competitive pressures, and demands for maintaining extant governance structures and related 
vested interests. The former represents no less legitimate and also, in principle, no less 
urgent concerns for policy makers and key actors than the latter. Reducing actual socio-
economic embeddedness to technical-economic calculations about competitive performance 
here misses both the redistributive nature of Chinese SSG and the mediated efficacy of 
transplanted mechanisms. The distinctive features of Chinese SSG reform can now be 
summarized thus:
1
   
Deinstitutionalisation of Centrally-Planning and Reform Emergence (Propositions 1 and 4): 
Over three decades, legitimacy concerns and efficiency imperatives have constituted the 
main parameters of SSG reform. Like other social institutions, SSG emerges as a product of 
its particular political-economic setting, reflecting the prevailing developmental strategy at a 
certain point in time (Dacin et al., 2002). The chronic shortcomings in China’s SSG system 
have been rooted in closely woven institutional arrangements across various different 
domains, and have repeated questioned particular governance practices and/or reform 
measures, producing “a web of vulnerability” which destabilizes the wider economy in ways 
which bring the legitimacy of central leadership into question (Seo and Creed, 2002, p. 227). 
For the party-state, the state sector simply has represented such a vast patronage system that 
any performance deterioration therein directly erodes the loyalty of its key constituencies. 
This accentuated differences among leading actors and exacerbated the decoupling of the 
extant SSG until other potentially innovative but initially experimental reform schemes duly 
emerged.  
Power delegation and corporatization both illustrate how legitimacy-driven pressures 
associated with performance deterioration provide particular impetus for reformist leadership 
to question the existing state-enterprise relationship and adopt increasingly market-oriented 
programs in respect of enterprise autonomy, managerial incentives, and ownership structure. 
Measures taken prior to the official corporatization programme can be viewed as 
intermediate steps towards expanding market mechanisms and decentralizing decision-
                                                 
1
 The propositions each analysis may respond to are stated in the pantheists.   
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making. The multiple connections among components of SSG institutions mean that changes 
in one domain will affect other parts of the system. The problems and resultant legitimacy 
concerns opened “cracks” in the “monolith” of the socialist economy, by which cumulative 
forces eventually took over amid further splitting and contention (MacMillan and Naughton, 
1992). SSG transformation reflects the “gradual historical exhaustion” of traditional 
administrative planning, and the quest of the party-state to improve efficiency in the midst of 
economic patronage (Streeck, 2009). 
At firm level, although changed economic conditions and regulation may not directly 
threaten change agents, they nevertheless invite negative-feedback effects about prior 
governance practices which help bring about their eventual demise. As shown by class-
action lawsuits, international listing here caused fundamental tensions between the state-led 
or dominated corporatization model and the market-oriented governance system. Recent 
reform initiatives, including improved information disclosure and curtailed non-monetary 
benefits, indicate more willingness to provide for investor protection. Meanwhile, reliance 
upon ideological compliance and/or loyalty make conventional political oversight even less 
effective during accelerated marketization. Despite an impressive network and enduring 
nomenklatura hierarchy, there are still possibilities of transformation. The initial institutional 
deviation may take the form of organizational rearrangements (e.g. the invention of “two-
way intervention”), or the cognitive reorientation of change agents (e.g. increasing emphasis 
upon profit and efficiency in cadre evaluation). Innovative policy options and practices are 
likely to emerge from governance elements under challenge. As internal audit development 
demonstrates, the accelerated growth of mainland insurance markets and regulatory 
enforcement questions how feasible the director responsibility system really is.  
Layering and Political Constraints (Propositions 2, 3 and 4): Processes of layering often 
occur when reformers lack the necessary political power and financial ability to overturn 
previous governance institutions. While defenders of the status quo can oppose and prevent 
radical displacement, they are still unable to prevent new practices being brought in 
alongside the old rules. This was particularly so during the initial stage of SOE reform.  
Political opposition stemmed largely from the socialist orthodoxy which stressed the 
dominance of state ownership and superiority of central planning. With progressively 
dismantled central planning the politics of corporate restructuring changed enough to invite 
new lines of defence among key power groups. Containing the social repercussions of 
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corporate restructuring and dampening ideological controversy were part of the policy 
makers’ agenda from the very beginning of SOE reform. Against this background, SOE 
reform – as in most domains of China’s economic transformation – has occurred in a dual-
track manner whereby innovative, often experimental measures have been introduced or 
“layered” in parallel with prior institutional arrangements. Instead of displacement, layering 
becomes a more promising strategy of change in a political environment where there are 
strong veto players (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). First implemented as an institutional 
addition, these policy innovations erode the legitimacy of entrenched institutions of 
centralised planning while generating support for reform by creating “newly vested 
interests”. In this context, the (previous) fragmentation of enterprise authorities provides 
central policy makers with an opportunity to fine-tune different reform initiatives (Saich, 
2011). 
From 1978 to the mid-1990s, recurrent reform experimentation or fiscal decentralization 
resulted in “protracted policy tinkering with bureaucratic and financial incentives or formal 
corporate reorganization, yet without touching the politically protected and financially 
privileged status of SOEs in the economy”. More market-oriented practices enabled 
coalitions among vested interests or/and reform beneficiaries which gradually eroded the 
prominence of veto players.
 2
 Layering can also be regarded as experimental reform. Various 
market-oriented schemes were first experimented with before being expanded in the name of 
“maintaining the superiority of socialist institutions” (weihu shehui zhuyi zhidu de 
youyuexing in Chinese). In this process, fragmented authoritarianism inherited from the 
centrally-planned era “allowed the implementation of innovative programmes in politically 
distinctive and territorially bounded regions” (Mahoney and Streeck, 2010, p. 57). Localities 
provided the test bed for emerging administrative and business practices where novel policy 
options were fed back into national policymaking to provide the basis for broader reform 
departures. In this way, particular policy deadlocks could frequently be overcome and 
experiments expanded “far beyond what could have been accomplished by top-down 
initiatives dependent on political consensus” among party leaders (Rawski, 1995, p. 1162; 
Heilmann, 2011, p. 113).   
                                                 
2
 For Stark et al. (1989), the great uncertainty of changing corporate institutions forces the reformist leadership 
to form a political coalition in order to keep enterprise reform on the agenda. Crafting coalition requires the 
compromise that allows the coexistence of two seemingly contradictory institutional configurations. 
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Conversion and Exploiting Extant Institutions (Propositions 2, 3 and 4): Change agents, 
such as reformist leadership and new regulatory bodies, often exploit extant institutional 
resources in order to reduce the opposition to, and uncertainties of, innovative policy 
options. This tactic enables them to progressively convert certain existing institutions, “even 
subverting its purposes, while still following them to the letter” (Sheingate, 2010, p. 185). 
This permits expanded reform initiatives. In the case of “grasping the large and letting go of 
the small”, the criss-cross governance framework developed by central and local 
bureaucracies re-asserted authority over parts of the state sector: local government in 
particular reclaimed control over small and medium-sized SOEs while central government 
reconsolidated its authority over large corporations.
3
 For Yeo (2013), central government 
seeks more feasible but not necessarily the best ways to “accommodate” market-oriented 
government institutions with prevailing political-economic realities, and thus creates its own 
preferred corporate governance regime. The enhanced power of independent directors and 
the norms of two-way intervention demonstrate how mechanisms transplanted from other 
market-oriented governance regimes have been carefully “orchestrated” or “converted” to 
institutionalize such political oversights and this further enhances the State Asset 
Supervision and Administration Commission’s (SASAC) own regulatory regime. 
Moreover, despite continued nomenklatura based personnel control, evaluation criteria for 
SOE managers have become increasingly market-oriented, reducing earlier ideological 
compliance. Central government has redefined its role from general administrator of the state 
sector to “the representative of state interests as an investor and ‘owner’ of state asset” 
(Jung, 2011, p. 131; see also Naughton, 2007). This requires the party-state to limit the scope 
of its control by withdrawing from non-key industrial sectors while also introducing better 
monitoring of SOE management. In such cases, policy changes have sought to re-orient 
extant institutions according to central government’s reform vision, even though the formal 
attributes of these institutions remain largely intact. 
Displacement and Contrasting Effects (Proposition 2 and 4): Displacement mechanisms are 
not often observed in the development of China’s SSG system. This would have involved the 
radical and sudden substitutions of previous rules, which could invoke opposition from 
vested interests. When boards of directors and supervisors were transplanted into China 
Life, they were intended to replace the “old three committees” as new governance bodies, 
                                                 
3
 Such a fragmented governance framework was once designated for implementing planning directive and 
mobilizing political campaigns. 
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and to further distance government intervention from detailed enterprise operation. Under 
concentrated ownership structure (more than 70 per cent of shares held by the Group 
Company), efficacy of these “modern enterprise institutions” has been largely mediated and 
further manipulated by entrenched insiders pursuing their own interests. Agents from quasi-
administrative agencies have their own considerations and may challenge reformist 
leadership at particular junctures, as the limited success of state ownership consolidation and 
investor protection measures demonstrates. Confronting market-based CG mechanisms in a 
bureaucratic-centric environment questions whether a fully functioning CG system 
comparable to that found in civil and common law countries is really feasible and likely to 
restrict economically detrimental rent-seeking (see Braendle et al., 2005). Statistical findings 
here confirm that transplanted governance mechanisms do not really achieve their expected 
goals. In contrast, promulgation of internal audit systems goes beyond mere formal or 
statutory compliance, being largely driven by central policy makers’ economic imperatives. 
This has brought more substantive changes in managerial conducts which are positively 
confirmed by market participants. The contrasting results of two transplanted institutions 
highlight the central role of endogenous factors in generating meaningful improvement in 
governance practices, including risk control awareness, qualified personnel with business 
expertise, and extant organizational structure. Transnational policymakers should be careful 
when importing so-called “best practices” when such essential conditions are absent.  
Ad Hoc Measure without Complementary Institutions (Propositions 2, 3 and 4): While the 
Chinese party-state is able to bring critical resources to embark upon selected reforms within 
a limited period of time, it often employs an ad hoc approach to address the problems of 
implementation and follow-up. Insights from the VoC literature underscore the need to 
consider institutional support for developing corporate governance systems. The degree to 
which institutional complementarities exist affects the efficacy of the governance system and 
the lack of appropriate institutions itself limits the achievable goals. In the Chinese case, 
transplanted CG mechanisms provide notional structural compliance which entrenched 
insiders can still potentially circumvent. 
Nevertheless the evidence here suggests that, when central policy makers can determine the 
sequencing of reforms, this may help mediate, if not mitigate, the lack of complementary 
institutions. For example, to take government out of enterprise operation, the party-state 
needed specific entities to act as its representative in exercising due ownership rights. Such 
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agencies were lacking until several line ministries were eventually converted into 
shareholding agencies though administrative streamlining. Given other ideological 
breakthroughs and the thriving non-state sector, central government subsequently established 
stock markets in the 1990s in order to accelerate SOE restructuring. Once reformers realized, 
the further consequences of equity market underdevelopment they advanced further 
particular policies to improve investor protection. China’s SSG reform has often been 
implemented through a policy-based, ad hoc approach to address the lack of complementary 
institutions at an opportune point in time. As noted by Heilmann (2011), such an incremental 
reform strategy – even if sometimes criticized for perpetuating governance shortcomings and 
resource misallocation – has nevertheless contributed to the fine-tuning which enabled 
further SOE reform to proceed.  
7.3 Research Findings and Propositions 
In light of the above, it is now necessary to review to what extent the research propositions 
have been specifically responded to. 
Proposition 1: Rather than become locked into self-reinforcement among entrenched 
institutions, China’s SSG system will progressively deviate from past central planning, 
and thereby develop other distinctive characteristics. 
China’s SSG system has been transformed from an administrative command system to one 
in which market competition, an increasingly regulatory state, and also a non-state 
shareholder can and does increasingly dominate. Despite limited efficiency gains, state 
sector profitability and overall competitiveness have improved. Overall mutual stabilization 
of the different institutional spheres of the centrally-planning system, or State Syndicate 
model, worked only for a limited time. Nevertheless, the path from its central-planning 
origins to the current outcome has not been notably radical. It has proceeded more gradually, 
cumulatively, and without dramatic disruptions and discontinuities. With the legacy of state 
control focussed upon ownership concentration and board dominance, the perceived 
governance shortcomings brought serious enough efficiency and legitimacy concerns for the 
ruling party-state that reforms continued amid such exogenous events as the demise of the 
former Soviet Union and China’s WTO entry. 
A principal source of transformation has been changes in the political-economic conditions 
in in which the state sector operates.  It has been also shown how changes in capital structure 
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and further integration with the world economy induced further cognitive reorientation 
among corporate strategizers which helped bring about improved governance practices. 
Central policy makers and strategizers in China Life have chosen a continuous and perhaps 
more familiar incremental path to improve the governance practices. Observed 
transformations (i.e. corporate restructuring and internal audit system) occurred largely 
without such major structural changes as radical privatization or thoroughgoing 
reorganization. In spite of the constraining effects of broader social-political institutions, 
change agents (i.e. central policymakers, the NAO and internal auditors) could exploit 
existing organizational arrangements and authority relations to avoid organizational 
upheavals and resistance. Transitional conditions have significantly redefined what SSG 
institutions are and do, in particular the respective roles and different visions of the relevant 
actors.
4
 Changed reform objectives reflect key actors’ growing knowledge about both the 
merits of particular SSG practices and the balance between different interest groups. Thus, 
the logic of institutional perpetuation is limited in terms of explaining SSG transformation. 
Proposition 2: Where the interaction between change agents determines policy outcomes, 
the significant economic and political interests of central policymakers make them leading 
change agents for SSG reform.  
In terms of interest redistribution, SOE reform has been historically marked by active 
interaction between, and leading differences among, certain key social actors and change 
agents. This highlights the central role of social actors actively generating change via two 
distinct, though interrelated, causal ways. Most directly, emerging actors managed at times 
to introduce more effective arrangements that dismantled, eroded, reinterpreted or (nearly) 
displaced seemingly ineffective prior governance practices. Central to their ability to craft 
and expand such innovative practices are the economic, political and social resources that 
were “latent in the very institutions they sought to revise” (Jacobs, 2010, p. 124). As regards 
investor protection, economic liberalization and financial market development enabled 
public investors to exert more influence over corporate agendas. Their quest for more 
effective protection was further aided by the government’s renewed agenda for corporate 
restructuring and regulatory reform.  These radical changes created a new constituency 
seeking fairer rules against incumbent corporate insiders while other regulatory reforms 
likewise fostered anti-incumbent institutions (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).  
                                                 
4
 For Streeck (2009, p. 251),  in contingent conditions, a corporate governance system, in what may be called a 
deficient mode, may temporarily become subordinate to the progress of marketization and allocative efficiency. 
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A second mechanism of institutional change, however, sprang from institutional defendants 
themselves. The economic interests and legitimacy concerns often made central policy 
makers more responsive and active implementers of SOE reforms than they might otherwise 
have been. While initial reforms sought to prevent threatened national economic 
disintegration, changed ownership rights reflected a vision of “forging a state sector with 
global competitiveness” (Shao, 2012). Repeatedly, central policy makers pushed through 
major institutional changes intended to address governance shortcomings and improve state 
sector competitiveness. Changed evaluation criteria suggest that central government is also 
undergoing a significant cognitive and/or ideological reorientation. Despite rejecting 
wholesale privatization, the gradual extension of market mechanisms provoked the party-
state to change earlier revolutionary rhetoric and adopt realpolitik to guide reform. Faced 
with entrenched corporate insiders, the party-state lost legitimacy because of corruption and 
other malpractice, in particular the close identity of interests between business executives 
and officials (as indicated by close-knitted relationships between CIRC and China Life) 
(Saich, 2011). For SASAC, central government is seeking better oversight over corporate 
management as part of the effort to reconsolidate state ownership rights. As a result, its role 
as ultimate planner has been transformed into the owner of strategic state assets. While the 
central policy makers maintain their espoused commitment to a market-driven economy, one 
major impact of the current financial crisis has been to increase the presence of government 
in regulatory reform and industrial restructuring.  
At firm level, despite the disciplinary power of capital markets, the transformation of China 
Life’s governance system can be considered largely state-led. The economic and political 
importance of this state-owned insurance giant has been repeatedly asserted by the party-
state. As noted, central policymakers challenge regulatory and coordinating authorities to 
orchestrate the disposal of non-performing assets. They craft coalitions with other regulators 
and thus manage to impose more effective monitoring over entrenched corporate interests. 
Moreover, meaningful transformation of SSG practices takes place when key actors adapt 
themselves in line with changed environments. Different reforms, including the reorientation 
of party evaluation criteria, represent their adaptive response to the changing socio-economic 
context. For China Life, the meaning of ideological correctness has shifted towards 
economic efficiency and competiveness, emphasizing sales growth and profitability. All this 
indicates the party-state’s continuing efforts to reconcile its legitimacy concerns with the 
quest for economic efficiency. For Saich (2011), the combination of personnel control and 
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profitability has created a hybrid economic institution referred to as “numenklatura 
capitalism”. Thus the Chinese party-state should not be conceived as a monolithic apparatus. 
What is actually  “effective” under these circumstances is “a matter of continuing social, 
political, and economic experimentation, of successive trial and error, and of tentative 
approximation” which requires not only deductive reasoning and experiential accounting, 
but also political contestation and a legitimating societal discourse with stakeholders 
(Streeck, 2009, p. 179).  
Proposition 3: China’s SSG reform encounters constraining or/and mediating forces from 
prevailing social-economic conditions, in particular entrenched interests from prior 
institutional arrangements.  
Despite other enabling conditions, the reform process often encounters institutional 
constraints and political resistance, in particular from rising corporate power. Different 
reforms measures often provoke the resistance of those actors they disadvantage. The 
bargaining and lobbying activities of SOEs still has considerable “residual strength”, not just 
from the workers affected and the ministries they were transformed from, but because they 
also contribute so much to national output (about 80 per cent over 2011) and communes 60 
per cent of household savings through bank loans (China Statistical Year Book, 2011; see 
also Saich, 2011). Although such constraints as ideological concerns and interest groups are 
not   insurmountable, they can nevertheless shape ongoing governance reforms. For Grindle 
and Thomas (1991, p. 126; see also Saich, 2011, p, 264), a “policy reform initiative may be 
altered or reversed at any life stage in its life cycle by the pressures and reactions of those 
who oppose it”. It is probable that in contingent conditions, the SSG polity, in what may be 
called deficient mode, is temporally subordinate to the progress of marketization and 
allocative efficiency. However, this cannot remain the dominant mode of institutional 
transformation, especially in a transitional economy in which vested interests remain 
influential, and complementary socio-economic conditions for better SSG are still 
underdeveloped. 
An appreciation of this helps explain why Chinese SOE reforms have occurred gradually, 
particularly through myriad “suboptimal” policy arrangements. Despite reformists’ intention 
to accelerate this, political, administrative and fiscal conditions have limited changes agents’ 
choices to date. This “lengthy learning process” has absorbed many leading actors (Saich, 
2011, p. 254). To neutralize opposition from entrenched interests, reformists forged 
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coalitions or sought wider compromises. Such compromised solutions have sometimes been 
identified and subverted by other skilled actors. In the process of corporate restructuring, 
central policymakers continued the profit retention and administrative welfare systems to 
elicit entrenched managers' support. Leading members used their board control and 
administrative privileges to advance their own interests. In other words, state sector reform 
came at a significant cost of side-payments to the “losers” (as also shown by the reduced 
profit remittance to SASAC for securing corporate compliance). For Shirk (1993, p. 17), “a 
reform package that is politically logical is not necessarily economically logical”. The 
compromise in the writing of new reform policies brought institutional practices that 
departed from, or even contradicted, better institutional design (Streeck, 2009).  
However, inadequate governance arrangements also provide social actors with opportunities 
to challenge the status quo (Oi and Hua, 2011). As regards corporatization, the absence of a 
well-developed financial market and political opposition prevented restructuring from being 
a single step process, moving directly from state ownership to privatization. Instead, central 
government took “smaller, less invasive and less ideologically alien” steps towards 
progressive restructuring (Oi and Hua, 2011, p. 20). As a result, China’s state sector turned 
to shareholding or corporatization rather than privatization and thereby settled for partial 
reform. Since the institutional arrangements first adopted during corporatization were largely 
second-best choices, mounting governance problems later made central government promote 
more market-oriented policies through further restructuring. The inherent problems of stage-
like sub-optimal policy arrangements reinforced and accelerated the endogenous 
disorganization which sowed the seeds of further SSG reform. 
Proposition 4: To the extent that entrenched institutions exert powerful constraints, 
strategizers may resort to different path-generation mechanisms to create innovative 
policy options to ameliorate particular governance shortcomings.  
China’s SSG institutions can still be populated by resourceful, interpretative actors seeking 
opportunities for change. Hence, instead of static and rigid depictions of institutional 
reproduction, experience here highlights the relations between change agents and institutions 
as “a dialectical process of mutual shaping over time” (Bell and Feng, 2013, p. 16). SOE 
reform has become a pluralistic process involving different social actors who employ various 
transformative strategies based on their own interests (Oi and Hua, 2011). As shown here, 
change agents affect reform through well-chosen mechanisms (Mintzberg, 1985; Jing and 
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McDermott, 2012). A good example was how 1990's state sector restructuring was locally 
extensive but readily contested at the centre (Saich, 2011). For Seo and Greed (2002, p, 
229), the formation and transformation of governance practices “are basically political 
processes involving participants who have divergent interests and unequal power”.  These 
empirical observations demonstrate how institutionally entrepreneurs or change agents craft 
particular implementation strategies based on their respective political and economic 
interests. As stakeholders can embrace different transformative mechanisms, they are less 
resistant to profound changes, producing a continuous feedback between the system 
evolution and the socio-economic environment in which SSG institutions function (Farrar 
and Mayes, 2013).  
Actors can engage minor but unforeseeably path-breaking, violation of governing 
institutional norms. Both “layering” and “conversion” represent reform strategies for those 
Chinese change agents prevented from creating entirely new governance institutions from 
scratch (Streeck, 2009). Where central government sanctioned enterprise reform, 
implementation was left to government bureaucracies and key enterprise managers. During 
initial enterprise reform, reformist leadership employed a layering strategy to craft coalitions 
with local governments and enterprise managers. In this way, it overcame rival party hard-
liners’ resistance. Thus reformists can be considered what Mahoney and Thelen (2010, p. 
30) termed the “insurrectionaries” whose interests are at odds with defenders of the status 
quo, but closely allied with other institutional challengers of rigid administrative planning. In 
addressing the ideological challenges, party cadres used the existing nomenklatura 
framework as a platform for introducing more subtle changes from the margins, which 
helped transform corporate governance practices in directions more consistent with their 
own ideology and preferences. 
However, the way actors can also exploit the sub-optimal arrangements or/and conflicts 
points to how they might advance their own interests at the expense of others. For example, 
ministries or/and shareholding agencies represent another group of change agents 
categorized by Mahoney and Thelen (2010, p. 31) as “opportunists” who can only accept 
changes if leading reformers ensure they also benefit equally from them. Ownership 
concentration enabled them to manipulate or convert transplanted governance mechanisms 
using their own considerations and interests. These new institutions broadened the scope for 
political coalition building. As reforms unfolded, central policy makers encountered 
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resistance regarding possible redistributive effects rather than ideological fidelity. Social 
actors altering current governance practices through different transformative strategies can 
also bring new problems to bear while doing so. 
7.4 Methodological Implications of a Path-Based Approach 
The incremental and dynamic process of SSG reform also brings important methodological 
implications to light. To generate fruitful insights into what actually occurs, a path-based 
approach needs to explore the content, context, and stages of change together through time 
(see also Stroz et al., 2013). The incremental nature of SOE reform, and other institutional 
transformation, are difficult to capture in statistical terms alone, and key causal relationships 
may only be realized retrospectively (Streeck, 2009). For that reason governance researchers 
may later add other versions of the organizational past and similar institutional legacies to 
the set of variables and data they first considered. However, the limits of data drawn from 
narrow bounded time and space have sometimes been overlooked.
5
  
The primary task here is to define what an appropriate length of time might be. Duration sets 
a frame of reference for the changes observed and how these are analysed. The longer an 
emergent process is observed, and the further back its origins are traced, the more each 
different change can be pursued in depth. Theoretically and empirically, change and 
continuity, path generation and path dependence, pose important time issues. A meaningful 
inquiry into institutional change needs to accommodate differing origins, causes, temporal 
patterns and movements from simple continuity through into complex transformation and 
vice versa. To do this, path-based research like this needs sufficient longitudinal data to 
enable present practices and arrangements to be explored in relation to their past and 
projected future (Pettigrew, 1990).  
The cumulative dimension of China’s SSG reform is evident. But how long does the 
required time frame need to be? And when does any given change process begin?  There are, 
of course, no absolute and simple answers. As for time, events and process are mapped into a 
time metric, providing a grid within which different historical events and processes are 
located (Caporaso, 1980). Events and processes are expressed as transformations within the 
grid specified (Caporaso, 1980). In a path-based perspective time is no given and 
                                                 
5
 As noted by Streeck (2009), comparative studies of corporate governance also have a tendency to organize 
empirical observations in historically invariant.  
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unquestioned construct. Instead, events and developmental stages themselves construct the 
metric of analysis; they become the language a path-based approach uses to elucidate 
transformation and the metric by which to judge temporal results. For Pettigrew (2013), 
judgments should be made in the light of the theoretical framework adopted, research 
questions pursued, empirical setting of the inquiry, and the nature and characteristics of the 
researcher-subject relationship in any site. Or, as argued by Morgan (2006), the key to 
choosing the appropriate duration of time is to understand the logic of what unfolded in the 
process of change itself. What is critical here is not the longitudinal order of events but the 
underlying logic and dynamics that have given such events particular meaning and 
significance. This is expected to provide the rationale for choice. For a path-based approach, 
instead of the major exogenous events or critical historical junctures alone, it is also 
necessary to focus upon key stakeholder interactions and co-evolution between institutions 
and the socio-economic environment over time. Prevailing research on Chinese SOE reform 
has often chosen events such as the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CCP Central 
Committee in 1979 or China’s entry into WTO in 1998, as the beginning of reform. 
However, more contextualized, path-based explanations may suggest that these given start 
points may have been preceded by major disjunctures at higher levels of analysis. These 
events are undoubtedly important turning points, and indeed particular reform opportunities, 
as latters became apparent in subsequent years. What they ultimately produced was 
conditioned by pre-existing socio-economic conditions and actors who were able and willing 
to take advantage of them (see also Streeck, 2009). Meanwhile, governance researchers may 
also need to refer to on-going policy reformulation and emerging social sectors. A full time 
period can thus provide “a more encompassing investigation of successive strategic renewal 
trajectories” (Kwee et al., 2011, p. 986). 
However, judgments on transformation are conditioned both by how long they are observed, 
and by the experience and interpretation of the social actors or agents involved (Stroz et al., 
2013). Their strategies and interplay exert salient influence upon the enactment and/or 
demise of institutions, “imparting on them a particular bias or dynamic that makes for 
incremental changes” (Streeck, 2009, p. 245). While elements of path-based research are not 
appropriate for quantitative surveys, elite interviews here prove helpful for generating 
meaningful insights.  The interview process here tends to be more unstructured or open-
ended than in conventional surveys, so that interviewees can stress their own definition of 
the situation, and other contextual information related to it (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). 
P a g e  | 238 
 
 
Such in-depth validity is particularly important for path-based research to pursue. However, 
the unique socio-economic context of China raises particular issues about conducting any 
longitudinal elite study. First, the present transition means that elites do not necessarily 
remain stable over time. This is particularly so in a government apparatus which can be more 
dynamic institution than “the stereotypes might lead one to believe” (Aberbach and 
Rockman, 2002). Apart from the streamlining and creation of new administrative agencies, 
officials are often reappointed as the executives of SOEs and vice versa. In this case, prior 
in-depth investigation of background information is particularly useful, in particular 
regarding organizational structure and personnel change. Second, contradictory accounts 
emerge from different informants, given the plurality of government bureaucracies. 
Interpretation from reform losers can be in striking contrast to beneficiaries’ accounts. 
Where this occurs, it is useful to expose alternative accounts rather than “accord one 
privileged status” (Pettigrew, 1990, p. 272). This approach is valuable to appreciate how 
different versions of transformative reality come to be held by the actors concerned (Kezar, 
2003).  
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion 
This thesis explores the characteristics and transformative dynamics of the prevailing system 
of Chinese state sector governance (SSG). Using a path-generation perspective, it examines 
how the changing social-economic environment and leading social actors’ conduct impact 
upon ultimate SSG practices. By applying a mixed-method strategy at both national and firm 
levels, it presents a more comprehensive and convincing picture of such governance than 
anything which could have been derived from just one single method alone. China’s overall 
experience with state sector reform resembles that of a relatively unsynchronised, largely 
incremental process whose strength is less its coherence than its openness or flexibility to 
pursue “unexpected and tentative policy solutions that are seized upon when they come up” 
(Heilmann, 2011, p. 117). Leading social actors and surrounding political-economic 
conditions demonstrably influenced eventual policy outcomes. The firm-level case study 
further illuminated how subtle changes among related institutional spheres can expand and 
ultimately generate meaningfully improved governance practices. Much on-going debate 
regarding state and/or public sector reform has primarily been concerned with efficiency 
gains from market liberalisation. However, the findings here suggest that the promulgation 
and transplantation of reform policies should take the specific socio-economic context of any 
given country, particularly interaction among key social actors, into greater consideration 
than before (Streeck, 2009, p. 5). State sector reform goes beyond abstract efficiency and 
welfare considerations into matters of basic compatibility with prevailing socio-political 
factors.  
Chinese SSG 
Marketization and, to a lesser extent, globalisation have deeply transformed the institutions 
of the central planning and set the ground for the development of a new type of polity and 
style of SSG (Bellamy and Palumbo, 2010). The reform focus has here shifted from initial ad 
hoc structural tinkering, towards more comprehensive institution-building across different 
spheres, including political ideology, law and regulation, fiscal and administrative 
frameworks, corporate governance (CG), and financial markets (OECD, 2005b). For Saich 
(2011) the governance practices arising from China's changing political-economic landscape 
may not mount to a market-oriented system but instead constitute a distinctive, state-centric 
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governance model that more resembles “state corporatism” in the following aspects.  
State dominance. To the extent that authoritarian political institutions are perpetuated in the 
foreseeable future, the Chinese party-state will dominate SSG arrangements albeit in a less 
singular, discretionary manner (Dickson, 2001). Despite its diminishing dominance in the 
national economy, the state sector remains a major source of revenue and employment, and 
plays an increasing role in industrial restructuring and technological upgrading (Dong and 
Putterman, 2003; Nolan, 2012). Such a vast constituency base is of paramount political 
importance for ruling elites (Pei, 2009). Legitimacy and economic concerns give central 
policymakers leading roles in SSG conduct and reform. The enhanced monitoring of SASAC 
and other regulatory agencies has demonstrated how central government itself intervened in 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and/or state-controlled corporations (SCCs) in key strategic 
sectors. At the core of these interventions was the interest intermediation whereby explicitly 
recognized corporate interests became incorporated into a policy-making and 
implementation process (see Sarti, 1971) in which legitimacy concerns were of (at least) 
equal importance with economic factors for the ruling authoritarian regime. 
Extensive frameworks. Chinese SSG bears a remarkably complex architecture which Lin and 
Milhaupt (2013) term a networked hierarchy.
1
 Its hierarchical aspects are readily apparent: 
they range from the vertical integration of firms along the production chain, to the top-down 
character of policy transmission and supervision in an authoritarian political regime (Lin and 
Milhaupt, 2013). Vertically integrated corporations transmit directives from central 
policymakers to various shareholding agencies and down through a chain of vertically 
affiliated firms, which facilitates information flow and policy implementation from the top 
down and vice versa. However this hierarchical structure is embedded in dense networks not 
only of other corporate groups, but also of government apparatus and attendant party cells. 
These foster collaboration and supervision at different levels of policy-enforcement and 
enterprise management. It also adds incentives for the key actors involved, including 
prominent officials and top executives, where recognized success leads to promotion and 
political rewards. For Dickson (2001), this networked hierarchy has emerged as a substitute 
for coercion, propaganda, and central planning for maintaining party hegemony. As Unger 
and Chan (1995) argued, it represents a mechanism through which the party-state's grip 
                                                 
1
 For Lin and Milhaupt (2013, p. 707) the principal-agent perspective on listed firms fails to capture the 
hierarchy and embeddedness of Chinese SSG system. 
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could be lessened but not released altogether. 
Evolving state role. SSG practices are changing significantly amidst accelerated market 
liberalisation, with intense efforts to raise technical management skills and reinforce state 
ownership functions (Nolan, 2012). Corporatisation, combined with more decentralised state 
administration in the 1990s, has enabled selected shareholding entities to dominate major 
corporate decision-making (OECD, 2005b, 2011b). Aggravated insider control increases the 
expropriation risk which then hinders further financial market development. Failure to 
discipline entrenched insiders inhibits enterprise performance and erodes the party-state’s 
legitimacy when pursuing future reforms (Pei, 2009). Recent initiatives intend to reinforce 
state ownership functions, particularly regarding performance evaluation and capital 
management. With significant ideological reorientation, the party-state has sought to 
institutionalise its political oversights through market-based CG mechanisms and 
professional regulatory organs. The empowerment of a centralised ownership entity, i.e. 
SASAC, constitutes state ownership rights in a more centralized but still market-oriented 
manner (Naughton, 2006).  
Power structure. The respective interests and authority of central policymakers, state 
apparatus, local governments, and corporate managers have themselves changed. The once 
unilateral authority relationship between government and enterprise has since become more 
bilateral and contestable.  SOEs control primarily resides among insider managers sharing 
various other network linkages (Tam, 2002). Where extant governance institutions have been 
used to entrench vested interests, other opportunities for management indiscretion and 
insider expropriation have occurred. However, accelerated marketization also increases 
public investors’ input into policy and business decision-making, as deeper financial markets 
provides channels for increasing their influence. The prevailing agenda for pension reform 
and effective state asset management further aid the quest for better protection. The direction 
of SSG reform may therefore depend upon whether and how central policymakers reconcile 
that agenda with the interests of other emerging economic actors. 
8.1 Elements of SSG Reform  
The findings here further call into question those “trapped transition” and “path-dependence” 
arguments which emphasize institutional “locked-in” and stability above all. For Baum and 
Shevchenko (1999) the key attraction of the “state corporatism” model is the state’s ability to 
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accommodate party-state control to the more diverse socio-economic changes induced 
through market liberalisation. As indicated in Figure 8.1, SSG reform here suggests that 
these elements ensure meaningful transformation: 
Stable socio-political environment amid increased marketization. China’s economic 
transition contrasts strikingly with other former socialist economies which adopted a big 
bang approach. The gradualist approach has brought a stable socio-political environment, 
which has then seen governance reform even proceed through different leadership 
successions. A stable socio-political environment is a necessary – though not sufficient – 
condition for SSG reform. As noted, a principal source of transformation has been the 
changing economic conditions in which SGG is situated and conducted. The drive to 
maintain institutionalized party-state dominance provides particular stability and assurance 
(Saich, 2011, p. 141). Where much prevailing economic-finance literature might demonstrate 
how major regulatory reforms were preceded by significant market failures, this study here 
suggests that marketization has imposed competitive pressure upon extant governance 
practices and brought further improvements. The gradual expansion of market mechanisms, 
both domestic and international, increases the economic and institutional resources and 
diversifies the channels available for different stakeholders to exert more influence (Djelic 
and Quack, 2007). 
Institutional flexibility and openness. In China, decentralized authority structures allow 
novel policy options to overcome strong political resistance; lessons from experimentation 
were fed back into national policymaking and helped provide the basis for future reform. 
Many implementation related issues were not necessarily unique to China, and could also 
arise elsewhere, even if certain particular problems here appeared more acute. In particular, 
China's size and diversity makes it important that policy and its makers accommodate local 
variations (Saich, 2011). Policy innovation also requires the prevailing regime to incorporate 
new economic actors who might voice other, different claims over reform agendas. Such 
flexibility and openness can, in effect, bring in “institutional seeds” whose “emergent 
qualities” add other pressures for change. 
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Figure 8.1 Implications for China’s SSG Reform 
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Skilled social actors and leader authority. The redistributive nature of SSG suggests 
that reform can hardly occur without also bringing other difficulties for those groups 
most favoured and protected by the ruling status quo. Whilst responsive and skilful 
actors can employ innovative strategies to address political-economic constraints, 
governance reform also requires actors with legitimate authority over others. The 
retention or enhancement of authority does not mean that reform leaders can impose 
policies in a recalcitrant manner, or free themselves from due accountability to others. 
Chinese central policymakers’ search for improved managerial oversight suggests an 
attempt to reconcile their stated policy agenda with the interests of other economic 
actors. The reorientation of socialist ideology and reform imperatives highlights their 
adaptability to the changing socio-economic environment, in particular the gradual 
expansion of market mechanisms. Further considerations include: 
Sub-optimal governance arrangements. As noted, the redistributive nature of SGG 
makes reform both dynamic and contestable. Where policy outcomes are conditioned by 
the environment and rival interests, those financial economists who emphasize the 
detrimental effects of governance malpractices often call for radical regulatory 
enforcement. However, these findings here demonstrate that costly self-destructive 
dynamism can also lead to deinstitutionalization (see also Streeck, 2009).  
8.3 Future Research Agenda and Concluding Remarks  
These distinctive policy outcomes suggest several other research avenues for corporate 
governance scholars to pursue. First, this thesis represents a preliminary attempt to 
employ path-generation explanation for the Chinese context, but a more explicit 
theoretical framework is needed to address the issues of: (1) which distinct spheres 
and/or stages is a particular set of transformative mechanisms likely to emerge, (2) how 
do/might different transformative mechanisms connect with each other, and (3) how 
do/might the choice of transformative strategies differ among particular groups of social 
actors. Better answers to these questions are needed to understand how the Chinese 
SGG system arrived at its present conjuncture.  
Second, the case study selected here focuses on existing key representative actors from 
several related institutional spheres. With further change, attention might shift towards 
other emerging economic actors, and their relations with current key stakeholders. 
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These could include institutional investors and foreign regulatory bodies, whose reform 
imperatives might provoke more innovative governance practices. The statistical 
analysis presented here suggests that investors can assess the value of prevailing 
governance practices via stock price reactions but the question of how this also 
translates into policy making is still open.  
Third, there are the signs of Chinese regulators and companies devising more of their 
own measures or adapting international standards in local contexts, but still more can be 
done, “in particular in the area of institutional capacity building” (Makamura, 2008, p. 
230). As the reform model remains largely state-led, how might central policymakers 
reconcile their agenda with other rising social actors in respect of policy and practice? 
While current practices are underpinned by concentrated ownership, what governance 
practices prevail in non-state sectors? If state and non-state governance practices 
converge or diverge, what might the possible policy outcomes be? To the extent the 
cognitive and normative aspects of governance matter, mixed methods can promise 
further insights, not least in terms of accounting for real-time actions within and 
between different institutions (see also Stroz et al., 2013).   
There are real issues about why salient institutional differences cannot be fully 
appreciated without simultaneously looking at wider political-economic foundations 
and leading social actors (O’Sullivan and Graham, 2010; Kwee, 2013). The key point is 
that, in order for a state or company to foster sound governance practices, it needs more 
than just advanced legal institutions; there are other problems which reach into their 
societal core. As such, it is no surprise that policymakers have often found stylized 
solutions frustrating or difficult to implement and, even when implemented, compliance 
is still lacking unless and until complementary economic and political conditions are 
developed alongside. For example, there may be little demand for independent directors 
until national political institutions have enabled the necessary institutional foundations 
for making corporate insiders accountable to operate as intended. This thesis does not 
intend to justify the legacy of an authoritarian state, but underlines the importance of 
recognizing due political-economic conditions when analysing observed institutional 
variations. This recalls Roe’s (2003, p. 204) metaphor about understanding the control 
of water as it moves in rivers and oceans. One cannot fully understand and make good 
use of water movement without also investigating the huge gravitational pull of the 
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moon. For SGG, while viscosity, rainfalls, erosion, and so on are like reform policies, 
the moon’s pull comes from the wider political-economic environment.  
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Appendices:  
STATA Syntax and Results 
Appendix 1  
Syntax for CAR Calculation and Regression 
Data Preparation for Regression 
set memory 500m 
use "E:\new event study\stock return\eventdates.dta", clear 
sort company_id 
by company_id: gen eventcount=_N 
by company_id: keep if _n==1 
sort company_id 
keep company_id eventcount 
save eventcount 
use "E:\new event study\stock return\stockdata.dta", clear 
sort company_id 
merge company_id using eventcount 
tab _merge 
keep if _merge==3 
drop _merge 
expand eventcount 
drop eventcount 
sort company_id date 
by company_id date: gen set=_n 
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sort company_id set 
save stockdata2 
use "E:\new event study\stock return\eventdates.dta", clear 
sort company_id 
by company_id: gen set=_n 
sort company_id set 
save eventdates2 
use stockdata2, clear 
merge company_id set using eventdates2 
tab _merge 
list company_id if _merge==2 
keep if _merge==3 
drop _merge 
egen group_id = group(company_id set) 
sort company_id date 
by company_id: gen datenum=_n 
by company_id: gen target=datenum if date==event_date 
egen td=min(target), by(company_id) 
drop target 
gen dif=datenum-td 
save for_regression 
Event Window of 11 Day 
sort company_id 
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by company_id: gen event_window=1 if dif>=-5 & dif<=5 
egen count_event_obs=count(event_window), by(company_id) 
by company_id: gen estimation_window=1 if dif<-30&dif>=-120 
egen count_est_obs=count(estimation_window), by(company_id) 
replace event_window=0 if event_window==. 
replace estimation_window=0 if estimation_window==. 
tab company_id if count_event_obs<11 
tab company_id if count_est_obs<90 
drop if count_event_obs<11 
drop if count_est_obs<90 
set more off 
gen predicted_return=. 
egen id=group(company_id) 
forvalues i=1(1)482{ 
l id company_id if id==`i' & dif==0 
reg ret market_return if id==`i' &estimation_window==1 
predict p if id==`i' 
replace predicted_return = p if id==`i' &event_window==1 
drop p 
} 
sort id date 
gen abnormal_return=ret-predicted_return if event_window==1 
by id: egen cumulative_abnormal_return = sum(abnormal_return) 
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sort id date 
by id: egen ar_sd = sd(abnormal_return) 
gen test =(1/sqrt(11)) * ( cumulative_abnormal_return /ar_sd) 
list company_id cumulative_abnormal_return test if dif==0 
outsheet company_id event_date cumulative_abnormal_return test using stats11_30_120.csv 
if dif==0, comma 
reg cumulative_abnormal_return if dif==0, robust 
egen nmis=rmiss2(ret) 
sort company_id 
by company_id:egen totalcount=total(nmis) if dif<-30&dif>=-120 
outsheet company_id event_date totalcount using missingcheck11.csv if dif==-31, comma 
Event Window of 5 Days  
sort company_id 
by company_id: gen event_window=1 if dif>=-2 & dif<=2 
egen count_event_obs=count(event_window), by(company_id) 
by company_id: gen estimation_window=1 if dif<-30&dif>=-120 
egen count_est_obs=count(estimation_window), by(company_id) 
replace event_window=0 if event_window==. 
replace estimation_window=0 if estimation_window==. 
tab company_id if count_event_obs<5 
tab company_id if count_est_obs<90 
drop if count_event_obs<5 
drop if count_est_obs<90 
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set more off 
gen predicted_return=. 
egen id=group(company_id) 
forvalues i=1(1)487{ 
l id company_id if id==`i' & dif==0 
reg ret market_return if id==`i' &estimation_window==1 
predict p if id==`i' 
replace predicted_return = p if id==`i' &event_window==1 
drop p 
} 
sort id date 
gen abnormal_return=ret-predicted_return if event_window==1 
by id: egen cumulative_abnormal_return = sum(abnormal_return) 
sort id date 
by id: egen ar_sd = sd(abnormal_return) 
gen test =(1/sqrt(5)) * ( cumulative_abnormal_return /ar_sd) 
list company_id cumulative_abnormal_return test if dif==0 
outsheet company_id event_date cumulative_abnormal_return test using stats05_30_120.csv 
if dif==0, comma 
reg cumulative_abnormal_return if dif==0, robust 
egen nmis=rmiss2(ret) 
sort company_id 
 by company_id:egen totalcount=total(nmis) if dif<-30&dif>=-120 
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outsheet company_id event_date totalcount using missingcheck05.csv if dif==-31, comma 
Event Window of 3 Days 
sort company_id 
by company_id: gen event_window=1 if dif>=-1 & dif<=1 
egen count_event_obs=count(event_window), by(company_id) 
by company_id: gen estimation_window=1 if dif<-30&dif>=-120 
egen count_est_obs=count(estimation_window), by(company_id) 
replace event_window=0 if event_window==. 
replace estimation_window=0 if estimation_window==. 
tab company_id if count_event_obs<3 
tab company_id if count_est_obs<90 
drop if count_event_obs<3 
drop if count_est_obs<90 
set more off 
gen predicted_return=. 
egen id=group(company_id) 
forvalues i=1(1)487{ 
l id company_id if id==`i' & dif==0 
reg ret market_return if id==`i' &estimation_window==1 
predict p if id==`i' 
replace predicted_return = p if id==`i' &event_window==1 
drop p 
} 
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sort id date 
gen abnormal_return=ret-predicted_return if event_window==1 
by id: egen cumulative_abnormal_return = sum(abnormal_return) 
sort id date 
by id: egen ar_sd = sd(abnormal_return) 
gen test =(1/sqrt(3)) * ( cumulative_abnormal_return /ar_sd) 
list company_id cumulative_abnormal_return test if dif==0 
outsheet company_id event_date cumulative_abnormal_return test using stats03_30_120.csv 
if dif==0, comma 
reg cumulative_abnormal_return if dif==0, robust 
egen nmis=rmiss2(ret) 
sort company_id 
by company_id:egen totalcount=total(nmis) if dif<-30&dif>=-120 
outsheet company_id event_date totalcount using missingcheck.csv if dif==-31, comma 
Event Window of 2 Days 
sort company_id 
by company_id: gen event_window=1 if dif>=-1 & dif<=0 
egen count_event_obs=count(event_window), by(company_id) 
by company_id: gen estimation_window=1 if dif<-30&dif>=-120 
egen count_est_obs=count(estimation_window), by(company_id) 
replace event_window=0 if event_window==. 
replace estimation_window=0 if estimation_window==. 
tab company_id if count_event_obs<2 
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tab company_id if count_est_obs<90 
drop if count_event_obs<2 
drop if count_est_obs<90 
set more off 
gen predicted_return=. 
egen id=group(company_id) 
forvalues i=1(1)487{ 
l id company_id if id==`i' & dif==0 
reg ret market_return if id==`i' &estimation_window==1 
predict p if id==`i' 
replace predicted_return = p if id==`i' &event_window==1 
drop p 
} 
sort id date 
gen abnormal_return=ret-predicted_return if event_window==1 
by id: egen cumulative_abnormal_return = sum(abnormal_return) 
sort id date 
by id: egen ar_sd = sd(abnormal_return) 
gen test =(1/sqrt(2)) * ( cumulative_abnormal_return /ar_sd) 
list company_id cumulative_abnormal_return test if dif==0 
outsheet company_id event_date cumulative_abnormal_return test using stats02_30_120.csv 
if dif==0, comma 
reg cumulative_abnormal_return if dif==0, robust 
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egen nmis=rmiss2(ret) 
sort company_id 
by company_id:egen totalcount=total(nmis) if dif<-30&dif>=-120 
outsheet company_id event_date totalcount using missingcheck02.csv if dif==-31, comma 
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Appendix 2  
Syntax and Result for Cross-Sectional Regression in Chapter 5 
 
 
 
. use "C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\µÚÎåÕÂ½ØÃæ»Ø¹éÊý¾ÝÐÞ¸ÄºÃ(ÒÑÉ¾¼õ£©.dta", clear
running D:\Stata11\profile.do ...
      3.  New update available; type -update all-
      2.  (/v# option or -set maxvar-) 5000 maximum variables
      1.  (/m# option or -set memory-) 50.00 MB allocated to data
Notes:
                       STATA
         Licensed to:  STATAForAll
       Serial number:  71606281563
Single-user Stata license expires 31 Dec 9999:
                                      979-696-4601 (fax)
                                      979-696-4600        stata@stata.com
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  Statistics/Data Analysis            StataCorp
___/   /   /___/   /   /___/   11.0   Copyright 1984-2009
 /__    /   ____/   /   ____/
  ___  ____  ____  ____  ____ (R)
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0129367   .0528772    -0.24   0.807    -.1180889    .0922155
              
       2012      .1454303   .0592563     2.45   0.016     .0275926     .263268
       2011       .145998   .0566225     2.58   0.012     .0333978    .2585981
       2010      .1459736   .0566559     2.58   0.012     .0333072      .25864
       2009      .1354662   .0612513     2.21   0.030     .0136614     .257271
       2008      .1473239   .0567638     2.60   0.011     .0344429    .2602049
       2007      .1450267   .0589411     2.46   0.016     .0278158    .2622376
       2006      .1463976   .0583274     2.51   0.014     .0304071     .262388
       2005      .1272494   .0574989     2.21   0.030     .0129065    .2415922
       2004      .1147566   .0564353     2.03   0.045     .0025289    .2269844
       2003      .1140644    .057986     1.97   0.052    -.0012471    .2293758
       2002      .1196824   .0551004     2.17   0.033     .0101091    .2292557
       2001      .1246577   .0582491     2.14   0.035     .0088229    .2404924
       2000      .1050979   .0610781     1.72   0.089    -.0163626    .2265584
       1999      .2083767   .0985065     2.12   0.037     .0124857    .4042678
       1998      .0594117   .0673472     0.88   0.380    -.0745156     .193339
       1997      .1354579   .0565157     2.40   0.019     .0230702    .2478457
       1996      .1753761    .056407     3.11   0.003     .0632046    .2875476
       1994      .0924408   .0537215     1.72   0.089    -.0143902    .1992719
        year  
              
    ts_dummy    -.0102968    .006457    -1.59   0.115    -.0231372    .0025436
         opm     .0002152   .0001429     1.51   0.136     -.000069    .0004994
         roa    -.0018691   .0006017    -3.11   0.003    -.0030656   -.0006726
          de     .0000495   .0000478     1.04   0.303    -.0000456    .0001447
         tq1    -.0025038   .0009459    -2.65   0.010    -.0043849   -.0006227
          fs    -.0051255   .0016983    -3.02   0.003    -.0085028   -.0017482
          fa    -.0007725   .0002924    -2.64   0.010    -.0013541    -.000191
                                                                              
 car3_30_120        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 85 clusters in sic_code)
                                                       Root MSE      =  .07192
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1139
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 23,    84) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     432
. regress car3_30_120 fa fs tq1 de roa opm ts_dummy i.year, vce(cluster sic_code)
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       _cons     .0508208    .032549     1.56   0.123    -.0140062    .1156477
              
       2012      .0588898    .014455     4.07   0.000     .0301002    .0876794
       2011      .0675017   .0160596     4.20   0.000     .0355162    .0994871
       2010      .0667869   .0214219     3.12   0.003     .0241214    .1094524
       2009      .0494031   .0147615     3.35   0.001     .0200029    .0788032
       2008       .072321   .0207767     3.48   0.001     .0309406    .1137015
       2007      .0661048   .0171961     3.84   0.000     .0318559    .1003538
       2006      .0653319   .0202134     3.23   0.002     .0250734    .1055905
       2005      .0486018   .0193732     2.51   0.014     .0100167    .0871869
       2004      .0356484   .0194193     1.84   0.070    -.0030285    .0743253
       2003      .0384794   .0287084     1.34   0.184    -.0186982     .095657
       2002      .0541969   .0174806     3.10   0.003     .0193813    .0890125
       2001      .0403241   .0179763     2.24   0.028     .0045212     .076127
       2000      .0378051   .0320801     1.18   0.242    -.0260879    .1016981
        year  
              
largest_ho~g     .0003454   .0001608     2.15   0.035     .0000252    .0006656
    gf_dummy    -.0183278   .0092667    -1.98   0.052    -.0367839    .0001284
    ts_dummy     -.004436   .0067753    -0.65   0.515    -.0179302    .0090582
         opm      .000364   .0000908     4.01   0.000     .0001832    .0005449
         roa    -.0018117   .0005183    -3.50   0.001     -.002844   -.0007794
          de     .0000156    .000031     0.50   0.616    -.0000461    .0000774
         tq1    -.0024123   .0009367    -2.58   0.012     -.004278   -.0005467
          fs    -.0048074     .00158    -3.04   0.003    -.0079543   -.0016605
          fa    -.0004879   .0002486    -1.96   0.053     -.000983    7.25e-06
                                                                              
 car3_30_120        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 77 clusters in sic_code)
                                                       Root MSE      =  .05345
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1163
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 21,    76) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     375
> ter sic_code)
. regress car3_30_120 fa fs tq1 de roa opm ts_dummy gf_dummy largest_holding i.year, vce(clus
                                                                              
       _cons     .0610989   .0331857     1.84   0.070    -.0049961     .127194
              
       2012      .0544708   .0139767     3.90   0.000     .0266338    .0823077
       2011      .0624311   .0153305     4.07   0.000     .0318978    .0929644
       2010      .0627166   .0210755     2.98   0.004      .020741    .1046921
       2009      .0463559   .0140465     3.30   0.001       .01838    .0743319
       2008      .0669784   .0206816     3.24   0.002     .0257873    .1081695
       2007      .0624905    .017568     3.56   0.001     .0275009    .0974801
       2006       .064846   .0202126     3.21   0.002     .0245891    .1051028
       2005      .0460368   .0191762     2.40   0.019     .0078441    .0842295
       2004      .0331736   .0191576     1.73   0.087    -.0049821    .0713294
       2003      .0361006   .0298523     1.21   0.230    -.0233555    .0955567
       2002      .0528485   .0176646     2.99   0.004     .0176664    .0880305
       2001      .0376056   .0173241     2.17   0.033     .0031016    .0721096
       2000      .0342114   .0314442     1.09   0.280    -.0284151     .096838
        year  
              
    gf_dummy    -.0099988   .0081458    -1.23   0.223    -.0262225    .0062249
    ts_dummy    -.0043498   .0067324    -0.65   0.520    -.0177586     .009059
         opm      .000374   .0000871     4.30   0.000     .0002006    .0005474
         roa    -.0018567   .0005208    -3.56   0.001    -.0028941   -.0008194
          de     3.48e-06    .000032     0.11   0.914    -.0000602    .0000672
         tq1    -.0024277   .0008767    -2.77   0.007    -.0041738   -.0006817
          fs    -.0044226   .0016241    -2.72   0.008    -.0076573   -.0011878
          fa    -.0005683    .000236    -2.41   0.018    -.0010383   -.0000983
                                                                              
 car3_30_120        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 77 clusters in sic_code)
                                                       Root MSE      =  .05363
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1077
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 20,    76) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     375
. regress car3_30_120 fa fs tq1 de roa opm ts_dummy gf_dummy i.year, vce(cluster sic_code)
 | 258 P a g e
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0726304   .0347699     2.09   0.040     .0033802    .1418806
              
       2012      .0648557    .014657     4.42   0.000     .0356638    .0940477
       2011      .0737005   .0155327     4.74   0.000     .0427644    .1046366
       2010      .0716106   .0201948     3.55   0.001     .0313892     .111832
       2009      .0519191   .0140099     3.71   0.000      .024016    .0798221
       2008      .0770304   .0202194     3.81   0.000     .0367599    .1173009
       2007      .0681502   .0168534     4.04   0.000     .0345838    .1017165
       2006      .0657565   .0198167     3.32   0.001     .0262881    .1052248
       2005      .0498976   .0185284     2.69   0.009     .0129952       .0868
       2004      .0383019   .0186939     2.05   0.044     .0010697    .0755341
       2003      .0414941   .0274847     1.51   0.135    -.0132464    .0962345
       2002      .0532769   .0169397     3.15   0.002     .0195385    .0870152
       2001      .0380318   .0179843     2.11   0.038      .002213    .0738506
       2000      .0449982   .0340443     1.32   0.190     -.022807    .1128033
        year  
              
 cso_dummy_r     .0203498   .0096596     2.11   0.038      .001111    .0395886
largest_ho~g     .0001932   .0001618     1.19   0.236    -.0001292    .0005155
    gf_dummy    -.0232391   .0099494    -2.34   0.022     -.043055   -.0034233
    ts_dummy    -.0035232   .0064872    -0.54   0.589    -.0164436    .0093973
         opm     .0003743   .0000891     4.20   0.000      .000197    .0005517
         roa    -.0017754   .0004882    -3.64   0.001    -.0027476   -.0008031
          de     .0000103   .0000308     0.33   0.740    -.0000511    .0000717
         tq1     -.002351   .0008207    -2.86   0.005    -.0039856   -.0007163
          fs    -.0062698   .0017203    -3.64   0.000    -.0096961   -.0028436
          fa    -.0005414   .0002436    -2.22   0.029    -.0010265   -.0000563
                                                                              
 car3_30_120        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 77 clusters in sic_code)
                                                       Root MSE      =  .05304
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1322
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 22,    76) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     375
> ear, vce(cluster sic_code)
. regress car3_30_120 fa fs tq1 de roa opm ts_dummy gf_dummy  largest_holding cso_dummy_r i.y
                                                                              
       _cons     .0804687   .0339822     2.37   0.020     .0127873      .14815
              
       2012      .0633414   .0145918     4.34   0.000     .0342794    .0924034
       2011      .0718847   .0152102     4.73   0.000      .041591    .1021784
       2010      .0701345   .0199525     3.52   0.001     .0303958    .1098733
       2009      .0506816   .0135381     3.74   0.000     .0237181    .0776451
       2008      .0748968   .0199959     3.75   0.000     .0350716     .114722
       2007      .0665688   .0170049     3.91   0.000     .0327006     .100437
       2006      .0655619   .0197067     3.33   0.001     .0263127    .1048112
       2005      .0487565   .0183437     2.66   0.010     .0122218    .0852912
       2004      .0373707   .0184217     2.03   0.046     .0006806    .0740607
       2003      .0406551   .0278551     1.46   0.149    -.0148232    .0961334
       2002      .0524833    .016967     3.09   0.003     .0186906     .086276
       2001      .0363791   .0176059     2.07   0.042     .0013138    .0714443
       2000      .0440498   .0340334     1.29   0.199    -.0237335    .1118332
        year  
              
 cso_dummy_r     .0228111   .0090165     2.53   0.013     .0048531     .040769
    gf_dummy    -.0196189     .00951    -2.06   0.043    -.0385598   -.0006781
    ts_dummy    -.0033691   .0064232    -0.52   0.601     -.016162    .0094237
         opm     .0003806   .0000876     4.34   0.000     .0002061    .0005552
         roa    -.0017938   .0004889    -3.67   0.000    -.0027675     -.00082
          de     3.49e-06   .0000318     0.11   0.913    -.0000598    .0000667
         tq1    -.0023513    .000782    -3.01   0.004    -.0039089   -.0007938
          fs     -.006252    .001716    -3.64   0.000    -.0096697   -.0028343
          fa    -.0005886   .0002371    -2.48   0.015    -.0010608   -.0001163
                                                                              
 car3_30_120        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 77 clusters in sic_code)
                                                       Root MSE      =  .05304
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1298
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 21,    76) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     375
> sic_code)
. regress car3_30_120 fa fs tq1 de roa opm ts_dummy gf_dummy cso_dummy_r i.year, vce(cluster 
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       _cons     .0726427   .0377141     1.93   0.058    -.0024714    .1477568
              
       2012      .0625464   .0142072     4.40   0.000     .0342502    .0908425
       2011      .0682204   .0157298     4.34   0.000     .0368919     .099549
       2010      .0682222   .0202687     3.37   0.001     .0278535    .1085909
       2009      .0507872   .0140408     3.62   0.001     .0228225    .0787518
       2008      .0739162   .0198867     3.72   0.000     .0343084    .1135241
       2007      .0676951   .0169295     4.00   0.000     .0339771     .101413
       2006       .065419   .0199145     3.28   0.002     .0257558    .1050822
       2005      .0495979   .0187599     2.64   0.010     .0122342    .0869616
       2004      .0377059   .0190427     1.98   0.051    -.0002208    .0756327
       2003      .0387103   .0290758     1.33   0.187    -.0191991    .0966197
       2002      .0546214   .0169442     3.22   0.002      .020874    .0883687
       2001       .040119   .0179746     2.23   0.029     .0043195    .0759185
       2000      .0452761   .0333644     1.36   0.179    -.0211749    .1117272
        year  
              
   lgo_dummy    -.0155959   .0098854    -1.58   0.119    -.0352844    .0040926
largest_ho~g      .000302   .0001682     1.80   0.077     -.000033    .0006371
    gf_dummy    -.0245996   .0097144    -2.53   0.013    -.0439475   -.0052517
    ts_dummy    -.0029476    .006365    -0.46   0.645    -.0156245    .0097294
         opm     .0003919   .0000933     4.20   0.000      .000206    .0005778
         roa    -.0017644   .0005218    -3.38   0.001    -.0028036   -.0007252
          de     .0000168   .0000315     0.53   0.594    -.0000459    .0000796
         tq1    -.0025269   .0008952    -2.82   0.006    -.0043098    -.000744
          fs    -.0055335   .0016444    -3.37   0.001    -.0088085   -.0022584
          fa    -.0005193   .0002505    -2.07   0.042    -.0010182   -.0000204
                                                                              
 car3_30_120        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 77 clusters in sic_code)
                                                       Root MSE      =  .05327
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1247
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 22,    76) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     375
> r, vce(cluster sic_code)
. regress car3_30_120 fa fs tq1 de roa opm ts_dummy gf_dummy  largest_holding lgo_dummy i.yea
                                                                              
       _cons     .0839162   .0369493     2.27   0.026     .0103253    .1575072
              
       2012      .0591511   .0137814     4.29   0.000      .031703    .0865992
       2011      .0639374   .0148738     4.30   0.000     .0343137    .0935612
       2010      .0648796   .0198182     3.27   0.002     .0254083    .1043509
       2009      .0483193   .0132547     3.65   0.000     .0219202    .0747184
       2008      .0694967   .0195391     3.56   0.001     .0305812    .1084121
       2007      .0647621   .0171144     3.78   0.000     .0306758    .0988484
       2006      .0650105   .0197891     3.29   0.002     .0255971     .104424
       2005      .0475017   .0184587     2.57   0.012     .0107381    .0842653
       2004      .0358055   .0186979     1.91   0.059    -.0014345    .0730456
       2003      .0366891   .0301971     1.21   0.228    -.0234536    .0968317
       2002      .0535083   .0168887     3.17   0.002     .0198715    .0871451
       2001       .037757   .0173054     2.18   0.032     .0032903    .0722237
       2000      .0430157   .0330967     1.30   0.198    -.0229021    .1089334
        year  
              
   lgo_dummy    -.0173322   .0095307    -1.82   0.073    -.0363143    .0016498
    gf_dummy     -.018131   .0090287    -2.01   0.048    -.0361132   -.0001489
    ts_dummy    -.0027077    .006259    -0.43   0.667    -.0151736    .0097582
         opm     .0004036   .0000898     4.50   0.000     .0002248    .0005825
         roa    -.0017979   .0005252    -3.42   0.001    -.0028438    -.000752
          de     6.52e-06   .0000324     0.20   0.841     -.000058     .000071
         tq1    -.0025529   .0008438    -3.03   0.003    -.0042335   -.0008722
          fs    -.0052832   .0016722    -3.16   0.002    -.0086136   -.0019528
          fa     -.000592   .0002372    -2.50   0.015    -.0010643   -.0001196
                                                                              
 car3_30_120        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 77 clusters in sic_code)
                                                       Root MSE      =  .05339
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1182
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 21,    76) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     375
> ic_code)
. regress car3_30_120 fa fs tq1 de roa opm ts_dummy gf_dummy  lgo_dummy i.year, vce(cluster s
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Appendix 3 
Syntax and Result for Cross-Sectional Regression in Chapter 6 
 
 
 
 
. use "C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\µÚÎåÕÂ½ØÃæ»Ø¹éÊý¾ÝÐÞ¸ÄºÃ(ÒÑÉ¾¼õ£©.dta", clear
running D:\Stata11\profile.do ...
      3.  New update available; type -update all-
      2.  (/v# option or -set maxvar-) 5000 maximum variables
      1.  (/m# option or -set memory-) 50.00 MB allocated to data
Notes:
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         Licensed to:  STATAForAll
       Serial number:  71606281563
Single-user Stata license expires 31 Dec 9999:
                                      979-696-4601 (fax)
                                      979-696-4600        stata@stata.com
                                      800-STATA-PC        http://www.stata.com
     Special Edition                  College Station, Texas 77845 USA
                                      4905 Lakeway Drive
  Statistics/Data Analysis            StataCorp
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 /__    /   ____/   /   ____/
  ___  ____  ____  ____  ____ (R)
                                                                              
       _cons     .0694452   .0407215     1.71   0.092    -.0116761    .1505665
              
       2012      .0556113   .0151307     3.68   0.000     .0254695    .0857531
       2011      .0641766   .0163279     3.93   0.000     .0316497    .0967034
       2010      .0637277    .021786     2.93   0.005     .0203277    .1071277
       2009      .0473964   .0151364     3.13   0.002     .0172431    .0775497
       2008      .0716802   .0215361     3.33   0.001     .0287781    .1145822
       2007      .0624332   .0184873     3.38   0.001     .0256046    .0992619
       2006      .0649578   .0199997     3.25   0.002     .0251163    .1047994
       2005       .046005   .0190453     2.42   0.018     .0080649    .0839451
       2004       .032726   .0188071     1.74   0.086    -.0047396    .0701917
       2003      .0369072   .0280436     1.32   0.192    -.0189586     .092773
       2002      .0531341   .0177473     2.99   0.004     .0177797    .0884885
       2001      .0356949   .0171953     2.08   0.041     .0014402    .0699497
       2000      .0321917   .0313413     1.03   0.308    -.0302435    .0946268
        year  
              
    BOD_indp    -.0001401   .0005218    -0.27   0.789    -.0011796    .0008994
    gf_dummy    -.0102739   .0080616    -1.27   0.206    -.0263335    .0057856
    ts_dummy    -.0054274   .0069396    -0.78   0.437    -.0192518     .008397
         opm     .0003838   .0000848     4.53   0.000     .0002149    .0005527
         roa    -.0019187   .0005216    -3.68   0.000    -.0029579   -.0008796
          de    -2.16e-06   .0000304    -0.07   0.943    -.0000627    .0000583
         tq1    -.0025497   .0008598    -2.97   0.004    -.0042626   -.0008369
          fs    -.0045496   .0016583    -2.74   0.008    -.0078532    -.001246
          fa    -.0005947   .0002389    -2.49   0.015    -.0010706   -.0001187
                                                                              
 car3_30_120        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 76 clusters in sic_code)
                                                       Root MSE      =  .05313
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1158
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 21,    75) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     372
> _code)
. regress car3_30_120 fa fs tq1 de roa opm ts_dummy gf_dummy BOD_indp i.year, vce(cluster sic
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       _cons     .0530888   .0319719     1.66   0.101    -.0106025    .1167801
              
       2012      .0403231   .0179889     2.24   0.028     .0044875    .0761588
       2011      .0477393   .0199485     2.39   0.019     .0079999    .0874786
       2010      .0467541   .0239189     1.95   0.054    -.0008948    .0944029
       2009       .030789   .0191317     1.61   0.112    -.0073232    .0689012
       2008      .0551388   .0244603     2.25   0.027     .0064113    .1038662
       2007      .0465498   .0200145     2.33   0.023     .0066788    .0864208
       2006      .0496472   .0242047     2.05   0.044     .0014289    .0978654
       2005      .0291755    .023471     1.24   0.218    -.0175812    .0759321
       2004      .0206831   .0220923     0.94   0.352    -.0233271    .0646932
       2003      .0231383   .0330782     0.70   0.486    -.0427568    .0890334
       2002      .0380709   .0209259     1.82   0.073    -.0036156    .0797574
       2001      .0283566    .018203     1.56   0.123    -.0079056    .0646187
       2000       .020124   .0346535     0.58   0.563    -.0489092    .0891573
        year  
              
    AUD_indp     .0002478   .0001376     1.80   0.076    -.0000264    .0005219
    gf_dummy    -.0160399   .0081797    -1.96   0.054    -.0323347    .0002548
    ts_dummy    -.0040558   .0066193    -0.61   0.542    -.0172421    .0091305
         opm     .0003974    .000085     4.68   0.000     .0002282    .0005667
         roa    -.0019434   .0005135    -3.78   0.000    -.0029663   -.0009204
          de     3.38e-06   .0000319     0.11   0.916    -.0000603     .000067
         tq1    -.0025313   .0008479    -2.99   0.004    -.0042204   -.0008422
          fs     -.004061   .0016197    -2.51   0.014    -.0072875   -.0008344
          fa    -.0004727   .0002366    -2.00   0.049     -.000944   -1.37e-06
                                                                              
 car3_30_120        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 76 clusters in sic_code)
                                                       Root MSE      =  .05293
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1224
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 21,    75) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     372
> ic_code)
. regress car3_30_120 fa fs tq1 de roa opm ts_dummy gf_dummy   AUD_indp i.year, vce(cluster s
                                                                              
       _cons     .0486496   .0330157     1.47   0.145    -.0171209    .1144202
              
       2012      .0531479   .0156209     3.40   0.001     .0220295    .0842663
       2011      .0592407   .0165644     3.58   0.001     .0262427    .0922386
       2010      .0608276   .0216252     2.81   0.006      .017748    .1039072
       2009       .042798   .0145567     2.94   0.004     .0137995    .0717965
       2008      .0683718   .0210066     3.25   0.002     .0265244    .1102191
       2007      .0588078   .0177797     3.31   0.001     .0233889    .0942267
       2006      .0603956    .020817     2.90   0.005      .018926    .1018652
       2005      .0409145   .0199681     2.05   0.044      .001136    .0806931
       2004      .0311384   .0191125     1.63   0.107    -.0069357    .0692125
       2003      .0302369   .0299127     1.01   0.315    -.0293521     .089826
       2002      .0484458   .0180762     2.68   0.009     .0124363    .0844554
       2001      .0320592   .0179148     1.79   0.078    -.0036289    .0677473
       2000      .0286874   .0327359     0.88   0.384    -.0365258    .0939007
        year  
              
   supb_size    -.0017252   .0010788    -1.60   0.114    -.0038743    .0004239
    gf_dummy    -.0121995    .007725    -1.58   0.118    -.0275886    .0031895
    ts_dummy     -.004671   .0067006    -0.70   0.488    -.0180193    .0086772
         opm      .000352   .0000831     4.24   0.000     .0001864    .0005176
         roa    -.0019132   .0005057    -3.78   0.000    -.0029206   -.0009057
          de    -1.52e-06   .0000316    -0.05   0.962    -.0000645    .0000614
         tq1    -.0023537   .0008119    -2.90   0.005     -.003971   -.0007364
          fs    -.0029222   .0018882    -1.55   0.126    -.0066836    .0008393
          fa    -.0007133   .0002691    -2.65   0.010    -.0012494   -.0001773
                                                                              
 car3_30_120        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 76 clusters in sic_code)
                                                       Root MSE      =  .05291
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1230
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 21,    75) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     372
> ic_code)
. regress car3_30_120 fa fs tq1 de roa opm ts_dummy gf_dummy  supb_size i.year, vce(cluster s
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       _cons     .0484295   .0331397     1.46   0.148    -.0175881    .1144472
              
       2012      .0530371   .0158089     3.35   0.001     .0215442    .0845299
       2011      .0582004   .0165657     3.51   0.001     .0251999     .091201
       2010      .0599882   .0214576     2.80   0.007     .0172425    .1027339
       2009      .0415983   .0144291     2.88   0.005      .012854    .0703425
       2008      .0677396   .0210843     3.21   0.002     .0257375    .1097418
       2007      .0585265   .0177898     3.29   0.002     .0230873    .0939657
       2006      .0590968    .020821     2.84   0.006     .0176192    .1005744
       2005      .0406803   .0199558     2.04   0.045     .0009262    .0804344
       2004      .0303111   .0190807     1.59   0.116    -.0076996    .0683219
       2003      .0297611   .0297235     1.00   0.320    -.0294512    .0889734
       2002      .0476007   .0180656     2.63   0.010     .0116121    .0835893
       2001      .0304563   .0179862     1.69   0.095     -.005374    .0662867
       2000       .026731   .0328776     0.81   0.419    -.0387644    .0922265
        year  
              
   supb_size    -.0018864   .0011269    -1.67   0.098    -.0041313    .0003586
 CEO_duality    -.0050782   .0080572    -0.63   0.530    -.0211291    .0109726
    gf_dummy    -.0124702   .0074914    -1.66   0.100    -.0273939    .0024534
    ts_dummy    -.0047474   .0066708    -0.71   0.479    -.0180362    .0085414
         opm     .0003459   .0000854     4.05   0.000     .0001756    .0005161
         roa    -.0018351   .0005201    -3.53   0.001    -.0028711   -.0007991
          de    -1.91e-06   .0000313    -0.06   0.951    -.0000642    .0000604
         tq1    -.0022563   .0008246    -2.74   0.008    -.0038989   -.0006137
          fs    -.0027617   .0018983    -1.45   0.150    -.0065434      .00102
          fa    -.0007434   .0002729    -2.72   0.008    -.0012871   -.0001998
                                                                              
 car3_30_120        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 76 clusters in sic_code)
                                                       Root MSE      =  .05295
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1241
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 22,    75) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     372
> e(cluster sic_code)
. regress car3_30_120 fa fs tq1 de roa opm ts_dummy gf_dummy CEO_duality supb_size i.year, vc
                                                                              
       _cons     .0693286   .0406734     1.70   0.092    -.0116971    .1503542
              
       2012      .0555023   .0150291     3.69   0.000     .0255628    .0854417
       2011      .0638409   .0159046     4.01   0.000     .0321573    .0955244
       2010      .0634025   .0213293     2.97   0.004     .0209124    .1058926
       2009      .0470042   .0146028     3.22   0.002      .017914    .0760943
       2008       .071409   .0213725     3.34   0.001     .0288327    .1139852
       2007      .0623368   .0183615     3.39   0.001     .0257588    .0989149
       2006      .0646106   .0197578     3.27   0.002      .025251    .1039701
       2005      .0459864   .0190543     2.41   0.018     .0080283    .0839446
       2004      .0324824   .0185446     1.75   0.084    -.0044603    .0694251
       2003       .036782   .0280502     1.31   0.194    -.0190968    .0926609
       2002      .0528821   .0175484     3.01   0.004     .0179239    .0878402
       2001      .0353974   .0171038     2.07   0.042     .0013249      .06947
       2000      .0317872   .0313303     1.01   0.314    -.0306261    .0942004
        year  
              
    BOD_indp    -.0001273   .0005073    -0.25   0.803     -.001138    .0008834
 CEO_duality    -.0014868   .0075034    -0.20   0.843    -.0164343    .0134607
    gf_dummy     -.010271   .0080561    -1.27   0.206    -.0263195    .0057775
    ts_dummy    -.0054284   .0069423    -0.78   0.437    -.0192582    .0084013
         opm     .0003823   .0000858     4.46   0.000     .0002114    .0005532
         roa    -.0018957   .0005286    -3.59   0.001    -.0029487   -.0008426
          de    -2.20e-06   .0000304    -0.07   0.942    -.0000627    .0000583
         tq1    -.0025258   .0008581    -2.94   0.004    -.0042353   -.0008163
          fs    -.0045403   .0016492    -2.75   0.007    -.0078257   -.0012549
          fa    -.0005986   .0002375    -2.52   0.014    -.0010716   -.0001256
                                                                              
 car3_30_120        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 76 clusters in sic_code)
                                                       Root MSE      =   .0532
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1159
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 22,    75) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     372
> e(cluster sic_code)
. regress car3_30_120 fa fs tq1 de roa opm ts_dummy gf_dummy CEO_duality  BOD_indp i.year, vc
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       _cons      .053563   .0320251     1.67   0.099    -.0102343    .1173603
              
       2012      .0399666   .0180692     2.21   0.030     .0039708    .0759624
       2011      .0469176   .0199961     2.35   0.022     .0070834    .0867518
       2010      .0459273   .0237599     1.93   0.057     -.001405    .0932595
       2009      .0298453   .0191551     1.56   0.123    -.0083136    .0680041
       2008      .0544692   .0245005     2.22   0.029     .0056616    .1032768
       2007      .0461482   .0199182     2.32   0.023     .0064691    .0858273
       2006      .0486938   .0242895     2.00   0.049     .0003066    .0970809
       2005      .0288693   .0233937     1.23   0.221    -.0177335     .075472
       2004      .0199451   .0220293     0.91   0.368    -.0239395    .0638297
       2003      .0228313   .0331279     0.69   0.493    -.0431629    .0888255
       2002      .0373992    .020993     1.78   0.079     -.004421    .0792193
       2001       .027411   .0181492     1.51   0.135    -.0087441     .063566
       2000      .0188324   .0347439     0.54   0.589     -.050381    .0880458
        year  
              
    AUD_indp     .0002541   .0001408     1.81   0.075    -.0000263    .0005345
 CEO_duality    -.0031246   .0079429    -0.39   0.695    -.0189476    .0126984
    gf_dummy    -.0162354   .0080501    -2.02   0.047     -.032272   -.0001989
    ts_dummy    -.0040999   .0065881    -0.62   0.536    -.0172239    .0090242
         opm     .0003957   .0000864     4.58   0.000     .0002236    .0005678
         roa    -.0018962    .000525    -3.61   0.001    -.0029421   -.0008503
          de     3.27e-06   .0000318     0.10   0.918      -.00006    .0000665
         tq1    -.0024819   .0008536    -2.91   0.005    -.0041824   -.0007814
          fs    -.0040414   .0016155    -2.50   0.015    -.0072596   -.0008232
          fa    -.0004808   .0002339    -2.06   0.043    -.0009469   -.0000148
                                                                              
 car3_30_120        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 76 clusters in sic_code)
                                                       Root MSE      =  .05299
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1229
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 22,    75) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     372
> e(cluster sic_code)
. regress car3_30_120 fa fs tq1 de roa opm ts_dummy gf_dummy CEO_duality  AUD_indp i.year, vc
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